



# FCPA/Anti-Bribery Alert Winter 2015

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## INTRODUCTION

*She's some kind of demon messing in the glue.  
If you don't watch out it'll stick to you. (To you.)  
What kind of fool are you?  
Strange brew, kill what's inside of you.*

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- Cream, "Strange Brew"<sup>1</sup>

In the last edition of this Alert, we borrowed from Mark Twain to assert that reports of the FCPA's death were greatly exaggerated. And it's true — the FCPA remains alive and well. Penalties imposed by U.S. regulators in 2014 were greater than the previous fines leveled in 2011, 2012, and 2013 combined, and individual prosecutions continued at a significant pace while new resources were dedicated to continued enforcement. The collective impact of these actions conclusively dismisses any suspicions that the DOJ and SEC might diminish their efforts to prosecute corruption and related offenses.

But 2014 emerges as more than just another year where the United States asserted itself in the anti-corruption space. Rather, it is best seen as a "Strange Brew" of enforcement activities from jurisdictions as diverse as Brazil, Canada, China, Holland, Norway, Oman, and the United Kingdom. The efforts of Chinese and Brazilian authorities, discussed in detail in our Focus Issues section, are of particular note.

In China, a court not only sentenced GlaxoSmithKline ("GSK") to pay a fine of over \$484 million for bribery offenses, but it also convicted five former GSK executives and handed down suspended prison sentences of two to four years. China secured the arrest or surrender of nearly 680 officials through its international *Operation Fox Hunt*, and, in a groundbreaking shift, began actively cooperating with foreign authorities on anti-corruption matters to do so. China has reportedly signed 51 mutual legal assistance agreements for criminal matters and 39 bilateral extradition treaties. China, the United States, and 20 other countries from the Asia-Pacific region agreed to increase asset recovery efforts, cooperate on the extradition of corrupt officials and put in place an anti-corruption transparency network to share intelligence on graft.

Reports continue to pour out from the groundbreaking *Operation Car Wash* in Brazil, focused on corruption in the state-owned Petrobras. Multiple Petrobras officials have been arrested and charged. In addition, Brazilian and international individuals and companies — particularly contractors and other third parties — have faced inquiries, raids, and arrests as part

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<sup>1</sup> In honor of, and memory to, *Jack Bruce, Cream Bass Guitarist*, (May 14, 1943 – October 25, 2014).

of the far-reaching corruption probe. The pace of the investigation gives every indication that it will continue to expand with more explosive developments.

In 2015, companies and individuals will need to be even more alert and vigilant to the strange brew of international regulators and laws. An effective anti-corruption compliance program must address risks in light of this new environment, ensuring that the company has the proper tools and resources to prevent improper activities from occurring, and to seek out and address corruption risks posed by internal conduct and third parties with whom the company works.

These are just some of the highlights of the new wave of truly global anti-corruption enforcement discussed in Hughes Hubbard's FCPA/Anti-Bribery Alert Winter 2015. This Alert begins with a summary and analysis of certain critical enforcement trends and lessons from recent settlements and other related developments. Following that analysis and a focus on international developments in Brazil, China, the European Union, and Norway, the Alert provides: (i) a brief discussion of the statutory requirements of, and penalties under, the FCPA; (ii) a description of FCPA settlements and criminal matters from 2013 and 2014 in reverse chronological order; (iii) an overview of recent developments and enforcement actions in the United Kingdom; (iv) a review of other select international developments; (v) an overview of other FCPA-related developments; and (vi) a summary of the DOJ's most recent Opinion Procedure Releases.

The full version of this Alert is available electronically. It contains, in addition to the above, (i) a description of FCPA settlements and criminal matters from 2005 through 2012 (including recent related updates) in reverse chronological order; (ii) a discussion of other FCPA and related developments; and (iii) a summary of each DOJ Review and Opinion Procedure Release issued from 1980-present.

For more information about the matters discussed in this Alert or our Anti-Corruption and Internal Investigations practice generally, please contact:

*Kevin T. Abikoff*  
Chairman, Anti-Corruption and Internal Investigations Practice Group  
+ 1 202 721-4770  
[kevin.abikoff@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:kevin.abikoff@hugheshubbard.com)

*John F. Wood*  
Partner  
+ 1 202 721-4720  
[john.wood@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:john.wood@hugheshubbard.com)

*Beatrice A. Hamza Bassey*  
Partner  
+ 1 212 837-6778  
[beatrice.hamza.bassey@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:beatrice.hamza.bassey@hugheshubbard.com)

*Bryan J. Sillaman*  
Partner  
+ 33 (0)1 44 05 80 03  
[bryan.sillaman@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:bryan.sillaman@hugheshubbard.com)

*Michael R. Silverman*  
Counsel  
+ 1 202 721-4773  
[michael.silverman@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:michael.silverman@hugheshubbard.com)

*Benjamin S. Britz*  
Senior Associate  
+ 1 202 721-4772  
[benjamin.britz@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:benjamin.britz@hugheshubbard.com)

*Michael H. Huneke*  
Senior Associate  
+ 1 202 721-4714  
[michael.huneke@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:michael.huneke@hugheshubbard.com)

*Anne Hukkelaas Gaustad*  
Senior International Specialist  
+ 33 (0)1 44 05 80 57  
[anne.gaustad@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:anne.gaustad@hugheshubbard.com)

*Daniel McLaughlin*  
Senior Associate  
+ 33 (0)1 44 05 76 18  
[daniel.mclaughlin@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:daniel.mclaughlin@hugheshubbard.com)

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## SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS

The combination of resolved actions, ongoing criminal and regulatory investigations, guidance issued by regulatory authorities, and other developments discussed below underscore a number of important themes of which companies should be aware in conducting their operations, designing and implementing their compliance programs, considering whether to enter into potential transactions or to affiliate with an international agent, intermediary or joint venture partner, and dealing with government agencies. These themes take the form of both enforcement trends and practice lessons.

### Enforcement Trends

- *The New Era of Global Anti-Corruption Enforcement*: On November 19, 2014, U.S. Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell stated that “the global trend against foreign corruption continues to face many challenges, but the tide has turned.” Indeed, the combined effect of enforcement actions, investigations, and legislative initiatives around the world, in what shaped up to be a watershed year of 2014, suggests that rigorous enforcement has established a firm foothold on the global stage, and there are no indications that such efforts will subside any time soon.
  - *Continuing and Increased Enforcement of Anti-Corruption Laws*: The United States remains the global pace-setter in establishing a vigorous anti-corruption enforcement posture, with penalties of over \$1.4 billion imposed in 2014 alone (more than the previous three years combined). But there has also been a combined and notable increase in global enforcement actions. In addition to China and Brazil, discussed in further detail as part of this year’s Focus Issue (*see below*), many other countries have ramped up their anti-corruption enforcement efforts. The Netherlands — which an OECD Working Group had criticized as recently as December 2012 regarding “serious concerns” about the country’s enforcement efforts — settled charges in 2014 with SBM Offshore and KPMG, and joined other regulators in launching an investigation into VimpelCom Ltd and TeliaSonera AB. Similarly, Norwegian authorities fined Yara International \$48.5 million and raided the offices of Kongsberg Gruppen.
  - *Large Corporate Penalties*: Five years after the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Securities Exchange Commission (“SEC”) leveled fines of \$800 million against Siemens, enforcement agencies worldwide sent a stunning reminder in 2014 that they will impose behemoth fines when they believe it necessary and appropriate. The DOJ alone imposed criminal fines of \$772 million against Alstom in December 2014. The DOJ and SEC also settled charges with Alcoa and Total in 2014 and 2013, respectively, that each included combined criminal fines, disgorgement, and civil penalties of nearly \$400 million.

Other countries have now demonstrated a similar appetite for massive penalties: a Chinese court sentenced GlaxoSmithKline in September 2014 to pay a fine of over \$484 million after it was found guilty of bribery, and SBM Offshore Group

agreed to pay \$240 million in fines and disgorgement in a settlement with the Dutch Prosecutor's Office in November 2014.

- *Prosecution of Individuals*: The United States has continued to prosecute both U.S. and non-U.S. citizens for FCPA and related violations, including through negotiated pleas. In the last two years alone, the DOJ and SEC have announced enforcement actions against twenty-two different individuals. Particular highlights in this regard have been the prosecutions against (i) three former executives of PetroTiger Ltd. who were arrested in late 2013 and early 2014 in connection with an alleged scheme to bribe an official of Colombia's majority state-owned company, Ecopetrol; (ii) former executives of Alstom, three of whom have pleaded guilty and await sentencing; (iii) five former executives of the now-bankrupt Direct Access Partners, who have all pleaded guilty to criminal counts of violating or conspiring to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act in connection with improper payments to Venezuelan state banking officials; (iv) a Venezuelan government official who allegedly received improper payments from the Direct Access Partners executives, and who pleaded guilty to violating and conspiring to violate the Travel Act in connection with that conduct; (v) Frederic Cilins, a French citizen who was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison on July 25, 2014 for obstructing the DOJ's investigation into BSG Resources, a mining company that won extraction rights in the Republic of Guinea; (vi) influential Ukrainian businessman Dmitry Firtash (who was arrested in Austria in March 2014 on charges that he orchestrated an international conspiracy to pay bribes to government officials in India) and five alleged co-conspirators; and (vii) former BizJet executive Bernd Kowalewski, who was arrested in Amsterdam and extradited to the United States, where he pleaded guilty to violating and conspiring to violate the FCPA.

The United States, however, was not alone in its prosecution of individuals. In the United Kingdom, the Serious Fraud Office ("SFO") successfully prosecuted four former Innospec executives. Former CFO and CEO Paul Jennings and former business director David Turner both pleaded guilty to corruption-related charges. A Crown Court convicted former CEO Dennis Kerrison and former regional sales director Miltiades Papachristos in June 2014 and sentenced them to prison terms of three years and eighteen months, respectively. The convictions of Kerrison and Papachristos were upheld in September 2014 by a U.K. appellate court, which condemned their "prolonged, cynical and serious corruption of public officials in a foreign country."

As discussed further in our Focus Issues below, Brazil and China have both pursued individual convictions with particular rigor as well. In China, five former GlaxoSmithKline executives (including one U.K. citizen) were convicted of bribery and received suspended prison sentences of two to four years. The country's *Operation Fox Hunt* — a campaign to capture the high-level "tigers" and low-level "flies" who have accepted bribes — resulted in the arrest or

surrender of nearly 680 officials by the end of 2014. More generally, state reports indicate that more than 53,000 officials were under investigation in China in the last year alone. In Brazil, as part of the ever-expanding *Operation Car Wash*, dozens of government officials and employees of various contracting companies have been arrested on suspicion of corruption in connection with dealings with the country's state-owned oil and gas company, Petrobras.

Other countries have also aggressively investigated and prosecuted individuals for corruption offenses. In February 2014, for example, an Omani court sentenced the former CEO of Oman Oil Company to a 23-year prison term for accepting bribes from South Korean oil company LGI in connection with awarding contracts for the construction of an aromatics plant. The Vice-CEO of LGI and the individual who organized the scheme were both sentenced to ten years as well.

Together, these prosecutions have demonstrated that individuals will increasingly be held personally responsible for acts of corruption, either by enforcement agencies or within the corporations for which they work. The increasing rate at which individuals have been prosecuted and the possibility of severe punishments effectively challenge any notion that engaging in corruption and the potential penalties thereof are merely economic costs that can be calculated into a model and economically rationalized.

- *Coordinated Enforcement Efforts*: To a greater extent than ever, international regulators are cooperating in their anti-corruption enforcement efforts. The DOJ and SEC continue to rely upon and provide assistance to non-U.S. enforcement agencies in their efforts to tackle complex bribery investigations. In 2014, the SEC made more than 900 requests for international assistance and responded to more than 500 requests from non-U.S. enforcement agencies. In its April 2014 press release announcing the enforcement action against Hewlett-Packard, for example, the DOJ stated that it had received the support of the German Public Prosecutor's Office in Dresden, as well as the Anti-Corruption Bureau and Appellate Prosecutor's Office in Poland and its other law enforcement partners in Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

In addition to cooperating on specific cases, international regulators have also begun sharing information and providing training on law enforcement techniques. In 2013, the SEC, DOJ, and FBI hosted the first-ever "Foreign Bribery and Corruption Training Conference" for law enforcement officials from over 30 different countries. Following the success of that conference, the SEC, DOJ, and FBI hosted another week-long training course in late 2014 on combatting corruption that was attended by prosecutors, investigators, regulators, and judges from over 50 countries, multi-development banks, and international organizations.

- *Coordinated Relief*: The DOJ has long suggested that it would restrain its own enforcement efforts against non-U.S. companies if those entities were prosecuted

instead by their home countries. Consistent with that approach, the DOJ informed SBM Offshore in November 2014 that it had closed its investigation of that company following the announcement that SBM Offshore had agreed to pay \$240 million to settle the charges with the Dutch authorities. Although the United States did pursue its prosecution against Alstom, the DOJ relied for the first time on monitorship activities being carried out pursuant to a negotiated resolution with the World Bank's Integrity Vice Presidency. Specifically, in the December 2014 plea agreement, the DOJ stated that it would not require Alstom to retain a corporate monitor so long as the Integrity Compliance Office of the World Bank certified that Alstom had satisfied the Bank's monitoring requirements.

- *Broad Reading by U.S. Enforcement Agencies of FCPA Elements*: In large part, the number and breadth of enforcement actions in the United States have resulted from the broad reading that the DOJ and SEC have given to the jurisdictional and substantive elements of the law.
  - *Expansive Jurisdictional Reach*: U.S. regulators take an expansive jurisdictional view as to the applicability of the FCPA, and they look carefully when they believe it is warranted to find any hooks or connections (even if not particularly close or ongoing) that could arguably establish U.S. jurisdiction over perceived violations of anti-corruption laws. The \$8.97 billion enforcement action brought against the French bank BNP Paribas in June 2014 (pursuant to the International Economic Emergency Powers Act and the Trading with the Enemy Act, not the FCPA) illustrates this general point: the DOJ claimed jurisdiction over BNP Paribas in connection with the sanctions violations because the bank's U.S. dollar transactions were processed through U.S. financial institutions.

Moreover, in the 2012 Resource Guide to the FCPA, the DOJ and SEC confirmed their belief that they would have jurisdiction over issuers and domestic concerns who did no more than send "an email, text message, or fax . . . through the United States" (that is, for example, an email that originated outside the United States and was sent to another non-U.S. location, but which passed through a U.S. server) in connection with an FCPA violation. The agencies claim jurisdiction over U.S. companies and persons for violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA even in the absence of such communications.

Although the DOJ and SEC have conceded that they would only have jurisdiction over a non-issuer or non-domestic concern for substantive violations of the FCPA if it committed some act (directly or through an intermediary) in furtherance of that violation while on U.S. territory, they have also taken the position that such jurisdictional nexus would not be required to charge the non-issuer or non-domestic concern with conspiracy to violate the FCPA if it conspired with an issuer or domestic concern.

- *Use of Constructive Knowledge Standard*: The DOJ and SEC have shown a clear willingness to rely on the constructive knowledge element of the FCPA, invoking “high probability” language and relying on circumstantial factors, in instances where a company’s conduct may fall short of actual knowledge. In the December 2012 Eli Lilly case, for example, the SEC confirmed its position that “[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.” Similarly, in charging Bio-Rad in November 2014 with its failure to maintain an effective anti-corruption compliance program, the DOJ stated that Bio-Rad had ignored red flags that suggested a “high probability” that its payments to third-party intermediaries were being passed on to government officials.
- *Broad Reading of “Foreign Official”*: The FCPA defines the term foreign official to include more than just ministry officials or other high-level government functionaries, but also employees of a government “instrumentality.” In the landmark decision of *U.S. v. Esquenazi*, the 11th Circuit held that Haiti Teleco was a government instrumentality on the basis of a non-exclusive test to determine whether the entity is “controlled” by the government and whether it “performs a function that the controlling government treats as its own.” As discussed further below, the court’s “list of factors that may be relevant to deciding” this question of government function include whether the entity has a monopoly over the service and provides it to the public at large, and whether the public of the country perceive that entity to be performing a government function. The term may receive further court treatment soon in the case of *U.S. v. Sigelman*, as the defendant there has cited the *Esquenazi* test to argue that Colombia’s Ecopetrol — a majority state-owned entity that employed an individual whom he is accused of bribing — is not an “instrumentality” because it does not perform a government function.

In practice, however, U.S. federal prosecutors continue to construe the term “foreign official” to include even relatively low-level employees of state agencies and state-owned institutions, such as workers in hospitals, telecommunications companies, shipyards, and steel mills, and members of an executive committee overseeing the construction of a government-owned hotel. Even journalists working for state-owned media concerns, an unpaid manager of a government majority-owned entity, and officials at entities that are controlled (but not majority-owned) by a government fall within the government’s broad interpretation of “foreign official.” There is every reason to believe that jurisdictions outside the United States will take a similarly expansive view.

- *Broad Reading of “Anything of Value”*: The FCPA prohibits far more than mere cash payments and can be violated by the provision of such diverse benefits as entertainment, scholarships, vehicles, property, shoes, watches, flowers, wine,

electronics, office furniture, stock, and share of profits. Travel expenditures for government officials and customers, even when there is some link to legitimate business and promotional activities, remain a frequent source of charged impropriety when excessive or not mostly related to the business purpose. Half of the fourteen enforcement actions from 2014 have included the provision of gifts or travel. Benefits to relatives of the foreign official may also run afoul of the law, as demonstrated by the DOJ and SEC's ongoing investigations into the hiring practices of banks and hedge funds in China.

Additionally, "anything of value" has been interpreted to include even more intangible benefits, such as an official's pleasure in knowing that a company has made a charitable contribution to a cause that he or she finds important. In October 2013, the SEC charged Stryker Corporation with violations of the FCPA in connection with donations to an apparently *bona fide* university medical laboratory because it was the "pet project" of a Greek professor.

Further expansions of this broad reading are on the horizon. On November 21, 2014, Andrew Ceresney, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, stated that the SEC's "pipeline of cases" for 2015 include "FCPA cases involving unique facts, using the broad definition of 'anything of value'."

- *Parent-Subsidiary Liability*: The DOJ and SEC have prosecuted or charged parent companies based on the conduct of far-removed non-U.S. subsidiaries. As discussed immediately below, the agencies have initiated such enforcement actions even in the absence of alleged knowledge or direct participation of the parent company in the improper conduct.
  - *Direct Parent Company Involvement Not Required*: The DOJ has held companies criminally liable for books and records or internal controls violations committed without their knowledge by their non-U.S. subsidiaries, including in connection with several Oil-for-Food settlements. The U.K. SFO has taken a similar line in moving against Mabey Engineering under the Proceeds of Crime Act for actions of its subsidiary Mabey & Johnson. As a result, companies must ensure that their anti-corruption compliance policies and procedures are implemented throughout the corporate structure and extended to subsidiaries, including those gained through acquisition.
  - *Foreign Subsidiaries Treated as Agents of the Parent*: A parent company can be liable for improper payments made by its foreign subsidiaries if the parent maintains sufficient control over the subsidiary's operations to establish an agency relationship. In practice, the DOJ takes an expansive view of the meaning of "control." In the context of a non-prosecution agreement, for example, the DOJ and Ralph Lauren appeared willing to acknowledge that the parent company's hiring of its Argentinean subsidiary's general manager was sufficient to establish an agency relationship. The DOJ has also advanced an agency theory

of liability in enforcement proceedings against companies such as Schnitzer Steel and Diagnostic Products Corporation. The DOJ likely will continue to use the agency theory reflected in these cases (at least as an initial enforcement posture) in charging a parent company for corrupt acts by a foreign subsidiary, despite the parent's lack of direct knowledge or participation.

- Accounting Provisions Violations: When a subsidiary's misrepresented financials are consolidated into the parent corporation's books and records, this can give rise to an independent violation by the parent of the FCPA books and records and internal controls provisions if the parent company is a U.S. issuer, even though the parent company may not be aware of such misrepresentations. In connection with the 2013 settlement between the SEC and Philips, for example, the SEC alleged that the parent issuer was liable for the actions of its Polish subsidiary even though the parent issuer had no prior knowledge of those violations. The SEC also filed a complaint in 2012 against Oracle Corporation, arguing that the NASDAQ-listed company was liable for the maintenance of "secret cash cushions" by its wholly owned Indian subsidiary, despite not advancing any argument that Oracle knew of the actions of its subsidiary employees.
- Requirement of Monitors and Consultants: The imposition of compliance monitors or consultants as part of settlements continues to be commonplace. In general, the DOJ considers several factors when deciding whether to impose a monitorship, including (i) whether the company has an effective internal compliance program and sufficient internal controls, (ii) the seriousness, duration, and pervasiveness of the misconduct, and (iii) the nature and size of the company. Recent cases continue to reflect the DOJ's practice, as outlined in its previous memorandum on the Selection of Monitors in Criminal Division Matters, of permitting the settling company to choose its own corporate monitor from a pool of qualified candidates, subject to DOJ approval, rather than having the DOJ make the appointment itself.

But the use of external monitors is not a universal feature of settlements, and some have instead relied on self-reporting. The December 2014 Deferred Prosecution Agreement ("DPA") with Dallas Airmotive and the November 2014 Non-Prosecution Agreement ("NPA") with Bio-Rad, as well as the combined settlements and plea agreements of Hewlett-Packard and its subsidiaries, instead only required the companies to undertake periodic internal reviews during the term of the agreements on their remediation efforts and the implementation of their enhanced compliance programs and internal controls, and to provide reports detailing the findings of those reviews to the DOJ or SEC.

A company may also be placed on corporate probation, with or without a monitorship. In January 2014, for example, a subsidiary of Alcoa was placed on a probation period of four years, during which time it will be required to maintain contact with its probation officer and provide any information or documentation that the officer may request.

- *Prosecution for Payments to Non-Government Officials:* Enforcement agencies in the United States and other jurisdictions have shown a willingness to investigate or prosecute improper payments to individuals and entities other than “foreign officials,” even though such payments may not violate the anti-bribery provisions of relevant anti-corruption statutes, such as the FCPA. As discussed below, enforcement agencies have brought charges or launched investigations in connection with allegations of payments to governmental entities, private parties, and former government officials.
  - *Payments to Governmental Entities:* The anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and the Bribery Act do not technically cover payments made to government entities, as opposed to the officials who work for such entities. As a result, businesses have traditionally viewed payments to government entities as a relative safe harbor that would be unlikely to incur liability. Nevertheless, in certain circumstances, enforcement agencies may be willing to look beyond the face of a payment to a state-owned or governmental institution if there is a suspicion that the company knew or should have known that there was a reasonable likelihood that such payments would be passed on improperly to a government official. Press reports from 2013, for example, confirmed that the U.K. Crown Prosecution Service is investigating Shell and ENI for possible money laundering violations in connection with the payment of \$1.3 billion directly to the Nigerian government for the purchase of an oil field, following allegations from watch groups that the companies used the Nigerian government as an intermediary to transfer much of the funds to a third party owned by former Nigerian Oil Minister, Dan Etete. ENI confirmed in September 2014 that Italian Prosecutors had opened a separate “preliminary investigation” targeting its current CEO and Chief Development, Operations, and Technology Officer in connection with their roles in the transaction. Similarly, without addressing the issue directly, the DOJ’s Oil-for-Food prosecutions were premised on improper payments and kickbacks that companies made directly to the Iraqi government, rather than to Iraqi officials.
  - *Payments to Private Parties:* The Bribery Act prohibits commercial bribery payments to private parties in addition to improper payments to government officials. Some commentators have suggested that the inclusion of this prohibition represents a significant expansion over the breadth and scope of the FCPA. While technically true, the DOJ and the SEC nonetheless possess a wide array of other prosecutorial tools that they can use to pursue companies or individuals for improper payments to non-U.S. private parties abroad, including the Travel Act, money laundering, and wire fraud statutes, as well as the accounting and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. Many of the proceedings against companies operating in the telecommunications and pharmaceutical / medical device industries, for example, have included payments to persons employed by private institutions, while the Control Components’ prosecutions coupled FCPA charges with charges that the company violated the Travel Act by making corrupt payments to private entities, both in the United States and abroad, in violation of California state law against commercial bribery.

In the 2012 settlement with Tyco, the DOJ and SEC stated that the company violated the FCPA in connection with “illicit payment schemes” and “improper payments” that Tyco’s various subsidiaries made to private individuals (as well as government officials) in China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Niger, and Saudi Arabia.

- *Prosecution for Payments to Former Government Officials:* As with the other payments discussed above, the DOJ and SEC will look for creative ways to prosecute other conduct that they consider to be improper, including payments to certain former government officials — even if the agencies cannot pursue FCPA anti-bribery charges. The DOJ prosecuted Tyco and Alcatel-Lucent for, among other things, payments made by those companies’ subsidiaries to former employees of a public utilities company in Indonesia and a former Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations, respectively.
- *Use of Related Statutes:* U.S. authorities and other regulators continue to use complementary statutes (such as those governing export control or false statements) to bring corruption-related charges. The interconnectivity of the various statutes, and the relative ease by which multiple offenses can be established through similar and overlapping facts, is a reminder not to take a narrow view of anti-corruption compliance. In addition, U.S. authorities’ use of other statutes to bring charges allows them to seek greater penalties and expands their ability to punish corrupt conduct, even when an FCPA violation might not be established.
  - *Breadth of the False Statement Statute:* The willingness of the DOJ to take a more expansive approach to anti-corruption enforcement is underscored by the use of the false statement statute, which generally can reach a wide range of conduct, from informal communications (such as the letters sent by BAE Systems to the Department of Defense) to court, regulatory, or congressional testimony. Companies must be cognizant that they will potentially be held accountable for virtually any representation made to the U.S. government or a U.S. government official regarding anti-corruption compliance.
  - *Export Control and Government Contracts Connection:* Government contractors and companies subject to U.S. export controls may face heightened scrutiny and risks with regard to anti-corruption compliance. As the BAE case illustrates, such companies may be required to make representations to the government, which can themselves become the source of legal liability if those representations are inaccurate or incomplete with respect to anti-corruption elements. Such companies must be cognizant not only of anti-corruption rules, but also of the legal liability the companies face for making statements regarding their anti-corruption efforts as part of regulatory schemes, such as the export control laws and federal acquisition regulations. As the DOJ’s push to broaden anti-corruption enforcement continues, this intersection of different enforcement regimes will become even more important.

- *Money Laundering, Wire Fraud, and Related Financial Crimes*: Prosecutors also remain committed to enforcing laws prohibiting other financial crimes, such as money laundering and wire fraud, that often intersect with FCPA enforcement actions. These statutes can also apply — unlike the FCPA — to foreign officials or private parties for soliciting or accepting corrupt payments, as demonstrated by the December 2014 plea agreement by Asem Elgawhary (a former Bechtel employee who accepted kickbacks from various international power companies to manipulate the bidding process in their favor) and the November 2013 plea agreement of Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez (a Venezuelan government official who accepted bribes from former employees of Direct Access Partners).
- *Use of Industry Sweeps*: The SEC and DOJ have continued to use industry-wide sweeps in conducting their investigations, including the oil-services industry, the pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries, and the film industry. An analysis of foreign bribery trends conducted by the OECD in December 2014 suggests that this approach has been well placed, as 59% of the 427 cases that it reviewed occurred in four specific industries: extractive, construction, transportation and storage, and information and communication. Of course, these higher numbers may simply reflect that those industries have been targeted with greater frequency and not that they are more prone to corruption. Either way, this potentially self-confirming cycle and the successful prosecutions that have come from such sweeps suggest that more will come. Indeed, the SFO announced in October 2013 that it too would focus on “sectoral sweeps . . . , such as construction and public contracts, oil and gas.”
- *Targeting Suspect Jurisdictions*: The DOJ and SEC hold the position that conducting business in or through suspect jurisdictions may itself be a red flag, including with respect to both notoriously opaque banking jurisdictions like the British Virgin Islands and corruption-prone countries or regions.
  - *Jurisdictions Perceived to Have High Levels of Corruption*: Enforcement agencies target companies that conduct business in countries or regions in which they consider corruption to be common. The SEC noted in its July 2014 cease-and-desist order against firearm manufacturer Smith & Wesson that the company had engaged various third parties in connection with its efforts to enter high-risk markets such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Turkey, but that it had “conducted virtually no due diligence of its third-party agents regardless of the perceived level of corruption.” In a press release, Kara Brockmeyer, chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit, characterized the settlement as “a wake-up call for small and medium-size businesses that want to enter into high-risk markets and expand their international sales.”

At the same time, agents and third parties based in developed countries such as the United Kingdom are not exempt from these requirements. Although companies are permitted to tailor the amount of due diligence according to relative compliance risks, they should also keep in mind that the 2014 OECD

Foreign Bribery Report found that, contrary to the perception that the vast majority of bribery occurs in developing nations, as many as 43% of bribery cases involved public officials from countries with either high or very high levels of human development based on the UN Human Development Index.

- *Suspect Banking Jurisdictions*: Companies are well advised to ensure that there is a legitimate reason to engage entities located in traditional “tax havens,” as opposed to using them as a masking technique or for an illicit motive (such as inappropriate tax avoidance by the agent). In the BAE Information, for example, the DOJ took particular issue with BAE’s conduct involving both the British Virgin Islands and Switzerland as jurisdictions notorious for discretion. Similarly, the SEC noted in particular that Eli Lilly’s Russian subsidiary had made payments to third-party entities located in Cyprus and the British Virgin Islands.
- *Increasing Whistleblower Reports*: The Dodd-Frank Act, passed by Congress on July 15, 2010, provides an aggressive tool for regulators by mandating that the SEC pay whistleblowers who provide it with original information leading to enforcement actions over \$1 million a reward of 10% to 30% of the total sanctions collected. Since the program was instituted in 2012, the SEC has made awards to fourteen whistleblowers, including eight in 2014. On September 22, 2014, the enforcement agency announced it had made an award of \$30 million, its largest to date. On numerous occasions, DOJ and SEC officials have highlighted the large number of whistleblowers who continue to come forward under the Dodd-Frank regime.
- *Creative Methodologies for Uncovering Information*: The Siemens settlement demonstrated regulatory approval (manifested by its consideration as part of the company’s cooperation credit) of a groundbreaking amnesty and leniency program aimed at providing company counsel with timely, complete, and truthful information about possible violations of anti-corruption laws. Siemens instituted an amnesty program whereby employees were encouraged to voluntarily report corrupt practices without fear of termination or claims by the company for damages. The approval of such a program likely signals regulatory acceptance of the broader use of creative approaches to collect and process accurate and complete information from within a company and, in turn, respond appropriately to such information. Indeed, following its April 2013 confidential settlement agreement with the World Bank, SNC-Lavalin instituted a similar amnesty program to encourage employees to provide information on any potential corrupt practices within the company.
- *Use of Traditional Law Enforcement Techniques*: The common thinking has been that enforcement actions are most likely to arise from self-reporting companies or whistleblowers. While this may be true, the DOJ is also willing to rely on the assistance of the FBI and traditional law enforcement techniques to find and investigate violations of the FCPA. The unsealed court filings in the DOJ’s case against former BizJet executive Peter DuBois, for example, revealed that he had worked in an “undercover

capacity” in connection with the DOJ’s investigation, surreptitiously recording conversations with former BizJet executives and subjects of other investigations.

- *SEC Signals New Efforts to Protect Compliance Officers:* Recent statements and actions by the SEC demonstrate that the enforcement agency has adopted a broad strategy of seeking to protect and strengthen the position of compliance officers. On August 27, 2013, the SEC instituted administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings against Carl Johns, a portfolio manager for, among other things, violating Rule 38a-1 of the Investment Company Act, which prohibits fund personnel from taking “any action to coerce, manipulate, mislead, or fraudulently influence the fund’s chief compliance officer in the performance of his or her duties.” Although there is no parallel rule under the Securities Exchange Act, SEC officials have indicated that this enforcement action reflects a broader protective approach that could be extended beyond the Investment Company Act.

As recently as December 10, 2014, Norm Champ, the Director of the Division of Investment Management, stated that the *Johns* “case stands for the proposition that the Commission will not tolerate interference with CCOs who enforce their compliance policies and procedures.” SEC Chairman White and others at the SEC have made similar references to the *Johns* case. On October 22, 2013, Chairman White cited *Johns* as part of the SEC’s strategy to protect compliance officers and noted that the SEC would “be looking for more cases [like *Johns*] to drive that message home.” Similarly, in an October 7, 2013 speech to the Society of Corporate Compliance and Ethics, Associate Director of Enforcement Stephen L. Cohen stated, in the context of discussing anti-corruption compliance developments (including the FCPA Resource Guide and Ralph Lauren NPA), that the *Johns* case “should send a clear message” that the SEC would “not tolerate interference” with chief compliance officers endeavoring to do their jobs.

- *Regulators May Force or Reward Management Changes:* In certain circumstances, regulators may use enforcement actions as a tool to force a change in management where the regulators believe management is insufficiently attuned to corruption concerns. Regulators may also reward companies that change management in response to findings of misconduct or seek lesser penalties where management changed before the misconduct came to light. As noted in the Resource Guide, “[n]o executive should be above compliance, no employee below compliance, and no person within an organization deemed too valuable to be disciplined, if warranted. Rewarding good behavior and sanctioning bad behavior reinforces a culture of compliance and ethics throughout the organization.” Furthermore, the DOJ has stated that “For a company to receive full cooperation credit following a self-report, it must root out the misconduct and identify the individuals responsible, even if they are senior executives.”

This view has been borne out in settlement language. In 2014, the DOJ and SEC commended Bio-Rad on terminating the contracts of culpable employees. The SEC also noted in its 2014 settlements with Bruker, Layne Christensen, and Smith & Wesson that each had conducted significant top-level changes. Bruker terminated the senior staff in

each of its China offices; Layne Christensen terminated the contracts of four responsible employees, including its division president and CFO; and Smith & Wesson fired its entire international sales staff. Perhaps in recognition of these significant efforts, none of the three companies was charged with FCPA violations by the DOJ.

- *Amount of Penalty Influenced by Level of Cooperation*: Through a variety of means, the DOJ and SEC have long signaled that companies that cooperate extensively with their investigations may face less severe penalties. In 2014, officials from the DOJ have pointed to the plea agreement with Alcoa as an example in which cooperation with the agency and thorough investigations by outside counsel can earn meaningful credit for the company. The DOJ cited the company's extensive cooperation in entering into the plea agreement, which proposed a criminal penalty of \$209 million even though the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines suggested a range of \$446 million to \$892 million. (Perhaps more pertinent, however, was the consideration that a higher penalty would have "substantially jeopardize[d] Alcoa's ability to compete.") Similarly, the 2013 NPA with Ralph Lauren included a criminal penalty of \$885,000 as a result of the company's cooperation during the investigation.

Conversely, the DOJ and SEC have indicated that companies that do not cooperate, or that actively hinder the enforcement agencies' investigations, will be subject to higher fines. The SEC's final judgment against Weatherford in November 2013, for example, included an additional \$1.8 million penalty because of the company's initial lack of cooperation. The SEC stated that Weatherford and its employees "compromised" its initial investigation by, among other things, stating that an Iraq Country Manager that it wanted to interview was missing or dead, even though he remained employed by the company. Similarly, the DOJ specifically cited Alstom's initial refusal to cooperate with its investigation as justification for assessing \$772 million in criminal fines as part of its plea agreement in December 2014.

- *Declinations*: The DOJ and SEC have sought to assure companies that, where they have compliance programs in place and can demonstrate that they have conducted credible, good-faith internal reviews that uncover misconduct by low-level employees, enforcement agencies will increasingly prove willing to decline enforcement action. The Resource Guide notes that the DOJ had "declined several dozen cases [in the two previous years] against companies where potential FCPA violations were alleged." The Resource Guide goes on to provide six anonymized examples of instances where they have declined to prosecute corporate entities as a means of illustrating that such declinations exist, and the circumstances under which they may be provided.

As discussed above, the DOJ declined to pursue an enforcement action against SBM Offshore in light of the company's settlement with Dutch authorities in 2014. Other notable declinations in 2014 include several pharmaceutical companies that avoided the fate of many of their peers in the ongoing sweep of the pharmaceutical industry, such as Baxter International, Merck, and LyondellBasell Industries NV.

## Lessons

- *Need for Appropriate Due Diligence of Business Partners:* The vital importance of risk-based due diligence of third parties is perhaps the single most important lesson to guide the development and implementation of an effective corporate compliance program. Similar to the situation in previous years, of the ten U.S. corporate settlements in 2014, all but one involved payments through third party agents or distributors. In almost every one of those cases, the DOJ or SEC criticized the companies for failing to conduct appropriate due diligence on their proposed third-party agents, or for ignoring red flags that suggested that there was a high probability that the payments to such entities would be passed on to government officials. Bio-Rad, for example, failed to conduct any due diligence on its agent in Russia, and its failure to do so put it in a position where it could not rationally form a basis to conclude that no illegal payment was made, making it liable for violating the recordkeeping and internal control requirements. This view has also been embraced by the international community, with the OECD releasing guidance on internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs that counsel towards the adoption of a risk-based approach to due diligence.
  - *Determine Identities of Beneficial Owners:* Entities such as shell companies can easily conceal or obscure the identities and locations of their beneficial owners, and thus the true source or destination of funds. Any due diligence procedure must include the objective of learning the identities of all beneficial owners and actual control persons of various shell companies, holding companies, and trusts that maintain an ownership interest of the agent or third party in question.
  - *Need to Examine Carefully the Qualifications of Agents and Third Parties:* It is critical for companies to understand the background, competence, and track record of their agents and intermediaries, and enforcement agencies will criticize and penalize companies for failing to do so. The DOJ and SEC criticized Bio-Rad, for example, for engaging an agent that did not have the capabilities to perform the tasks purportedly required because the company had been recently formed and had no employees other than the agent himself. Third parties that are insufficiently qualified or with little or no assets (*i.e.*, a “brass plate” or “mailbox” company) should be avoided. The 2012 enforcement actions against Eli Lilly and Smith & Nephew demonstrate once again that distributors can pose many of the risks traditionally associated with sales agents.
  - *Careful Examination of the Tasks to Be Performed by Agent is Critical:* Companies must examine the competence of an agent to provide the particular tasks for which it is being engaged and the value of those tasks relative to the agent’s compensation. “Paper tasks” will not suffice. Companies must validate the tasks allegedly being provided by the agent to ensure they are undertaken. In the December 2014 enforcement action against Avon, for example, the DOJ and SEC specifically criticized Avon and its Chinese subsidiary for engaging a third-party consulting company for tasks that were either never performed (such as

sponsoring an art exhibition that never occurred) or could not be identified (such as payments for an unknown “communication service fee”).

- *Third Parties Recommended by Government Officials:* Companies are reminded to be especially cautious when third parties — including not only agents but also subcontractors, vendors, and joint venture partners — are suggested to them by government officials, especially when the government official is in a position to affect the company’s business. Recent enforcement actions have illustrated this risk: the SEC’s settlement with Layne Christensen in October 2014 stated that the company’s subsidiaries in Guinea and the DRC had engaged lawyers that had been recommended by (and later funneled payments to) government officials. Similarly, Weatherford’s 2013 DPA with the DOJ provides that the company had formed a joint venture with local Angolan entities that had been recommended by Sonangol officials and which in fact were owned or associated with several government officials.
- *Possession of Confidential Information:* Companies must be particularly cautious with respect to non-public or confidential information that its agents, subcontractors or other third parties may seek to provide it regarding its clients, competitors, or specific bid processes. Aside from potential anti-competition violations that may result from such activities, regulators may view the mere possession of such materials as *prima facie* and perhaps *per se* evidence of bribery, particularly given the continuing evidence (such as the 2014 action against Asem Elgawhary, the former Bechtel employee who solicited kickbacks from international companies to provide confidential information during the bidding process) reinforcing the belief that individuals who would have access to such materials would not provide them to others absent the return of some improper benefit.
- *Paper Procedures Are Not Enough:* Company procedures that require due diligence, anti-corruption covenants, other contractual provisions and certifications, or appropriate accounting practices provide no protection (and may prove harmful) when the procedures are not followed or are followed only to the extent to “paper the file.” For example, the DOJ’s resolution of its investigations into Diebold, Orthofix and Alcatel-Lucent, as well as the SEC’s settlement with Keyuan Petrochemicals, stressed that the company’s managers regularly failed to notice or investigate so-called compliance “red flags.”
- *Need to Structure and Staff Compliance Functions Appropriately:* Government regulators have emphasized the need for companies to take measures to ensure that their compliance obligations are taken seriously at the highest level of management and that the compliance function is appropriately structured, staffed, and funded. The November 2013 settlements with Weatherford, for example, state that although Weatherford was a \$15 billion company with 500 legal entities and over 60,000 employees, it had no dedicated compliance officer prior to 2008. As a result, Weatherford could not establish effective corruption-related mechanisms to control or monitor its many foreign subsidiaries. The SEC also included criticisms in its December 2014 complaint against Avon that the company failed to conduct anti-bribery training in its Chinese subsidiary —

as its internal auditors had recommended after making various findings — due to what it considered to be budgetary constraints.

- *Need to Recognize the Importance of Foreign Investigations:* In the past, the DOJ has favorably cited advice given by outside counsel that foreign investigations provided the DOJ and SEC “ample” basis for launching an investigation, and that those agencies would expect a company, at a minimum, to conduct an adequate investigation of the allegations and the larger implications of any improper conduct that was discovered. Consistent with this view, the SEC criticized Diebold in its October 2013 complaint against that company for failing to adequately investigate and address red flags that arose from a government agency investigation in China. In today’s environment of increased cross-border enforcement activity and investigative cooperation, companies would be wise to assume that an investigation conducted in one jurisdiction may have implications in other jurisdictions in which the company does business.
- *Need to Closely Review Changes in Agreements with an Agent or Third Party:* A significant change in the payment or other material terms of an agreement with an agent or third party can be a potential red flag to which management should pay close attention. Several of the Oil-for-Food settlements, including those with Fiat, Chevron, Flowserve, and Akzo Nobel, involved scenarios in which arrangements with third parties were altered to facilitate or mask improper payments. Thus, changes in the nature or terms of arrangements with third parties should be closely examined to ensure that they have a legitimate basis.
- *Need to Conduct Appropriate Employee Training:* Companies that fail to conduct appropriate employee training may face liability if the conduct of those parties ends up violating anti-corruption laws. Employees overseeing high-risk transactions or operational areas (such as customs clearance and logistics) should receive frequent training. Enforcement agencies have stressed, however, that training should be conducted in languages that its employees can understand. In its December 2014 settlement with Bruker, the SEC specifically criticized the company for failing to translate any of its compliance materials, including FCPA trainings, ethics trainings, FCPA policy, Code of Conduct, or its toll-free employee reporting hotline, to local languages for its Chinese subsidiaries. Similarly, the SEC had criticized Orthofix in its July 2012 settlement for giving anti-corruption compliance training in English only to the employees of its Mexican subsidiary, as “it was unlikely that [the subsidiary] employees understood them as most [of those] employees spoke minimal English.” Such training may also serve to surface improper activity so that it may be effectively remediated.
- *Training of Third-Party Agents:* Recent enforcement actions have confirmed that the DOJ endorses corporate anti-corruption compliance programs that include mandatory training of agents and consultants, as well as other third-party entities. Through DPAs and NPAs, the DOJ has consistently required that settling companies implement mechanisms designed to ensure that they communicate their anti-corruption policies and procedures to their agents and business partners, including through periodic training

“where necessary and appropriate.” In recent years, however, it has become more common for settling companies to implement mandatory training requirements for all of their agents and business partners. In the 2012 settlement agreement with Orthofix, for example, both the DOJ and SEC noted favorably that the company had instituted enhanced compliance procedures that included “mandatory annual FCPA training for all employees and third-party agents.” Broader still, prior to entering into its DPA, Data Systems implemented mandatory FCPA training not only for its third-party agents, but for all subcontractors as well.

- Liability for “Promises” to Make Payments and Payments that Do Not Accomplish Their Purpose: An executed payment that results in the company obtaining or retaining business is not necessary for an FCPA violation. As the AB Volvo, Tenaris, and Flowserve settlements illustrate, improper payments that are authorized but never made are still considered improper. Most recently, the July 2014 Smith & Wesson settlement includes several instances of bribes approved or made that failed to obtain their objective, but which nevertheless constituted a violation of the FCPA.
- Narrow View of Facilitation Payments: The U.S. government takes a very narrow view of what constitutes a “facilitation” payment — *i.e.*, a payment that expedites routine or ministerial governmental acts and does not run afoul of the FCPA. For example, the DOJ’s settlement with Westinghouse appears to rest on, among other things, payments for services such as scheduling shipping inspections or obtaining product delivery certificates. Also, Noble Corporation was punished for improperly recording various improper payments as facilitation payments. The SEC claimed that Noble personnel did not understand the concept of “facilitating payments” and that its internal controls were insufficient to prevent what the SEC considered bribes as being recorded as facilitating payments. The U.S. government’s approach of taking a narrow view may be in part a result of OECD statements that recommend countries review their laws on facilitation payments, a move seen as a step towards full prohibition by the OECD. Other international regulators, such as the United Kingdom, have taken the approach of criminalizing such payments, although the SFO maintains prosecutorial discretion as to whether to pursue such conduct.
- No De Minimis Exception: There is no *de minimis* exception to the FCPA’s prohibitions. Small-value bribes have resulted in enforcement actions, particularly in instances in which such payments were numerous and frequent. The SEC alleged in its Complaint against Avon in December 2014, for instance, that the company’s Chinese subsidiary had made 9,600 separate payments for meals and entertainment over a period of four and a half years — meaning that, on average, the cost of each expense was approximately \$172 with 39 such transactions per week for the entire time period. Similarly, the settlements with Dow, Paradigm, and Avery Dennison each involved frequent payments of \$100 or less, and the October 2014 settlement with Layne Christensen discusses improper payments as low as \$4 to customs officials. In the 2012 Eli Lilly settlement, the SEC discussed gifts of cigarettes and meals, noting that “although the dollar amount of each gift was generally small, the improper payments were widespread.”

- *Investigate and Respond to Allegations Fully:* Enforcement agencies expect companies to fully investigate allegations or evidence of misconduct. Once payments to an agent or others are determined to be inconsistent with the FCPA, anti-corruption standards, or company policies, termination of the payments is expected, and further action, such as revising codes of ethics and compliance training, will be viewed favorably by regulators. Breakdowns in internal controls should be fully remedied, and companies that encounter anti-corruption issues in one circumstance should be careful not to repeat the mistakes that led to those issues.

Identification of red flags or suspicious conduct by internal or external auditors has also been used by enforcement agencies as evidence of companies' knowledge of and failure to stop improper practices. In its December 2014 settlement with Avon, for example, the DOJ and SEC specifically criticized the company for failing to adequately respond to internal audit reports that identified the provision of improper gifts and travel for government officials in China, but also for taking active steps (such as altering the audit report and destroying the original copies) to conceal the nature of those concerns.

- *Commonality of Practice Not an Excuse:* The fact that a practice is common in a region or industry is not a defense. While this has been confirmed multiple times in U.S. enforcement actions, other countries have also refused to view commonality as a mitigating factor. In March 2013, for example, former Alcatel-Lucent executive Radziah Ani was convicted by a Malaysian court of paying bribes to Telekom Malaysia through third-party intermediaries to obtain confidential tender information. During the proceedings, the court specifically rejected Ani's defense that the practice had been common, and sentenced her to a prison term of two years. Furthermore, as other enforcement actions have illustrated, prosecutors are unlikely to excuse illegal conduct even in extreme circumstances, such as extortion by foreign officials.
- *Experienced Anti-Bribery Counsel Required:* While the mere use of outside counsel will not completely insulate a company from FCPA liability, the selection of experienced anti-corruption counsel gives the greatest chance of compliance with the expectations and requirements of enforcement agencies. The DOJ has previously rejected three potential independent monitors recommended by BAE as insufficiently qualified for the position. The World Bank Sanctions Board, in its first published decisions, has also emphasized that only internal investigations conducted by experienced, independent counsel will enable a respondent company to mitigate the penalty to be imposed on it for improper conduct.

## FOCUS ISSUES

From “Operation Car Wash” in Brazil to “Operation Fox Hunt” in China, countries around the world are pursuing anti-corruption enforcement actions against both individuals and corporations with more resources and vigor than ever before. The growing international consensus that forceful measures are necessary to combat the plight of corruption continues to bear fruit as well in the form of stronger anti-corruption legislation around the world. This year we focus on several of the most important enforcement and legislative efforts that occurred outside of the United States.

### Brazil

#### *Operation Car Wash*

In March 2014, the Brazilian Federal Police launched coordinated raids aimed at dismantling a network of criminal gangs that been under investigation for perpetrating a massive money-laundering scheme. Police seized approximately \$2.1 million in cash and three hotels, as well as numerous luxury vehicles and works of art. Police also arrested, among others, Alberto Youssef, a well-known black market moneychanger, and Carlos Chater, the owner of Brazil’s largest gas station *Posto da Torre*.

The investigation focused initially on the *Posto da Torre* gas station, where it was alleged that much of an initially estimated \$4 billion of laundered money passed. For this reason, the investigation was dubbed “Operation Car Wash.” (It appears that the name may be a result of the television-viewing habits of the Brazilian police. Although Walter White of *Breaking Bad* purchased a car wash to launder his illicit drug-dealing profit, the only cleaning activities you could do at *Poste da Torre* was at its laundromat.) The investigation, however, quickly expanded beyond its initial scope to focus on the activities of Petrobras and ensnare a growing numbers of politicians, public officials, and private contractors.

- *State’s Witnesses Provide Crucial Information*

Youssef — who had been arrested nine times previously on charges of smuggling, corruption, and money laundering — had spent less than a year in prison due in part to his willingness to provide testimony about others involved. His approach to Operation Car Wash was no different. After his arrest, he entered a plea agreement and provided detailed information linking the money-laundering scheme to Petrobras and the country’s political parties. He stated that contractors paid bribes and kickbacks to politicians and Petrobras executives to win inflated contracts. Youssef served as the “banker” at the *Posto da Torre* gas station — described as the “ATM of Bribery” in reports — where many of the cash exchanges occurred.

Police arrested former Petrobras executive Paulo Roberto Costa shortly after Youssef. From 2004 to 2012, Costa had served as the high-ranking Supply Director at Petrobras. At the time of his arrest, police seized approximately \$300,000 in cash from his home and stated that Costa had kept approximately \$23 million in Swiss bank accounts.

Like Youssef, Costa turned state's evidence. In September 2014, he accepted a plea agreement and provided details on his role in the scheme. According to a report by Brazilian magazine *Veja*, Costa stated that portions of the bribes were passed on through João Vaccari Neto, the treasurer of Brazil's ruling party PT, and that the ultimate beneficiaries included the presidents of both houses of Congress, the former Minister of Mines and Energy, and three governors of states in which Petrobras had major projects, among others.

- *Domestic and International Contractors Come Into Focus*

Costa stated that he had accepted bribes valued at 3% of various Petrobras contracts from Brazilian construction companies that won project awards between 2004 and 2012. Following Costa's revelations, Julio Camargo and Augusto Ribeiro de Mendonça Neto also entered into plea agreements with Brazilian prosecutors. Both individuals were executives of Toyo Setal Empreendimentos Ltda. ("Toyo Setal") — the Brazilian affiliate of the Japan-based engineering, procurement, and construction company Toyo Engineering Corporation.

Subsequently, in November 2014, Brazilian police conducted raids of different contracting companies across the country and arrested eighteen individuals, including former Petrobras Director of Services Renato Duque. By the end of December 2014, the Brazilian federal prosecutor's office had formally indicted 39 individuals for corruption, money laundering, and conspiracy, including Petrobras employees and representatives of companies Toyo Setal, Sanko-Sider, Camargo Corrêa, OAS, UTC Engenharia, Galvão Engenharia, Mendes Júnior, and Engevix.

Former Petrobras director Nestor Cervero and businessman and lobbyist Fernando Soares were among those charged. The two allegedly accepted more than \$53 million in improper payments from Samsung Heavy Industries in connection with the award of two projects for the supply of offshore drilling vessels, valued together at approximately \$1.2 billion. According to Brazilian prosecutors, Cervero requested the payments from Toyo Setal's Camargo, one of the individuals cooperating with Brazilian police in the investigation. As of the end of 2014, Samsung Heavy Industries had not been charged with any wrongdoing.

- *Parallel Investigations*

The Brazilian Congress launched a parliamentary commission of inquiry in May 2014 to investigate the allegations against Petrobras. In December 2014, the commission issued an inconclusive final report that requested that the authorities "continue to investigate" the facts. The DOJ and SEC have also initiated investigations of potential violations of the FCPA. Brazilian authorities are reported to be cooperating with the U.S. agencies in this effort.

Separately, following the November 2014 settlement between SBM Offshore ("SBM") and Dutch authorities (see SBM Offshore, below), Brazil's Comptroller-General (Controladoria Geral da União, "CGU") opened official proceedings against SBM and several Petrobras employees. Among other things disclosed by the settlement was the fact that SBM Offshore had paid approximately \$139.1 million in commissions to several Brazilian sales agents between 2007 and 2011. Although SBM could not itself prove that the payments were provided to

government officials, the Dutch authorities obtained evidence through various MLAT requests that purport to prove that the sales agents did in fact make payments to Brazilian government officials from their offshore accounts. SBM is reportedly willing to enter into a leniency agreement and cooperate with the investigations.

### ***São Paulo Railway Transport Investigation***

In March 2014 — the same month that the details of Operation Car Wash first became public — the Office of the Prosecutor of the State of São Paulo indicted 30 individuals in connection with an alleged nationwide scheme involving cartel activity and bid collusion by numerous companies in the railway industry. Multiple Brazil-based affiliates of international companies allegedly engaged in bid-rigging and bid-rotation schemes to split the railway transport market and overinflate prices of public projects by up to 30%. The companies also allegedly paid bribes through lobbyists and agents to public officials and politicians who turned a blind eye to the scheme.

The São Paulo Prosecutor's Office initiated investigations in 2008 after *The Wall Street Journal* reported that France's Alstom was under investigation for improper payments in Brazil and other countries. The Prosecutor's Office reviewed projects awarded by state-controlled railway transport companies Companhia do Metropolitano de São Paulo ("CMSP") and Companhia Paulista de Trens Metropolitanos ("CPTM").

The investigations did not make any significant progress until 2013, when Siemens self-reported to CADE (Brazil's competition authority) and disclosed its role in the scheme. At the time, Siemens signed a leniency agreement and admitted that it had engaged in bid collusion and bribery together with other international contractors. CADE initiated formal proceedings in March 2013 against 18 companies in connection with such allegations: Alstom, Balfour Beatty, Bombardier, CAF, Caterpillar, Constech, Tejofran, Hyundai-Rotem, Iesa, MGE, Mitsui, MPE, Procont, Serveng-Civilsan, Siemens, TCBR, Temoinsa, and T'Trans.

Following the conclusion of its investigation, the Prosecutor's Office filed for the dissolution of the Brazilian branches of Siemens, Alstom, CAF, T'Trans, Bombardier, MGE, Tejofran, Temoinsa, Mitsui and MPE. As of December 2014, these applications were still pending. Separately, in December 2014, Brazilian federal police concluded their own investigation into the matter, which culminated in the indictment of 33 individuals. As of December 2014, CADE's investigation was still active.

### ***New Anti-Corruption Legislation Comes Into Effect***

On January 29, 2014 — less than two months prior to the first indictments under Operation Car Wash and the São Paulo Railway Transport investigations discussed above — Brazil's new Anti-Corruption Law (Law No. 12846/13) came into effect. The Anti-Corruption Law, for the first time, imposes administrative and civil liability on legal entities for corrupt or fraudulent conduct committed to the detriment of domestic or foreign public administration. It was drafted and submitted to Congress in 2010 by a group of federal agencies, mainly in response to Brazil's international commitments to fight corruption (such as the OECD Anti-

Bribery Convention and the UN Convention Against Corruption), and was intended not only to address the country's shortcomings with respect to punishing foreign bribery, but also to strengthen its domestic anti-corruption framework.

The Anti-Corruption Law applies to domestic legal entities and any foreign companies (incorporated or not) that have an office, branch, or representation in Brazil. It prohibits conduct encompassing: (i) offering or giving, directly or indirectly, an undue advantage to a domestic or foreign public official (including officers of any government branch or state-controlled companies, or international organizations) or a related third party; (ii) tampering with public tenders, including by rigging bids or defrauding public contract amendments or extensions; (iii) using third parties or shell companies to conceal corrupt acts; (iv) aiding or abetting the listed corrupt acts. Without prejudice to the liability of individuals, the law imposes administrative and civil liability on companies that engage in the aforementioned conduct.

In the administrative context, penalties include a monetary fine and publication of the conviction. The fines range from 0.1% to 20% of the company's gross revenues, or, when these are undetermined, from R\$6,000 to R\$60 million (approximately to \$2,700 to \$2.7 million), depending on the offender's financial situation. In either case, the Anti-Corruption Law specifies that the fine should not be less than the actual profit from the corrupt conduct. In determining the size of the fine, the law requires the administrative authority to take into account whether the company maintained and effectively implemented codes of ethics and internal control systems. In the civil context, penalties may include: (i) the disgorgement of profits and criminal proceeds; (ii) the suspension or partial revocation of the company's license to operate; (iii) the compulsory dissolution of the legal entity; (iv) the debarment from participating in tax benefit programs or receiving funding or loans from the government or state-controlled entities, from one to five years.

The Anti-Corruption Law also provides for the possibility of "leniency agreements," under which companies that effectively cooperate may avoid debarment sanctions and reduce the administrative monetary fine by up to two-thirds. To be eligible for such benefits, companies must self-disclose the violations, immediately cease any participation in the corrupt conduct, and admit to the wrongdoing. The leniency agreements are to be made public and provide for appropriate measures to ensure their effectiveness.

Finally, the Anti-Corruption Law also creates the National Register of Wrongdoing Companies, which will record and publicize all sanctions imposed by any government branch in connection with its provisions.

On October 29, 2014, the OECD commended Brazil on the enactment of the new Anti-Corruption Law, noting that it was "a significant step, provided it can be enforced effectively." The OECD recommended that the country issue the announced Presidential Decree that is required to properly enforce the law and which will provide further regulations with respect to sentencing guidelines and the specific requirements of an effective internal controls system.

## China

China has continued to increase its anti-corruption enforcement efforts through 2014 following the issuance of its “Five-Year Anti-Corruption Plan.” Since the beginning of the recent anti-corruption campaign, in which President Xi vowed to aggressively fight corruption committed by members of the political elite (“tigers”) and low-level bureaucrats (“flies”), more than 50 high-level officials in senior provincial and ministerial posts and thousands of lower-level cadres have been investigated for corruption and other serious disciplinary violations. According to some reports, over 53,000 officials were under investigation in China during 2014 alone, and more than 100,000 since the campaign began in November 2012. Current prosecutions include senior officials such as the former domestic security chief and member of the Politburo’s Standing Committee, the former vice president of China’s Military Commission, the former deputy head of the general office of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs, and the former vice minister of Public Security.

The campaign has had a dramatic effect. Analysts have estimated that China’s GDP could drop as much as 2% as Chinese officials refrain from purchasing luxury goods or real estate that might invite further scrutiny.

### *Operation Fox Hunt*

On November 17, 2014, as part of a campaign dubbed “Operation Fox Hunt” conducted in 56 countries, China arrested 288 fugitives suspected of committing economic crimes. The Chinese government, in exchange for possible mitigated punishment, gave overseas graft suspects a deadline of December 1 to surrender. According to news reports, 390 suspects surrendered by the end of 2014.

China’s ability to carry out the elaborate overseas operation was enhanced by its new willingness to cooperate with foreign authorities to fight corruption. Along with 20 other members from the Asia-Pacific region, China and the United States have agreed to increase asset recovery efforts, cooperate on the extradition of corrupt officials and put in place an anti-corruption transparency network to share intelligence on graft. The network, called the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation) Network of Anti-Corruption Authorities and Law Enforcement Agency, led by China, committed to “deny safe haven to those engaged in corruption, including through extradition, mutual legal assistance and the recovery and return of proceeds of corruption.”

China has already signed 51 mutual legal assistance agreements for criminal matters and 39 bilateral extradition treaties, according to the Ministry of Justice. In October 2014, Fairfax Media reported that Australian Federal Police were assisting Chinese authorities in seizing illicit assets. Canada and France have announced similar plans, although both initiatives will need to be approved by the Canadian and French Parliaments.

Given the significant reliance by U.S. and other authorities on mutual legal assistance to combat overseas corruption, any meaningful effort by China to provide and receive mutual legal assistance would be a significant development.

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***Enforcement Focus – GlaxoSmithKline***

On September 19, 2014, after a one-day secret trial, British pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline PLC (“GSK”) was found guilty of bribing non-government personnel in China and fined 3 billion yuan (approximately \$484 million) by the Changsa Intermediate People’s Court in Hunan province. The fine was the largest ever imposed by a Chinese court, and it brought what BBC China termed a “humiliating” conclusion to a sordid tale of sex tapes and slush funds, bribes and kickbacks, and a televised, groveling corporate apology to the Chinese state and people.

The court also found Mark Reilly, a U.K. citizen and the former head of GSK China, guilty of orchestrating the byzantine bribery scheme that relied on hundreds of travel agencies to funnel illicit payments to Chinese doctors and health officials to boost GSK drug sales. Reilly received a suspended three year prison sentence, four years of probation, and prompt deportation. Four other GSK executives — all Chinese nationals — received suspended prison sentences of two to four years for their role in the scheme. In a closely related matter, two principals of a local due diligence investigative firm hired by GSK China were sentenced to 2.5 years in prison each for violating Chinese privacy laws in the course of their investigation.

GSK’s troubles in China began in January 2013 when an anonymous whistleblower began sending emails to GSK’s board, top executives, and compliance officers alleging that GSK China sales personnel had provided Chinese doctors with cash payments, lavish dinners, and all-expenses-paid trips to Europe in exchange for prescribing the company’s drugs. Around the same time, Chinese police and the Chinese Ministry of Public Security began investigating suspicious activity at a Shanghai travel agency and traced a money laundering conspiracy involving tens of millions of dollars and spanning several years back to GSK China executives.

In March 2013, the whistleblower sent a sex video of Mark Reilly, recorded without his knowledge or consent from inside his Shanghai apartment bedroom, to GSK executives. GSK hired a due diligence firm, ChinaWhys, to investigate the source of the sex tape. ChinaWhys principals Peter Humphrey (a U.K. citizen) and his wife Yu Yingzeng (a Chinese-born American citizen) were arrested in July 2013 for violating Chinese privacy laws while investigating the sex tape. Following a trial the next year, Yu was sentenced to two years in prison, and Humphrey was sentenced to two and a half years in prison along with subsequent deportation.

In late June 2013, Chinese officials raided GSK China’s offices, and Reilly briefly fled to the U.K. before returning to cooperate with the Chinese investigation. Around the same time, Gao Feng, the head of the Ministry of Public Security’s Economic Crimes Investigations unit, claimed that GSK China salesmen had used over 700 different travel agencies to pay hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to Chinese doctors, hospitals, and medical associations. According to Gao, the travel agencies overbilled GSK China for meetings and events or created invoices for conferences that never took place so that GSK China executives were reimbursed with money that could be used for bribes. Furthermore, the share of the money allegedly skimmed off for the travel agencies was so lucrative that the various agencies would compete for the chance to take part in the scheme by offering kickbacks of cash, travel, and sex to GSK China executives. Gao

also confirmed that four Chinese GSK executives were being held as part of the investigation: Liang Hong (Vice President and operations manager of GSK China), Zhang Guowei (an HR director), Zhao Hongyan (a legal affairs director), and Huang Hong (a business development manager). Hong later appeared on Chinese television and confessed that up to 20-30% of the high prices for GSK drugs in China could be attributed to costs associated with paying bribes. Chinese authorities charged Reilly with running the elaborate scheme in May 2014.

Following its sentencing on September 19, 2014, GSK issued a press release stating that GSK China's illegal activities had been a clear breach of GSK governance and compliance procedures. GSK added that it had changed many of its procedures, including decoupling sales targets from compensation, reducing and changing engagement activities with healthcare professionals, and expanding the processes for review and monitoring of invoices and payments. On the same day, GSK posted a public apology to the Chinese government and the Chinese people on its website, stating that it "fully accept[ed] the facts and evidence of the investigation, and the verdict of the Chinese court." Xinhua, the official news agency of the Chinese government, reported that GSK and Reilly did not intend to appeal their sentences.

The investigation — given the wider Chinese anti-graft campaign, the public allegations, and the televised confession — dramatically impacted GSK China's business and sales. While analysts had predicted that sales might fall by 30% in the wake of the negative publicity, the final third quarter 2013 figures showed that its sales had plummeted by 61%.

### ***China's Enforcement Activities Are "Just The Beginning"***

China recently signaled the seriousness, breadth, and likely longevity of its effort through official statements and actions on the heels of the conclusion of the Fourth Plenum of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China ("Fourth Plenum"), held on October 23, 2014. The sustained nature of this effort gives companies operating in China a clear warning to re-evaluate whether they are properly attuned to their ethics and compliance-related risks given the rising tide of anti-corruption enforcement in China and the potentially severe consequences therefrom.

- *Fourth Plenum Focuses on Rule of Law*

The Fourth Plenum declared sweeping constitutional reforms of the judiciary. Reportedly, this was the first time the Central Committee has made the rule of law the focus of the plenum, and key points included: (i) greater separation between the courts and the Party, (ii) increased scrutiny of judicial decisions, and (iii) transparent public broadcasts and wider access to judicial opinions.

First, courts will remain separate from the Communist Party, as judges will be chosen from the legal profession rather than by ranks of Party members who have received no prior legal training. The introduction of professional lawyers who take part in a judiciary system focusing significantly on anti-corruption will increase the quality of judgment and may lead to more changes to the Constitution, other laws or regulations that further a systemic, long-term anti-corruption framework. Moreover, cross-administrative regional courts will be set up to diminish

the power of the local government in the legal system in order to prevent the corrupt use of local courts, judges and officials.

Second, the Fourth Plenum established that judges will have lifetime accountability for their major opinions given in court. This increase in scrutiny consequently bolsters the provisions in the Five-Year Reform Plan for greater impartiality in decision-making as it seeks to deter judges from issuing opinions under the influence of Party members, peers and supervisors.

Third, trial proceedings will be more transparent and subject to increased judicial opinions, which will be helpful in informing the public about officials involved in judicial cases. These new enforcement mechanisms and accountability measures will be set and shared on both a national and international level.

- *Recent Anti-Corruption Initiatives*

Following the Fourth Plenum, the head of the ruling Communist Party's Central Commission for Discipline Inspection ("CCDI") stressed that current anti-corruption enforcement efforts are "just the beginning;" in fact, the anti-corruption campaign for clean government "will never be concluded." He further warned that any complacency would be punished. "Any corrupt officials who go back to their old ways will pay the price," he cautioned. "We will keep pressing the anti-graft campaign, treating sick trees and rooting up rotten ones."

Reports on November 3, 2014, stated that China's Supreme People's Procuratorate ("SPP") will create a new anti-corruption agency. A deputy prosecutor explained that "the new agency will be better organized and better able to help the SPP handle major cases and break institutional obstacles." The agency will aid in President Xi's agenda to root out corruption in the government and the private sector. Specifically in accord with the Fourth Plenum, this agency will help China combat bribery, support whistleblowers, demand asset declarations from Chinese officials and create budget transparency.

With increased reliance on lawyers to fill judicial positions, China's legislature has released draft amendments to the Criminal Law to broaden and strengthen crimes and penalties related to corruption. The Draft Amendments would expand punishments for both bribe-receivers and bribe-givers and impose greater monetary fines. These amendments will be further facilitated by the strengthened judiciary's supervision and evaluation system. Recent initiatives demonstrate that the Fourth Plenum's comprehensive legal reforms have already begun and will continue to reinforce and boost President Xi's push to combat corruption.

Centers have opened throughout China to display morbid methods of torture historically used in imperial China to combat graft. Foreign multinational companies that do business in China may need to evaluate whether the risks and consequences of improper conduct in China are being adequately considered, especially because China's current anti-corruption enforcement approach, while not as macabre as the historical torture methods, remains very severe. Indeed, China still imposes the death penalty for serious corruption offenses, including against the former vice-mayors of Suzhou and Hangzhou, the former Chinese Railway Minister, and the former Communist Party chief in Chongqing.

## The European Union

### *European Commission Releases First Anti-Corruption Report*

In February 2014, the European Commission (the “Commission”) released its first Anti-Corruption Report, providing a broad overview of the state of anti-corruption regulation, prevention and enforcement across the European Union (the “EU”). Among other things, the Report discusses (i) general trends across the EU and identifies high risk areas and best practices, (ii) anti-corruption efforts in the context of public procurement, and (iii) the specific legislation, cases, trends, and areas of risk of each of the twenty-eight member states.

The Report follows the Commission’s June 2011 policy statement, in which it stated that it would issue such reports every two years “to monitor and assess Member States’ efforts against corruption, and consequently encourage more political engagement.” Importantly, the Commission had stated that it would use such reports to consider “the need for additional EU policy initiatives, including the approximation of criminal law in the field of corruption.”

- General Trends

The Anti-Corruption Report noted that most member states have set up “complex and sophisticated legal and institutional frameworks,” but it cautioned that “these alone do not necessarily lead to tangible results.” The Report detailed several categories of factors that have contributed to the lack of effective prevention and enforcement of anticorruption measures, including political obstacles, insufficient control mechanisms and prevention efforts, and repressed enforcement.

First, the Report discussed political obstacles such as a lack of coordinated strategies and centralized efforts to fight corruption, a lack of political will to follow through with prevention and enforcement strategies, lax regulation of political party funding, and a chronic lack of funding for counter-corruption agencies and institutions that results in ineffective monitoring, prosecution and sanctioning. As one example, the Report noted anti-corruption coordination efforts are impeded at a basic level due to the failure of member states to agree on a standardized EU-wide definition of what constitutes a “public official.”

Second, the Report provided that many member states were not doing enough to implement policies that would improve integrity, transparency and accountability in the public sector. While recognizing that preventive policies are difficult given the challenge in changing political and business cultures, the Report stated that such policies offered the best chance for long term success in the fight against corruption. Control mechanisms like asset disclosures by public officials (and the verification of these disclosures) and task forces to monitor conflicts of interest have yet to be introduced in all member states.

Third, the Report noted that although much of the implementing anti-corruption legislation meets the highest international standards, many member states were not devoting the time or resources to enforce the laws effectively. Even in states that did prosecute and sanction offenses, the processes were often inefficient, slow, and uncoordinated. The Report stated that

the most effective anti-corruption efforts are often in countries where specialized and flexible agencies have the tools to fast track investigations and prosecutions, are free from political interference, collaborate highly with other institutions, have access to extensive information, and are able to hire staff based purely on merit and skill. These same states also have the independent judiciaries necessary to quickly and effectively handle cases and impose sanctions.

The EU Anti-Corruption Report also detailed many high risk areas including petty corruption, corruption at the regional and local level, non-transparent financial sectors, and state-owned companies, as well as the industries of urban development and construction, healthcare, tax administration and environmental planning. Additionally, the Report found a correlation between corruption and lack of freedom of information, lack of whistleblower protection, and lack of transparency in lobbying. The Report also touched on the issue of foreign bribery and noted that “member states that effectively address corruption within their own borders often face challenges regarding the behavior of their companies abroad, especially in countries where corrupt practices are widespread.” The Report recognized that there are some best practices in this regard and defers to the OECD’s findings for those states that have been criticized for “insufficient or non-existent prosecution of foreign bribery, considering the risks their companies face abroad.”

- Public Procurement

The Commission found that despite the corruption risks associated with public procurement, member states continue to exercise weak oversight. Based on a review of select public procurement corruption cases, the Commission found that the most recurring risks were the “drafting of tailor-made specifications to favour certain bidders, splitting of public tender in smaller bids to avoid competitive procedures, conflicts of interest affecting various states of procedures and concerning not only procurement officials but also higher level of contracting authorities, disproportionate and unjustified selection criteria, unjustified exclusion of bidders, unjustified use of emergency procedures, inadequate analysis of situations where the bid price were too low, excessive reliance on the lowest price as the most important criteria [...] and unjustified exceptions from publication of bids.”

EU legislation to-date relating to public procurement has predominantly focused on ensuring equal access to tendering processes, increasing transparency at all stages of bidding, and standardizing certain aspects of public/private interaction during procurement. The Report notes that some of these regulations could serve as a foundation for future anti-corruption legislation.

With a view toward building its capacity to respond to fraud and corruption in the public procurement domain, the Commission proposed significant revisions to the Public Procurement Directives in 2011. If approved, new provisions would clearly define conflicts of interest for the first time in EU legislation, centralize data on corruption, fraud and conflicts of interest, tighten rules on the modification of contracts, broaden exclusion criteria and increase monitoring of concluded contracts. Additionally, the Commission’s proposal called for oversight monitoring

of the implementation of new procurement regulations, red flagging procedures and alert systems to detect fraud and corruption.

The Report contained a list of recommendations on public procurement which are outlined along the following three areas: (i) need for systematic use of corruption risk assessments within public procurement; (ii) implementation of high transparency standards for the entire procurement cycle as well as during contract implementation; (iii) strengthening of internal and external control mechanism for the entire procurement cycle as well as during contract implementation; (iv) exercising coherent overview and raising awareness about the need and know-how for prevention and detection of corrupt practices at all levels of public procurement; and (v) strengthening sanctioning regimes.

### ***French Anti-Corruption Laws***

On December 6, 2013, France enacted two new laws that introduced structural and substantive changes to the French anti-corruption environment. As discussed below, these laws sought in many ways to address criticisms of France's prior anti-corruption laws and enforcement efforts. Among other things, the laws created a new special prosecutor position to address financial crimes, granted standing to non-profit organizations to file complaints for corruption-related offenses, strengthened whistleblower protections, and sharply increased the fines for corrupting a foreign public official.

Though generally viewed as a marked improvement, France continues to face criticism with respect to certain aspects of its legal framework and its perceived lack of meaningful enforcement efforts to date.

- *The Context of France's Anti-Corruption Legislation*

The French anti-corruption framework was built on basis of two conventions: (i) the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions of December 17, 1997 ("the OECD Convention"), which France ratified on July 31, 2000, and (ii) the European Convention Against Corruption of European Officials or National Officials of Member States of the European Union of May 26, 1997, which it ratified on January 27, 1999.

As implementing legislation, France adopted the Law of June 30, 2000, which still represents the cornerstone of the French anti-corruption legal framework. This law inserted Articles 435-1, 435-2 and 435-3 into the Criminal Code (*Code pénal*). The new articles prohibited influence peddling as well as active or passive acts of corruption of foreign public officials, with sanctions including up to ten years' imprisonment and a maximum fine of €150,000. In 2005, France also prohibited active and passive bribery in the private sector, with the adoption of Articles 445-1 and 445-2 of the Criminal Code.

- Prior Criticism of Laws and Enforcement Efforts

Under Article 435-6 of the Criminal Code, the Public Prosecutor's office was the only entity with the jurisdiction to initiate an enforcement action. Critics, however, noted as early as 2004 that guidance from the executive branch of government, such as instructions from the Ministry of Justice not to prosecute in certain instances, could affect the number and quality of enforcement actions. In addition, the Code — like the FCPA — provided no private right of action, so that there existed no mechanism whereby individual plaintiffs, companies, or non-governmental organizations (“NGO”s) could file a complaint alleging a violation of an anti-bribery provision. The “statutory subordination of the Public Prosecutor's office to the executive by virtue of the very hierarchical internal organization presided over by the Ministry of Justice” was highlighted by the OECD as a major issue explaining the low number of criminal actions initiated by the Ministry of Justice.

There has also been criticism that France has not actively or aggressively enforced its anti-bribery laws. The first conviction for bribery of foreign public officials occurred only in September 2012, when French aerospace and defense company Safran was found guilty of active corruption and fined €500,000 for the bribery of Nigerian civil servants between 2000 and 2003 to win a €171 million contract for the supply of 70 million ID cards. Similarly, there has only been one major conviction of an individual in France for corruption of public officials.

The OECD's Phase 3 Report on the implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention in France published in October 2012 underlined that France did not “seem to have pursued criminal action in such cases as vigorously as expected.” Transparency International pointed to a “lack of adequate rules” for the protection of whistleblowers and urged French authorities to create a private right of action.

As a result of its insufficient regulatory framework and enforcement activities, France was ranked 22nd on Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index for 2013, a distant rank compared other European Union countries such as Denmark (1st), Sweden (3rd), the Netherlands (8th) and Germany (12th). Transparency International France also proposed ten “priority recommendations” in favor of creating a more robust anti-corruption environment in its 2013 Report on France. Key recommendations included the implementation of a genuine reform of the French judicial system in view of securing its independence and the creation of an independent authority in charge of compiling and addressing whistleblowing alerts from all citizens.

- Amendments of December 2013

The first of the two new laws (n°2013-1115) created a new special Prosecutor with jurisdiction over financial crimes and corruption-related offenses (*procureur de la République financier*). The idea of appointing the special Prosecutor originated with President François Hollande, who announced the creation of a public prosecutor's department specializing in white collar crime in light of the embezzlement scandal involving Budget Minister Jérôme Cahuzac in

early 2013. The first Prosecutor was appointed on February 1, 2014, whose precise duties and scope of authority are envisioned to include “complex cases” related to fraud and corruption.

The second law (n°2013-1117) added a number of substantive changes directly responding to the shortcomings identified by the OECD and Transparency International. The law inserted a new Article 2-23 into the Criminal Procedure Code (*Code de procédure pénale*) to grant standing to non-profit anti-corruption organizations to file a complaint with an investigating magistrate in cases of alleged violations of the foreign bribery provisions. This provision ended the monopoly of French prosecutors on prosecuting offences of foreign bribery under the former Article 435-6 of the Criminal Code, which was deleted by the new law. Article 2-23 is the direct result of the advocacy of anti-corruption associations, which had expressed concerns regarding the perceived lack of independence of the original Prosecutor’s office and the insufficient political will to investigate certain cases.

The new law modified Article 435-1 of the Criminal Code, which now provides for increased individual fines for offenses such as corruption of a foreign public official and influence peddling to a new maximum of €1,000,000, which can be increased to double the financial benefits gained through the violation. Corporate fines were increased to a new maximum of €5,000,000, which could be increased to ten times the illicit proceeds. At the same time, Article 324-6-1 of the Criminal Code halves prison sentences for a person who is committing, or assisting with committing, a foreign bribery offense in instances where the person notifies an administrative or judicial authority and thereby enables the misconduct to be stopped or identified other individuals involved.

The new law also provides improved protection for whistleblowers through the creation of Article L1132-3-3 in the Labor Code (*Code du travail*). The text prohibits any state-owned or private companies from sanctioning, terminating or discriminating against any employees that have testified, in good faith, of offenses related to their professional duties.

- *Remaining Criticisms*

In a report released on January 27, 2014, the Council of Europe Group of States against Corruption (GRECO) welcomed the “recent reforms in the prevention of corruption in France,” but nevertheless noted “that important gaps remain in the rules and regulations applicable to parliamentarians, judges and prosecutors.”

Similarly, the OECD commended France on these “significant reforms,” but noted that “there exists no sufficiently convincing practice that [the OECD’s] recommendations are being fully implemented.” Among other things, the OECD noted that while private anti-corruption organizations could file civil party claims, the Public Prosecutor’s Office could only launch an enforcement action with respect to offenses committed outside France if the victim filed a complaint or the foreign authority made an official accusation. The OECD also criticized France for failing to enact any amendments to ensure that the country’s “blocking statute” does not raise obstacles to investigations conducted by other regulators.

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### ***Enforcement Focus – SBM Offshore***

On November 12, 2014, SBM Offshore Group (“SBM”), a Dutch manufacturer of floating production systems for the oil and gas industry, agreed to pay \$240 million in fines and disgorgement to the Dutch Public Prosecutor’s Office (“Openbaar Ministerie”) to resolve allegations that it had made improper payments to public officials through third-party sales agents in Equatorial Guinea, Angola, and Brazil.

SBM first publicly disclosed in April 2012 that it had “become aware of certain sales practices involving third parties and which may have been improper.” The company provided updates on its own internal investigation in March 2013, indicating that improper payments had been made “involving sales intermediaries in certain African countries,” but that the company was also reviewing allegations of improper payments “in countries outside Africa.”

- *February 2014 Wikipedia Modification*

The investigation attracted widespread international attention in early February 2014, however, after the Wikipedia entry on SBM was modified — apparently by a disgruntled, former SBM employee — to include detailed allegations of improper behavior by SBM throughout the world. (A similar modification that had been made in October 2013 had been quickly deleted and largely went unnoticed.) Various media outlets, including Reuters and *The Wall Street Journal*, reported on the lengthy allegations that detailed alleged names, dates, and telephone recordings, as well as a chronology of events purporting to confirm the corrupt activity and an internal cover-up by SBM executives.

On February 7, 2014, following two days in which SBM’s stock had lost 15% of its value, the company issued another press release to address the situation. SBM stated that the modified Wikipedia entry “shows great similarity to an e-mail attachment the Company received from a former employee shortly before the publication was [first] posted online” in October 2013. The company stated that the former employee attempted to extort SBM by threatening to disclose the information unless the company paid him €3 million — which SBM refused to do. The company clarified that its investigation centered on potentially improper payments in two countries in Africa (later identified as Angola and Equatorial Guinea) and one country outside of Africa (later identified as Brazil).

- *Equatorial Guinea and Angola*

According to the Openbaar Ministerie press release, SBM’s sales agents funneled payments to government officials in Equatorial Guinea and Angola. Between 2007 and 2011, SBM had paid its sales agent in Equatorial Guinea approximately \$18.8 million. The Equatorial Guinea sales agent provided that money to other third parties who paid it to one or more government officials. The Dutch enforcement agency stated that other payments were made for education and health insurance expenses, and it noted initial allegations that the agent had purchased cars and a building for government officials as well. The Openbaar Ministerie found that a number of then-SBM employees — including one member of the SBM Management Board — had knowledge of these payments at the time that they were made.

During the same time period, SBM paid approximately \$22.7 million to several sales agents in Angola. These sales agents funneled portions of this money directly to Angolan government officials or their associates and used other portions to pay for travel and educational expenses for government officials and their relatives. The Openbaar Ministerie found that several SBM employees had knowledge of these payments at the time they were made.

- Brazil

SBM paid approximately \$139.1 million in commissions to several Brazilian sales agents between 2007 and 2011. During its internal investigation, SBM discovered several red flags regarding its main Brazilian sales agent, including that: (i) high amounts of commissions had been paid to the sales agent, (ii) separate payments had been made to the sales agent's Brazilian and off-shore entities, and (iii) documents suggested that the Brazilian agent possessed confidential information about a Brazilian client.

In detailing the results of its internal investigation in April 2014, however, SBM stated that "it did not find any credible evidence that payments had been made directly or indirectly to government officials." Similarly, Petrobras had launched its own internal investigation in response to the allegations in the modified Wikipedia entry and reported in March 2014 that it had found no evidence of bribery in SBM contracts.

The Dutch Fiscal Intelligence and Investigation Service ("FIOD"), however, obtained evidence through an MLAT request that established that the sales agent had made payments to Brazilian government officials from its offshore entities. Following the revelations of the Dutch investigation, Petrobras forbid SBM from bidding on future contracts. Brazilian authorities continue to make arrests in the country as part of its sweeping "Operation Car Wash."

- Settlement: The Dutch Perspective

Although Dutch authorities do not appear to have ever formally charged SBM, the Openbaar Ministerie stated that the improper payments constituted indictable offenses. The enforcement agency explained, however, that it had offered SBM an out-of-court settlement in lieu of prosecution primarily because of SBM's extensive self-reporting and remediation efforts.

The Openbaar Ministerie specifically noted that:

- SBM self-reported to the Openbaar Ministerie, investigated the matter itself, and fully cooperated with investigations by the FIOD and Openbaar Ministerie.
- In 2012, after discovering the illegal payments, the SBM Supervisory Board entirely replaced the existing SBM Management Board.
- The new SBM Management Board has, of its own initiative, improved SBM's anti-corruption compliance program and related internal controls by appointing a Chief Governance and Compliance Officer to the Management Board, hiring a Compliance Director, increasing training for all employees in compliance-

sensitive positions, disciplining employees who were involved with or had knowledge of improper payments, enhancing reporting procedures, reviewing all active sales agents for possible improprieties, and completely overhauling SBM's sales agent policies so that sales agents must contractually commit to SBM's compliance policies and are no longer hired in countries where SBM has a substantial presence.

- The Supervisory Board and current Management Board have publicly expressed their regret for the failure of SBM's previous control mechanisms.
- SBM agreed to give the Openbaar Ministerie access to its continued remediation efforts.

The Openbaar Ministerie also noted that, while it lacked the jurisdiction to prosecute certain non-Dutch individuals who had committed criminal offences outside of the territory of the Netherlands, it would cooperate fully with the authorities in the countries that do have jurisdiction over those individuals.

### **Norway**

Norway has seen an increased level of anti-corruption investigation and enforcement activity in 2014, with several partly state-owned entities coming under the scrutiny of the Norwegian National Authority for Investigation and Prosecution of Economic and Environmental Crime ("Økokrim").

In addition to the actions and investigations against Yara International and Kongsberg Gruppen (discussed immediately below), Økokrim has also assisted U.S., Dutch, and Swiss authorities in connection with an investigation of VimpelCom, of which the Norwegian majority state-owned telecommunications company Telenor owns 33%. The VimpelCom investigation is discussed further below under Non-U.S. Investigations and Settlements of Note.

#### ***Enforcement Focus – Yara International***

In January 2014, Yara International ASA ("Yara"), a Norwegian chemical company and one of the world's largest fertilizer producers, admitted corporate criminal liability for paying and agreeing to pay over \$8 million in bribes to public officials in Libya and India. As part of its settlement with Økokrim, Yara accepted to pay NOK 295 million (approximately \$48.5 million at the time) — the largest corporate penalty ever imposed on a corporation in Norway. Yara is partially owned by the Norwegian government, which holds around 36% of its shares.

Økokrim also indicted four former senior executives: former CEO Thorleif Enger, former Head of Upstream Tor Holba, former Head of Operations Daniel Clauw, and former Chief Legal Counsel Kendric Wallace, all of whom served in key leadership roles when the alleged improprieties occurred. Charges against former CFO Hallgeir Storvik have since been dropped. Each of the defendants has denied wrongdoing. The former executives' trial has been set for January 5, 2015, and is slated to last for three months.

Yara admitted that it had paid bribes to public officials in Libya and India in connection with the creation of joint ventures in those countries with state-owned entities between 2006 and 2007. In April 2007, Yara entered into a 50/50 joint venture with Indian company Kribhco, which was at the time 67% state-owned. The same month, Yara entered into a 50/50 joint venture with the National Oil Corporation of Libya.

According to the Norwegian prosecutors, in 2007, Wallace agreed to pay over \$5 million in bribes to Mohamed Ghanem, the son of former Libyan Oil Minister Shukri Ghanem, in connection with negotiations of the joint venture between Yara and Libya's National Oil Corporation. Enger, Holba and Clauw each allegedly approved the deal. (Shukri Ghanem was found dead in the Danube River in 2012 after the tumultuous Arab Spring upheavals in Libya.)

Similarly, the Norwegian prosecutors further allege that Clauw and Wallace agreed in 2007 to pay an initial bribe of \$250,000 — which later increased to \$ 3 million — to a relative of an Indian official in connection with the negotiations on a joint venture between Yara and Kribhco. Enger allegedly approved the deal.

Holba has indicated that he informed the former CEO and his successor, Mr. Jørgen Ole Haslestad, about requests for improper payments, but added that Haslestad did not report the matter to the police until *Dagens Næringsliv* (DN), a leading Norwegian financial newspaper, alleged over two years later that Yara had made corrupt payments. Yara initiated an internal investigation into these facts in 2011 and reported the findings to Økokrim.

According to statements by prosecutors from Økokrim, the investigation of Yara is the most significant and complex corruption investigation conducted by the agency to date, and involved significant cross-border cooperation and coordination with enforcement agencies in France, Brazil, Switzerland, the British Virgin Islands and the United States.

### ***Investigation Focus – Kongsberg Gruppen***

On February 25, 2014, Norwegian company Kongsberg Gruppen ASA (“Kongsberg”) issued a press release and disclosed that Økokrim had launched an investigation of Kongsberg into allegations of corruption. Kongsberg is a technology corporation that is partially owned by the Norwegian government (50%). Through its various subsidiaries, the company provides services in the defense, maritime, oil and gas, and aerospace industries.

Kongsberg provided further details about the investigation in its 2013 annual report (issued in April 2014), noting that Økokrim had charged the company — as well as its subsidiary Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace AS (“Kongsberg Defence”) and an unnamed Kongsberg Defence employee — “with allegations of serious corruption related to deliveries of communication equipment to Romania from 2003 to 2008.” According to an article by *The Wall Street Journal*, the transactions in question involved several Romanian ministries.

In a press release, CEO Walter Qvam stated that Økokrim had searched Kongsberg's headquarters and Asker office, but neither he nor Økokrim would confirm whether the enforcement agency seized any materials. According to *The Wall Street Journal*, Qvam

explained at the same press release that Kongsberg had conducted its own internal investigation into the allegations, but decided in 2013 that there was not sufficient evidence to notify the authorities or warrant other further action.

Kongsberg has stated that it is cooperating with Økokrim “to clarify the actual circumstances” and noted that “it must be expected to take time before the case can be closed.” The company’s quarterly reports issued throughout the remainder of 2014 confirmed that it was continuing to cooperate, and noted that it is not aware of “any new factors that would change the Board’s assessment of the case.”

Under the Norwegian Penal Code, individuals who have been convicted of “gross corruption” can be punished with a maximum prison term of ten years. The code provides that whether a corruption offense constitutes “gross corruption” depends on factors such as whether the criminal act resulted in a considerable economic advantage or whether false accounting documents had been prepared, among other things. Corporations are liable for fines.

## FCPA ELEMENTS AND PENALTIES

The FCPA has two fundamental components: (1) the Anti-Bribery Provisions in Section 30A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”)<sup>2</sup> and in Title 15, United States Code,<sup>3</sup> and (2) the Books and Records and Internal Accounting Control Provisions in Sections 13(b)(2)(A)<sup>4</sup> and 13(b)(2)(B)<sup>5</sup> of the Exchange Act, respectively (collectively, the “Accounting Provisions”). The DOJ has exclusive jurisdiction to prosecute criminal violations of the FCPA, while the DOJ and the SEC share jurisdiction over civil enforcement actions.

### *Anti-Bribery Provisions*

The FCPA’s Anti-Bribery Provisions prohibit: (i) an act in furtherance of (ii) a payment, offer or promise of, (iii) anything of value, (iv) to a foreign official,<sup>6</sup> or any other person while knowing that such person will provide all or part of the thing of value to a foreign official, (v) with corrupt intent, (vi) for the purpose of either (a) influencing an official act or decision, (b) inducing a person to do or omit an act in violation of his official duty, (c) inducing a foreign official to use his influence with a foreign government to affect or influence any government decision or action, or (d) securing an improper advantage, (vii) to assist in obtaining or retaining business.<sup>7</sup>

The term “foreign official” is broadly defined to mean any officer or employee of a foreign government, agency or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, or any person acting in an official capacity on behalf of such government, department, agency, or instrumentality, or public international organization.<sup>8</sup> The term foreign official has been construed by federal prosecutors to include employees, even relatively low-level employees, of state-owned institutions.

Under the FCPA, “a person’s state of mind is ‘knowing’ with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or result” if he or she has actual knowledge of the conduct, circumstance or result or “a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur.”<sup>9</sup> In addition, knowledge of a circumstance can be found when there is a “high probability” of the existence of such circumstance.<sup>10</sup> According to the legislative history,

[T]he Conferees agreed that “simple negligence” or “mere foolishness” should not be the basis for liability. However, the

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<sup>2</sup> Codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a).

<sup>3</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(a), 78dd-3(a).

<sup>4</sup> Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).

<sup>5</sup> Codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).

<sup>6</sup> The FCPA further prohibits payments to foreign political parties and officials thereof.

<sup>7</sup> See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a).

<sup>8</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(1).

<sup>9</sup> *Id.*

<sup>10</sup> See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(f)(2)(B).

Conferees also agreed that the so called “head-in-the-sand” problem — variously described in the pertinent authorities as “conscious disregard,” “willful blindness” or “deliberate ignorance” — should be covered so that management officials could not take refuge from the Act’s prohibitions by their unwarranted obliviousness to any action (or inaction), language or other “signaling [*sic*] device” that should reasonably alert them of the “high probability” of an FCPA violation.<sup>11</sup>

Since the 1977 enactment of the FCPA, the Anti-Bribery Provisions have applied to U.S. and foreign issuers of securities that registered their securities with or reported to the SEC and to domestic concerns such as U.S. citizens and companies organized under U.S. law or with a principal place of business in the United States, if the U.S. mails or a means or instrumentalities of U.S. interstate commerce (such as an interstate wire transfer) were used in furtherance of the anti-bribery violation.<sup>12</sup> In 1998, amendments to the Anti-Bribery Provisions generally extended U.S. jurisdiction to cover acts outside of U.S. territory in furtherance of an anti-bribery violation by U.S. issuers and domestic concerns and acts inside U.S. territory in furtherance of an anti-bribery violation by other persons, such as foreign non-issuers and foreign nationals, who were not previously subject to the FCPA.<sup>13</sup> Such extended jurisdiction is not dependent upon the use of U.S. mails or means or instrumentalities of U.S. interstate commerce.<sup>14</sup>

The FCPA also applies to officers, directors, employees, or agents of any organization subject to the FCPA and to stockholders acting on behalf of any such organization.<sup>15</sup>

### ***The Exception and Defenses to Alleged Anti-Bribery Violations***

Under the FCPA, facilitating payments “to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine governmental action” are excepted from the Anti-Bribery Provisions.<sup>16</sup> This is a narrow exception, only applying to non-discretionary acts such as obtaining official documents or securing utility service and not applying to any decision to award or continue business with a particular party.<sup>17</sup> Also, its practical effect is limited because many other jurisdictions and international conventions do not permit facilitation payments.

There are two affirmative defenses to the FCPA. Under the “written law” defense, it is an affirmative defense to an FCPA prosecution if the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value that is at issue was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the recipient’s

<sup>11</sup> H.R. Rep. No. 100-576, at 920 (1987) (Conf. Rep.), *reprinted in* 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1953.

<sup>12</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 78dd-2(a).

<sup>13</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i), 78dd-3(a).

<sup>14</sup> *Id.*

<sup>15</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), (g), 78dd-2(a), (i), 78dd-3(a).

<sup>16</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(b), 78dd-2(b), 78dd-3(b).

<sup>17</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(B), 78dd-2(h)(4)(B), 78dd-3(f)(4)(B).

country.<sup>18</sup> It is also an affirmative defense if the payment, gift, offer, or promise of anything of value was a reasonable, *bona fide* expenditure directly related either to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services, or to the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency.<sup>19</sup> Both defenses, however, are narrow in practice and, because they are affirmative defenses, it would be the defendant's burden to prove their applicability in the face of an FCPA prosecution.

### ***Accounting Provisions***

The FCPA's Accounting Provisions apply to issuers who have securities registered with the SEC or who file reports with the SEC.<sup>20</sup> The Books and Records Provisions compel such issuers to make and keep books, records and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer.<sup>21</sup> The Internal Accounting Controls Provisions require such issuers to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls regarding accounting for assets, enabling the preparation of financial statements, and providing reasonable assurances that management authorizes transactions and controls access to assets.<sup>22</sup> As used in the Accounting Provisions, "reasonable detail" and "reasonable assurances" mean a level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs.<sup>23</sup>

### ***Penalties***

The FCPA imposes both criminal and civil penalties. Willful violations of the Anti-Bribery Provisions carry maximum criminal fines of \$2 million for organizations and \$250,000 for individuals, per violation.<sup>24</sup> Under U.S. criminal law, alternative fines of up to twice the pecuniary gain from the offense apply instead, if the alternative fine exceeds the maximum fine under the FCPA.<sup>25</sup> Individuals also face up to five years' imprisonment for willful violations of the Anti-Bribery violations.<sup>26</sup> Anti-bribery violations also carry civil penalties of up to \$16,000

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<sup>18</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1), 78dd-3(c)(1).

<sup>19</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2), 78dd-3(c)(2).

<sup>20</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2). The Accounting Provisions were passed as part of the original 1977 FCPA legislation out of concern over companies improperly recording payments on their books and records and failing to fully account for illicit "slush" funds, from which improper payments could be made. These provisions, however, have broader application than simply within the context of the FCPA. For purposes of this Alert, when violations of these provisions are alleged in the context of improper payments to foreign officials or similar conduct, they are referred to as violations of the FCPA's Accounting Provisions. When violations occur in situations not involving improper payments (*see, e.g.*, the Willbros Group settlement discussed *infra*), they are described as the Exchange Act's books and records and/or internal controls provisions.

<sup>21</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A).

<sup>22</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B).

<sup>23</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7).

<sup>24</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c), 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3), (e).

<sup>25</sup> 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), (e).

<sup>26</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(2)(A), 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), 78dd-3(e)(2)(A).

for organizations or individuals, per violation.<sup>27</sup> These fines may not be paid by a person's employer or principal.<sup>28</sup>

Willful violations of the Accounting Provisions carry maximum criminal fines of \$25 million for organizations and \$5 million for individuals, or, if greater, the alternative fine of twice the pecuniary gain.<sup>29</sup> Individuals face up to 20 years' imprisonment for willful violations of the Accounting Provisions.<sup>30</sup> Civil penalties for violations of the Accounting Provisions include disgorgement of any ill-gotten gains and penalties up to \$775,000 for organizations and \$160,000 for individuals, per violation, in actions brought by the SEC.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>27</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c), 78dd-2(g), 78dd-3(e); *see* DOJ & SEC, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT (2012) (indicating that the maximum civil penalty for an anti-bribery provision violation is \$16,000, but citing the SEC's announcement of the adjustment for issuers subject to SEC enforcement without citing to a parallel DOJ announcement for domestic concerns and other persons).

<sup>28</sup> 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(3), 78dd-2(g)(3), 78dd-3(e)(3).

<sup>29</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a); 18 U.S.C. § 3571(d), (e).

<sup>30</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).

<sup>31</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3), (5); *see* 17 C.F.R. § 201.1005, Table V (2013) (adjusting the amounts for inflation).

## FCPA SETTLEMENTS AND CRIMINAL MATTERS<sup>32</sup>

2014<sup>33</sup>

### *Alstom S.A.*

On December 22, 2014, the DOJ resolved its investigation of Alstom S.A., a French multinational design, construction, and services company in the power generation, power grid, and rail transport sectors. Alstom S.A. paid a \$772,290,000 criminal fine and pleaded guilty to criminal books and records and criminal internal accounting controls violations. A Swiss subsidiary, Alstom Network Schweiz AG (f/k/a Alstom Prom AG), pleaded guilty to a criminal conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. Two U.S. subsidiaries, Alstom Power Inc. and Alstom Grid Inc., each entered DPAs related to criminal informations charging them with conspiracies to violate the bribery provisions. Alstom is permitted to self-report to the DOJ regarding its compliance program, rather than have an independent compliance monitor, provided that it satisfies certain compliance-program related elements of its current settlement with the World Bank Group (under which Alstom had already been subject to an independent compliance monitor).

Alstom S.A.'s fine was, according to its plea agreement with the DOJ, in the middle of the Guidelines' recommended sentencing range and was based on five factors: (1) the failure to self-report after a 2008 criminal resolution in Italy, (2) the failure to meaningfully cooperate until after the U.S. arrested former executives, (3) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, (4) the lack of an effective compliance program at the time of the misconduct, and (5) prior criminal misconduct, including that underlying prior settlements with the Swiss Attorney General and the World Bank Group. The DOJ noted, however, that—

The Defendant lacked an effective compliance and ethics program at the time of the offense. Since that time, the Defendant has undertaken substantial efforts to enhance its compliance program and to remediate prior inadequacies, including complying with undertakings contained in resolutions with the World Bank (including an ongoing monitorship) and the government of Switzerland, substantially increasing its compliance staff, improving its alert procedures,

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<sup>32</sup> Hughes Hubbard represents or has represented multiple companies who have been the subject of the enforcement actions or other activities summarized in this Alert. All details and information provided in this Alert in connection with such enforcement actions, however, are based solely on the government's charging documents or other publicly available documents. Additionally, all descriptions of allegations underlying the settlements (or other matters such as ongoing criminal cases) discussed in this Alert are not intended to endorse or confirm those allegations, particularly to the extent that they relate to other, non-settling entities or individuals.

<sup>33</sup> Cases and settlements have been organized by the date of the first significant charging or settlement announcement.

increasing training and auditing/testing, and ceasing the use of external success fee-based consultant.

The Alstom S.A. plea agreement provides several examples of criminal books and records or internal control violations that occurred prior to Alstom's substantial efforts to enhance its compliance program and remediate prior inadequacies. Alstom S.A. was subject to these provisions of the FCPA from its 1998 listing on the New York Stock Exchange until its delisting in August 2004.

Regarding the books and records violation, Alstom admitted in its plea agreement that it disguised on its books and records millions of dollars in payments and other things of value given to foreign officials in exchange for those officials' assistance in securing projects, keeping projects, or otherwise gaining other improper advantages. In some instances, Alstom hired consultants to "conceal and disguise" such payments and recorded the payments as "commissions" or "consultancy fees." Alstom created, or caused to be created, false records to justify these payments in the form of consultancy agreements for purportedly legitimate services and in the form of false invoices and supporting documentation, even when Alstom employees knew that such services were not actually performed. Alstom also falsely recorded improper payments made directly by Alstom as "consultant expenses," "donations," or other purportedly legitimate expenses.

Regarding the criminal internal accounting controls violation, Alstom admitted to knowingly failing to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure compliance with corporate policies prohibiting direct or indirect unlawful payments to foreign officials. These internal accounting controls failures included:

- Failing to implement and maintain adequate controls to ensure meaningful due diligence for the retention of third-party consultants;
- Retaining consultants without meaningful scrutiny even after due diligence uncovered "red flags," such as a proposed consultant's lack of relevant expertise, a proposed consultant's location in a country other than the project country, or a proposed consultant's request to be paid in a country other than the country where the consultant and the project were located;
- Certain executives who "had the ability to ensure appropriate controls surrounding the due diligence process" either "knew, or knowingly failed to take action that would have allowed them to discover" that the purpose of hiring certain consultants was to conceal payments to foreign officials;
- Failing to implement adequate controls over the approval of consultancy agreements, such that inadequate scrutiny was given to changes to the amount and terms of payments to consultants, made in violation of the company's own internal policies in order to make cash available to bribe foreign officials;

- Failing to implement adequate controls over payments to consultants, such that payments were made in multiple instances without adequate or timely documentation of the services performed or based on false “proofs of services” prepared long after the purported services were rendered; and
- Failing to engage in auditing or testing of consultant invoices or payments.

Regarding the bribery conspiracy to which Alstom Network Schweiz pleaded guilty and that was the basis for the criminal informations filed against the two U.S. subsidiaries, Alstom admitted that it paid “approximately \$75 million in consultancy fees knowing that this money would be used, in whole or in part, to bribe or provide something of value to government officials to secure approximately \$4 billion in projects in multiple countries, with a gain to Alstom of approximately \$296 million.” The admitted misconduct involved conduct in the power sector in Indonesia (2002-2009), Saudi Arabia (1998-2003), and the Bahamas (1999-2004), the power and grid sectors in Egypt (2002-2011), and the transport sector in Taiwan (2001-2008). Alstom’s admitted misconduct in Indonesia is related to the same power project underlying the DOJ’s prior resolution with Marubeni and the DOJ’s prosecution against several former Alstom executives, discussed immediately below.

- Individual Prosecutions

On April 14, 2013, U.S. authorities arrested Alstom vice president Frederic Pierucci at New York’s John F. Kennedy International Airport. Following his arrest, the criminal indictment that a grand jury had returned against Pierucci nearly six months before was unsealed. The indictment charged Pierucci with 10 separate offenses, alleged to have occurred when he held executive-level positions at a U.S. subsidiary of Alstom and other entities in the Alstom Group. The charged offenses are (i) four payments totaling \$360,000 to a U.S. consultant in connection with a project in Indonesia that allegedly violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery provision applicable to domestic concerns, (ii) alleged participation in a criminal conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions, (iii) an alleged money laundering offense for each of the four payments, and (iv) participation in an alleged conspiracy to commit money laundering. Pierucci pleaded guilty to two counts of the ten count indictment (including violating and conspiracy to violate the FCPA) on July 29, 2013. His sentencing that had been scheduled for December 10, 2014 was continued. As of December 31, 2014, no new sentencing date had been set, and Pierucci was in France on temporary release.

On April 30, 2013, a grand jury returned a superseding indictment against Pierucci that added another former Alstom vice president of the U.S. subsidiary, William Pomponi, as a co-defendant. A second superseding indictment dated July 30, 2013 charged Pomponi as well as former Alstom senior vice president Lawrence Hoskins with six counts of violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and four counts of money laundering violations, as well as counts of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and commit money laundering violations. Pomponi pleaded guilty on July 17, 2014 to one count of conspiracy; his sentencing has been continued until the conclusion of the trial against Hoskins, which is scheduled for June 2015.

Additionally, on April 16, 2013, a November 2012 plea agreement with a former Alstom vice president of sales for the same U.S. subsidiary was unsealed. David Rothschild pleaded guilty to a single criminal conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. Like Pierucci and Pomponi, Rothschild admitted to participating in the conspiracy and that, in furtherance of the conspiracy, he and others had engaged in telephone and electronic mail communications to bribe Indonesian officials in order to obtain a contract on the Tarahan project from the state-owned electricity company Perusahaan Listrik Negara ("PLN"). Rothschild also admitted that corrupt payments were made to Indonesian officials through two consultants, one of whom received wire transfers from the company to a U.S. bank account in Maryland.

Alstom had previously disclosed on May 26, 2010 that certain companies or current and former employees had been or were currently being investigated with respect to allegedly improper payments in various countries, and that these investigations could result in fines, exclusion from public tenders, and third-party actions. Alstom disclosed that these investigations included an investigation by the World Bank and the European Investment Bank. In February 2012, the World Bank announced the three-year debarment of Alstom Hydro France and Alstom Network Schweiz AG (Switzerland) along with their affiliates as part of a Negotiated Resolution Agreement between Alstom and the World Bank related to an alleged improper payment in connection with a World Bank-financed project. Alstom further agreed to make a restitution payment of \$9.5 million.

- *Other Actions*

On July 24, 2014, the U.K. Serious Fraud Office ("SFO") announced that it had commenced preliminary criminal proceedings against Alstom Network UK Ltd. in connection with activities which took place between 2000 and 2006 involving contracts for transport projects in India, Poland, and Tunisia.

### ***Bruker Corporation***

On December 15, 2014, Bruker Corporation ("Bruker"), a NASDAQ-listed, Massachusetts-based manufacturer of life-sciences instruments, settled allegations with the SEC that it had violated the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. The SEC entered a cease-and-desist order, concluding its investigation and the resulting administrative proceeding. Under the terms of the settlement, Bruker agreed to pay \$2.4 million, including \$1.7 million in disgorgement, \$310,000 in prejudgment interest, and a civil monetary penalty of \$375,000.

According to the SEC, Bruker's failure to implement internal controls at the offices of its four Chinese subsidiaries (collectively the "Bruker China Offices") allowed the Bruker China Offices to make unlawful payments of approximately \$230,938 to Chinese government officials employed at State Owned Enterprises ("SOEs") that were Bruker customers. These payments were allegedly entered into the Bruker China Offices' books and records falsely as legitimate business and marketing expenses and consolidated into Bruker's books and records. Bruker neither admitted nor denied the charges.

According to the SEC, the Bruker China Offices paid approximately \$230,938 to several Chinese government officials from 2005 through 2011 in order to increase Bruker's sales. Approximately half of these alleged payments related to vacations for government officials to the United States, the Czech Republic, Norway, Sweden, France, Germany, Switzerland, and Italy. According to the SEC, Bruker improperly profited by \$1,131,740 from contracts obtained from SOEs whose officials participated in these trips.

Some of these trips followed business-related travel funded by the Bruker China Offices. For instance, in 2006 as part of a sales contract with a Chinese SOE, the Bruker China Offices paid for training for the government official who signed the sales contract on behalf of the SOE. However, in addition to the training, the Bruker China Offices paid the government official's expenses related to sightseeing, shopping and leisure activities in Paris and Frankfurt. Similarly, in 2007, the Bruker China Offices paid for certain Chinese government officials to attend a conference in Sweden, but also leisure travel in Sweden, Finland, and Norway.

In other instances, the trips had no legitimate business component at all, including one instance in 2009 where the Bruker China Offices paid for two Chinese government officials to visit New York and Los Angeles even though Bruker had no facilities there.

The other half of the alleged payments were made through twelve Collaboration Agreements between the Bruker China Offices and SOEs. Under the Collaboration Agreements, SOEs allegedly were required to provide research on Bruker products, however the SEC alleged that the Bruker China Offices paid the SOEs regardless of whether they provided any work product. In some cases, the Bruker China Offices allegedly made these payments directly to the government officials rather than to the SOEs. According to the SEC, the Bruker China Offices profited by approximately \$582,112 from contracts obtained from SOEs whose officials received these payments.

During this period, the SEC alleges that Bruker's internal controls system was completely inadequate. According to the SEC, Bruker did not translate any of its compliance materials including FCPA trainings, ethics trainings, FCPA policy, Code of Conduct, or its toll-free employee reporting hotline into local languages, including Mandarin. Furthermore, according to the SEC, the Bruker China Offices had no independent compliance or internal audit staff to monitor the activities of Bruker's management in China.

Bruker discovered the improper payments in 2011 during an internal review of certain of the Bruker China Office's employees. Upon discovery, Bruker immediately alerted its board of directors, initiated an internal investigation, and self-reported the preliminary results of the investigation to both the DOJ and SEC. Furthermore, Bruker provided extensive cooperation to the SEC by sharing reports of its investigative findings, analysis of important documents, summaries of witness interviews, and documents requested by the SEC. Bruker also expanded the scope of its investigation at the request of the SEC and undertook significant remedial measures, including terminating the senior staff at each of its China offices, implementing enhanced FCPA training in local languages, and implementing a new whistleblower hotline, among other things.

*Dallas Airmotive, Inc.*

On December 10, 2014, Dallas Airmotive, Inc. (“DAI”), a Texas corporation specializing in the maintenance, repair, and overhaul of aircraft engines, entered into a DPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay \$14 million to resolve criminal charges that it had violated and conspired to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA.

The charges resulted from bribes that DAI and its Brazilian affiliate, Dallas Airmotive do Brasil (“DAB”), made to government officials in Brazil, Argentina, and Peru. Specifically, from 2008 through 2012, employees of DAI and DAB engaged in a scheme to provide improper payments and other things of value to government officials in the Brazilian and Peruvian Air Forces, the Office of the Governor of the Brazilian State of Roraima, and the Office of the Argentinian State of San Juan in order to obtain contracts that generated over \$2.5 million in revenue for DAI.

DAI and DAB paid the bribes through various front companies that were affiliated with or owned by government officials, as well as intermediary companies that would pass payments through to the government officials. In emails between one another, employees of DAI and DAB referred to these improper payments as “commissions” or “consulting fees,” even though the employees knew that the payments were in fact intended as bribes.

The company’s schemes were documented in candid emails among the participants over a number of years. These emails included explicit discussions between government officials and DAI employees that, among other things (i) confirmed that the payments to front companies were in fact intended for the government officials; (ii) discussed specific budgetary pricing information to assist with DAI’s bid efforts; and (iii) referenced personal trips that DAI provided to a government official and his spouse.

First, in July 2010, a DAI sales agent asked one Brazilian government official to provide his personal bank account information so that it could be included in documentation submitted by one of the front companies. After providing that information to DAI, the company’s sales director asked pointedly, “Who is getting commissions for engines that come to us from the [Brazilian Air Force]?” The sales agent responded that the commissions would go to the government official.

Second, in December 2010, a separate Brazilian government official sent an email from his private account to the private email address of a DAB manager, stating that the company should prepare a budget plus expenses of \$350,000 and explaining that he was using private email accounts because “these issues involving amounts and decisions are ‘sensitive’.”

Third, during a vacation that DAI sponsored for another Brazilian Air Force official and his spouse in January 2012, a DAB manager emailed the official to ask whether “everything [is] alright there?? And the hotel is so-so or worth the expense??? I hope that you are enjoying it.” The official responded, “When I said I had confidence in your good taste, I confess that I underestimated you....hehe The Hotel was excellent. I believe that it was a great present to [my wife]. She insists on passing on thanks to you. Great job, my good friend!!!”

As justification for deferring prosecution, the DOJ cited DAI's substantial cooperation, including conducting an internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and other employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing evidence. The DOJ also agreed to a decreased monetary penalty in light of DAI's substantial cooperation, accepting \$14 million to settle the charges, a 20% reduction from the minimum penalty calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

As part of the DPA, DAI agreed to self-report annually to the DOJ for three years with respect to its remediation efforts and plans to improve its FCPA and corruption compliance procedures.

***Avon Products, Inc.***

On December 17, 2014, Avon Products, Inc. ("Avon"), a global manufacturer and marketer of beauty and related products, agreed to pay \$134.95 million to settle charges with the DOJ and SEC that it violated or conspired to violate the accounting provisions of the FCPA with respect to the activities of Avon and its Chinese subsidiary Avon Products (China) Co. Ltd ("Avon China") in China. Separately, Avon China pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the books and records provisions of the FCPA.

Avon entered into a DPA with the DOJ in connection with charges that Avon conspired to violate the accounting provisions of the FCPA. Together, the terms of the DPA and the final judgment against Avon China imposed a criminal penalty of \$67.6 million.

The SEC filed a complaint against Avon, alleging that it committed violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. The company consented to a proposed final judgment that would require it to pay disgorgement of \$52.85 million and prejudgment interest of \$14.5 million.

The DPA and proposed final judgment with the SEC also require Avon to retain an independent corporate monitor for a period of 18 months, followed by an additional 18-month reporting period that will require the company to report to both enforcement agencies at six-month intervals thereafter until the expiry of the DPA.

The settlement and plea agreements focus on Avon and Avon China's activities in China between 2003 and 2008, during which time the companies (i) conspired to disguise numerous gifts and other things of value that it provided to the Chinese government officials, (ii) falsely recorded payments to a third-party consulting company, and (iii) sought to conceal concerns about these practices that had been raised by its internal audit department.

- *Gifts, Travel, and Other Things of Value*

First, Avon and Avon China conspired to conceal more than \$8 million in gifts, cash, and non-business meals, travel and entertainment that it provided to Chinese government officials in order to obtain and retain business benefits for Avon China, such as obtaining its direct selling license or other approvals. The company provided officials with various personal luxury items,

such as designer wallets, bags, and watches, but recorded these expenses using incorrect labels such as “public relations entertainment” expenses. Among other reasons, Avon employees believed that they needed to disguise the nature of the gifts and the corresponding recipients because the government officials who received such items did not want a “paper trail” reflecting their acceptance of such items.

The company also paid for personal travel for officials (and sometimes their families), such as a \$90,000 trip for four Chinese officials of the Guandong Food & Drug Administration to the United States that combined a half-day visit to an Avon research and development facility with an 18-day sightseeing tour that included locations in New York, Canada, Las Vegas, and Hawaii. Some of the personal travel expenses were recorded as “study visits.”

Although not all of the improper gifts and expenses were as extravagant, they appear to have been given frequently. The SEC Complaint, for example, notes that Avon China made 9,600 separate payments for meals and entertainment between 2004 and the third quarter of 2008 — meaning that, on average, the cost of each expense was approximately \$172 but that there were 39 such transactions per week for four and half years.

The company also made cash payments to government officials. Avon China executives and employees obtained the money to make these payments by submitting receipts for reimbursement that had been provided to them by the government officials, or by making the payments directly and falsely reporting them as fine payments.

- Third Party Consultancy Payments

In October 2003, an Avon China executive engaged a third-party consulting company to provide, upon request, services relating to “(1) crisis management; (2) government relations; and (3) coordinate with public security authorities” in exchange for payments of \$2,000 - \$7,000 per month plus expenses. Avon China also paid the consulting company nearly \$1.2 million for other apparently fictitious services, including \$43,000 for “PR Fees” and “sponsorship” in connection with an art exhibition that never occurred, and \$25,900 for unknown services (described as “communication service fee; business entertainment; hotel/lodging; telecommunications’ material preparation” in connection with a threatened fine of \$66,000.

The DOJ and the SEC both criticized Avon and Avon China for failing to conduct any due diligence review of the consulting company or to require that the consulting company agree in writing to comply with the anti-bribery compliance provisions of Avon’s Code of Conduct.

- Initial Efforts to Conceal Nature of Concern

As early as June 2005, a senior Avon audit manager reported Avon China executives and employees were intentionally failing to maintain proper records of entertainment expenses given the sensitivity expressed by government officials. Several months later, Avon’s internal auditors issued a draft audit report of Avon China’s travel, entertainment, and discretionary expenses that, according to the charging documents, found that:

(1) high value gifts and meals were offered to government officials on an ongoing basis; (2) the majority of the expenses related to gifts, meals, sponsorships, and travel of substantial monetary value for Chinese government officials to maintain relationships with the officials; (3) a third party consultant was paid a substantial sum of money to interact with the government but was not contractually required to follow the FCPA, was not actively monitored by AVON CHINA, and was paid for vague and unknown services; and (4) the payments, and the lack of accurate, detailed records, may violate the FCPA or other anti-corruption laws.

After reading the draft audit report, multiple Avon and Avon China executives instructed the internal audit team to retrieve and physically destroy every copy of the draft report that had been made, and to issue a new report that removed any discussion of the provision of gifts, meals, travel, or other things of value to Chinese government officials.

The charging documents note, however, that Avon executives did not instruct any Avon China executives or employees to stop any of the conduct that had been identified in the draft report, and that it failed to put proper controls in place that would prevent such activity from occurring or ensure the accuracy of its books and records. Moreover, the SEC Complaint added that Avon declined to provide FCPA-specific training for its employees in China, as its internal audit department had recommended, because of budgetary concerns.

Likewise, when a second audit in December 2006 revealed that the improper practices had continued unabated, no one at Avon or Avon China took any steps to stop them. Instead, one Avon executive falsely reported to the company's compliance committee that the earlier concerns reported in 2005 had been "unsubstantiated," which as a result terminated Avon's own internal investigation of Avon China at that time.

A subsequent internal investigation began in June 2008 when Avon's CEO received a letter from an employee alleging improper travel spending related to Chinese government officials. Avon voluntarily contacted the SEC and DOJ to advise them of the allegations and of its own internal investigation.

Although there appear to have been some difficulties in reaching a final settlement — Avon reported in August 2013 for example that the enforcement agencies had rejected its \$12 million settlement offer — both the DOJ and SEC noted Avon's extensive cooperation, disclosure, and remediation efforts.

***Stephen Timms and Yasser Ramahi (FLIR)***

On November 17, 2014, the SEC announced that issued a Cease-and-Desist Order against Stephen Timms and Yasser Ramahi, two former employees of the Oregon-based defense contractor FLIR Systems, Inc. ("FLIR"), in connection with charges that they violated the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA. The SEC accepted a settlement offer from

Timms and Ramahi that required the two American expatriates to pay \$50,000 and \$20,000, respectively, but did not require them to admit or deny the SEC's findings.

FLIR makes thermal imaging and night vision products, infrared camera systems and other sensing products. During the relevant time period, Timms led the company's Middle East regional office in Dubai, and Ramahi worked in the company's business development department and reported to Timms. Both individuals were responsible for obtaining business from the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Interior.

In early February 2009, Timms and Ramahi allegedly instructed their Saudi commercial agent to purchase five watches that cost \$1,425 each. The following month, Timms gave the five expensive watches to Ministry officials during a nine-day visit to Saudi Arabia to discuss various business opportunities with the Ministry, including a \$12.9 million sales contract for thermal binoculars that FLIR had previously secured and another potential \$17.4 million sales contract for the sale of FLIR security cameras. The SEC stated that the two men believed that the recipient officials were important to each sales contract, and they hoped that the two contracts would lead to additional future sales.

Timms submitted an expense report for reimbursement that labeled the purchases as "Executive Gifts," and properly reported the cost of each watch and the individual Ministry recipients. In July 2009, however, FLIR's finance department flagged the expense during an unrelated audit. The SEC stated that Timms tried to cover-up his conduct by falsely stating that he had made a mistake and that the watches had only cost \$377 each. When his supervisors requested supporting documentation, Timms allegedly created and submitted a fabricated invoice, the accuracy of which Ramahi and the local Saudi agent both allegedly confirmed for FLIR's internal investigators.

Separately, FLIR had been preparing for a Factory Inspection Test in Massachusetts that was required to consummate the \$12.9 million thermal binoculars contract with the Ministry. Ramahi allegedly arranged for a delegation of Ministry officials (including two of those who had received watches) to travel to Massachusetts in June 2009 for the test and product inspection. Although the trip included several site-visits to FLIR's inspection facility, it also allegedly included multiple other international locations both before and after the trip to Boston as part of an extensive "world tour" for the Ministry officials. From Saudi Arabia, the delegation first traveled to Casablanca and then spent several nights in Paris. The individuals then travelled to Boston, where they stayed for seven nights, including a weekend trip to New York City. Before returning to Saudi Arabia, the members of the group first flew to Dubai or Beirut. The Ministry subsequently approved of the product sale and also purchased an additional \$1.2 million in thermal binoculars.

FLIR had paid for all expenses related to the twenty-day "world tour," which Timms and Ramahi had allegedly submitted for reimbursement. When questioned about these expenses during the same July 2009 internal FLIR financial review, however, the SEC stated that Timms and Ramahi claimed that this entry had been a mistake too, claiming that the Ministry officials had used FLIR's Dubai travel agent and the expenses had been mistakenly billed to the company.

Timms and Ramahi allegedly submitted additional false supporting documentation, including a false itinerary from the Dubai travel agent showing that the Ministry officials had traveled directly from Boston to Riyadh.

The SEC noted that, at all relevant times, FLIR had a code of conduct prohibiting FCPA violations and requiring accurate and honest record keeping in its books and records. The SEC also noted that FLIR had a compliance training program, that both Ramahi and Timms had received FCPA-specific training, and that their training had included as specific examples of prohibited conduct the provision of luxury watches, vacations and side travel during official business trips.

FLIR was not immediately charged with any FCPA-related violations at the time of the settlement. The SEC noted in its press release that its investigation was continuing.

### ***Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc.***

On November 3, 2014, Bio-Rad Laboratories, Inc. (“Bio-Rad”), a medical diagnostics and life sciences manufacturing and sales company that is based in California and listed on the NYSE, settled charges with the DOJ and SEC that it had violated the FCPA and agreed to pay over \$55 million total. The company had self-reported the events that led to these charges.

Bio-Rad entered into an NPA with the DOJ, under which it agreed to pay \$14.35 million in penalties to resolve allegations that it violated the accounting provisions of the FCPA by falsifying its books and records and failing to implement adequate internal controls in connection with sales made in Russia, as well as failing to maintain “an adequate compliance program.”

Separately, the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Bio-Rad for violating the internal controls, anti-bribery, and books and records provisions of the FCPA in connection with conduct in Russia, Thailand and Vietnam. In anticipation of the cease-and-desist order, the SEC agreed to accept Bio-Rad’s settlement offer of \$40.7 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.

- *Russia*

From 2005 through 2010, Bio-Rad’s French subsidiary used the help of a third-party “Agent” to assist it and Bio-Rad’s Russian subsidiary with sale of clinical diagnostics products (such as HIV-testing kits and blood bank equipment) to government customers in Russia. Specifically, the French subsidiary engaged three intermediary companies, which the Agent had established in Panama, the United Kingdom, and Belize.

The DOJ and SEC criticized Bio-Rad for failing to conduct any due diligence on these intermediary companies, and for ignoring significant red flags that suggested a high probability that Bio-Rad’s payments to these intermediaries were being passed through to Russian government officials.

The settlement documents provide a litany of classic red flags, including (i) poor qualifications, (ii) a lack of business justification, (iii) unexplored connections of the Agent to government officials, and (iv) unreasonable compensation.

First, the enforcement agencies noted that the intermediary companies did not have adequate qualifications or experience to perform the tasks listed in their contracts, which included business development, the creation and distribution of marketing materials, product distribution and installation services, and training. In fact, the intermediary companies had all been recently created, and they had no employees besides the Agent himself. One of the intermediary companies listed the address of a Russian government building as its own office address.

Second, the settlement documentation indicates that Bio-Rad did not have a sufficient business justification for engaging the intermediary companies. To the contrary, Bio-Rad managers knew that some of the intermediary contracts called for the provision of installation and training activities that were not required given the type of products being sold. In other instances, Bio-Rad had engaged the intermediary companies to perform product distribution services even though Bio-Rad was separately using the services of another bona fide distributor to provide such services.

Third, Bio-Rad failed to investigate purported connections that its Agent had with Russian government officials. The SEC cease-and-desist order, for example, notes specifically that Bio-Rad's new Russia country manager continued to engage the intermediary companies without conducting any further due diligence even though he "knew from discussions with colleagues in the Russian health care industry that the [Agent] had important contacts at the Russian Ministry of Health, and could influence the tender offer specifications and selection process."

Fourth, the payment terms were unreasonable and not consistent with market rates. In one instance a Bio-Rad Russia Country Manager estimated that true distribution costs for Bio-Rad products in Russia cost between 2% and 2.5% of the value of the products; nevertheless, Bio-Rad's French subsidiary paid the Russian Agent 15-30% commissions. Moreover, the payments were transferred to bank accounts that the Agent had set up in Lithuania and Latvia. In some instances, the Russian Country Managers requested pre-payment of commissions before Bio-Rad received its own payment from the underlying sales contracts.

The DOJ and SEC also criticized Bio-Rad for its "extensive efforts to conceal matters relating to the [Agent]." Among other things, only the Russia Country Managers were permitted to communicate with the Agent, and one did so by using ten different personal email accounts, with aliases. One employee of Bio-Rad's French subsidiary was specifically told that she should "talk with codes" when communicating about invoices from the intermediary companies. Along those lines, the Russia Country Manager used the code phrase "bad debts" to refer to the Agent's commissions in email communications. The Country Managers did not keep any records related to the agents, and the second Russia Country Manager used and used code words including "bad debts" to reference the Russian Agent's commissions.

Several managers from Bio-Rad's Emerging Markets division, who were located for the most part in California, were responsible for negotiating and approving the contracts with the intermediary companies and for approving all related invoices for payment. The DOJ and SEC stated that these Emerging Markets Managers participated in concealing activities related to the Agent, or failed to apply appropriate internal controls, by approving payments even though they knew that some of the invoices had been fabricated internally by Bio-Rad's Russia subsidiary, and that the Russia Country Managers often requested commissions to be paid in increments less than \$200,000, which was the threshold that would have triggered additional scrutiny and required additional approvals under Bio-Rad's signature authority matrix. The Emerging Markets Managers also approved payments above \$200,000 without reviewing the underlying documentation, and they failed to provide the legal and finance departments with translated copies of the contracts with the intermediary companies, as was required by Bio-Rad's internal policies and procedures.

According to the NPA, the Emerging Markets Managers "failed to implement adequate controls for Bio-Rad's Emerging Markets sales region, including controls related to its operations in Russia where those managers knew that the failure to implement these controls allowed [the Agent] to be paid significantly above-market commissions for little or no services that were supported by false contracts and invoices. For example, [the Emerging Markets Managers] did not put in place a system of controls to conduct due diligence on third party agents, such as the Intermediary Companies, to ensure documentation supporting payments to third parties, or to monitor such payments. Nor did the company implement adequate testing of the controls that should have been in place."

Bio-Rad paid the Agent a total of \$4.6 million through payments to these intermediary companies, which Bio-Rad falsely recorded as "commission payments" in the books and records of its French subsidiary (and ultimately consolidated into Bio-Rad's reported financial statements). Bio-Rad's French and Russian subsidiaries won every government contract on which it bid on with the support of the Agent, generating \$38.6 million in sales revenue. After cancelling its agreements with the intermediary companies, Bio-Rad lost its first bid in Russia.

- Vietnam

In its cease-and-desist order, the SEC also alleged that Bio-Rad violated the accounting provisions of the FCPA through the activities of its Vietnam Office. The SEC stated that Bio-Rad's Vietnamese employees initially made cash payments to officials of state-owned hospitals and laboratories so that those entities would purchase Bio-Rad products.

The SEC alleged that Bio-Rad continued to make improper payments to Vietnamese officials after the conduct was discovered by the company's Regional Sales Manager and Asia Pacific General Manager in 2006, because the Vietnamese Country Manager had explained in an email that the company otherwise would lose 80% of its Vietnamese sales. Instead, the Country Manager proposed to make the improper payments by discounting sales to distributors, who could resell the products to their government customers at full price and provide a portion of the difference as a bribe.

The SEC stated that Bio-Rad made improper payments of \$2.2 million to Vietnamese government officials through agents and distributors between 2005 and 2009. The company recorded these payments as “commissions,” “advertising fees,” and “training fees.”

Although the SEC and DOJ both characterized the activities of Bio-Rad in Vietnam as involving “improper payments,” neither enforcement agency alleged that the company had violated the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. Although the SEC alleged that Bio-Rad had violated the accounting provisions of the FCPA, it noted that “[t]he payment scheme did not involve the use of interstate commerce, and no United States national was involved in the misconduct.” The DOJ did not discuss the Vietnamese activity at all except to note that Bio-Rad’s “failure to maintain an adequate compliance program significantly contributed to the company’s inability to prevent . . . improper payments to government officials in Vietnam.”

In the wake of the settlement, Vietnamese authorities announced that they would review the conduct as well. In November 2014, the Ministry of Health launched an investigation into eight public hospitals that purchased Bio-Rad medical equipment.

- Thailand

In connection with its October 2007 acquisition of Switzerland-based Diamed AG, Bio-Rad acquired a 49% stake in Diamed Thailand (the remaining 51% of which was retained by local Thai owners). The SEC alleged that Diamed Thailand had engaged in a bribery scheme prior to the acquisition (using Thai agents and distributors to pass on portions of an inflated commission to Thai government officials), and that Bio-Rad conducted “very little due diligence” on the company prior to the acquisition.

The SEC stated that Bio-Rad’s Asia Pacific GM learned of the activities in 2008, but that he nevertheless did not instruct Diamed Thailand to stop making the improper payments. In total, Diamed Thailand paid \$708,600 to its local distributor, which it recorded in its books as sales commissions.

As with the Vietnamese activities discussed above, the DOJ and SEC declined to allege any violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions.

- Settlement Notes

The DOJ and SEC both lauded Bio-Rad’s self-disclosure, extensive cooperation, and remedial efforts. The enforcement agencies emphasized that, immediately after Bio-Rad’s audit committee learned of the potential FCPA violations, it retained independent counsel to conduct an investigation that covered multiple countries and included over 100 in-person interviews, the review of millions of documents, and forensic auditing.

Bio-Rad’s cooperation with the DOJ and SEC further involved voluntarily producing overseas documents, translating documents, producing witnesses from foreign jurisdictions, and providing timely reports on witness interviews. Bio-Rad also voluntarily remediated many issues by terminating problematic processes, terminating employees involved in misconduct,

comprehensively reevaluating and supplementing its anti-corruption policies on a world-wide basis, enhancing its internal controls and compliance functions, developing FCPA compliance and due diligence procedures for intermediaries, and conducting anti-corruption training throughout the organization worldwide. Bio-Rad also closed its Vietnam office.

Under the terms of the settlement, Bio-Rad is required to report to the SEC and DOJ for two years as to its remediation efforts and plans to improve its FCPA and anti-corruption compliance procedures.

***Layne Christensen Co.***

On October 27, 2014, the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Layne Christensen Co. (“Layne”), a Delaware-incorporated and Texas-headquartered global water management, construction, and drilling company listed on the NASDAQ Global Select market.

The SEC charged Layne with violations of the accounting provisions of the FCPA in connection with the conduct of its wholly-owned subsidiaries in Africa and Australia. The SEC alleged that Layne had paid more than one million dollars to government officials in Mali, Guinea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (the “DRC”), Burkina Faso, Tanzania, and Mauritania between 2005 and 2010 in return for improper tax benefits, customs clearance of a drilling rig, reduced custom duties and associated penalties, and work permits for its employees.

The SEC accepted Layne’s offer to pay \$5.1 million in disgorgement, penalties, and prejudgment interest to settle the charges. Layne was also required to retain a Monitor for a period of two years.

The SEC alleged that Layne’s subsidiaries in Mali, Guinea, and the DRC hired third parties to forward improper payments to government officials to obtain favorable tax treatment. In Mali, Layne’s subsidiary allegedly hired a local agent for this purpose, whereas the company’s subsidiaries in Guinea and the DRC allegedly funneled the improper payments through lawyers that had been recommended by government officials.

In the DRC, for example, the CFO of the supervising Mineral Exploration Division sought approval of the subsidiary’s President to hire a lawyer, explaining that he had spoken to the country manager and knew “more than can be written down.” The President of the Mineral Exploration Division approved the arrangement without questioning. Payments to the lawyer, who obtained a revised tax assessment that was substantially lower than the original assessment, were falsely recorded as legal expenses. Similar payments in other countries were recorded as audit or freight service costs.

Layne’s affiliates also allegedly made improper payments to custom officials in order to avoid paying customs duties and to obtain clearance for the import and export of its equipment. In Burkina Faso, for example, the local affiliate allegedly retained a customs agent who successfully reduced its assessed customs duties in 2009 from nearly \$2 million to less than \$300,000 and received \$100,000 for his services. In 2010, the Layne affiliate made an

arrangement to pay the agent 10% of the difference between the original assessment and the final assessment, resulting in a success fee of approximately \$138,000. The SEC stated that the affiliate falsely recorded these payments as legitimate consultant fees.

Similarly, in the DRC, Layne's affiliate paid a total of \$124,000 to a customs agent in 2007 and recorded the payments as "per diem," "intervention expenses," and "honoraires." In 2009, the subsidiary allegedly hired another agent when an initial one that it had engaged to arrange the expedited exportation of a drilling rig noted that a delay may occur due to a lack of documentation relating to the rig; the new agent allegedly made payments to customs officials and obtained the exportation as planned. The SEC also alleges that the affiliate made payments to unrelated third parties in the United States at the direction of its agent and also hired a local official's nephew (described in internal documents as a "protector") as its office manager.

The SEC stated that Layne made relatively minor payments (ranging from \$4 to \$1,700) between 2007 and 2010 through customs agents to African government officials to avoid penalties and obtain permits for equipment and employees under local immigration and labor regulations. Similarly, Layne's affiliates allegedly made more than \$23,000 in cash payments to police, border patrol, immigration officials, and labor inspectors in Africa to avoid penalties and obtain permits for equipment and employees under local immigration and labor regulations.

In announcing the relatively light civil penalty, the SEC noted that Layne had conducted an internal investigation, immediately self-reported its preliminary findings to the SEC, and publicly disclosed its potential FCPA violations. Layne also terminated the contracts of four employees, including the Mineral Exploration Division's President and its CFO. The SEC also acknowledged that Layne issued a standalone anti-bribery policy, improved its accounting policies for cash disbursements, created an integrated accounting system worldwide, revamped its anti-corruption training, conducted extensive due diligence of business partners, and hired a chief compliance officer and three full-time compliance employees.

The SEC also took note of Layne's close cooperation, noting that Layne voluntarily provided real-time reports of its investigative findings, produced translations of documents to the English language, made foreign witnesses available for interviews in the United States, shared summaries of witness interviews and reports prepared by external consultants, and responded to the SEC's requests in a timely manner. This conduct allowed the SEC to gather information that otherwise would have been unavailable.

### ***Smith & Wesson***

On July 28, 2014, the SEC entered an administrative cease-and-desist order against Massachusetts-based firearms manufacturer Smith & Wesson Holding Corporation ("Smith & Wesson") for violations of the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA. Without admitting or denying the SEC's findings, Smith & Wesson agreed to pay over \$2 million in civil penalties, including nearly \$108,000 in disgorgement. The company also agreed to report to the SEC for two years on the status of its compliance program implementation by submitting a written report and two follow-up reviews regarding its remediation and compliance efforts.

According to the SEC, Smith & Wesson sought to increase its international sales to foreign military and law enforcement agencies between 2007 and 2010 in high-risk markets such as Pakistan, Indonesia, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Turkey. The SEC alleged that Smith & Wesson aimed to do so, however, by engaging in “a systemic pattern of making, authorizing and offering bribes” through third-party agents to government officials in those countries in an effort to win contracts for the supply of firearms and other goods.

The SEC criticized Smith & Wesson for having “conducted virtually no due diligence of its third-party agents regardless of the perceived level of corruption in the country,” as well as its failure to implement a compliance program designed to address the risks of working in such high-risk countries. In a press release announcing the settlement, Kara Brockmeyer, chief of the SEC Enforcement Division’s FCPA Unit, characterized the settlement as “a wake-up call for small and medium-size businesses that want to enter into high-risk markets and expand their international sales.”

In Pakistan, for example, Smith & Wesson’s agent allegedly provided firearms and cash payments worth more than \$11,000 to officials of a Pakistani police department in order to win a tender to provide pistols to the department.

Smith & Wesson also tried unsuccessfully to obtain contracts for the sale of firearms or handcuffs in Turkey, Nepal, and Bangladesh through the use of improper payments to local government officials conveyed by local agents. In Turkey, the company made improper payments to its agent, but only authorized but never made the payments to its agents in Nepal and Bangladesh. Although Smith & Wesson ultimately failed to secure any of the related sales contracts, the SEC noted that it nonetheless had “attempted to obtain the contract by using third party agents as a conduit for improper payments to government officials.”

In Indonesia, Smith & Wesson authorized and made payments to its local third-party agent knowing that such would be provided to Indonesian police officials responsible for firearm sales to National Police Force. The payments, disguised as costs for firearm “lab tests,” rose when the agent informed Smith & Wesson that the costs of the “tests” had increased beyond the level originally foreseen.

Following the announcement of the SEC settlement, Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), an Indonesian anti-corruption NGO, publicly called on the country’s Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) to open an investigation into any illegal payments made by Smith & Wesson to Indonesian officials. Although it is unclear whether the KPK will do so, the National Police have stated that controls are in place to guarantee the transparency of the bidding process, and that it would not award any further procurement contracts to Smith & Wesson.

On June 19, 2014, Smith & Wesson announced that the DOJ had closed its investigation into the company and declined to bring any FCPA charges. The DOJ investigation into Smith & Wesson began after the company’s former Vice President of Sales to International & US Law Enforcement was arrested as part of the DOJ’s “SHOT Show” sting operation on January 18, 2010. As discussed below, the government’s prosecution failed to result in any convictions, and

charges against the former Smith & Wesson Vice President and a number of other defendants were dismissed on February 24, 2012.

*Dmitry Firtash et al.*

On March 12, 2014, Dmitry Firtash, a prominent Ukrainian businessman, was arrested in Vienna, Austria after being charged by a U.S. federal grand jury of heading an international racketeering conspiracy that paid over \$18.5 million in bribes to Indian state and central government officials. Also charged in the federal indictment were Andras Knopp (a Hungarian citizen), Suren Gevorgyan (a Ukrainian citizen), Gajendra Lal (an Indian citizen with U.S. permanent residency), Periyasamy Sunderalingam (a Sri Lankan citizen), and K.V.P. Ramachandra Rao (an Indian citizen and member of Indian Parliament).

Firtash is one of the most prominent gas traders in Europe. He leads Group DF, an international conglomerate of companies, and co-founded RosUkrEnergo, a joint venture between him and Russia's Gazprom. With a net worth reportedly as high as several billion dollars and with close ties to both former Ukrainian President Victor Yanukovich and current Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko, Firtash is a hugely influential political and business figure in Ukraine. Reports also allege that Firtash has ties to Russian organized crime, including Semion Mogilevich, a member of the FBI's "10 Most Wanted" list.

- DOJ Indictment

A five-count indictment filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Firtash and his alleged co-conspirators was returned under seal in June 2013 and unsealed on April 2, 2014. It charged the six defendants with one count each of conspiracy to commit racketeering, money laundering, and FCPA violations, as well as two counts of interstate travel in aid of racketeering. (Rao was not charged with conspiracy to violate the FCPA.) All defendants but Firtash remain at large.

According to the indictment, Firtash directed subordinates to pay at least \$18.5 million in bribes to Indian government officials to secure mining licenses for a joint venture project between a Swiss subsidiary of his Group DF and the state government of Andhra Pradesh. The joint venture was forecast to generate more than \$500 million in revenue per year and would have allowed Group DF subsidiaries to supply 5-12 million pounds of titanium products per year to an unidentified U.S. company based in Chicago. Allegedly, Knopp helped supervise the enterprise while Gevorgyan and Lal signed falsified documents, monitored bribe payments, and coordinated money transfers. Sunderalingam allegedly worked to identify bank accounts outside of India that could be used to funnel money to Rao, who allegedly solicited bribes for himself and others for approving the required licenses. According to the indictment, from 2006 through 2010, the enterprise caused at least 57 transfers of funds within or through the United States totaling nearly \$10.6 million in order to promote the illegal scheme.

Notably, in addition to the forfeiture of \$10.6 million from all six defendants, the indictment also seeks forfeiture by Firtash of all property and contractual rights that afforded him

a source of influence over the enterprise, including his interests in Group DF and its assets, his interests in RosUkrEnergo, and his interests in over 150 subsidiaries of Group DF.

- *Release and Response*

Firtash was released on €125 million bail, the largest in Austrian history, but he has agreed to remain in Austria pending resolution of extradition hearings remain pending. He has since released a video statement defending his innocence, calling the charges against him “absurd and unfounded” and “clearly politically motivated.” In a similar statement posted on the Group DF website, Firtash claims to be caught in the “geopolitical” struggle between Russia and the United States with respect to Ukraine.

Gajendra Lal, who reportedly fled the United States for Moscow to avoid pressure from U.S. federal investigators, has also spoken out since the indictment was unsealed. Lal claims that he was harassed by American law enforcement who demanded that he lie to entrap Firtash. Lal stated that he would also record a video statement detailing the prosecutorial and FBI misconduct that he witnessed.

### ***Hewlett-Packard Co.***

On April 9, 2014, Hewlett-Packard Co. (“HP”) settled civil charges with the SEC and three HP subsidiaries settled criminal charges with the DOJ in connection with its conduct in Russia, Poland, and Mexico.

The SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against HP for violations of the FCPA’s accounting provisions, and it agreed to accept HP’s settlement offer of \$29 million in disgorgement and \$5 million in prejudgment interest (although the SEC agreed that a little more than \$2.5 million of HP’s disgorgement obligations would be satisfied by payment of the same amount in forfeiture as part of HP’s Mexican subsidiary’s resolution with the DOJ).

HP’s subsidiary in Russia, ZAO Hewlett-Packard A.O. (“HP Russia”), pleaded guilty to the four-count Criminal Information that charged the subsidiary with violations of, and conspiracy to violate, the FCPA’s anti-bribery and accounting provisions. HP Russia was sentenced in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California on September 11, 2014 to pay a \$58.77 million fine.

Hewlett-Packard Polska, SP Z.O.O. (“HP Poland”) entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ with respect to a two-count criminal information that charged the subsidiary with violations of the FCPA’s accounting provisions. Under the terms of the DPA, HP Poland agreed to pay a \$15.45 million penalty.

Finally, HP’s Mexican subsidiary, Hewlett-Packard Mexico, S. de R.L. de C.V. (“HP Mexico”) entered into an NPA with the DOJ that required it to pay over \$2.5 million in forfeiture. As noted above, this amount offset the total amount of disgorgement that HP was required to pay pursuant to its settlement with the SEC.

In total, HP and its subsidiaries were required to pay more than \$108 million to resolve the matters with U.S. enforcement agencies. Although the company was not required to obtain a corporate monitor, the various agreements specified that it must adopt or maintain a rigorous corporate compliance program, and that it must also provide annual reports to the DOJ and SEC for three years regarding the status of its remediation and implementation of compliance measures.

The settlements reflected wide-reaching cooperation efforts between domestic and international enforcement agencies. As reported in earlier Alerts, Russian authorities had raided the local offices of HP Russia on behalf of German prosecutors in April 2010. In its press releases, the DOJ noted the support of the German Public Prosecutor's Office in Dresden, as well as the Anti-Corruption Bureau and Appellate Prosecutor's Office in Poland and its other law enforcement partners in Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Spain, and the United Kingdom.

- Russia

As noted above, HP Russia pleaded guilty to committing and conspiring to commit substantive violations of the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA. Although the DOJ and SEC's descriptions of the underlying misconduct are not entirely clear or consistent, they detail that HP Russia had engaged multiple intermediaries to pass through improper payments, created and used a slush fund, and made improper payments to government officials or their associates in order to obtain and retain the first phase of a project to automate the telecommunications and computing infrastructure of Russia's Office of the Prosecutor General (the "GPO Project").

According to an internal memorandum, HP Russia viewed the €35 million initial phase of the GPO Project as the "golden key" that would not only help the company to secure subsequent phases of the project (valued together at more than \$100 million), but also lead to \$150 million of other potential projects with the Russian Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court. The company won the first phase of the project in January 2001 and executed the project contract later that year.

HP Russia engaged various intermediaries to serve as its principal "subcontractor" on the project and funnel improper payments to various entities. Initially, HP Russia engaged a Swiss firm operated by Russian nationals for this purpose, but later switched to an American intermediary when the Russian government sought to secure U.S. government-backed project financing which required that at least 85% of all goods and services provided be of U.S. origin. (The SEC's order stated that the American intermediary had initially approached HP Russia in December 2000 to inform the company that the GPO Project was in jeopardy and that HP Russia had agreed to pay the agent \$1.2 million to ensure that the project moved forward and was awarded to HP Russia.)

The Russian government later sought and secured German government-backed financing in 2003, which resulted in the termination of HP Russia's contract. To prevent a re-opening of the bidding process — and potentially losing the project to German competition — HP Russia

employees and representatives agreed to pay bribes to an official from the Russian foreign trade agency that had been assigned to the project, and also to replace the American intermediary with a German one as the principal “subcontractor” on the project. Specifically, HP Russia entered into an off-the-books contract with Burwell Consulting Ltd — a U.K. shell company linked to the Russian government official and his associate — valued at €2.836 million (equivalent to 8% of the GPO Project contract). HP Russia signed a renewed contract on August 1, 2003.

The Criminal Information filed against HP Russia stated that the company created and used an €8 million slush fund to make improper payments, and that it funneled most of €21 million of project proceeds to the bank accounts of multiple shell companies that were used for gifts, travel, and entertainment, among other things.

First, HP Russia employees created a slush fund of nearly €8 million by selling products to a Russian channel partner, which resold them to the German intermediary. HP Russia then bought the products back from the intermediary at a mark-up of nearly €8 million, and also paid the intermediary an additional €4.232 million. The amount of the slush fund corresponded to nearly €8 million in payment obligations that the HP Russia employees tracked in an additional, password-protected set of project pricing records, including the €2.836 million to be paid to Burwell Consulting Ltd. A flowchart included with the second set of financial records showed that the €8 million would flow through payments to the German intermediary and the Russian channel partner. HP Russia maintained a second, “clean” set of records that it provided to other HP officers.

Second, HP Russia had contracted with its German intermediary to provide €21 million worth of services on the €35 million contract. The SEC stated that some of this €21 million paid for “goods and services actually provided under the contract,” but that the German intermediary paid “a portion of the €8 million [slush fund] . . . to shell companies that performed no services.”

The DOJ, on the other hand, stated the German intermediary passed most of the entire €21 million to the bank accounts of shell companies that “laundered most of the money through multiple layers of additional shell companies.” Specifically, the DOJ listed over \$17.7 million in payments to bank accounts in the names of shell companies in Austria, Bosnia, the British Virgin Islands, Lithuania, Latvia, and Switzerland or to companies owned by Russian government officials. The DOJ stated that portions of these payments landed in accounts used for expensive jewelry, luxury automobiles, travel expenses, tuition costs, and other luxury purchases. Perhaps reflecting the difficulty in determining exactly how these funds were used, however, the DOJ only listed about \$3.6 million of these payments as overt acts undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy.

In April 2010, Russian authorities, acting on behalf of German prosecutors, raided the Moscow offices of HP. German prosecutors then brought criminal charges in 2012 against two former HP employees, one then-current HP employee and a local German politician and businessman related to the conduct of HP’s Russian-based subsidiary.

- Poland

Between 2006 and 2010, HP Poland provided a Polish government official with more than \$600,000 worth of cash, gifts, entertainment, and travel in order to win contracts with the national police agency that were valued at approximately \$60 million. In 2006, with several projects in the tendering process, HP Poland invited the official to an industry conference in San Francisco, where HP Poland employees paid for dinners, gifts, a trip to Las Vegas, and a private flight tour over the Grand Canyon. After the trip, an HP Poland executive provided the official with desktop and laptop computers, an HP Printer, iPods, TVs, and a home theater system. These expenses were not properly recorded in the company's books and records.

In January 2007, the official signed a \$4.3 million sole-source contract award with HP Poland on behalf of the Polish government. He awarded HP Poland another \$5.8 million sole-source contract the following month. HP Poland agreed to pay the official cash bribes and a percentage of net revenue from the contracts. In March 2007, an HP Poland executive left a bag with \$150,000 in cash at the official's house and provided him with another \$100,000 in cash at a Warsaw parking lot when HP Poland won another contract worth \$15.8 million. In 2008, the HP Poland executive paid the official in bags of cash worth a total of \$360,000 on four different occasions, and the company won three contracts with a total value of \$32 million.

The HP Poland executive and Polish official attempted to disguise and protect communications about upcoming tenders and bribe amounts in several ways. Using a practice employed in other bribery schemes, they created several anonymous email addresses and shared the passwords to exchange information with draft emails. They also used prepaid mobile telephones and conducted meetings in remote locations where they would communicate silently using a laptop.

Polish authorities and media outlets have identified the official and former HP executive in question as Andrzej Machnacz and Tomasz Ziolkowski. According to a March 2013 ProPublica investigative report, Machnacz was "released from prison and has agreed to cooperate and testify against others involved in the scheme." According to Polish newspapers, over 41 government officials, police officers, and private businessmen have been charged in connection with a related investigation by Poland's Central Anti-Corruption Bureau.

- Mexico

HP Mexico paid more than \$1 million in commissions to a consulting company that had close ties to senior government officials in an effort to win a software sales contract with Mexico's state-owned petroleum company, Pemex. HP Mexico agreed to pay the intermediary an "influencer fee" of 25% if awarded the \$6 million contract. Because the company was not a pre-approved partner and had not been subject to due diligence, HP Mexico instead passed the funds through another previously approved partner, which kept a small percentage of the fee.

HP Mexico justified the increase in commission from the standard 1.5% to 25% by stating that the approved partner had put in extra work and successfully negotiated discounts with Pemex. HP's regional officers authorized the increase the same day, with little additional

review. HP Mexico signed the contract with Pemex in December 2008 and wired \$1.66 million several months later to the approved partner, which transferred \$1.41 million to the consulting company. The consulting company paid \$125,000 to Pemex's Chief Information Officer, the official who had signed the contract with HP Mexico.

### ***Marubeni***

On March 19, 2014, Marubeni Corporation ("Marubeni"), pleaded guilty to criminal charges relating to improper payments to Indonesian government officials. The charges consisted of one count of criminal conspiracy to violate the FCPA and seven substantive anti-bribery violations. Marubeni agreed to pay a fine of \$88 million for its role in the seven-year bribery scheme.

Marubeni is a Japanese trading company headquartered in Tokyo. The FCPA violations stemmed from a project known as the Tarahan Project, a \$118 million contract to provide power-related services in Indonesia. The Tarahan Project was contracted through Indonesia's state-owned and -controlled electric company, Perusahaan Listrik Negara ("PLN"). Marubeni bid on the project as part of a consortium that consisted of Marubeni, Alstom, and various subsidiaries of each ("the Consortium Partners").

According to the plea agreement, the Consortium Partners retained two independent consultants prior to the awarding of the Tarahan Project contract. According to the facts to which Marubeni admitted as part of its guilty plea, the primary purpose of these consultants was "to pay bribes to Indonesian officials who had the ability to influence the award of the Tarahan Project Contract." The consortium was ultimately successful in obtaining the Tarahan Project contract, and the Consortium Partners subsequently made payments to the consultants, which were allegedly transferred in part to the bank accounts of Indonesian officials.

As part of the plea agreement, Marubeni agreed to address deficiencies in its internal controls and compliance programs. Specifically, Marubeni agreed to adopt or enhance a system of internal accounting controls designed to ensure the accuracy of the company's books and records, and to enforce a rigorous anti-corruption compliance program which includes policies and procedures designed to detect and prevent FCPA violations. Marubeni also agreed to ensure high level commitment from its senior management to create a culture of compliance, to engage in periodic risk-based review of the compliance program, and to ensure proper training, oversight, monitoring, enforcement, and discipline.

### ***Asem M. Elgawhary***

On February 10, 2014, Asem Elgawhary was indicted in the U.S. District of Maryland on charges that he engaged in a scheme to accept kickbacks and bribes from several international contractors in Egypt that sought to obtain a competitive advantage during the bid process. The indictment contained four counts of mail fraud, two counts of wire fraud, one count of conspiracy to launder money, and one count of interfering with the administration of internal revenue laws. After initially filing motions to dismiss and for a bill of particulars, Elgawhary

pleaded guilty on December 10, 2014 to the latter two charges, including conspiracy to launder money.

Elgawhary is a dual U.S. and Egyptian citizen who was a long-time employee of Bechtel Corporation (“Bechtel”), a U.S.-based international engineering, construction and project management company. From 1996 to 2011, Elgawhary served as the general manager of Power Generation Engineering and Services Company (“PGESCO”), an Egyptian-based joint venture between Bechtel and the state-owned Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (“EEHC”).

As the general manager of PGESCO, Elgawhary maintained oversight responsibility for the competitive bidding process and assisted in selecting subcontractors on projects for EEHC. Elgawhary misused his position, however, and accepted kickbacks from several international power companies that had sought to win contracts from EEHC. These companies included (i) “a French company engaged in the business of providing power generation and transportation-related services around the world,” — later identified by the DOJ as Alstom (see Alstom, above), (ii) “a Japanese company engaged in power-related services around the world,” and (iii) “a Kuwaiti company engaged in power-related services in the Middle East.”

Elgawhary admitted that he accepted kickback payments from three international power companies that sought to obtain an unfair advantage during the bid processes. The indictment states that this improper assistance included non-public information about competing companies and the bidding process, manipulation of the timing of the bidding process, and the expedition of payments from EEHC.

According to the DOJ, the three power companies paid the bribes to Elgawhary’s various bank accounts through payments made to various third-party consultants. The DOJ notes that the French and Japanese companies each engaged their own consultants for this purpose, but provided more details with respect to the engagement of the Kuwaiti company’s consultant: a BVI-incorporated company located in the UAE “that purportedly provided oil-and-gas-related consulting services” and which further engaged as a sub-agent “an individual working for an Italian company” who purportedly acted as a representative of [the BVI company], but in reality negotiated kickback payments from [the Kuwaiti company] on behalf of Elgawhary.”

Elgawhary received at least \$5.2 million in payments from these three companies. The DOJ alleges that he sought to conceal the origin of the money by purchasing a \$1.8 million home in Maryland for two close family members, and that he further sought to delete evidence relating to the scheme from his computer. Sentencing for Elgawhary has been scheduled for March 23, 2015.

### ***Alcoa Inc. / Alcoa World Alumina LLC***

On January 9, 2014, Alcoa World Alumina LLC (“Alcoa World”), a subsidiary of the world’s third-largest Aluminum producer Alcoa Inc. (“Alcoa”), pleaded guilty to one count of violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. Under the terms of the plea agreement, Alcoa World agreed to pay a criminal fine of \$209 million and an administrative forfeiture of \$14 million. Additionally, pursuant to the plea agreement, the final judgment placed Alcoa World on

probation for a period of four years, during which time the company is required to maintain contact with a probation officer, answer all inquiries from the officer truthfully, and provide any other information or documentation requested by the officer.

On the same day, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order against Alcoa, charging the company with violations of the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA. In settling those charges, Alcoa agreed to pay \$175 million in disgorgement (offset partially by the \$14 million administrative forfeiture included in the judgment against Alcoa World).

The combined \$384 million in fines and disgorgement, though substantial, could have been much higher. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provided a range of \$446 million to \$892 million for the criminal fine alone. The DOJ stated, however, that the penalty was appropriate due to the fact that “a penalty within the guidelines range” could impact Alcoa’s financial condition such that it would “substantially jeopardize[e] Alcoa’s ability to compete,” particularly given the fact that the SEC was imposing its own significant penalty. The DOJ also noted the external investigation that Alcoa’s outside counsel had conducted, the “substantial cooperation” Alcoa provided, and the company’s remedial efforts and commitment to upgrading its compliance program.

The settlements relate to Alcoa’s business practices in Bahrain. Since 1989, Alcoa and its various subsidiaries had engaged a London-based consultant to assist with its business with Aluminium Bahrain B.S.C (“Alba”), a large aluminum plant owned and operated by the government of Bahrain.

In 2002 and 2004, Alcoa World entered into purported distributorship agreements with the consultant in connection with the sale of alumina to Alba, even though Alcoa’s Australian subsidiary (and not the consultant) shipped the alumina directly to Alba. Instead, the sham contracts enabled Alcoa World to provide its consultant with excess mark-up funds that could be paid on to government officials in Bahrain. Between 2002 and 2009, payments made to the consultant generated more than \$267 million in excess mark-up, of which at least \$110 million was passed on to Bahraini government officials.

In addition to failing to conduct appropriate due diligence or determining whether there was a legitimate business reason for entering into the distributorship agreements, Alcoa extended the consultant a line of credit that reached as high as \$58 million to enable the intermediary to meet its required financial obligations in connection with the agreements, despite their refusal to provide Alcoa with financial statements as required under the company’s policies and procedures.

Although the various individuals in the underlying documents were not identified, former Alba CEO Bruce Allan Hall pleaded guilty on June 25, 2012 in the U.K. to conspiring to violate and violating the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Proceeds of Crime Act. Hall stated that he had entered into a conspiracy with Viktor Dahdaleh (the consultant engaged by Alcoa) and Sheikh Isa bin Ali al-Khalifa (Alba’s Chairman and the brother-in-law of the Bahraini Prime Minister), and that he received payments as part of a deal to allow the existing corrupt scheme between Dahdaleh and Sheikh Isa to continue. On July 22, 2014, Hall was sentenced to 16

months in prison and required to pay £3.67 million in disgorgement, compensation and contribution to prosecution costs.

According to public media reports, Sheikh Isa insisted on personally selecting and approving any supply contract valued at over 100,000 dinars (\$265,000) so that he could organize and control the flow of kickbacks for himself and others, and reportedly worked very closely with Mr. Dahdaleh, whom he called his “friend in London.” Sheikh Isa has denied any wrongdoing and has not been charged.

Dahdaleh had been charged by the SFO with seven counts of corruption based on allegations that he paid \$67 million in bribes to Alba officials in exchange for contracts awarded to Alcoa and other companies. As discussed further below, Dahdaleh was initially arrested in the U.K., but authorities later dropped the case for various reasons.

The origins of the Alcoa settlement can be traced back to 2005, when Bahraini Crown Prince Sheikh Salman bin Hamad Isa al-Khalifa vowed to root out corruption in government contracting. In 2006, Bahrain commissioned a two-year investigation into Alba that unearthed indications of widespread corruption and bribery. That same year, Hall and Sheikh Isa were both removed from their positions.

### ***Gregory Weisman, Knut Hammarskjold, and Joseph Sigelman***

Gregory Weisman, Knut Hammarskjold, and Joseph Sigelman, three former executives of British Virgin Islands-based oil and gas company PetroTiger Ltd. (“PetroTiger”), have been arrested in connection with an alleged scheme to bribe an employee of Ecopetrol (the large, majority state-owned petroleum company of Colombia) in order to obtain approval for a pending oil services contract. (The three individuals were also charged with defrauding PetroTiger’s investors by accepting kickbacks themselves from officials of a company that PetroTiger was seeking to acquire.) Weisman and Hammarskjold have both pleaded guilty, and Sigelman is challenging the charges in U.S. federal court.

According to documents filed by the DOJ, PetroTiger sought to secure a \$39.6 million contract in 2010 from a private company in Colombia to provide oil services in that country. The contract required the approval of Ecopetrol, and the DOJ alleges that Weisman, Hammarskjold, and Sigelman paid bribes of \$333,500 between September and December 2010 to an official from Ecopetrol to secure that approval.

The underlying complaints allege that PetroTiger made these payments pursuant to falsified invoices from the Ecopetrol official’s wife, which falsely claimed that she had provided finance and management consulting services for PetroTiger. The DOJ alleged that the executives sought to wire \$133,400 to the account of the Ecopetrol official’s wife, but instead wired it directly to the official’s account when their earlier attempts were rejected.

Gregory Weisman, PetroTiger’s former general counsel, pleaded guilty on November 8, 2013 to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit wire fraud. On the same day, sealed charges were filed against former PetroTiger co-CEOs Knut Hammarskjold and Joseph

Sigelman. Hammarskjold was arrested on November 20, 2013 at Newark International Airport in New Jersey, and he pleaded guilty on February 18, 2014 to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the wire fraud statute.

Sigelman was arrested in the Philippines on January 3, 2014, and extradited to Guam, where he appeared in federal court on January 6, 2014. Sigelman was indicted in federal court in New Jersey on May 9, 2014 on counts of (i) conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the wire fraud statute, (ii) three counts of substantive violations of the FCPA, (iii) conspiracy to commit money laundering, and (iv) transacting in criminal proceeds. The DOJ is also seeking forfeiture of any property derived from these offenses. On May 14, 2014, Sigelman pleaded not guilty.

Sigelman subsequently moved the court to dismiss the government's FCPA-related charges against him on the theory that Ecopetrol was not a government instrumentality in 2010, and that the individual whom Sigelman allegedly paid was not a government official. Relying on the government's brief in the *Esquenazi* case, Sigelman argued that Ecopetrol could only be an instrumentality if it performed a government function. According to Sigelman, although Ecopetrol previously performed both governmental and commercial functions, the Colombian government split the company in 2003, with the newly created National Hydrocarbon Agency retaining the governmental functions, and Ecopetrol retaining only its commercial functions. Sigelman also argued that Ecopetrol only had authority to approve private oil services contracts because it had entered into a joint venture agreement with the client that gave it a private right to do so.

In its brief in opposition to the motion to dismiss, the government argued principally that Ecopetrol's status as an instrumentality was a question of fact to be decided by a jury. The government added that it would present evidence at trial to establish that point, including that the joint venture agreement that provided Ecopetrol with contract approval rights had been signed prior to 2004 at a time that the private company was legally mandated to do so.

On December 11, 2014, Sigelman filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss, which at the time of publication of this Alert remained pending before the court.

PetroTiger had self-reported the conduct that formed the basis of the charges against Weisman, Hammarskjold, and Sigelman. In the wake of a feud between the Board and then-co-CEOs Sigelman and Hammarskjold, the Board ousted the three executives from the company and launched a review of the company's books and records. When the Board discovered the invoices to the wife of the Ecopetrol Official, it hired an outside law firm to conduct an internal investigation and subsequently disclosed the conclusions of that review to both U.S. and Colombian authorities.

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**2013*****Archer Daniel Midlands Company***

On December 20, 2013, Illinois-based agricultural commodities and biofuel producer Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”) and its Ukrainian subsidiary Alfred C. Toepfer International (Ukraine) Ltd. (“ACTI Ukraine”) agreed to pay over \$53.8 million to resolve FCPA-related allegations with the DOJ and SEC.

First, ADM entered into an NPA with the DOJ under which it agreed to pay a criminal penalty of \$9.45 million (but which was reduced and offset entirely by the criminal penalty paid by ACTI Ukraine).

Second, ADM consented to the entry of a final judgment with the SEC for violating the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA in connection with the conduct of subsidiaries ACTI Ukraine, Alfred C. Toepfer International G.m.b.H. (“ACTI Hamburg”), ADM de Venezuela Compania Anonima (“ADM Venezuela”), and ADM Latin America. As part of the final judgment with the SEC, ADM was ordered to pay \$33.3 million in disgorgement and \$3.1 million in prejudgment interest.

Third, ACTI Ukraine pleaded guilty in federal court to charges that it had conspired to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and agreed to pay a criminal penalty of \$17.8 million.

ACTI Hamburg was also required to pay a \$1.3 million fine in a related German action.

- *Ukraine*

ACTI Ukraine sourced agricultural commodities in Ukraine to supply ACTI Hamburg’s sales. The commodities purchased in Ukraine were subject to a 20% value-added tax (“VAT”), although the goods that were exported were eligible for VAT refunds. Between 2002 and 2008, however, the Ukrainian government did not refund the VAT collected on most exported goods because it lacked the funds to do so. In order to recover their refunds (totaling more than \$100 million), ACTI Hamburg and ACTI Ukraine paid approximately \$22 million to Ukrainian government officials.

Initially, ACTI Ukraine sold commodities to a U.K. exporting company (“Vendor 1”) that subsequently resold the commodities to ACTI Hamburg at a higher price, which included a bribe for Ukrainian officials and contained a handling fee for Vendor 1. Later, ACTI Ukraine made payments through a Ukrainian insurance company (“Vendor 2”) which purportedly had provided crop insurance but which actually forwarded nearly all of the money it received to government officials in Ukraine.

According to the DOJ and SEC, ADM failed to monitor and enforce adequate compliance procedures during this time period. According to the SEC Complaint, ADM did not implement

any controls that required due diligence or ongoing monitoring of ACTI Hamburg's relationship with its third-party agents or dealings with the Ukrainian government.

The SEC also stated that ADM executives had multiple indications that ACTI Ukraine's ability to recover VAT refunds was the result of illegal activity. In July 2002, for example, executives from ACTI Hamburg traveled to ADM's headquarters in Decatur, Illinois and reported to ADM's tax department that ACTI Ukraine was able to recover VAT refunds by making charitable donations. In the follow-up investigation to this disclosure, an ADM executive sent an email in October 2002 expressing his suspicion that the payments being made by ACTI Ukraine were not donations but instead illegal payments to Ukrainian government officials against ADM compliance policy.

Similarly, ADM's accountants and auditors also discovered irregularities. In 2004, in connection with other business dealings, ADM retained an accounting firm to analyze possible tax issues in Ukraine, and it reported that there was widespread use in Ukraine generally of legally risky tactics to facilitate VAT refunds. In 2006, auditors discovered that ACTI Ukraine maintained a reserve that executives from ACTI Hamburg explained was the price that it paid to recover the VAT refunds from the authorities.

Despite these concerns, ADM failed to implement sufficient anti-bribery compliance policies and procedures, allowing payments to continue through 2008.

- Venezuela

From 2004 to 2009, ADM Latin America handled the accounting and payments systems for ADM Venezuela, a joint venture between ADM Latin America and several Venezuelan partners. One executive at ADM Venezuela was also one of the joint venture partners.

During this period, several of ADM Venezuela's customers used purchases with ADM Venezuela, processed by ADM Latin America, to funnel money from corporate bank accounts to offshore, personal bank accounts.

At first, customers artificially inflated the contract costs with ADM Venezuela by including deferred credit expenses (costing that would purportedly cover uncertain future costs such as vessel delays). At the customers' request, an ADM Latin America executive would then have ADM Latin America's credit department refund the overpayment to the offshore bank accounts. When the scheme was discovered in 2004, ADM changed its policy to prohibit refunding such payments to bank accounts that were different from where the payment had originated.

The improper payments continued through 2009, however, as various employees at ADM Venezuela began to inflate payments instead with unearned "commissions" that were processed by ADM Latin America's accounting department rather than its credit department. Customers would instruct ADM Latin America to pay excess commissions to various brokers who transferred the funds to accounts controlled by the customers' employees.

- Self-Disclosure, Cooperation, and Settlement Terms

ADM voluntarily reported its activities in Venezuela and Ukraine to the U.S. government. As part of its remediation efforts, ADM conducted a worldwide risk assessment and internal investigation, made numerous presentations to the DOJ about its investigation, and implemented significant enhancements to its compliance programs. The DOJ and SEC both emphasized ADM's timely disclosure, thorough remediation, and extensive cooperation as reasons for settling the charges and recommending a lower criminal penalty for ACTI Ukraine than would normally be calculated under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.

Under the terms of the settlement, ADM is required to report its remediation efforts and plans to improve its FCPA and anti-corruption compliance procedures to the DOJ and SEC for three years.

### ***Bilfinger SE***

On December 9, 2013, German engineering and services company Bilfinger SE ("Bilfinger") announced that it had reached a three-year DPA with the DOJ as a result of corrupt payments made by a Bilfinger consortium to Nigerian government officials in connection with the Eastern Gas Gathering System ("EGGS") project. As described in detail below, in 2008, Willbros Group, Inc. ("WGI") and several WGI subsidiaries (together, "Willbros") settled charges with the SEC and DOJ related to the same corrupt scheme. In addition, several Willbros executives (including Jim Bob Brown, Jason Steph, and James Tillery) and a Willbros consultant (Paul Novak) have been indicted, have pleaded guilty, or have settled civil charges related to the scheme. (See "Willbros Group Inc." below.)

According to the DPA, from late 2003 to 2005, Bilfinger conspired with Willbros, employees of Willbros (including Brown, Steph, and Tillery), and a Nigerian consultant (Novak) to make corrupt payments totaling more than \$6 million to Nigerian government officials. The DOJ filed a three-count criminal information with the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas, charging Bilfinger with one count of conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, one count of violating the anti-bribery provisions, and one count of aiding and abetting a violation of the anti-bribery provisions. Although Bilfinger was neither an U.S. issuer nor a domestic concern for purposes of the FCPA, the DOJ charged Bilfinger on the basis that (i) WGI was an issuer under the FCPA, (ii) Willbros International Inc. ("WII"), a Panamanian Corporation through which WGI conducted its international business, was a domestic concern (its principal place of business was in the U.S.), and (iii) certain acts in furtherance of the corrupt payments, including meetings and flights, occurred in the United States.

According to the DPA, in 2003, Bilfinger, its Nigerian subsidiary and WGI agreed to form a joint venture consortium to bid on and execute the EGGS project ("EGGS Consortium"). The EGGS Consortium agreed to inflate the price of its bid by 3% and use the additional revenue to fund bribe payments to Nigerian government officials, including employees of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (the "NNPC") and National Petroleum Investment Management Services ("NAPIMS"). Within Bilfinger, these payments were often referred to as

“landscaping.” Employees of Bilfinger, its Nigerian subsidiary, and Julius Berger Nigeria (a Nigerian company owned 49% by Bilfinger) made these “landscaping” payments using cash kept in a safe at the offices of Julius Berger Nigeria.

WGI, for its part, funneled bribes to officials in Nigeria through sham agreements with third-party consultants. In 2005, WGI launched an internal investigation into unrelated tax irregularities, including an audit of WGI’s Nigerian operations. As a result, WGI ceased paying its consultants in Nigeria. When these payments stopped, Willbros and Bilfinger became concerned that the EGGG Consortium could lose out on Phase 2 of the EGGG project. In response, Bilfinger employees caused Bilfinger’s Nigerian subsidiary to loan Willbros’ Nigerian subsidiary \$1,000,000 in order for WGI to continue sending money through its consultants. The money was delivered to WGI employee Jim Bob Brown in Lagos, Nigeria in a suitcase filled with cash. The funds were then allegedly transferred to a new consultant to be paid to Nigerian government officials. In total, the EGGG Consortium made, or agreed to make, more than \$6 million in corrupt payments.

As part of the DPA, Bilfinger agreed to pay a \$32 million penalty and admit to violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. Bilfinger also agreed to implement rigorous internal controls, continue cooperating fully with the DOJ, and retain an independent corporate compliance monitor for at least 18 months.

### ***Weatherford International Limited***

On November 26, 2013, Weatherford International Limited (“Weatherford”), an NYSE-traded multinational corporation that provides equipment and services to the oil and gas industry, settled charges with the DOJ and the SEC that it had violated the anti-bribery and/or accounting provisions of the FCPA. Weatherford entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ that required the company to pay an \$87 million criminal penalty and retain an independent corporate monitor for a period of 18 months.

Pursuant to its joint motion with the SEC (approved on December 19, 2013), the company agreed to pay \$97.2 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest and civil penalties (although \$31.6 million of that amount would be satisfied by payments required under Weatherford’s DPA with the DOJ) without admitting or denying the underlying conduct, including a \$1.87 million penalty for its lack of cooperation during the SEC’s initial investigation. Like the DPA, the final judgment required Weatherford to retain a monitor.

Additionally, Weatherford’s Bermuda-incorporated subsidiary Weatherford Services Limited (“WSL”) pleaded guilty to one count of violating the FCPA’s internal controls provisions, and Weatherford agreed to pay a \$420,000 criminal fine.

In total, Weatherford agreed to pay a total of approximately \$152.8 million to resolve the charges.<sup>34</sup> The documents filed in connection with the company's settlement with the DOJ describe improper conduct in Angola, Iraq, and another undisclosed Middle Eastern country. The SEC complaint, while describing and elaborating on those activities, also alleges further improper conduct in Albania, Algeria, and the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) ("Congo").

- *Angola*

In 2004, WSL sought to establish a monopoly on contracts with Angola's state-owned oil and gas company Sonangol for well screens (devices used in oil wells to filter impurities in oil) by forming a joint venture with two local Angolan entities that certain Sonangol officials had recommended. Although both local entities had "nominal" partners, they were in fact controlled by Angolan government officials or their relatives — the first (which retained a 45% interest in the joint venture) was controlled by three senior Sonangol officials, and the second (which had a 10% interest) by the daughter of a high-level official in the Angolan Ministry of Petroleum who "had influence over contracts entered into by the Angolan government."

According to the admitted facts of the plea agreement, various WSL employees knew that the local entities were controlled by government officials, and that those officials could and did exercise undue influence in WSL's favor.

First, the Sonangol officials and the daughter of the ministry official (and not the nominal partners) met with WSL employees to negotiate the terms of the joint venture or discuss operational issues in Houston in October 2004, in London in July 2005, and in Paris in September 2006. Prior to the Paris meeting, one Weatherford executive noted that the company would need to meet the "named partners" for registration purposes, but that another Weatherford executive "would like to meet with the 'real' partners."

Second, the government officials exerted significant influence to direct business to WSL. In a May 2005 email, a Weatherford executive stated that the officials "did their part and cancelled the \$10M Kizomba contract and moved it over to us." In January 2006, one of the Sonangol officials informed the Weatherford executive that Sonangol would consider "not giving any new contract to Weatherford" unless the local partners received some "financial benefit." Another email from the same month explained WSL's "connections in Sonangol have again help[ed] us to secure" a Sonangol contract, even though its price was 30% higher than the competition.

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At the same time, Weatherford and four of its subsidiaries agreed to pay \$100 million to resolve criminal and administrative export controls matters before the Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security and the Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control. In relation to the export controls settlement, two Weatherford subsidiaries agreed to plead guilty to export controls charges, and Weatherford agreed to enter into a separate, two-year DPA with the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Southern District of Texas.

In November 2006, WSL asked that the Sonangol officials intervene in connection with a private oil company that had awarded a \$7 million contract to a WSL competitor. In a later email to an internal Weatherford lawyer, the Weatherford executive wrote that the private company subsequently stated that it would cancel the contract with the competitor and award it to WSL instead, and that he had explained to the company that WSL would “need another 10-15% to cover our local activities.” He added that “Every now and then, life gets good.”

Emails from January 2007 also suggest that the Sonangol officials provided WSL with the bid prices submitted by competitors to enable them to win the contract awards.

In addition to failing to conduct any meaningful due diligence on the local entities prior to executing the joint venture, Weatherford sought preliminary advice from outside counsel but ultimately ignored the unfavorable responses. In October 2004, for example, the company’s lawyer contacted one firm to ask whether the relationship raised any FCPA issues, but never responded to that firm’s advice that it should learn the identity of the ultimate beneficiaries of the local joint venture partners. In July 2005, the Weatherford lawyer falsely informed a separate law firm that had inquired about FCPA issues that the joint venture had been vetted and approved by outside counsel.

The settlement documents also state that WSL participated in a separate bribery scheme in Angola that involved improper payments to a Sonangol drilling manager in order to obtain regulatory approval for the renewal of an \$11.7 million contract between WSL and a private oil company for the provision of oil services in the Cabinda region of Angola.

One WSL manager reported internally that he had attended a meeting with the drilling manager in late 2005 in which the official slid an envelope across the table that that “250,000” written on it. The manager refused to pay the bribe and informed the company that he believed other Weatherford and WSL managers were making such payments.

The manager was transferred out of Angola in 2006, and WSL executives subsequently agreed to pay the bribe to the drilling manager by entering into a sham consultancy agreement with a Swiss-based freight forwarder. At the agent’s request, Weatherford removed the FCPA compliance clause from the agreement as “in view of the nature of the business [the freight forwarder] cannot accept the original wording.” The SEC added that Weatherford had also provided certain travel benefits to the drilling manager, such as a weeklong European trip that included only one day of bona fide business activities.

- Undisclosed Middle Eastern Country

Weatherford Oil Tool Middle East Limited (“WOTME”), a wholly-owned, Dubai-headquartered subsidiary of Weatherford International, awarded improper “volume discounts” to a third-party distributor who supplied Weatherford products to the national oil company of an undisclosed country in the Middle East. Officials of the national oil company had directed WOTME to work with the distributor in question. WOTME subsequently provided the distributor with a 5-10% volume discount on each sale, which totaled approximately \$15 million

between 2005 and 2011. WOTME believed that the excess funds would be used to create a slush fund to bribe government officials.

The DOJ noted that neither WOTME nor Weatherford had conducted any due diligence on the distributor despite the existence of several red flags, including (i) the above-mentioned recommendation by government officials, (ii) the distributor's role in selling goods to a government instrumentality, and the fact (known by WOTME executives) that a member of the royal family had an ownership interest.

- Iraq

WOTME also paid kickbacks to the Iraqi government in relation to the United Nations Oil for Food Program ("OFFP"). As discussed in other OFFP cases, the Iraqi government began demanding 10% kickbacks from the suppliers in connection with the humanitarian program in violation of OFFP regulations and U.N. sanctions. Between February and July 2002, WOTME paid approximately \$1.4 million to the Iraqi government in the form of kickbacks on contracts for oil drilling and refining equipment, and WOTME falsified its books and records to conceal the payments.

- Congo

The SEC alleged that WSL made over \$500,000 in bribe payments to employees of a commercial customer through the same Swiss freight forwarding agent mentioned above in order to obtain and retain business in Congo. Because this arrangement did not involve the bribery of government officials, the SEC did not allege violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, but instead alleged that WSL falsified its books and records to conceal the payments, in violation of the accounting provisions.

- Algeria

According to the SEC Complaint, Weatherford provided improper travel and entertainment expenses to officials of Sonatrach, the Algerian state-owned oil and gas company. These alleged expenses included trips for two Sonatrach officials to the World Cup Soccer tournament in Germany, a honeymoon trip for the daughter of a Sonatrach official, and a religious trip by a Sonatrach employee and his family to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia. The SEC stated that none of these trips had a legitimate business purpose, and that Weatherford also gave cash to Sonatrach officials on at least two occasions in connection with their visits to the Weatherford offices in Houston.

- Albania

The SEC alleged that management of Weatherford Mediterranean S.p.A. ("WEMESPA"), a wholly-owned Italian subsidiary of Weatherford, used company funds to bribe Albanian tax officials. The SEC stated that two WEMESPA managers misreported cash advances, diverted payments on paid invoices, and falsified reimbursement expenses to misappropriate over \$200,000 of funds for personal benefit, but later paid a portion of those

funds to Albanian tax auditors who questioned the company's accounts. The SEC added that the general manager responsible for the misappropriation also terminated an employee who had threatened to expose the misconduct.

- *Additional SEC fine for early lack of cooperation*

As noted above, the final judgment with respect to the complaint filed by the SEC included a \$1.8 million penalty assessed against Weatherford for its lack of cooperation early in the investigation. According to the SEC complaint, Weatherford and its employees "compromised" the SEC's initial investigation in a number of ways, including by (i) telling the enforcement agency that its Iraq Country Manager was missing or dead, even though he remained employed by the company, (ii) failing to secure important materials, and (iii) allowing potentially complicit employees to collect documents that had been subpoenaed by the SEC. The agency added that emails had been deleted by employees prior to computer imaging in at least two instances.

The SEC also noted, however, that Weatherford subsequently "greatly improved its cooperation and engaged in remediation efforts." The DOJ also noted both in its complaint and plea agreement that the company had been largely cooperative.

### ***Stryker Corporation***

On October 24, 2013, the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Stryker Corporation ("Stryker"), a Michigan-based medical device manufacturer and distributor listed on the NYSE, in connection with charges that Stryker had violated the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA in connection with conduct by its foreign subsidiaries. In anticipation of the cease-and-desist order, the SEC agreed to accept Stryker's offer of \$7.5 million in disgorgement, \$2.28 in prejudgment interest, and a civil monetary penalty of \$3.5 million to settle the charges.

The SEC alleged that Stryker's foreign subsidiaries in Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Poland, and Romania made a combined 520 improper payments between 2003 and 2008 totaling nearly \$2.2 million, including payments made directly or indirectly to public health officials in Mexico, Romania, and Argentina that were disguised as "honoraria" or passed through a third-party law firm. The SEC alleged that these improper payments resulted in nearly \$7.5 million in illicit profits for Stryker.

According to the SEC, Stryker's wholly-owned Polish subsidiary provided gifts, donations, travel and other payments totaling approximately \$460,000 to public health professionals. In May 2004, the subsidiary paid for a government official and her husband to travel to New Jersey to attend a single-day tour of a manufacturing and research facility, but also provided the couple with accommodations in New York City for six nights (including tickets for a Broadway Show) and a five-day trip to Aruba.

The SEC further alleged that Stryker's wholly-owned subsidiary in Greece donated nearly \$200,000 to fund a public university laboratory that was the "pet project" of "a foreign

official who served as a prominent professor at the Greek University, and was the director of medical clinics at two public hospitals affiliated with the Greek University.” The SEC explained (brackets and ellipses in original):

The country manager wrote: “I think that anything below 30k will leave [the foreign official] disappointed. He did promise that he would direct his young assistants into using our trauma and sports medicine products. [The foreign official] is . . . difficult to get as a ‘friend’ and really tough to have as a disappointed customer.” The regional manager asked, “What do we get for the sponsorship – or is it just a gift?” The country manager confirmed the quid pro quo, stating, “For the sponsorship we get the Spine business and a promise for more products in his Department. . . .”

Even though the SEC only charged Stryker with violations of the accounting provisions of the FCPA, the enforcement agency’s discussion here, as with *Eli Lilly* (discussed further below), demonstrates how broadly enforcement agencies might read the “anything of value” element of the FCPA. Even though the charitable contribution in question would benefit the university laboratory itself and would not be passed along to a government official, the SEC appears to take the position that it would nevertheless constitute something of “value” to the official because it was his “pet project.” The SEC — which itself refers to the laboratory payment as a “donation” — claimed that the Greek subsidiary improperly recorded the payment by booking it in an account entitled “Donations and Grants.”

### ***Diebold Inc.***

Diebold Inc. (“Diebold”) is an Ohio-based manufacturer of automated teller machines (“ATMs”) and bank security systems that has operations or subsidiaries in 90 countries. On October 22, 2013, Diebold entered agreements to settle charges filed by the DOJ and SEC on the same day. The DOJ filed an Information charging Diebold with (i) conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA in connection with its operations in China, and (ii) violating the books and records provisions in connection with its operations in Russia. The SEC filed a complaint alleging that Diebold had violated the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA in connection with its conduct in China, Indonesia, and Russia.

Diebold entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ, agreeing to pay a \$25.2 million penalty, implement rigorous internal controls, and retain a compliance monitor for at least 18 months. Diebold’s agreement with the SEC also required the company to appoint an independent compliance monitor, as well as to pay an additional \$22.9 million in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest, bringing the total financial cost to settle the charges to over \$48 million. Diebold also consented to a final judgment and agreed (once again) to be permanently enjoined from violating the FCPA.

- Underlying conduct

Between 2005 and 2010, Diebold's Chinese and Indonesian subsidiaries, Diebold Financial Equipment Company (China), Ltd ("Diebold China") and P.T. Diebold Indonesia ("Diebold Indonesia"), made payments of cash, travel, and other gifts totaling approximately \$1.6 million to employees of majority state-owned banks in China and Indonesia. The SEC Complaint details various improper travel expenses that the company paid to provide "leisure trip[s]" to various Chinese and Indonesian banking officials, including:

- A number of trips to the United States, including: (i) fifteen-day "leisure trip" in 2005 for two banking officials to Los Angeles (including Universal Studios and Disneyland), Las Vegas, the Grand Canyon, Washington DC, New York City, San Francisco, and Hawaii, (ii) a "two-week leisure trip to the U.S. for three officials" in 2008, and (iii) a two-week trip for twenty-four officials to Chicago, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, San Diego, and San Francisco and Napa Valley in 2009;
- Multiple trips to Europe, including: (i) a 12-day "leisure and sightseeing trip" in 2006 for eight banking officials to Rome, Italy, and Stockholm, (ii) a two-week leisure trip in 2007 for thirteen banking officials to France, (iii) a two-week tour through France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria, and Italy in 2008 for eight banking officials, and (iv) an additional trip to Europe in 2009; and
- Trips to locations in the Asia Pacific region, including "two-week leisure trip[s]" to Australia and New Zealand for five banking officials in 2006, and to Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia in 2008.

In addition to the trips, Diebold also conspired to provide cash gifts to senior banking officials with the ability to influence purchasing decisions by the banks. The DOJ quotes several emails from 2005 and 2006 in which Diebold employees discuss the distribution of "China Spring Festival" gifts to senior officials and provide detailed spreadsheets showing previous and proposed expenditures for such gifts.

Separately, Diebold's Russian subsidiary Diebold Self-Service Ltd ("Diebold Russia") entered into fraudulent contracts with a third-party distributor in Russia. The distributor did not perform any of the services fictitiously described in those contracts, but instead used the compensation that it received from Diebold to pay bribes to the employees of privately-owned banks in order to obtain or retain contracts from those entities. The SEC Complaint alleges that Diebold Russia paid at least \$1.2 million in bribes to its customers in Russia through its distributor.

- Key Takeaways

The Diebold settlements are instructive in demonstrating that companies are expected to investigate red flags thoroughly when they are uncovered, either by a due diligence review or in light of the existence of corruption-related investigations in other jurisdictions. The SEC, for

example, criticized Diebold for not fully investigating red flags that were the subject of a governmental investigation in China:

Other executives at Diebold were on notice of potential corruption issues at Diebold China. In 2007, a regional governmental agency in China, the Chengdu Administration of Industry & Commerce (“CDAIC”), opened an investigation involving, among other issues, leisure trips and gifts Diebold China had provided to bank officials. Company executives in China and the U.S. learned of the investigation after a Diebold field office in Chengdu was raided by the authorities. . . . Diebold was able to settle the matter with no corruption charges filed . . . . Despite being on notice of potential corruption issues at Diebold China, Diebold failed to effectively investigate and remediate these problems.

Similarly, the SEC criticized Diebold for continuing to engage third-party distributors in the Ukraine and Russia after learning that those distributors had made illicit payments in the past on behalf of other clients:

During due diligence, executives at Diebold . . . learned that Distributor B had previously made illicit payments to employees of its bank customers. Diebold was unable to determine whether these illicit payments involved sales of Diebold products. While Diebold did not move forward with the acquisition, without taking any further steps to investigate and remediate these corruption issues, Diebold continued to do business with Distributor B until 2010.

Additionally, the settlements demonstrate the importance that enforcement agencies place on remediation as a tool to foster an appropriate corporate environment and ensure the effectiveness of a compliance program. Notably, although Diebold voluntarily disclosed the alleged misconduct to the DOJ and SEC, both enforcement agencies required Diebold to retain an independent compliance monitor as a condition of settlement. In discussing this requirement, the DOJ explained that:

in light of the specific facts and circumstances of this case and the Company’s recent history, including a previous accounting fraud enforcement action by the [SEC], the [DOJ] believes that [Diebold’s] remediation is not sufficient to address and reduce the risk of recurrence of the Company’s misconduct and warrants the retention of an independent corporate monitor.

The court documents do not provide details regarding Diebold’s remediation efforts, including whether Diebold took any disciplinary measures against its relevant employees. The filings do note, however, that although Diebold self-disclosed its violations to the DOJ and SEC in 2010, the two Diebold executives principally involved with the conduct in question were

promoted in early 2010 and retained their positions until they both resigned in December 2011. Additionally, publicly available documents state that the individual identified as “Executive A” in the court filings received over \$1.3 million in compensation from Diebold in 2010.

Various emails discussed in the court filings also suggest that Diebold executives and employees devised various ways to conceal the improper activity or provide fictitious justifications specifically in anticipation of future investigations. For example, in one email, a Diebold employee suggested ways to make an overseas trip for banking officials appear “more training related . . . [so that] we can have some argue [sic] points if any investigation comes.”

In another email, a Diebold China executive wrote to a supervisor in Diebold’s French offices about an independent auditor’s request for evidence regarding the “overseas training” provided to bank officers. The executive requested that the supervisor appoint a local contact in France who could tell the auditors, if requested, “that Diebold France did assist Diebold China on the invitation preparation, program arrangement, and needed logistic assistance.”

***Ernesto Lujan, Tomas Clarke, Jose Hurtado, Maria Gonzalez, Benito China, and Joseph DeMeneses***

Between May 2013 and April 2013, five executives of New York-based broker-dealer Direct Access Partners LLP (“Direct Access”) and one Venezuelan government official have been arrested for paying or conspiring to pay bribes to officials of two state-owned economic development banks in Venezuela in violation of the FCPA and the Travel Act. Initially, this included Tomas Clarke Bethancourt, Jose Alejandro Hurtado, and Ernesto Lujan (who pleaded guilty in August 2013) but later expanded to include Benito China and Joseph DeMeneses (who pleaded guilty in December 2014).

United States officials also arrested a Venezuelan government official in connection with her alleged involvement in the bribery scheme. On May 3, 2013, Maria de los Angeles Gonzalez de Hernandez was arrested in Miami. Gonzalez served as the Vice President of Finance and Executive Manager of Finance and Funds Administration for Venezuela’s state-owned banking entity, Banco de Desarrollo Económico y Social de Venezuela (“BANDES”). As a foreign government official, Gonzalez would not be liable for receiving improper payments under the FCPA; she was charged instead with violating and conspiring to violate the Travel Act for traveling (and using the mail and facilities) in interstate and foreign commerce with the intent to violate the FCPA as well as New York state laws that prohibit the receipt of commercial bribes. Gonzalez pleaded guilty to the charges on November 18, 2013.

- ***Allegations***

Lujan, Clarke, China, and DeMeneses were executives of Direct Access’s Global Markets Group (“Direct Access Global”), a business unit that executed fixed income trades of foreign sovereign debt for its clients. Under its business model, Direct Access Global would buy government bonds on the open market to fill customer orders, and it would retain as profit the markup difference between the market price and the price that it charged its customers.

Similarly, the broker-dealer sold bonds on customer request and retained the markdown difference between the market transaction price and price paid to its customers.

Primarily through its Miami office, Direct Access Global executed such trades with BANDES, a new client that it developed through its connections with Hurtado. In connection with such trades, the broker-dealer executives improperly paid to BANDES officials portions of the profit that they received from executing bond transactions on BANDES's behalf. Specifically, according to the court filings, these individuals paid kickbacks to Gonzalez and another BANDES official, whom the individuals referred to respectively as "the ant and the passion fruit."

Between January 2009 and June 2010, Direct Access Partners generated revenue of over \$66 million in connection with its bond trades with BANDES. The broker-dealer obtained most of this revenue through markups or markdowns of bond transactions on the open market. For example, Direct Access Global fulfilled a BANDES order by purchasing Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. ("PDVSA") bonds on the market for approximately \$8.7 million and subsequently selling those bonds to BANDES for approximately \$9.4 million. The SEC Complaint states that Lujan and Clarke arranged to pay \$50,625 to Gonzalez as a kickback for implementing the BANDES orders.

Additionally, however, Direct Access Global also executed two same-day roundtrip trades with BANDES that generated over \$10.5 million in revenue. Specifically, on January 28, 2010, Direct Access Global purchased a large number of bonds from BANDES for approximately \$90.7 million, and immediately resold them back to BANDES for approximately \$96 million. Direct Access Global executed similar trades on the following day, purchasing bonds from BANDES for approximately \$90 million and reselling them back for approximately \$95.2 million. The court filings allege that the broker-dealer executives arranged to pay \$5.26 million (equivalent to half of the markup on the trades) to Gonzalez.

The broker-dealer executives developed a number of different methods to conceal their improper payments. At first, Direct Access Global routed the improper payments through Hurtado's wife, whom Direct Access Global improperly paid as a non-registered "foreign finder" even though she lived in Miami (and thus was not domiciled abroad as required) and had not introduced Direct Access Global to BANDES. After the "foreign finder" arrangement was questioned by one of the company's clearing brokers, Hurtado was hired as a "back office" non-registered employee, paying him an annual salary of \$1.2 million plus bonuses to make up the difference for the required payouts. Under this arrangement, Hurtado received approximately \$6.1 million between August 2009 and June 2010 in connection with trades that had been executed prior to August 2009. Furthermore, in connection with trades executed in August 2009 and after, Direct Access Global allegedly paid Gonzalez by funneling payments through ETC Investment, S.A. ("ETC"), a Panama corporation controlled by Clarke and his wife, or by directing payments to Clarke's wife, who had been hired as a foreign associate of Direct Access Global. Finally, the authorities also maintain that DeMeneses and Clarke paid Gonzalez approximately \$1.5 million from their personal funds, and were later reimbursed by Direct

Access Global. The reimbursements were allegedly concealed by China and DeMeneses in the company's books as sham loans to companies associated with DeMeneses and Clarke.

The court filings allege that Gonzalez received most of these improper payments through Cartegena International, Inc. ("Cartegena"), a Panamanian corporation that Gonzalez owned with Jorge Hernandez Gonzalez, an apparent relative. The documents allege, for example, that Clarke and Hurtado laundered kickbacks to Gonzalez in part by transferring funds from the Swiss-bank accounts of ETC and H.A.S. Investment Group (a company that Hurtado controlled) to Cartegena's various Swiss bank accounts. Similarly, a second BANDES official also received kickbacks that were transferred to the Swiss bank accounts of Hyseven S.A., a company that he controlled.

Lujan, Clarke, Hurtado, and DeMeneses were also accused of conspiring to violate the FCPA in connection with payments to another Venezuelan government official. The executives had entered into a similar agreement to bribe the vice president of another state-owned economic development bank, Banfoandes, and its successor Banco Bicentenario.

- Investigation

The anti-corruption investigation and subsequent charges developed from a periodic examination that the SEC commenced in November 2010. The Information states that Lujan, Clarke, Hurtado, and DeMeneses conspired to conceal evidence from the SEC examination staff and that each deleted emails relating to the above conduct. Additionally, Clarke was accused of lying to the SEC examination staff when responding to questions about the associated payments.

In parallel to the criminal prosecution, the SEC filed civil complaints against Lujan, Clarke, Hurtado, China, and DeMeneses, as well as the wives of Clarke and Hurtado, seeking civil monetary penalties and disgorgement with interest of all ill-gotten gains. Additionally, the DOJ filed a forfeiture complaint to seize the assets of the various third-party companies that the broker-dealer executives and BANDES officials allegedly used to transfer the illicit funds.

Each of the defendants have pleaded guilty to some of the charges, although as of the date of this Alert, none had been sentenced. First, in August 2013, Lujan, Clarke, and Hurtado pleaded guilty to (i) four counts of conspiring commit FCPA, Travel Act, and money laundering violations, (ii) three counts of substantive violations of the FCPA, the Travel Act, and money laundering laws, and (iii) one count of conspiracy to obstruct justice. Second, on November 18, 2013, Gonzalez pleaded guilty to charges of violating and conspiring to violate the Travel Act for traveling (and using the mail and facilities) in interstate and foreign commerce with the intent to violate the FCPA as well as New York state laws that prohibit the receipt of commercial bribes. Third, China and DeMeneses both pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act. They also admitted the forfeiture allegation with respect to that count, with China agreeing to forfeit \$3.6 million and DeMeneses agreeing to forfeit \$2.6 million.

***Subramanian Krishnan***

On July 2, 2013, Subramanian Krishnan, former CFO of Minnesota-based Digi International, Inc. (“Digi”), settled civil charges with the SEC relating to allegations that he caused Digi to file inaccurate reports and certifications, resulting in violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Krishnan consented to the payment of a \$60,000 civil penalty, a permanent injunction against future violations of securities laws, and a five-year bar from serving as an officer or a director of a public company and from appearing or practicing as an accountant before the Commission.

According to the SEC Complaint, Krishnan circumvented Digi’s corporate policy to approve travel and entertainment expenses that lacked legitimate business purposes. Digi’s internal procedures required Krishnan to submit his expenses to the CEO for approval. The Complaint alleged, however, that Krishnan circumvented those controls between March 2005 and May 2010 by seeking reimbursement instead through Digi’s Hong Kong office, where he could approve the expenses himself. The SEC also alleged that Krishnan authorized reimbursement of personal expenses for other Digi employees, falsely recording them as work and travel expenses, and that he authorized and approved cash payments that were not properly supported or explained. The SEC did not specify how Krishnan or other employees used the funds from the improper reimbursements, but stated only that Krishnan’s actions reflected a “lack of management integrity” and a material weakness in Digi’s internal controls.

The SEC also alleged that Krishnan made numerous material misrepresentations and omissions, including: (i) stating in Digi’s public filings and financial statements that he had assessed the company’s internal control over financial reporting and concluded that it was effective; (ii) representing to the company’s external auditor that he had no knowledge of any fraud; and (iii) signing approximately 20 management letters, in which he falsely attested that he had no knowledge of any fraud. In addition, Krishnan allegedly falsified books, records, accounts, and certifications, including Forms 10-K and 10-Q signed on behalf of Digi during the period of misconduct.

The charges filed against Krishnan originated from an internal investigation conducted by Digi following whistleblower allegations against Krishnan and three other employees in 2010. Reportedly, Digi voluntarily disclosed the allegations to the SEC and the DOJ, and used outside counsel to investigate potential FCPA violations in Asia Pacific and other selected regions. The company also adopted remedial measures that included terminating the individuals involved and strengthening its internal controls over branches located abroad. Even though the SEC found that Digi had failed to make and keep accurate books and records and to maintain a system of internal accounting controls, both the SEC and DOJ reportedly confirmed in July 2010 that they would not pursue any enforcement actions against the company in connection with Krishnan’s conduct.

***Total S.A.***

On May 29, 2013, Total S.A. (“Total”), the fifth-largest publicly traded integrated international oil and gas company in the world, and the DOJ entered into a DPA to resolve charges that Total violated the books and records provisions of the FCPA and conspired to violate both the anti-bribery and the books and records provisions. The same day, the SEC entered a cease-and-desist order against Total pursuant to a settlement between Total and the SEC. The resolution resolved a long-open investigation by the DOJ and the SEC into the company’s involvement in the development of oil and gas fields in Iran. The U.S. government asserted jurisdiction over Total based on Total’s NYSE-listed and SEC-registered American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”).

As part of a three-year DPA with the DOJ, Total agreed (i) to pay a criminal fine of \$245.2 million; (ii) to cooperate with the DOJ, non-U.S. law enforcement and multilateral development banks; (iii) to retain an independent corporate compliance monitor (designated as a French national) for a period of three years; and (iv) to continue to implement an enhanced compliance program and internal controls designed to prevent and detect violations of relevant anti-corruption laws. Total also consented to the filing of a three-count Criminal Information by the DOJ in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, which charged the company with one count of conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, one count of violating the internal controls provision, and one count of violating the books and records provision. Jurisdiction in the Eastern District of Virginia was asserted on the basis that Total’s filings with the SEC were submitted to the SEC’s Management Office of Information and Technology in Alexandria, Virginia. As part of an administrative cease-and-desist order (“CDO”) entered by the SEC, Total was also required to pay \$153 million in disgorgement in connection with the same events underlying the DPA. The CDO further required Total to retain a compliance consultant to review the company’s FCPA compliance program, which in practice will be satisfied by the imposition of the corporate monitor required pursuant to the DPA.

The following summary is based on the Statement of Facts attached to the DPA and the SEC’s allegations in the CDO. From 1995 to 2004, Total made payments of approximately \$60 million to gain access to the development of oil and gas fields in Iran, which yielded an estimated \$150 million in profits. Total entered into negotiations with an Iranian official of a state-owned and controlled engineering company in May 1995 to secure the official’s support in obtaining contracts from the National Iranian Oil Company (“NIOC”) to develop the Sirri A and E oil and gas fields. In July 2005, Total entered into a consultancy agreement with an intermediary designated by the official, and subsequently, NIOC awarded the Sirri A and E development contract to Total. Over the next two-and-a-half years, at the direction of the official, Total paid the intermediary \$16 million in “business development expenses,” which the United States claimed were unlawful payments to the official. In 1997, in connection with negotiations with NIOC for a contract to develop a portion of the South Pars gas field, the official directed Total to enter into another consultancy agreement with a second intermediary. Later that year, Total entered into a development contract with NIOC related to the South Pars gas field. Over the next seven years, Total paid approximately \$44 million in “business development expenses” to a second intermediary at the direction of the Iranian official.

According to the DPA, Total mischaracterized the payments to the intermediaries as “business development expenses” when they were actually “unlawful payments for the purpose of inducing the Iranian Official to use his influence in connection with the granting of development rights to the Sirri A and E and South Pars fields, and improperly characterized the unlawful consulting agreements as legitimate consulting agreements.”

In its announcement of the U.S. settlement, Acting Assistant Attorney General Raman characterized the case as the “first coordinated action by French and U.S. law enforcement in a major foreign bribery case,” and that “(o)ur two countries are working more closely today than ever to combat corporate corruption . . . .”

### ***Ralph Lauren Corporation***

On April 22, 2013, Ralph Lauren Corporation (“Ralph Lauren”) entered into an NPA with the DOJ (“DOJ NPA”) and agreed to pay a penalty of \$882,000 to resolve allegations that it violated the FCPA by paying bribes to customs officials in Argentina in return for preferential treatment. The same day, the SEC announced that it had also reached an NPA (“SEC NPA”) with Ralph Lauren based on the same conduct. As part of the SEC NPA, Ralph Lauren agreed to pay \$593,000 in disgorgement and \$141,859.79 in prejudgment interest, bringing Ralph Lauren’s total to more than \$1.6 million to resolve the allegations with both enforcement authorities.

Ralph Lauren, a New York-based company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, is a designer, marketer and distributor of apparel, accessories and other products. According to the charging documents, from 2005 through 2009, Ralph Lauren’s indirect, wholly-owned Argentine subsidiary, P.R.L.-S.R.L. (“Ralph Lauren Argentina”), paid over \$550,000 to a customs agent for the purpose of paying bribes to Argentine customs officials.

The DOJ NPA alleges that the general manager of Ralph Lauren Argentina orchestrated a scheme with the customs agent to make unlawful payments to officials in the Argentine customs department in order to secure various improper advantages, including clearance of certain merchandise without proper paperwork, clearance of items that were otherwise prohibited, and avoidance of inspection of Ralph Lauren Argentina merchandise. In order to disguise the purpose of payments, the customs agent submitted invoices to Ralph Lauren Argentina with line items such as “Loading and Delivery Expenses” and “Stamp Tax/Label Tax,” for which no back-up documentation was provided and which were allegedly for amounts used as bribes.

In addition to paying bribes to customs officials through the customs agent, the DOJ NPA alleges that the general manager of Ralph Lauren Argentina directly provided or authorized gifts provided to three different customs officials to secure the importation of Ralph Lauren products into Argentina. The gifts allegedly included perfume, dresses and handbags at values ranging between \$400 and \$14,000.

The settlement is primarily instructive regarding the DOJ’s willingness to hold parent companies responsible for the conduct of their foreign subsidiaries. As discussed above, the FCPA Resource Guide specifies that the DOJ may seek to hold parent corporations liable for their foreign subsidiaries’ violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA under an agency

theory and the principles of *respondeat superior*. In the Resource Guide, the enforcement agencies stated that agency-based liability would be determined on the basis of control, including a number of factors such as parent company knowledge and direction, reporting structures, the existence of shared management, and the involvement of the parent's legal department or corporate management in approving any relevant engagements or payments. In the context of the NPA, however, Ralph Lauren and the DOJ appear to have acknowledged that the parent company's hiring of the general manager of Ralph Lauren Argentina established that Ralph Lauren exercised sufficient control over its Argentinean subsidiary.

The NPAs also allege that Ralph Lauren lacked appropriate internal accounting controls. According to the DOJ NPA, during the five-year period in which the improper payments were made, Ralph Lauren did not have an anti-corruption program and did not provide training to employees or otherwise exercise any oversight to prevent misconduct.

In the beginning of 2010, Ralph Lauren implemented a new FCPA policy. After reviewing the new policy, certain employees of Ralph Lauren Argentina raised concerns about the use of the customs agent. In response to these concerns, Ralph Lauren conducted an investigation and discovered the improper payments. Within two weeks, Ralph Lauren self-reported the conduct to the DOJ.

Both the SEC and the DOJ lauded Ralph Lauren's extraordinary cooperation and remedial efforts. Among the cooperative efforts taken by Ralph Lauren were: (i) voluntary and complete disclosure of documents, including accurate translations of documents; (ii) summarizing witness interviews conducted by the company during its internal investigation; and (iii) making witnesses available and bringing them to the United States for interviews by U.S. authorities. In addition, Ralph Lauren took important remedial measures, including terminating its relationship with the customs agent, conducting a worldwide risk assessment, implementing whistleblower procedures, winding down operations in Argentina, enhancing due diligence procedures, improving policies related to commissions and gifts and hospitalities, providing targeted in-person anti-corruption training, and retaining a full-time designated compliance officer.

The Ralph Lauren settlement marks the first time that the SEC has entered into an NPA to resolve FCPA violations. The SEC cited Ralph Lauren's remedial efforts and cooperation as the main reason it chose to enter into its first agreement of this nature.

### ***Parker Drilling Company***

On April 16, 2013, Parker Drilling Company ("Parker Drilling"), a Houston-based provider of drilling services, entered into a DPA with the DOJ, and separately settled charges with the SEC to resolve investigations into its operations in Nigeria in 2003 and 2004. Parker Drilling will pay over \$15.85 million in fines, disgorgement, and interest, and must also implement and maintain an enhanced corporate compliance program.

Under the terms of the DPA, Parker Drilling agreed to pay a penalty of \$11.76 million, approximately 20% less than the minimum fine suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines. This

reduced penalty may be due, in part, to Parker Drilling's cooperation, extensive remediation efforts (including "ending its business relationships with officers, employees, or agents primarily responsible for the corrupt payments"), and responsive development of an enhanced compliance program. Separately, in the parallel civil proceedings, Parker Drilling agreed to settle civil charges brought by the SEC. Parker Drilling consented to pay disgorgement of \$3,050,000, the amount that Parker Drilling's fine was reduced, plus interest of \$1,040,818.

Parker Drilling's settlement is related to the prior Panalpina-related sweep. Since December 2010, when seven other companies (and, in some cases, their subsidiaries) paid more than \$236 million in combined penalties to resolve DOJ and SEC investigations, the DOJ and SEC had declined to pursue prosecutions of at least four other companies originally under investigation, including most recently Nabors Industries Ltd in 2013 and Schlumberger N.V. in 2012.

Parker Drilling retained Panalpina World Transport (Nigeria) Limited ("Panalpina") to assist it in obtaining temporary import permit ("TIP") extensions for several rigs that Parker Drilling owned and operated in Nigeria. According to the charging documents, Panalpina obtained these extensions by submitting false paperwork to the Nigerian authorities that claimed that the rigs had been exported from and re-imported into Nigerian waters, even though they in fact had not. This "paper process" violated Nigerian law, and an investigative panel of the Nigerian government summoned Parker Drilling in December 2002 to discuss its TIPs and extensions.

The DOJ and SEC were not principally concerned with the manner in which Parker Drilling and Panalpina obtained the TIP extensions, but rather with the subsequent efforts that Parker Drilling undertook to resolve the investigation. By December 2003, Parker Drilling wanted to settle the TIP matter so that it could sell its rigs and exit Nigeria. To assist with that goal, an unnamed lawyer ("Lawyer") at a U.S. law firm ("Law Firm") introduced Parker Driller to one of the Lawyer's clients, who recommended that the company engage a Nigerian and British citizen ("Agent") who resided in the United Kingdom. Parker Drilling retained the Agent indirectly through the Law Firm by engaging him to "act as a consultant to [Law Firm] to provide professional assistance resolving these issues in Nigeria." The DOJ and SEC charging documents note in particular that the Agent's resume did not indicate any relevant experience with customs issues, and that Parker Drilling did not conduct any due diligence on the Agent other than interviewing him in London.

Between January and June 2004, Parker Driller paid over \$1.25 million to the Agent, almost entirely through indirect payments routed through the Law Firm. Contemporary emails between Parker Driller and the Law Firm show that many of these payments were used for entertainment expenses, including in connection with the Nigerian presidential delegation, the Ministry of Finance, and the State Security Service, Nigeria's intelligence and law enforcement agency. In mid-April 2004, for example, the Agent emailed the Lawyer and an executive of Parker Drilling to explain that:

There is nothing more serious than landing in Nigeria without money to resolve the problems. . . . I have [a] meeting tomorrow in Abuja to discuss the drilling contracts. This is my reason for making sure that I can entertain my hosts because of their promises. Therefore, please make sure that you transfer the funds today so that my Bank Officer can send it to Nigeria tomorrow.

By early May 2004, the Lawyer explained to his contact at Parker Drilling that the Agent was spending nearly \$4,000 “a day per person because of the entourage entertainment.”

At the same time, Parker Drilling’s treasurer was concerned about an ongoing Sarbanes-Oxley audit and requested an invoice for the growing expenses. The Agent then provided two invoices to the Lawyer for “professional fees” for 2004 totaling \$500,000, which the Lawyer reproduced on Law Firm letterhead and arbitrarily divided between “expenses” and “fees,” even though there was no apparent reason for doing so.

On May 12, 2004, the Nigerian governmental panel investigating the TIP issues levied a fine of \$3.8 million against Parker Drilling. Two weeks later, however, the panel reduced the fine to \$750,000 without stating a reason for doing so. Following that decision, the Agent requested additional compensation, and Parker Drilling paid him another \$650,000 in June 2004.

Parker Drilling’s three-year DPA with the DOJ requires that the company (i) implement an enhanced compliance program with a high-level commitment from its directors and senior managers; (ii) develop and maintain risk-based policies, procedures, and internal controls capable of preventing and detecting FCPA violations, including internal mechanisms for discipline and confidential reporting of violations; (iii) provide training and guidance to directors, officers, and relevant employees, as well as agents and business partners “where necessary and appropriate;” and (iv) conduct appropriate risk-based due diligence on agents, business partners, and potential acquisitions.

### ***Frederic Cilins***

On April 14, 2013, Frederic Cilins, a French citizen, was arrested in Jacksonville, Florida, accused of attempting to obstruct an ongoing federal grand jury investigation into potential bribes paid by BSG Resources Ltd. (“BSGR”), the Guernsey-registered mining arm of the Beny Steinmetz Group, in exchange for the rights to the valuable mining concessions in the Simandou region of the Republic of Guinea. According to the three-count criminal complaint filed in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, Cilins was charged with (i) tampering with a witness, victim or informant, (ii) obstructing a criminal investigation, and (iii) destroying, altering, or falsifying records in a federal investigation. In March 2014, Cilins pleaded guilty to one count of obstruction of a criminal investigation filed under a superseding information. The remaining counts were dismissed. On July 25, 2014, Cilins was sentenced to 24 months in prison, and ordered to pay a \$75,000 fine and to forfeit \$20,000.

The Simandou Mountains are rich with iron ore, and the exploitation rights of the region have been valued at \$10 billion. According to press reports, Beny Steinmetz had acquired the

rights to extract half the ore from the mountains by pledging an investment of only \$165 million to develop the Simandou mine. Steinmetz then sold 51% of the subsidiary that had acquired the rights to the Brazilian-based Vale S.A. for \$2.5 billion, thereby recouping the entire investment cost while retaining over \$2.3 billion in profit as well as 49% ownership.

The FBI launched an investigation in January 2013 into the circumstances surrounding the transaction. According to the complaint against Cilins, BSGR allegedly obtained the extraction rights through a bribery scheme that involved as much as \$12 million distributed to Mamadie Touré (the fourth wife of late Guinean President Lansana Conté) and ministers or senior officials of Guinea's government whose authority might help secure the mining rights.

The complaint alleges that, during monitored and recorded phone calls and face-to-face meetings, Cilins attempted to induce a cooperating witness in the investigation with payments of as much as \$5 million to destroy original copies of relevant contracts that had been requested by the FBI and needed to be produced to the federal grand jury. The cooperating witness has been identified in various press sources as Mamadie Touré herself. The complaint also alleges that Cilins sought to induce Touré to sign an affidavit containing numerous false statements regarding matters under investigation by the grand jury.

The contracts that Cilins allegedly sought to obtain and destroy related to a scheme by which BSGR and its affiliate entities offered Touré millions of dollars. The complaint details five separate contracts that involved payments of \$7 million and transfers of stock of BSGR subsidiary companies and blocks 1 and 2 of the Simandou Mountains area of Guinea to a company held by Touré. One contract in particular provided that the BSGR subsidiary would transfer 17.65% of its capital to a holding company in which Touré would have a 33.3% interest. In filings dated June 28, 2013, Cilins stated that the contracts at issue are fake and that they were "created [by Touré] to extort monies from BSGR, Mr. Cilins, and others."

BSGR has repeatedly denied Guinean government allegations that it paid bribes to Conté, the country's former and now deceased ruler, to obtain access to the Simandou deposits, instead arguing that the allegations "are entirely baseless and motivated by an ongoing campaign to seize the assets of BSGR." Following Cilins's arrest, however, BSGR issued a "Response to press speculation" in which it stated that it had transferred a 17.65% stake in its subsidiary BSGR Guinea Ltd BVI to an entity named Pentler Holdings, which had been established by Cilins and two other individuals, Michael Noy and Avraham Lev Ran.

In April 2014, at the recommendation of a Guinean investigative committee set up to review Guinea's mining deals, BSGR was stripped of its rights to the Simandou mine. The investigative committee determined that there was sufficient evidence to conclude that BSGR had obtained its mining rights through corrupt acts. The rights to Simandou were subsequently awarded to Rio Tinto, Chinalco, and the International Finance Corporation. The FBI's investigations into BSGR's efforts to secure the Simandou mining rights remain ongoing.

***Koninklijke Philips Electronics***

On April 9, 2013, the SEC instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Dutch electronics company Koninklijke Philips Electronics N.V. (“Philips”) in connection with charges that Philips had violated the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA with respect to conduct by its Polish medical equipment subsidiary (“Philips Poland”) between 1999 and 2007. In anticipation of the cease-and-desist order, the SEC agreed to accept Philips’ offer of \$3.1 million in disgorgement and \$1.39 million in prejudgment interest to settle the charges.

According to the SEC, Philips first learned of potential control problems in Poland in August 2007, when Polish authorities raided three Philips Poland offices and arrested two Philips Poland employees. Philips subsequently conducted an internal audit, terminated and disciplined several Philips Poland employees, and made changes to the company’s management and internal controls. The settlement agreement, however, states that Philips failed to uncover the FCPA-related conduct that formed the basis of the April 2013 order and settlement.

The SEC further alleged that Philips Poland made payments to health care officials of 3% to 8% of the value of contracts for the sale of medical equipment, supported by falsified documentation and often with the assistance of an unidentified third-party agent. The SEC stated Polish healthcare officials allegedly accepted the improper payments in exchange for assisting the company in obtaining contract awards by incorporating the specifications of Philips’ equipment into relevant public tenders. The SEC also stated that some of the officials who received the alleged payments were also responsible for selecting the winners of the bids.

In December 2009, Polish prosecutors indicted three former Philips Poland employees along with four other private individuals and sixteen Polish healthcare officials. The indictments provided information on at least thirty improper payments that Philips Poland allegedly made between 1999 and 2007 in violation of public tendering laws.

In response to the 2009 indictments, Philips conducted another internal investigation with the help of three law firms and two accounting firms, the results of which supported the findings that Philips Poland employees had made improper payments to Polish healthcare officials and had inaccurately recorded those payments in their books and records. In 2010, Philips self-reported its ongoing internal investigation to the SEC and DOJ, and continued to update the enforcement agencies on the results of its internal audit as it progressed.

Although the activity in question was undertaken by a Polish subsidiary of a Dutch company, Philips agreed that the SEC had subject-matter jurisdiction because (i) Philips Poland’s financial statements are consolidated into Philips’ books and records, and (ii) in addition to having common shares listed on the Euronext Amsterdam Exchange, Philip’s New York Registry Shares are listed on the NYSE. As noted earlier in this Alert, the DOJ and SEC’s recently published Resource Guide makes clear that issuer parents might be held responsible for ensuring that their wholly-owned subsidiaries comply with the accounting provisions of the FCPA to an even greater level than with the anti-bribery provisions of that law. The SEC did not charge Philips with any violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, and in late 2011, the DOJ informed Philips that it declined to take enforcement action.

The SEC alleged that Philips had failed to “implement an FCPA compliance and training program commensurate with the extent of its international operations,” but noted that since launching its internal investigation and self-reporting the conduct, Philips had (i) established new internal controls related to third parties, (ii) substantially revised its Global Business Principles policies, (iii) established an anti-corruption training and certification program, (iv) “formalized and centralized its contract administration system and enhanced its contract review process,” and (v) “established a broad-based verification process related to contract payments.” Philips also terminated or disciplined several employees and installed new management of Philips Poland. In light of these remediation efforts, as well as Philips’ cooperation with the investigation, the SEC did not impose any civil penalty beyond the disgorgement and pre-judgment interest.

### ***Keyuan Petrochemicals***

On February 28, 2013, the SEC entered into a settlement with Keyuan Petrochemicals (“Keyuan”) and its former CFO, Aichun Li, for violations of the FCPA books and records and internal controls provisions and other violations of U.S. Securities laws. Keyuan agreed to pay a \$1 million civil penalty, while Aichun consented to a final judgment and agreed to pay a \$25,000 civil penalty without admitting or denying the allegations in the SEC Complaint.

Keyuan is headquartered in Ningbo, China, and was formed in 2010 when Ningbo Keyuan Plastics Ltd. (“Ningbo”) completed a reverse merger with a Nevada shell company that traded in the United States. Keyuan is still traded on the OTCQB, but was delisted from NASDAQ in October 2011 after amending its SEC filings to disclose potential violations of the FCPA along with other U.S. and Chinese laws. The Keyuan settlement appears to be the first FCPA settlement with a China-based company.

According to the SEC Complaint, Keyuan operated an off-balance cash account that the company used to provide gifts for Chinese government officials from the environmental, port, police, and fire departments, particularly during the Chinese New Year season. The SEC alleged that gifts included household goods such as bedding and linens, but also “red envelope” gifts that were filled with cash. In total, Keyuan dispersed approximately \$1 million from the off-balance cash account, including in connection with other payments that were not adequately recorded in Keyuan’s books and records, such as bonus payments to senior officers, fees for technical experts, and travel, entertainment, and apartment rental expenses for the Keyuan CEO.

The off-balance cash account was allegedly funded in part through proceeds from the sales of promissory notes and certain products like scrap metal, as well as through fictitious reimbursement claims used to withdraw cash from the company’s official accounts. According to the complaint, Ningbo’s vice president of accounting, who is based in China, actively maintained and hid the off-balance cash account from the company’s auditors.

The SEC alleged that Aichun, a Chinese national and resident of North Carolina, was hired by Keyuan to serve as CFO primarily to oversee its SEC reporting responsibilities. The SEC alleged that Aichun received “red flags that should have indicated to her that the company was not properly identifying or disclosing related party transactions” but that she nonetheless filed statements and reports that did not accurately disclose such transactions. The SEC alleged

that Aichun was also verbally informed by an audit manager of the related party transactions, and of the company's obligations to track and disclose them in its public filings, but "failed to take reasonable steps" to comply with those obligations, and subsequently knowingly submitted inaccurate public filings on the company's behalf.

The SEC did not allege that Keyuan or Aichun violated the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, including with respect to the gifts and payments that the company made from its off-balance cash account. Instead, the SEC charged the company and former CFO with two counts each of recordkeeping and internal controls violations, alleging that "Keyuan's books and records failed to accurately reflect the use and disbursement of cash through the off-balance sheet cash account" and that its "internal controls surrounding the disbursement, usage, and recording of cash and cash transactions were also inadequate."

## **2012**

### ***Eli Lilly and Company***

On December 20, 2012, Eli Lilly and Company ("Lilly") became the latest pharmaceutical company to settle FCPA-related charges, continuing what appears to be an ongoing sweep of the industry (*see also Pfizer, Akzo Nobel, Novo Nordisk and Johnson & Johnson*). The SEC alleged Lilly violated the FCPA's anti-bribery and accounting provisions. The Indianapolis-based company resolved the SEC's investigation of payments that various Lilly subsidiaries had made in Russia, Poland, China, and Brazil. Although Lilly neither admitted nor denied the allegations, the company agreed to pay a total of \$29.4 million to settle the charges, including approximately \$14 million in disgorgement, \$6.7 million in prejudgment interest, and a civil penalty of \$8.7 million. In addition to paying the civil penalty, Lilly also agreed to retain an independent consultant to review and make recommendations about its foreign corruption policies and procedures. At the time of the settlement, the DOJ had not announced any related enforcement actions against Lilly. In February 2013, the company stated that it believed that a DOJ investigation of the company was ongoing.

According to the SEC Complaint, Lilly's subsidiary in Russia ("Lilly-Vostok") paid millions of dollars over the course of a decade to forty-two separate third-party distributors through purported "marketing agreements." The SEC noted that the government officials with whom Lilly-Vostok negotiated drug supply contracts often directly proposed the third-party entities that Lilly would engage. Lilly allegedly engaged those third parties without conducting due diligence sufficient to identify the beneficial owners, ensure that the company could perform legitimate services, or determine if there were any improper links to the Russian government officials.

Noting a lack of evidence that any services had ever been provided — as well as emails from commercial managers that explained that "if real services are provided [then] the marketing agreement is not the appropriate form" — the SEC argued that Lilly made the payments improperly to secure business. The SEC provided specific examples, alleging that Lilly had paid approximately \$11 million to four of these third-party entities located in Cyprus and the British

Virgin Islands, two of which were owned by the director general of a Russian governmental distributor or a member of the upper house of Russian parliament.

The SEC stated that a number of internal control failures enabled such conduct to occur. Specifically, although Lilly's internal reviews raised concerns regarding such "marketing agreements" as early as 1997, the company did not employ meaningful efforts to stop using such agreements until 2004. Even then, the SEC stated that the subsidiary continued to make payments under existing marketing agreements until 2005.

The SEC also noted that Lilly-Vostok made several proposals to support charities and various educational events associated with government-owned or affiliated institutions between 2005 and 2008. Although these charities were related to public health issues and many of the proposals were reviewed by counsel, the SEC criticized Lilly because it did not specifically have internal controls in place to determine "whether Lilly-Vostok was offering something of value to a government official for a purpose of influencing or inducing him or her to assist Lilly-Vostok in obtaining or retaining business."

The SEC also focused on charitable donations that Lilly's subsidiary in Poland ("Lilly-Poland") allegedly made between 2000 and 2003. According to the complaint, while Lilly-Poland was negotiating the possible financing of a cancer drug with the director of one of the regional government health authorities that reimbursed hospitals and health care providers for approved medicines, the health authority director requested that Lilly-Poland make a small contribution to the Chudow Castle Foundation, a charitable institution that he founded and administered for the restoration of a local castle.

According to the SEC, Lilly-Poland made a total of eight payments totaling \$39,000 over two and a half years, and it mischaracterized them in its books and records by describing their purpose as being for the purchase of computers, to support of development activities, or to use the castle grounds for conferences that never actually occurred. The SEC criticized Lilly-Poland's payment approval process and internal procedures for not (i) seeking to better understand the ownership of the foundation; (ii) questioning the timing of the foundation payment requests; (iii) highlighting inconsistencies among the various justifications offered for the donations over the years; or (iv) asking why the company was seeking to make donations to the Chudow Castle Foundation (but no other archaeological charities) in Poland.

Interestingly, the SEC had previously criticized pharmaceutical maker Schering-Plough for donations to the Chudow Castle Foundation in a separate 2004 civil enforcement action.

In China, between 2006 and 2009, sales representatives of Lilly's subsidiary ("Lilly-China") allegedly provided improper gifts and entertainment to government-employed physicians to induce them to prescribe Lilly drugs. According to the SEC, various Lilly-China sales representatives falsified expense reports for travel expenses and used the reimbursements to buy the gifts, which included meals, cigarettes, jewelry, and visits to bath houses and karaoke bars. The SEC specifically noted that "[a]lthough the dollar amount of each gift was generally small, the improper payments were widespread throughout the subsidiary."

Finally, in Brazil, between 2007 and 2009, Lilly's subsidiary ("Lilly-Brazil") allegedly paid approximately \$70,000 in bribes to government officials through a third-party distributor to secure approximately \$1.2 million in sales of drugs. The SEC Complaint stated that Lilly-Brazil provided a certain distributor with an unusually high discount (between 17% and 19%), allowing the distributor to use part of the difference to bribe public officials who authorized the purchases. The SEC specifically criticized Lilly-Brazil because it "relied on the representations of the sales and marketing manager without adequate verification and analysis of the surrounding circumstances of the transaction," including the unusually high discount offered.

In connection with all of these allegations, the SEC argued that Lilly and its subsidiaries had failed to (i) implement an adequate system of internal accounting; (ii) perform adequate due diligence; (iii) implement adequate compliance controls and safeguards regarding third-party payments; and (iv) implement risk-based procedures that took into account the vulnerability of emerging markets to FCPA violations. However, the SEC also noted that Eli Lilly's internal controls and procedures had been improved since the alleged misconduct, which included enhancing third-party due diligence and financial controls, creating specific anti-corruption auditing and monitoring, and expanding anti-corruption training.

### *Allianz SE*

On December 17, 2012, the SEC issued a cease-and-desist order against Allianz SE, a German insurance and asset management company and Europe's largest insurer. The order alleged that Allianz had violated the FCPA's books and records and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA related to improper payments made between 2001 and 2008 to Indonesian government officials, in exchange for lucrative insurance contracts. Because Allianz's alleged misconduct occurred at a time when its American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") and bonds were listed on the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and were required to be registered with the SEC under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, Allianz was considered an issuer subject to the FCPA's anti-bribery and accounting provisions during the relevant time period. Allianz did not admit or deny the SEC's findings, and the SEC imposed disgorgement of \$5,315,649, prejudgment interest of \$1,765,125, and a civil monetary penalty of \$5,315,649 — \$12,396,423 in total. There was no parallel DOJ settlement; DOJ issued a declination letter to Allianz in 2011.

The SEC noted several remedial measures taken by Allianz in issuing the administrative order. Allianz took employment action against several persons who were involved in or failed to stop the conduct. Allianz issued new or enhanced policies, procedures, and internal accounting controls, including the mandating of strict scrutiny of payments to third parties. Allianz also revised its standard third-party contracts to specifically refer to the FCPA in the contracts' anti-corruption clause.

Particularly noteworthy about his case is that Allianz, over the course of five years, received three whistleblower complaints alleging potential FCPA violations to the company, its auditors, and the SEC. The following summary is based on the allegations in the SEC's administrative cease-and-desist order.

### 2005 Whistleblower

In 2005, Allianz initiated an internal audit within days after receiving a whistleblower complaint made to both the Allianz whistleblower hotline and the hotline of PT Asuransi Allianz Utama (“Utama”)’s minority owner, PT Asuransi Jasa Indonesia (“Jasindo”). Utama is a majority-owned subsidiary of Allianz, while Jasindo is an Indonesian state-owned entity. Evidence of the alleged bribes was identified during the internal audit. The audit identified two internal accounts for an Indonesian agent and was told that one of the accounts was for the agent’s normal commissions and the other was for “various” purposes. The auditors also identified a “special purpose” external account that was primarily used by Utama’s marketing manager “to pay project development [expenses] and overriding commissions to the special projects and clients for securing business with Utama.” Until 2009, however, no further inquiries were made about the nature and purpose of the accounts or the payments flowing between them. The audit’s findings were reported to Allianz’s board of directors and instructions to close the “special purpose” account and to cease all future payments followed. Yet the account was not closed and further payments were made to government officials, and others, through this account. For this reason, among others, the SEC found, as discussed below, that Allianz’s system of internal controls was ineffective to prevent future illegal payments. The staff specifically cited the fact that no steps were taken by the company to confirm that the special purpose account had been closed and that further improper payments were not made.

### 2009 Whistleblower

In March 2009, the company’s external auditors received a whistleblower complaint alleging that an Allianz executive had created a slush fund during his employment with Utama’s majority owner, Allianz of Asia-Pacific and Africa GmbH. In response, Allianz engaged external counsel to conduct an internal investigation of the company’s payment practices in Indonesia. The investigation confirmed, among other things, that illegal payments continued to be made from the “special account,” or slush fund, to government officials. This further misconduct was not initially reported to the SEC.

### 2010 Whistleblower

In 2010, the SEC received a whistleblower complaint alleging potential FCPA violations at Allianz. Prior to this complaint, the SEC had not been informed by Allianz, or otherwise, of the alleged misconduct investigated by the company in 2005 and 2009. The SEC opened an investigation and ultimately determined that 295 government insurance contracts had been obtained through improper payments between 2001 and 2008. Many of improper payments were described in the company’s records as “overriding commissions” or “reimbursements for overpayment” and were paid pursuant to falsified invoices.

In this case, the availability of an anonymous reporting hotline, alone, was ineffective at combatting misconduct and corruption. The company was timely in its initial internal response to the 2005 and 2009 complaints and pinpointed the source of the misconduct, but remedial steps were not promptly taken.

### *Tyco International*

In September 2012, the DOJ and SEC resolved parallel investigations of Tyco International, Ltd. (“Tyco”), the Swiss-based global manufacturing company, for violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions. Separately, Tyco’s Dubai-headquartered subsidiary, Tyco Valves & Controls Middle East, Inc. (“Tyco Middle East”), pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA. In total, Tyco and its subsidiary paid nearly \$29 million, including \$13.68 million in criminal penalties and \$13.13 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest in connection with Tyco’s settlement agreements with the DOJ and SEC, respectively, as well as an additional criminal fine of \$2.1 million that Tyco Middle East must pay in connection with its plea agreement.

As described below (*see 2006 Tyco*), the SEC filed an action against Tyco in April 2006 in connection with allegations that Tyco’s acquired subsidiaries in Brazil and South Korea had paid bribes and provided improper entertainment to government officials to obtain contracting work on government-controlled projects. As part of the settlement for securities laws violations and FCPA violations by Tyco and its subsidiaries, Tyco agreed to pay a \$50 million civil penalty. In the midst of its settlement discussions with the SEC, Tyco engaged outside counsel in 2005 to conduct a global anti-corruption compliance review. That review uncovered other FCPA violations, prompting a new round of negotiations with the DOJ and SEC that began in February 2010 and culminated with the September 2012 resolutions and sentencing hearing.

- *Tyco Settlement Agreements*

The SEC’s Complaint discusses various “post-injunction illicit payment schemes occurring at Tyco subsidiaries across the globe,” and the Statement of Facts attached to the DOJ’s NPA discusses those as well as other violations that occurred prior to May 2006. Together, the DOJ and SEC resolution agreements describe improper payments made by numerous Tyco subsidiaries (many of which are no longer part of the company due to changes in corporate structure or subsequent closings) incorporated or headquartered in twelve different countries to government officials or third-party agents in China, the Congo, Croatia, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, Libya, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Niger, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, Thailand, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and Vietnam. In total, Tyco obtained a benefit of over \$16.3 million in connection with these improper payments, including over \$10.5 million in profits acquired as a result of improper payments that occurred after Tyco’s 2006 settlement agreement with the SEC.

In settling the charges with the DOJ and SEC, Tyco agreed, in addition to the making the financial payments discussed above, to undertake further enhancements to its anti-corruption compliance program and to report to the DOJ at no less than twelve-month intervals during the course of the three-year NPA regarding its remediation efforts and the implementation of its enhanced compliance program and internal controls. Tyco also agreed to be permanently enjoined from violating the FCPA in the future.

Both the SEC and the DOJ noted the substantial remediation efforts that Tyco had undertaken prior to entering into the settlement agreements, including in particular:

The initial FCPA review of every Tyco legal operating entity - ultimately including 454 entities in 50 separate countries; active monitoring and evaluation of all Tyco's agents and other relevant third-party relationships; quarterly ethics and compliance training by over 4,000 middle-managers; FCPA-focused on-site reviews of higher risk entities; creation of a corporate Ombudsman's office and numerous segment-specific compliance counsel positions; exit from several business operations in high-risk areas; and the termination of over 90 employees, including supervisors, because of FCPA-compliance concerns.

o China

The DOJ and SEC discussed improper activities that were carried out by five of Tyco's subsidiaries in China: Tyco Thermal Controls (Huzhou) Co., Ltd ("Tyco Huzhou"), Tyco Flow Control Hong Kong Limited ("Tyco Hong Kong"), Beijing Valve Co. Ltd. ("Keystone"), Tyco Flow Control Trading (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. ("Tyco Flow Control Shanghai") and Tyco Healthcare International Trading (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. ("Tyco Healthcare Shanghai").

According to the filings, Tyco Huzhou authorized over 112 payments to employees of state-owned or -controlled design institutes between 2003 and 2005, and falsely described such transactions in its books and records as "technical consultation" or "marketing promotion" expenses. The DOJ and SEC both also note that Tyco Huzhou made an improper payment of \$3,700 to the "site project team" of a state-owned corporation through a sales agent in connection with a contract that it obtained from the Ministry of Public Security. Similarly, Tyco Flow Control Shanghai made approximately eleven payments to employees of design institutes and other companies that it mischaracterized within its books and records.

Additionally, between 2005 and 2006, Tyco Hong Kong and Keystone routed approximately \$137,000 through agencies that were owned by Keystone employees, who used the payments to provide gifts and cash to design institute employees or other commercial customers. Keystone also paid another agent approximately \$246,000 in connection with sales to Sinopec, even though "no legitimate services were actually provided." Tyco Hong Kong and Keystone improperly recorded all of these transactions.

Tyco Healthcare Shanghai spent over \$600,000 on meals, entertainment, travel, gifts and sponsorships for Chinese public healthcare professionals between 2001 and 2007. Because such expenses were not permitted under Tyco's internal guidelines, the subsidiary employees submitted falsified supporting documentation and receipts to justify the expenses. In one instance, a Tyco Healthcare Shanghai employee forged a receipt from a fictitious company, obtaining and stamping a corporate seal on the receipt.

o Germany

The NPA's statement of facts notes that Tyco's indirect German subsidiary Tyco Waterworks Deutschland GmbH and its direct subsidiary Erhard Armaturen made payments in

excess of \$2.3 million to at least thirteen sales agents in China, Croatia, India, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Syria, and the UAE “for the purpose of making payments to employees of government customers” between 2004 and 2009. The improper payments were falsely described as “commissions” in the company’s books and records.

○ France

Tyco’s indirect, wholly owned subsidiary in France, Tyco Fire & Integrated Solutions France (“Tyco France”), made improper payments between 2005 and 2009 totaling over \$363,000 to twelve other individuals or entities in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Niger. The DOJ noted that Tyco France made half of these payments to employees of the subsidiary’s customers, or family members thereof. Tyco France also made a number of improper payments to various individuals, including a security officer of a Mauritanian mining company, for purported “business introduction services.”

○ Indonesia

Between 2003 and 2005, Tyco’s indirect, wholly owned subsidiary Tyco Eurapipe Indonesia Pt. (“Tyco Indonesia”), made payments to current and former employees of a provincial utilities company in connection with a government water project in Banjarmasin, Indonesia. (The DOJ does not provide details regarding the purpose of the payments to the former government official or why such payments were improper.) Tyco Indonesia also made payments to sales agents during the same time period for on-payment to government employees in connection with other projects. The subsidiary improperly recorded all of the payments as “commissions payable.”

A separate subsidiary in Indonesia, PT Dulmison Indonesia, made a number of payments to third parties who in turn provided the payments in whole or in part to employees of Perusahaan Listrik Negara, the state-owned electricity company in Indonesia. PT Dulmison Indonesia also provided the electricity company’s employees with non-business-related entertainment and hotel costs in connection with a social trip to Paris, France following the visit to a factory in Germany. These costs were recorded in the subsidiary’s books and records as “cost of goods sold.”

○ Malaysia

The SEC Complaint includes allegations that Tyco’s indirect, wholly owned subsidiary in Malaysia, Tyco Fire, Security & Services Malaysia SDN BHD (“Tyco Malaysia”), made improper payments through subsidiaries to approximately twenty-six employees of customers, including one employee of a government-controlled entity, while it was bidding on contracts for those customers. Tyco Malaysia described the payments as “commissions.”

Interestingly, the DOJ does not discuss the conduct of any Malaysian subsidiaries in connection with its agreements with Tyco, although there are indications that it may have done so in any earlier draft. Just before describing the “details of the illegal conduct,” the NPA states that “[t]he conduct described below involving” Tyco Valves & Controls Malaysia (“TVC

Malaysia”) and a number of subsidiaries was related to Tyco’s Flow Control business. No mention of TVC Malaysia, however, is made within the rest of the NPA.

- Poland

Noted only in the SEC’s Complaint, Tyco’s indirect, wholly owned subsidiary in Poland, Tyco Healthcare Polska Sp.z.o.o (“Tyco Polska”), engaged public healthcare professionals through service contracts, some of which involved falsified or inaccurate records. Tyco Polska also reimbursed related expenses for some professionals’ family members.

- Saudi Arabia

Between 2004 and 2006, Tyco Healthcare Saudi Arabia (“Tyco Arabia”), an operational entity of Tyco’s indirect, wholly owned Swiss subsidiary, Tyco Healthcare AG, maintained a general ledger “control account” that it used in part to make improper payments to Saudi hospitals, publicly employed healthcare professionals, and other doctors. Tyco Arabia described these payments as “promotional expenses” or “sales development” expenses in its books and records.

- Slovakia

Tyco’s majority owned Slovakian joint venture, Tatra Armatúra s.r.o. (“Tatra”) paid an agent, who at the time was preparing technical specifications for a tender on behalf of a government entity, to have Tatra’s products included within specifications of that tender. As a result of the modified specifications, Tatra was able to earn over \$225,000 in gross profits.

- Thailand

The NPA states that Tyco’s minority-owned Thai subsidiary, Earth Tech (Thailand) Ltd, made payments of nearly \$300,000 to a local consultant in connection with the New Bangkok International Airport project and falsely recorded such expenses as project disbursements between 2004 and 2005. (The NPA, however, does not provide further details or allegations regarding the purpose of such payments.)

Separately, ADT Sensormatic Thailand Ltd. (“ADT Thailand”), also an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco, routed approximately \$78,000 through one of its subcontractors to various recipients in connection with its business in Laos. ADT Thailand also made payments against falsified invoices to consultants and other entities in connection with work that was never actually performed.

Last, the DOJ stated that another indirect, majority-owned Tyco subsidiary, Tyco Electronics Dulmison (Thailand) Co., Ltd., made improper payments to government officials in Vietnam that it mischaracterized in its books and records as “cost of goods sold.”

○ *The United Kingdom*

Between 2004 and 2008, Tyco's indirect, wholly owned subsidiary Tyco Fire & Integrated Solutions (UK) Ltd. ("Tyco UK") engaged an Egyptian agent to wire approximately \$282,022 to the personal bank account of a former Tyco UK employee so that the employee could entertain representatives of a majority state-owned company in Egypt. Tyco UK made payments to the Egyptian agent against inflated invoices to provide him with the necessary funds to pass along to the former employees. Those former employees used the money in part to fund two trips to the United Kingdom and two trips to the United States for those representatives. This conduct was only discussed in filings made by the SEC.

○ *The United States*

M/A-COM Inc. ("M/A-COM") was an indirect, wholly owned subsidiary of Tyco headquartered in Massachusetts and incorporated in Florida. Between 2001 and 2006, M/A-COM engaged a New York City-based sales agent to sell radio frequency microwave receivers and related equipment to government entities in Turkey. The sales representative sold the equipment at a mark-up, and he also received a commission in connection with one of his sales, which he provided in part to a Turkish government official to obtain further orders. According to the SEC Complaint, M/A-COM employees knew that the sales agent was making improper payments to Turkish government officials, and it cites one email in which an employee stated, "Hell, everyone knows you have to bribe somebody to do business in Turkey."

Additionally, as discussed further immediately below, the DOJ stated that Tyco's Delaware-incorporated subsidiary Tyco Middle East, which is headquartered in Dubai, had made direct and indirect cash payments to clients' employees in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE between 2003 and 2006.

● *Tyco Middle East Plea Agreement*

As noted above, the DOJ entered into a separate plea agreement with Tyco's subsidiary Tyco Middle East on September 24, 2012. Pursuant to the agreement, Tyco Middle East pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA by seeking to obtain and retain business from various foreign government customers — including (i) Saudi Aramco in Saudi Arabia, (ii) Emirates National Oil Company ("ENOC") and its subsidiary Vopak Horizon Fujairah ("Vopak") in the UAE, and (iii) the National Iranian Gas Company ("NIGC") in Iran — through the payment of bribes to government officials employed by those companies.

The plea agreement does not provide any details regarding the conspiracy to make improper payments to government officials in Iran, and, with respect to the UAE, notes only that a Tyco Middle East "employee cashed a check for the purpose of paying a bribe to an ENOC employee" on November 6, 2003.

The agreement discusses the conduct in Saudi Arabia in greater detail, explaining that Tyco Middle East had engaged a local company to act as its sponsor and distributor in that country, and that the subsidiary passed improper payments to Saudi Aramco officials through the

local sponsor. Tyco Middle East made payments to the local sponsor against falsified invoices for consultancy costs, fictitious commissions, or equipment costs. The local sponsor then provided those payments to Saudi Aramco employees to obtain the approval of Tyco equipment in connection with specific projects, win project contracts, and remove Tyco products and manufacturing plants from Aramco's blacklist.

As part of the plea agreement, Tyco Middle East also agreed to address any deficiencies in its internal controls and anti-corruption compliance by adopting and implementing the same corporate compliance program enhancements discussed in Tyco's NPA.

### ***Oracle Corporation***

On August 16, 2012, the SEC filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against Oracle Corporation ("Oracle"), a Delaware-incorporated and California-headquartered software company whose shares are listed on NASDAQ. On August 27, 2012, the district court entered a final judgment against Oracle that adopted the terms of the consent agreement between Oracle and the SEC: the court ordered that (i) Oracle was permanently enjoined from violating the books and records and internal control provisions of the FCPA and (ii) the company would pay a civil penalty of \$2 million. Oracle neither admitted nor denied the conduct alleged by the SEC.

According to the SEC's complaint and press release, employees of Oracle's wholly owned Indian subsidiary, Oracle India Private Limited ("Oracle India"), used a distributor to establish "secret cash cushions" that created the potential for bribery or embezzlement. Under Oracle India's typical business model, the company sold Oracle software licenses and services in India through local distributors. Although distributors typically retain the margin from their sales as compensation for their distribution services, the SEC alleged that Oracle India often negotiated particularly excessive margins and that its local distributors would only retain a portion of that amount. The complaint states that the select employees of Oracle India would request that the local distributors then retain the remaining portion of their margin to make payments to third parties later, as directed by those Oracle India employees.

The complaint gave further context to this alleged practice by providing an example of what the SEC described as "the largest government contract that involved parked funds used for unauthorized third-party payments." The SEC stated that Oracle India had executed a contract valued at \$3.9 million with India's Ministry of Information Technology and Communications in May 2006, but that Oracle India only received and booked as revenue approximately \$2.1 million of that amount. The local distributor received approximately \$151,000 of the margin as compensation, but Oracle India employees allegedly directed the distributor to retain the remaining \$1.7 million for future "marketing development purposes."

Several months later, Oracle India employees allegedly provided the local distributor with eight invoices for payments to "storefront" third-party vendors, who provided no legitimate services and which were not on Oracle's approved vendor list. The SEC further alleged that "[t]hese invoices were later found to be fake" and that they ranged in value from \$110,000 to \$396,000.

The SEC complaint alleged that Oracle India used local distributors to “park” nearly \$2.2 million between 2005 and 2007 in connection with eight separate government contracts.

Oracle discovered the conduct following an internal investigation that was conducted in response to a local tax inquiry. Following the investigation, the company fired four Oracle India employees whom Oracle determined knew of the alleged scheme, and it voluntarily disclosed the matter to U.S. authorities. The SEC’s press release stated that the enforcement agency took these remedial steps into account in determining the appropriate penalty, as well as the subsequent enhancements that the company made to its FCPA compliance program.

### ***Pfizer Inc.***

On August 7, 2012, Pfizer Inc. (“Pfizer”) and affiliated companies agreed to pay over \$60 million in penalties, disgorgement, and pre-judgment interest to resolve criminal and civil FCPA charges relating to conduct in multiple countries. Under a DPA with the DOJ, Pfizer H.C.P. Corporation (“Pfizer HCP”), an indirect wholly owned subsidiary of Pfizer, agreed to pay a \$15 million criminal penalty to resolve one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions applicable to domestic concerns and one count of violating the same anti-bribery provision. This DPA was resolved expressly on the alternative, nationality-based jurisdiction over domestic concerns that Congress granted to the DOJ in the 1998 FCPA amendments: U.S. entities like Pfizer H.C.P. are subject to the FCPA for their conduct anywhere in the world, regardless of whether those entities use U.S. mails or other means or instrumentalities of U.S. interstate commerce.

Separately, Pfizer agreed to pay \$26.3 million in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest to resolve the SEC’s investigation of conduct by its subsidiaries.

Wyeth LLC (“Wyeth”), which was acquired by Pfizer in 2009 and has since been sold to Nestle, agreed to pay \$18.8 million to the SEC in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest to resolve civil charges of books and records and internal controls violations. To resolve the SEC’s investigation, Wyeth was not required to admit or deny the SEC’s allegations; however, consistent with then-recent changes in SEC policy, Pfizer Inc. expressly acknowledged Pfizer HCP’s admissions in connection with the DPA, acknowledged the SEC’s new policy “not to permit a defendant or respondent to consent to a judgment or order that imposes a sanction while denying the allegations in the complaint or order for proceedings” filed by the SEC, and agreed to not make any statements or take an actions that would create the impression that the SEC’s complaint against Pfizer was without factual basis.

The three resolutions collectively pertained to conduct in eleven countries. The DOJ’s criminal charges against Pfizer HCP pertained to activities in Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, and Russia. The SEC Complaint against Pfizer covered conduct in these four countries, as well as in China, the Czech Republic, Italy, and Serbia. The SEC Complaint against Wyeth made separate allegations regarding conduct in Indonesia, Pakistan, China, and Saudi Arabia.

In almost all of these countries, the relevant conduct involved, at least in part, the provision of various benefits to healthcare professionals that worked at government-owned

healthcare facilities. As the SEC Complaints explained, echoed by similar language in the DOJ filings, “[i]n those countries with national healthcare systems, hospitals, clinics, pharmacies, doctors, and other healthcare professionals and institutions are generally government officials or instrumentalities within the meaning of the FCPA.” According to the court filings, doctors and other healthcare professionals were provided cash payments, gifts, and support for domestic and international travel in exchange for promises to increase purchases or prescriptions.

The court filings also alleged that in Croatia and Kazakhstan, payments were made to government officials involved with the registration and reimbursement of pharmaceutical products. Furthermore, in Russia and Saudi Arabia, payments were allegedly made in connection with the customs-clearing process.

Pfizer discovered the misconduct through extensive global investigations into the operations of Pfizer’s and Wyeth’s non-U.S. subsidiaries. Pfizer began an internal investigation in May 2004 when it became aware of potentially improper payments made by Pfizer HCP’s representative office in Croatia. After conducting a preliminary investigation, Pfizer made an initial voluntary disclosure to the SEC and DOJ in October 2004. Pfizer subsequently undertook a global internal investigation of its operations in nineteen countries, through which it discovered additional improper payments. Throughout the course of its investigation, Pfizer regularly reported the results to the DOJ and SEC.

Pfizer discovered the conduct relevant to Wyeth’s settlement when it conducted a post-acquisition review that uncovered potential improper payments. Pfizer undertook a global investigation of Wyeth’s operations and voluntarily disclosed the results to the SEC.

Pfizer’s extensive cooperation and assistance earned the company a sizable downward departure from the range of fines recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Under the Guidelines, the recommended fine was between \$22.8 and \$45.6 million. In settling for a \$15 million penalty, which represents a 34% reduction from the bottom of the recommended range, the DOJ took into account Pfizer’s “substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of others.”

The DPA did not impose a monitorship, but Pfizer represented that it had implemented a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent and detect violations of anti-corruption laws, that it would continue to conduct reviews of its anti-corruption policies and procedures, and that it would report to the DOJ regarding remediation and compliance measures during the two-year term of the DPA. Similarly, the SEC resolutions with Pfizer and Wyeth require the companies to periodically report the status of remediation and implementation of compliance measures over a two-year period.

### ***Orthofix International***

On July 10, 2012, Orthofix International N.V. (“Orthofix”) entered into settlement agreements with the DOJ and the SEC relating to allegations that its wholly owned Mexican subsidiary, Promeca S.A. de C.V. (“Promeca”), had violated the books and record keeping and internal control provisions of the FCPA. Orthofix is a NASDAQ-listed multinational

corporation that is headquartered in the island of Curaçao and maintains corporate offices in Lewisville, Texas. The company specializes in the design, development, manufacture, marketing and distribution of medical devices, and it became the third such company (after Biomet and Smith & Nephew, discussed *below*) to settle charges in 2012 as part of the government's ongoing investigation of the medical device industry.

According to the DPA and the SEC Complaint, a number of Orthofix and Promeca executives conspired between 2003 and 2010 to make illicit payments to Mexican officials at the state-owned Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social ("IMSS"), a health care and social services institution, as well as at two hospitals that IMSS owned.

Around 2003, IMSS awarded Promeca the right to sell medical products to two IMSS-owned hospitals. Promeca obtained this award by agreeing to pay various hospital officials between 5% and 10% of the collected revenue generated from sales to the hospitals. Between 2003 and 2007, Promeca executives obtained the money to make these commission payments — which they referred to internally as "chocolates" — by submitting requests for cash advancements against fictitious expenses, including meals, new car tires, and promotional and training expenses. The Promeca executives cashed these checks and provided cash payments to the hospital officials.

In 2008, IMSS implemented a national tendering system that placed the decision to award medical product contracts with a special committee rather than the individual hospitals. Subsequently, Promeca officials again agreed to pay IMSS officials a percentage of the collected sales revenue, but this time through payments to fictitious companies owned by those officials. According to the SEC and DOJ, these front companies submitted false invoices to Promeca for medical equipment, training, or other promotional expenses, which Promeca paid. The commissions were then passed on to government officials.

The filings also note that Promeca spent an additional \$80,050 "on gifts and travel packages, some of which were intended to corruptly influence IMSS employees in order to retain their business." In particular, the SEC Complaint notes that Promeca paid for vacation packages, televisions, laptops, appliances, and the lease of a Volkswagen Jetta, while falsely accounting for such payments in its books and records as promotional and training expenses.

In total, Promeca's improper payments totaled approximately \$317,000 and resulted in approximately \$4.9 million of illicit net profits.

The DOJ and SEC both stressed that Orthofix did not have an effective anti-corruption compliance program or internal controls prior to the discovery of the unlawful payments. In particular, both enforcement agencies criticized Orthofix for not providing relevant materials to Promeca employees in the local language. The SEC, for example, stated in its Complaint:

Although Orthofix disseminated some code of ethics and anti-bribery training to Promeca, the materials were only in English, and it was unlikely that Promeca employees understood them as most Promeca employees spoke minimal English.

The DOJ and SEC also faulted Orthofix for having failed to investigate red flags fully. The DPA explained, for example, that:

Promeca's monthly reports showed that Promeca's expenditures regularly far exceeded the budgeted amounts in several categories, including promotional expenses, travel expenses, and meetings for doctors. Those categories were all high risk, received no extra scrutiny, and were in fact budgeted funds from which Promeca made bribe payments over a multi-year period. . . . Orthofix N.V. failed to identify Promeca's persistent cost overruns or to endeavor to determine the reason for those overruns, and Promeca continued its bribery scheme for approximately seven years after being acquired by Orthofix N.V.

Similarly, the SEC alleged that "even though Orthofix knew that Promeca's training and promotional expenses were often over budget, it did nothing to act on the red flag." The SEC Press Release noted that Orthofix did "launch an inquiry" into the over-budget expenses, but added that it "did very little to investigate or diminish the excessive spending."

Orthofix voluntarily disclosed the violations to the SEC and DOJ and conducted an internal investigation after learning of them from a Promeca executive. The enforcement agencies also noted favorably that, after discovering the bribery scheme, Orthofix terminated the relevant Promeca executives, "wound up Promeca's operations," and enhanced its anti-corruption compliance program. These enhancements included "mandatory annual FCPA training for all employees and third-party agents," as well as expanded internal audit functions and other internal control measures.

Pursuant to its settlement agreements, Orthofix agreed to pay a total of \$7.4 million, including a \$2.2 million penalty to the DOJ and \$5.2 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC. Although the enforcement agencies did not impose a monitor on Orthofix, the company agreed to report to the SEC at six-month intervals for two years regarding the status of its remediation and the implementation of its enhanced anti-corruption compliance measures, and to report to the DOJ on an annual basis during the term of the three-year DPA.

### ***Nordam Group Inc.***

In July 2012, the privately held aircraft maintenance and component manufacturing company Nordam Group Inc. ("Nordam"), headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma, entered into a three-year NPA with the DOJ to resolve FCPA violations arising from improper payments to government officials in China. Under the terms of the non-prosecution agreement, Nordam was required to pay a criminal penalty of \$2 million, strengthen its compliance, bookkeeping, and internal controls standards and procedures, and periodically report to the DOJ on the implementation of those policies and procedures.

According to the Statement of Facts attached to the non-prosecution agreement, Nordam and its Singapore subsidiary, Nordam Singapore Pte Ltd. ("Nordam Singapore"), and a wholly

owned Singapore affiliate, World Aviation Associates Pte Ltd. (“World Aviation”), paid bribes to employees of state-owned or -controlled airlines in China between 1999 and 2008 in order to secure maintenance contracts with those airlines. In total, Nordam and its affiliates paid \$1.5 million in bribes to those employees and obtained contracts that resulted in profits of roughly \$2.48 million.

Initially, Nordam paid these bribes either by making wire transfers directly into the bank accounts of airline employees or by depositing money into the personal bank accounts of World Aviation employees who withdrew the funds to pay the airline employees in cash. Nordam internally referred to the direct payments to government officials as “commissions” or “facilitator fees,” and referred to the state employees who received the bribes as “internal ghosts” or “our friends inside.”

Around 2002, Nordam began routing the improper payments through fictitious entities that World Aviation employees themselves had created. Nordam and Nordam Singapore entered into sales representation agreements with these fictitious entities and paid them commissions that were then used to secure contracts. Nordam, Nordam Singapore, and World Aviation would sometimes inflate the value of the invoices that they submitted to clients to offset the bribes, thereby obtaining reimbursement from their clients for the improper payments that they made to those clients’ employees.

The non-prosecution agreement notes that the \$2 million penalty is “substantially below the standard range under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.” The DOJ explained, however, that it had agreed to this reduced fine in part because of Nordam’s “timely, voluntary and complete disclosure” and its “real time cooperation” with the department. Additionally, the Nordam settlement shows that verified demonstrations of hardship could result in reduced fines — the DOJ noted in particular that Nordam had demonstrated that a greater fine would “substantially jeopardize the Company’s continued viability.”

Nordam also agreed to (i) cooperate with the department for the three-year term of the non-prosecution agreement, (ii) update the department about the company’s compliance efforts, and (iii) continue to implement internal controls and an enhanced compliance program to detect and prevent future FCPA violations. Among Nordam’s requirements with respect to its enhanced corporate compliance program, the non-prosecution agreement requires that the company provide periodic training to, and obtain annual certifications from, not only its directors, officers, and employees, but also its agents and business partners “where necessary and appropriate.”

Nordam is not the first Oklahoma-based aircraft maintenance company to settle FCPA violations with the DOJ. In March 2012, only several months before the Nordam settlement, the DOJ also entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with BizJet International Sales and Support, Inc. (“Bizjet”) (discussed further *below*) in connection with the payment of bribes to foreign officials to obtain maintenance contracts. Bizjet agreed to pay an \$11.8 million criminal penalty.

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### *Data Systems & Solutions LLC*

On June 18, 2012, Data Systems & Solutions, LLC (“Data Systems”), a Virginia-headquartered corporation that provides design, installation, and maintenance services at nuclear power plants, entered into a two-year deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ and agreed to pay an \$8.82 million criminal penalty to resolve the DOJ’s investigation of violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and conspiracy charges. Data Systems is a wholly owned subsidiary of the U.K.-based Rolls Royce plc. Although the parent corporation was not named in the enforcement action, Rolls Royce is currently under investigation by the SFO, as discussed further *below*, following whistleblower allegations into the company’s separate activities in Indonesia and China.

According to the two-count criminal information, officers and employees from Data Systems made a series of improper payments between 1999 and 2004 directly and through subcontractors to officials employed by the Ignalina nuclear power plant, a state-owned nuclear power plant in Lithuania. The filings do not explicitly state the total value of the bribes paid by Data Systems to the power plant officials, but the information details thirty-two relevant payments totaling over \$629,000 and suggests that there were others.

The purpose of the bribes was to obtain and retain multi-million dollar instrumentation and control contracts from the Ignalina nuclear power plant. In exchange for the payments and other things of value, the five officials allegedly provided Data Systems with detailed information about upcoming projects and the bids of its competitors, which allowed Data Systems to tailor its bids in order to win the contracts. The power plant officials also allegedly designed project specifications to favor Data Systems and influenced the award of contracts in the company’s favor by providing input regarding bidder selection. During the relevant time period, the Ignalina power plant awarded Data Systems five contracts valued together at over \$32 million.

The court filings also state that Data Systems made the improper payments through three separate subcontractors, including two that separately provided legitimate, bona fide services to Data Systems in connection with the projects. In some instances, Data Systems made payments to one of its subcontractors pursuant to fictitious “scope of work” subcontract modifications, even though no additional work was actually performed and no additional payments were required. The subcontractor would then provide the payments to the power plant officials or route them through one of two other subcontractors for on-payment. In other instances, Data Systems significantly overpaid a subcontractor for the services that it provided so that the excess could be passed along to the government officials.

In addition to the payments, Data Systems provided thousands of dollars in gifts, entertainment, and travel for Ignalina power plant officials, including a trip to Florida, a vacation to Hawaii, and a Cartier watch.

Pursuant to the DPA, Data Systems also agreed to implement and maintain an enhanced corporate compliance program and to report to the DOJ regularly regarding its remediation efforts. The DPA noted that the reduced fine of \$8.82 million was based in part on Data

System's extraordinary cooperation following the issuance of the subpoena, as well as extensive remediation efforts. The company not only terminated the officers and employees responsible for the corrupt payments, but instituted new risk-based policies that required CEO review and approval of the engagement of any subcontractor, as well as periodic FCPA training for all agents and subcontractors.

### ***Garth Peterson***

On August 16, 2012, former Morgan Stanley executive Garth Peterson was sentenced to nine months in prison and three years supervised release. Peterson, who had served as the managing director in Morgan Stanley's real estate investment and fund advisory business as well as the head of the Shanghai office's real estate business, had pleaded guilty previously to "conspiring to evade internal accounting controls that Morgan Stanley was required to maintain under the FCPA." Peterson was released from prison on July 3, 2013.

Peterson had also previously settled charges with the SEC, which had asserted that he had violated the anti-bribery and internal controls provisions of the FCPA and aided and abetted violations of the anti-fraud provisions of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. As part of the settlement agreement, Peterson agreed to never again work in the securities industry, pay \$241,589 in disgorgement, and relinquish the interest he secretly acquired in Shanghai real estate (which was valued at approximately \$3.4 million).

According to the court documents, Peterson had a personal friendship and secret business relationship with the former Chairman (the "Chairman") of Yongye Enterprise (Group) Co. Ltd. ("Yongye"), a large real estate development arm of Shanghai's Luwan District and the entity through which Shanghai's Luwan District managed its own property and facilitated outside investment in the district. During the relevant period, Morgan Stanley partnered with Yongye in a number of significant Chinese real estate investments and recognized Yongye as one of Morgan Stanley's most significant partners in China.

According to the DOJ's charging documents, the corruption scheme began when Peterson encouraged Morgan Stanley to sell an interest in a Shanghai real estate deal relating to one tower ("Tower Two") of a building ("Project Cavity") to a shell company controlled by him, the Chairman, and a Canadian attorney. Peterson and his co-conspirators falsely represented to Morgan Stanley that Yongye owned the shell company, and Morgan Stanley sold the real estate interest in 2006 to the shell company at a discount equal to the interest's actual 2004 market value. As a result, Peterson and his co-conspirators realized an immediate paper profit. Even after the sale, Peterson and his co-conspirators continued to claim falsely that Yongye owned the shell company, which in reality they owned. Not only did the real estate appreciate in value, but Peterson and his co-conspirators periodically received equity distributions relating to the real estate.

The DOJ charging documents further alleged that, "[w]ithout the knowledge or consent of his superiors at Morgan Stanley," Peterson sought to compensate the Chairman for his assistance to Morgan Stanley and Peterson in Project Cavity. In particular, in 2006, Peterson arranged for the Chairman personally to purchase a nearly six-percent stake in Tower Two at the

lower 2004 basis rather than the current 2006 basis. Peterson concealed the Chairman's personal investment from Morgan Stanley and, as a result, others within Morgan Stanley falsely believed that, consistent with Morgan Stanley's internal controls and the desire to foster co-investment with Yongye, Yongye itself was investing in Tower Two. The SEC Complaint also asserted that, in negotiating both sides of the transaction, Peterson was engaging in secret self-dealing and thereby breached the fiduciary duties Peterson and Morgan Stanley owed to their fund client.

The SEC also alleged that Peterson never disclosed his own stake in the transaction, in annual disclosures of personal business interests Morgan Stanley required him to make as part of his employment or otherwise, until around the time of his termination in late 2008.

The SEC Complaint additionally alleged that Peterson and the Canadian Attorney secretly acquired from Morgan Stanley an interest in another Luwan District real estate deal called Project 138 by buying 1% of the Project as part of an investment group. Peterson failed to disclose his stake in Project 138 in annual disclosures of personal business interests Morgan Stanley required him to make as part of his employment. As in Project Cavity, Peterson negotiated both sides of this Project 138 sale to himself. The SEC Complaint alleged that this secret self-dealing breached the fiduciary duties Peterson and Morgan Stanley owned to their fund client.

Finally, the SEC Complaint alleged that Peterson devised a system to incentivize the Chairman to help Morgan Stanley win business on projects involving Yongye and to reward the Chairman for all he had done for Morgan Stanley and Peterson personally. Under this incentive deal, known as the 3-2-1 deal, Morgan Stanley would sell the Chairman a 3% interest in each deal he brought to Morgan Stanley for the cost of 2%, providing the Chairman a 1% discount that Peterson called a "finder's fee." Peterson also promised to pay the Chairman an added return he called a "promote" on any completed purchase to incentivize him to help make any acquired investments profitable.

Peterson disclosed the proposed 3-2-1 arrangement to his supervisors in April 2006. Less than a month later, however — before the official had been paid anything — a Morgan Stanley controller warned of the bribery implications of paying the Chairman personally for help obtaining business. One of Peterson's Morgan Stanley supervisors then instructed Peterson to abandon the 3-2-1 deal with the Chairman.

Peterson ignored his supervisor's instructions and secretly shared part of a finder's fee with the Chairman. Specifically, in March 2007, approximately six months after the Chairman retired from Yongye, Peterson caused Morgan Stanley to pay a \$2.2 million finder's fee to a private investor who had been involved in the various schemes (the "Shanghai Investor"). The Shanghai Investor transferred \$1.6 million of this fee to Peterson, who gave nearly \$700,000 to the former Chairman and kept the rest for himself. The Shanghai Investor agreed to help Peterson steal these funds in exchange for his promise to help the Shanghai Investor get future business from Morgan Stanley. Peterson kept his payment to the Chairman and his own kickback a secret from his Morgan Stanley supervisors.

The nine-month prison sentence was much shorter than the fifty-one to sixty month prison term that prosecutors had sought. At the sentencing hearing, DOJ lawyers argued that Peterson should be sentenced to a minimum of fifty-one months in prison, which represented the bottom range of the sentencing guidelines. In particular, prosecutors argued that “the past sentences of other FCPA violators do not warrant a below-Guideline sentence,” and referred to the previous sentencing of individuals involved with the Terra Telecommunications and Haiti Teleco matter, such as Joel Esquenazi (15 years), Jean Rene Duperval (9 years), Juan Diaz (57 months), Robert Antoine (4 years), Antonio Perez (2 years), and Jorge Granados (46 months) (*see Terra Telecommunications/Haiti Teleco*). The sentencing judge, however, took issue with the fact that the prosecutors could not provide any background details on the age or family situations of those individuals, and he noted in particular Peterson’s “harsh and unusual upbringing” as well as his level of cooperation and “significant financial penalties” that he had already suffered.

Neither the SEC nor the DOJ opted to charge Morgan Stanley. Both the SEC and DOJ complaints contained significant discussions of Morgan Stanley’s internal controls that were in place at the time. Specifically:

*Compliance personnel:* Morgan Stanley employed over 500 dedicated compliance officers, and its compliance department had direct lines to Morgan Stanley’s Board of Directors and regularly reported through the Chief Legal Officer to the Chief Executive Officer and senior management committees. In addition, Morgan Stanley employed regional compliance officers who specialized in particular regions, including China, in order to evaluate region-specific risks.

*Due diligence on its foreign business partners:* Morgan Stanley conducted due diligence on the Chairman and Yongye (the state-owned enterprise) before initially doing business with them.

*Payment approval process:* Morgan Stanley maintained a substantial system of controls to detect and prevent improper payments and required multiple employees to be involved in the approval of payments.

*Training:* Morgan Stanley trained Peterson on anti-corruption policies and the FCPA at least seven times between 2002 to 2008 in both live and web-based sessions. Between 2000 and 2008, Morgan Stanley held at least 54 training programs for various groups of Asia-based employees on anti-corruptions policies and the FCPA.

*Written compliance materials:* Morgan Stanley distributed written training materials specifically addressing the FCPA, which Peterson kept in his office.

*Audit and periodic review of compliance:* Morgan Stanley randomly audited selected personnel in high-risk areas and regularly audited and tested Morgan Stanley’s business units. Morgan Stanley conducted, in conjunction with outside counsel, a formal review annually of each of its anti-corruption policies and updated the policies and procedures as necessary.

Hotline: Morgan Stanley provided a toll-free compliance hotline 24/7, staffed to field calls in every major language including Chinese.

Frequent compliance reminders: Peterson personally received more than 35 FCPA compliance reminders during the time he was working for Morgan Stanley in China. These included a distribution of the Morgan Stanley Code of Conduct, reminders concerning policies on gift giving and entertainment and guidance on the engagement of consultants.

Written certifications: Morgan Stanley required Peterson on multiple occasions to certify, in writing, his compliance with the FCPA. These written certifications were maintained in Peterson's permanent employment record.

Disclosure of outside business interests: Morgan Stanley required Peterson, along with other employees, to annually disclose his outside business interests.

Specific instruction: An in-house compliance officer specifically informed Peterson in 2004 that employees of Yongye, a Chinese state-owned entity, were government officials for purposes of the FCPA.

Morgan Stanley voluntarily disclosed this matter and cooperated throughout the DOJ and SEC investigations. According to the SEC press release: “[t]his case illustrates the SEC’s commitment to holding individuals accountable for FCPA violations, particularly employees who intentionally circumvent their company’s internal controls.” The SEC press release further characterized Peterson as “a rogue employee who took advantage of his firm and his investment advisory clients.”

### ***Biomet***

On March 26, 2012, Biomet Inc., a medical device maker based in Indiana, settled FCPA charges with the DOJ and SEC for conduct occurring between 2000 and 2008. For most of the period of the misconduct, Biomet was listed on NASDAQ and was required to file periodic reports with the SEC, making it an “issuer” under the FCPA with respect to that time period. Biomet was targeted as part of the government’s ongoing investigation into medical device companies for bribes paid to health care providers and administrators employed by government institutions.

The SEC Complaint alleged violations of the FCPA anti-bribery, books and records, and internal control provisions, while the DOJ charged Biomet with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions and four counts of violations of the anti-bribery provisions. According to DOJ and SEC charging documents, between 2000 and 2008, Biomet and four subsidiaries located in Argentina, China, Sweden, and Delaware, paid more than \$1.5 million in bribes to health care providers in China, Argentina, and Brazil in order to secure business with hospitals. These payments were disguised in the company’s books and records as “commissions,” “royalties,” “consulting fees,” and “scientific incentives.” According to the government, bribes involved employees and managers at all levels of Biomet, its

subsidiaries, and its distributors. The payments were not stopped by Biomet's compliance and internal audit functions even after they became known.

In China, Biomet sold medical device products through two subsidiaries, Biomet China (a Chinese company and wholly owned subsidiary of Biomet) and Scandimed (a wholly owned Swedish subsidiary that sells in China and elsewhere). The DOJ and SEC alleged that Biomet China and Scandimed funneled bribes through a distributor who offered money and travel to publicly employed doctors in exchange for Biomet purchases. One e-mail from the Chinese distributor, sent on May 21, 2001, indicated that:

[Doctor] is the department head of [public hospital]. . . . Many key surgeons in Shanghai are buddies of his. A kind word on Biomet from him goes a long way for us. Dinner has been set aside for the evening of the 24th. It will be nice. But dinner aside, I've got to send him to Switzerland to visit his daughter.

A separate April 21, 2002 email from the Chinese distributor stated:

When we say "Surgeon Rebate included," it means the invoice price includes a predetermined percentage for the surgeon. For example, a vendor invoices the hospital for a set of plate & screws at RMB 3,000.00. The vendor will have to deliver RMB 750.00 (25% in this case) in cash to the surgeon upon completion of surgery.

Employees at Biomet China and Scandimed were allegedly made aware of the bribes from at least 2001, due to e-mail exchanges with the distributor that explicitly described the bribes. Biomet's President of International Operations in Indiana and employees in the United Kingdom were also allegedly made aware of the bribes in 2001. For example, one e-mail sent from the Chinese distributor copying the Associate Regional Manager stated "[Doctor] will become the most loyal customer of Biomet if we send him to Switzerland." And, in 2005, the Director of Internal Audit instructed an auditor to code as "entertainment" the payments being made to doctors in connection with clinical trials.

In 2006, Biomet ended its relationship with the Chinese distributor and hired staff to sell devices directly, a change that did not serve to end the misconduct. In October 2007, Biomet China sponsored 20 surgeons to travel to Barcelona and Valencia for training; the trips included substantial sightseeing and entertainment at Biomet's expense. Additionally, in October 2007, Biomet China's product manager sent an email to the Associate Regional Manager in which he discussed ways to bypass anti-corruption efforts by the Chinese government.

In Brazil, Biomet's U.S. subsidiary, working through a distributor, allegedly paid an estimated \$1.1 million in the form of 10% to 20% "commissions" to doctors at publicly owned and operated hospitals in order to sell Biomet products. The government alleged that Biomet employees were aware of these payments as early as 2001. Payments were openly discussed in documents between Biomet's executives and internal auditors in the United States, Biomet

International, and its distributor. For example, in August 2001 the Brazilian distributor sent an email to Biomet's Senior Vice President in Indiana, copying the Director of Internal Audit, stating it was paying commissions to doctors. Yet the SEC concluded that, "no efforts were made to stop the bribery." In April 2008, following its acquisition by the private equity groups, Biomet decided to purchase the Brazilian distributor and sent accountants and counsel to conduct due diligence. Accountants identified certain payments to doctors, raising red flags of bribery. In May 2008, Biomet terminated its relationship with its distributor and withdrew from the Brazilian market.

The government alleged that, with respect to Argentina, employees of Biomet paid doctors at publicly owned and operated hospitals directly, with kickbacks as high as 15% to 20% of sales. In total, Biomet allegedly paid approximately \$436,000 to doctors in Argentina. In order to conceal payments, employees of Biomet Argentina, a wholly owned Biomet subsidiary incorporated in Argentina, used false invoices from doctors stating that the payments were for professional services or consulting. Prior to 2000, the payments were falsely recorded as "consulting fees" or "commissions." In 2000, the Argentine tax authorities forbade tax-free payments to surgeons, and Biomet Argentina employees began recording the payments as "royalties" or "other sales and marketing."

Auditors and executives at Biomet's headquarters in Indiana were aware of these payments as early as 2000. For example, in 2003, during the company's audit of Biomet Argentina, the audit report stated that "[R]oyalties are paid to surgeons if requested. These are disclosed in the accounting records as commissions." The internal audit did not make any effort to determine why royalties were being paid to doctors, amounting to some 15% to 20% of sales. Later in 2008, Biomet distributed new compliance guidelines related to the FCPA, and the Managing Director of Biomet Argentina informed Biomet's attorneys of the company's payments to doctors. Biomet reacted by suspending the payments and sending outside counsel to investigate.

Biomet entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the DOJ, which requires that Biomet implement a rigorous system of internal controls and retain a compliance monitor for 18 months. Biomet also agreed to pay a criminal fine of \$17.28 million to the DOJ and \$5.5 million in disgorgement of profits and prejudgment interest to the SEC. The deferred prosecution agreement recognized Biomet's cooperation during the DOJ's investigation, as well as the company's self-investigation and remedial efforts. Biomet also received a penalty reduction in exchange for its cooperation with ongoing investigations in the industry.

### ***BizJet***

On March 14, 2012, BizJet International Sales and Support, Inc. ("BizJet") entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ in connection with allegations that it made improper payments to government officials in Mexico and Panama in violation of the FCPA. As part of the DPA, BizJet agreed to pay \$11.8 million in criminal fines, to cooperate with the department in ongoing investigations, and to periodically update the DOJ on the company's compliance efforts.

BizJet, founded and headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma, is a subsidiary of Lufthansa Technik AG (“Lufthansa Technik”) and provides aircraft maintenance, repair and overhaul services to customers in the United States and abroad. According to court documents, between 2004 and 2010, executives and managers from BizJet authorized wire and cash payments to key employees of potential government clients, including the Mexican Federal Police, the Mexican President’s aircraft fleet, the Governor of the Mexican State of Sinaloa’s aircraft fleet, the Panama Aviation Authority, and the aircraft fleet for the government of the Brazilian State of Roraima, as well as to customers in the United States. The purpose of the payments was to directly obtain and retain services contracts with these potential clients.

The payments were referred to within BizJet as “commissions,” “incentives,” or “referral fees” and were either paid directly to the foreign officials or disguised through use of a shell company owned by former BizJet sales manager Jald Jensen. Through the latter method, payments were made from BizJet to the shell company and then passed on to government officials, often delivered by hand in cash. Although the BizJet information contained just one count of conspiracy, the deferred prosecution agreement lists at least 12 recorded bribe payments (ranging from \$2,000 to \$210,000) made by BizJet and recorded as “commission payments” or “referral fees.”

The information alleges that the highest levels of the company were aware of the improper conduct, which was carried out or authorized by at least three senior executives and one sales manager. According to the information, the BizJet Board of Directors was informed in November 2005 that decisions as to where to send aircrafts for maintenance were often made by the potential customer’s “director of maintenance” or “chief pilot.” The Board was also informed that these individuals had requested commissions from BizJet ranging from \$30,000 to \$40,000 and that BizJet would “pay referral fees . . . to gain market share.”

The \$11.8 million fine paid by Bizjet falls well below the minimum range suggested under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The reduction may be due in part to what the DOJ perceived to be “extraordinary” cooperation by BizJet and Lufthansa Technik in the investigation. The DOJ expressly commended BizJet and Lufthansa Technik for this cooperation, which included an extensive internal investigation, voluntarily making U.S. and foreign employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing and organizing voluminous evidence and information for the agency.

Lufthansa Technik, wholly owned by European airline Deutsche Lufthansa, entered into a three-year NPA with the DOJ in December 2011 in connection with BizJet’s unlawful payments. Lufthansa Technik agreed to provide ongoing cooperation and implementation of rigorous internal controls. It is not clear from the charging documents what the basis for Lufthansa Technik’s liability was, as Lufthansa was not mentioned in the Bizjet DPA and the Lufthansa Technik NPA contains no factual basis other than the following statement:

It is understood that Lufthansa Technik admits, accepts, and acknowledges responsibility for the conduct of its subsidiary set forth in the Statement of Facts contained in the Deferred

Prosecution Agreement between the Department and BizJet (the “BizJet DPA”), and agrees not to make any public statement contradicting that Statement of Facts.

Both companies agreed to engage in extensive remediation, including terminating employees responsible for the corrupt payments, enhancing due-diligence protocol for third-party agents and consultants, and heightening review of proposals and other transactional documents for BizJet’s contracts. Neither company was required to retain a compliance monitor.

On April 5, 2013, a federal court in Oklahoma unsealed plea agreements with Peter DuBois and Neal Uhl, two former BizJet executives that had been charged in December 2011 with counts of violating or conspiring to violate the FCPA. After the court accepted their guilty pleas, DuBois and Uhl were both sentenced to eight months of home detention and a five-year probation term. Additionally, DuBois agreed to criminal and administrative forfeiture judgments totaling \$159,950, and the court imposed a \$10,000 criminal fine on Uhl.

The unsealed documents note that both DuBois and Uhl had cooperated with the DOJ. In particular, the Motion to Seal revealed that DuBois had worked in an “undercover capacity” in connection with the BizJet investigation, recording conversations with former BizJet executives and other subjects of the government’s investigation. In recommending a lesser sentence for DuBois, the DOJ also explained that the assistance that DuBois provided also led to the investigation of another maintenance, repair, and overhaul company that had been engaged in a similar scheme to pay bribes to government officials overseas. Although the DOJ did not provide further details about the other investigation, the DOJ entered an NPA with Nordam Group Inc., another Tulsa-based maintenance, repair, and overhaul services company, in July 2012 (*see Nordam, above*).

The District Court also unsealed indictments of Bernd Kowalewski (former BizJet President and CEO) and Jald Jensen (former BizJet Sales Manager), which had been entered on January 5, 2012, the same day that the DOJ filed DuBois and Uhl’s plea agreements. Kowalewski was arrested in Amsterdam on March 13, 2014 and waived extradited to the United States.

Among other things, the indictment against Kowalewski alleged that he attempted to destroy evidence relating to the payments by running software that erased content from his computer after he received notice that the parent company’s internal auditors would be auditing BizJet’s incentive payments. On July 24, 2014, he pleaded guilty in federal court in Tulsa, Oklahoma to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one substantive FCPA violation in connection with the bribery scheme. He was sentenced to time served and a criminal fine of \$15,000 and a special monetary assessment of \$200 on November 18, 2014.

Jensen still faces six counts of substantive FCPA violations, three counts of money laundering, and two charges of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and money laundering laws, as well as criminal and administrative forfeiture allegations.

*Smith & Nephew plc*

On February 6, 2012, U.K. medical device company Smith & Nephew plc (“S&N”) resolved DOJ and SEC investigations into alleged FCPA violations relating to payments to doctors of state-owned hospitals in Greece. S&N is an issuer subject to the FCPA because its American Depositary Receipts (“ADRs”) trade on the New York Stock Exchange. The underlying conduct also involved S&N’s wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, Smith & Nephew Inc. (“S&N US”); although S&N US is not subject to the SEC’s jurisdiction, because it is not an issuer, it is subject to DOJ enforcement of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions as a domestic concern. Accordingly, the SEC settled with S&N, while the DOJ entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with S&N US.

The enforcement action is noteworthy because it related to S&N US’s use of a distributor. While in some circumstances distributors may pose different risk profiles than consultants or representatives, this enforcement action demonstrates that the use of distributors is not without compliance risks. Until in or around late 1997, S&N US had a standard distributorship relationship with a Greek distributor, through which it sold products at a discount from its list prices to the distributor’s entities, who would then resell the products at profit to Greek healthcare providers. But beginning in or around 1998, and continuing until in or around December 2007, S&N US and a German subsidiary of S&N entered into various “marketing” relationships with two offshore shell companies controlled by the Greek distributor, by which a percentage of the sales made by the Greek distributor would be paid to the shell companies. Further arrangements with a third offshore shell company provided for increased discounts to generate a pool of cash that could be used for improper purposes. No “true services” were provided by any of the shell companies.

Despite several questions raised by S&N US’s internal legal and audit personnel about the propriety of the payments, including discussions of the fact that surgeons in Greece were being paid to use S&N US’s medical devices products, the relationships continued. Electronic mail communications were also sent between the United States and Greece in which the Greek distributor rejected a proposal to reduce the marketing payments to the shell companies, because:

[The payments are] already not sufficient to cover my company’s cash incentive requirements at the current market level, with major competitors paying 30-40% more than [the Greek distributor]. As I explained to you [during a recent trip to Memphis], I absolutely need this fund to promote my sales with surgeons, at a time when competition offers substantially higher rates . . . . In case it is not clear to you, please understand that I am paying cash incentives right after each surgery . . . .

S&N US entered into relationships with a series of shell companies, and even continued to use the Greek distributor until June 2008, even though its distribution contract had expired in December 2007. S&N US further admitted that in its books and records, which were incorporated into the books and records of S&N and reflected in S&N’s year-end financial

statements filed with the SEC, it falsely characterized the payments to the Greek distributor as “marketing services” and false characterized the discounts provided.

Additionally, in early 2007, S&N US acquired a company with a competing subsidiary in Greece and was informed by the Greek distributor that the Greek subsidiary of the newly acquired company paid Greek healthcare providers at an even higher rate than did the Greek distributor on behalf of S&N US.

S&N and S&N US agreed to pay a total of \$22.2 million to resolve these investigations. In its settlement with the SEC, S&N agreed to disgorge \$4,028,000, pay prejudgment interest of \$1,398,799, and agreed to retain an independent compliance monitor for 18 months. Under its deferred prosecution agreement, S&N US agreed to pay a \$16.8 million penalty, which the DOJ calculated to be a 20% reduction off the lower-end of the range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. The DOJ believed that this reduction was appropriate given S&N US’s internal investigation, the nature and extent of its cooperation, and what the DOJ characterized as extensive remediation (including improvements to its ethics and compliance program).

### ***Marubeni Corporation***

On January 17, 2012, Marubeni Corporation (“Marubeni”), a Japanese trading company headquartered in Tokyo, Japan, entered into a DPA with the DOJ to resolve FCPA-related charges in connection with its participation in a conspiracy to bribe Nigerian officials. Under the two-year DPA, Marubeni agreed to pay a \$54.6 million criminal penalty, to cooperate with the DOJ’s ongoing investigations, to review and improve its compliance and ethics program, and to engage an independent compliance consultant for two years. The \$54.6 million penalty represented the lowest limit of the DOJ’s calculated fine range, which spanned up to \$109.2 million.

According to the criminal information, Marubeni was involved in the corruption scheme implemented by the TSKJ joint venture between 1995 and 2004 to unlawfully obtain contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities in Bonny Island, Nigeria (*see, e.g., KBR/Halliburton, Tesler and Chodan*). As part of the scheme, TSKJ (operating through a corporate entity based in Madeira, Portugal) hired U.K. attorney Jeffrey Tesler and Marubeni as agents to arrange and pay bribes to high-level and working-level government officials, respectively. In that context, Marubeni met Albert Stanley (the former head of KBR) and other TSKJ officers in Houston and exchanged correspondence with them to discuss its contracts and fees. Throughout the course of the scheme, Marubeni received \$51 million from TSKJ, of which \$17 million was transferred by KBR from the Netherlands, in part for use in corrupting Nigerian officials. On two occasions preceding the award of engineering, procurement and construction (“EPC”) contracts to TSKJ, a Marubeni employee met with officials of the executive branch of the Government of Nigeria to identify a representative to negotiate bribes with TSKJ.

The DOJ ultimately charged Marubeni with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one count of aiding and abetting KBR in violating the FCPA. It should be noted that, given that Marubeni negotiated its contract with TSKJ through correspondence directed to the United States and an in-person meeting in Houston, there were seemingly grounds to prosecute

Marubeni for a direct violation of the statute, as it arguably took acts in furtherance of the scheme while in the territory of the United States

## 2011

### *Magyar Telekom and Deutsche Telekom*

On December 29, 2011, Magyar Telekom Plc. (“Magyar”) and its majority owner, German telecommunications giant Deutsche Telekom AG (“Deutsche Telekom”), announced that they would pay approximately \$95 million to resolve criminal and civil charges brought by the DOJ and SEC for FCPA violations. The DOJ’s investigation followed a February 2006 internal investigation initiated by Magyar after its auditors identified two suspicious contracts during an audit of the company’s financial statements.

In 2005, the Macedonian parliament enacted a new Electronic Communications Law that authorized telecommunications regulatory bodies in Macedonia to hold a public tender for a license that would allow a third mobile phone company to enter the Macedonian telecommunications market. This new mobile phone company would have competed directly with a Magyar subsidiary, Makedonski Telekomunikacii AD Skopje (“MakTel”). According to charging documents, Magyar and its executives entered into secret agreements — referred to internally at Magyar as “protocols of cooperation” — with high-ranking Macedonian officials to delay or preclude the issuance of this new license in order to help MakTel retain a dominant share of the Macedonian telecommunications market. The Macedonian officials also exempted MakTel from having to pay increased licensing fees required by the Electronic Communications Law. To effect the scheme, Magyar paid over \$6 million to a Greek intermediary under sham consulting contracts with the knowledge or belief that the funds would be passed on to Macedonian officials. These payments were recorded as legitimate expenses on MakTel’s books and records (including by the use of backdating and fabricated documentation), which Magyar consolidated into its own financial records and which were eventually incorporated into Deutsche Telekom’s financial statements.

The DOJ and the SEC also alleged that Magyar made approximately \$9 million in improper payments to acquire state-owned telecommunications company Telekom Crne Gore A.D. (“TCG”) in Montenegro. In exchange for these payments, Magyar acquired an approximately 51% interest in TCG from the Montenegrin government. Magyar was also able to acquire an additional 22% interest in TCG — giving Magyar supermajority control over the telecommunications company — after the Montenegrin officials committed the Government of Montenegro to supplement Magyar’s offer to minority shareholders by €0.30 per share. Magyar attempted to conceal these payments through sham contracts with third-party consultants, including one based in Mauritius and another based in the Seychelles, neither of which had ever provided services to Magyar or Deutsche Telekom, and one of which was not even legally incorporated at the time. A third sham contract with a counterparty in New York was designed to funnel money to the sister of a Montenegrin official, while a fourth, to a London-based shell company, was purportedly to provide strategic reports. The reports received were not original work and were valued by Magyar’s auditors at €20,000, far less than the €2.3 million paid for

them. The ultimate beneficiary was not identified. Magyar's payments were each recorded as consulting expenses in Magyar's books and records.

Magyar agreed to pay a \$59.6 million criminal penalty to the DOJ as part of a two-year DPA to resolve charges of one count of violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and two counts of violating the FCPA's books and records provisions. Magyar also agreed to implement an enhanced compliance program and submit annual reports regarding its efforts in implementing those enhanced compliance measures and remediating past problems. Additionally, Magyar agreed to pay \$31.2 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC. Deutsche Telekom will pay an additional \$4.36 million in criminal penalties as part of a NPA for one count of violating the FCPA's books and records provisions.

- *SEC Action Against Former Magyar Executives*

The SEC also brought civil charges against three former Magyar executives: former Chairman and CEO Elek Straub; former Director of Central Strategic Organization Andras Balogh; and former Director of Business Development and Acquisitions Tamas Morvai. The SEC alleges that the executives personally authorized Magyar's payments to the Macedonian officials. The SEC further alleged that, from 2005 through 2006, Straub, Balogh, and Morvai authorized at least six other sham contracts through the Greek intermediary. According to the SEC, these sham contracts were all designed to channel funds to government officials — a process referred to by the former executives as “logistics” — in a manner that circumvented Magyar's internal controls. The executives also proposed, though ultimately did not follow through on, a plan to secure political support by having Magyar construct a telecommunications infrastructure in a neighboring country that could be run for the benefit of a minor Macedonian political party. Finally, the SEC alleged that the former executives authorized and implemented the sham consultancy contracts Magyar used to facilitate its acquisition Telekom Crne Gore A.D.

The SEC accused Straub, Balogh, and Morvai of authorizing or causing all of the payments described above with “knowledge, the firm belief, or under circumstances that made it substantially certain” that all or a portion of the payments would be channeled to government officials. The SEC also alleged that the former executives caused these payments to be falsely recorded in Magyar's books and records and mislead auditors in charge of preparing Magyar's financial statements. Consequently, the SEC charged Straub, Balogh, and Morvai with violating or adding and abetting violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions; knowingly circumventing internal controls and falsifying books and records; and making false statements to auditors.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the case on November 5, 2012, arguing that (i) the district court lacked personal jurisdiction, (ii) the SEC's claims were barred by the statute of limitations, and (iii) the SEC had not adequately alleged claims of bribery. The court denied the motion on February 8, 2013, and further denied a motion for an interlocutory appeal on August 5, 2013 (*see Rulings on the Statute of Limitations in Civil Penalty Actions, below*). The cases against these individuals remain ongoing, with fact discovery anticipated to be completed by January 31, 2015.

- Investigation by German Authorities

German authorities also investigated Magyar. In late August 2010, German prosecutors raided Deutsche Telekom's offices, as well as the homes of several employees, as part of an investigation into the activities of Deutsche Telekom subsidiaries in Hungary and Macedonia. Although commentators have suggested that the raids stemmed from the SEC's request for assistance in the U.S. enforcement actions described above, German prosecutors insisted that the raids were not requested by the SEC and were ordered after a German investigation raised suspicions that a violation of German anti-corruption law may have occurred. The focus of these investigations was Deutsche Telekom's CEO, Renee Obermann, whose home was one of the residences searched as part of the raids. Deutsche Telekom strongly denied that Obermann was involved in any wrongdoing, however, and in January 2011, citing a lack of evidence, German prosecutors dropped all charges against Obermann.

### **Aon**

On December 20, 2011, Aon Corporation ("Aon"), a Delaware corporation and one of the largest insurance brokerage firms in the world, entered into a two-year NPA with the DOJ that required the company to pay a \$1.76 million penalty to resolve violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions. Simultaneously, the company entered into an agreement with the SEC to pay approximately \$14.5 million in disgorgement and interest to resolve books and records and internal controls charges. While the DOJ's charges were limited to conduct in Costa Rica, the SEC alleged additional misconduct in Egypt, Vietnam, Indonesia, UAE, Myanmar, and Bangladesh.

According to stipulated facts, in 1997, Aon's U.K. subsidiary, Aon Limited, acquired the British insurance brokerage firm Alexander Howden and took over management of a "training and education" fund ("the Brokerage Fund") set up by Alexander Howden in connection with its reinsurance business with Instituto Nacional De Seguros ("INS"), Costa Rica's state-owned insurance company. From 1999 through 2002, at INS' request, Aon Limited managed another training account ("the 3% Fund") that was funded by premiums paid by INS to reinsurers.

The ostensible purpose of both the Brokerage Fund and the 3% Fund was to provide education and training for INS officials. However, between 1997 and 2005, Aon Limited used a significant portion of the funds to reimburse INS officials for non-training related activity, including travel with spouses to overseas tourist destinations, travel to conferences with no apparent link to the insurance industry, or for uses that could not be determined from Aon's books and records. Many of the invoices and other records for trips taken by INS officials did not provide any business purpose for the expenditures, or showed that the expenses were clearly not related to a legitimate business purpose. A majority of the money paid from the funds was disbursed to a Costa Rican tourism company for which the director of the INS reinsurance department served on the board of directors. Aon's records included only generic descriptions of the expenses, such as "various airfares and hotel."

The SEC's complaint alleged further improper practices in Egypt, Vietnam, Indonesia, UAE, Myanmar, and Bangladesh, which the company has neither admitted nor denied. In

Egypt, Aon subsidiary Aon Risk Services agreed by written contract to sponsor annual trips to various U.S. cities for Egyptian officials from the Egyptian Armament Authority (“EAA”) and the Egyptian Procurement Office (“EPO”). According to the SEC complaint, the trips’ non-business segments unjustifiably outweighed the legitimate business segments. Also in Egypt, Aon made several payments to third parties without performing appropriate due diligence to ensure or prevent the payments from ending up in the hands of government officials. The SEC noted that the fact that the third parties appeared to perform no legitimate services, “suggest[ed] that they were simply conduits for improper payments to government officials in order to obtain or retain business.”

In Vietnam, Aon Limited allegedly paid a third-party facilitator \$650,000 between 2003 and 2006 to obtain and retain an appointment as insurance broker with Vietnam Airlines, a government owned entity. The facilitator, however, did not provide legitimate services and passed portions of the Aon Limited funds on to unidentified individuals referred to as “related people.”

In Indonesia, the SEC alleged that, between 2002 and 2007, Aon Limited paid \$100,000 as a retainer to a consultant as part of a kickback scheme to secure accounts with Pertamina, a state-owned oil and gas company. The scheme did not come to fruition however. Aon Limited also paid \$100,000 to a company recommended by officials of another state-owned oil company, BP Migas, to assist in securing Pertamina and BP Migas accounts. Another \$100,000 was paid by two Aon brokers to a “third-party introducer” to assist in obtaining the BP Migas account.

In the UAE, Aon Limited allegedly acquired a broker that had, from 1983 to 1997, made payments to the general manager of a private insurance company to secure and retain the Aon account. Aon Limited then continued to make these payments, which totaled \$588,000, to the general manager for 10 years after the acquisition in 1997. The payments were disguised as payments to a third-party consultant.

In Myanmar, Aon Limited’s records show that, between 1999 and 2005, a portion of the \$3.25 million paid to an “introducer” was transferred to an employee at Myanmar Insurance for protection of Aon’s business interests at Myanmar Insurance and Myanmar Airways, two state-owned entities.

Finally, in Bangladesh, the SEC alleged that a former Aon Limited employee and another company were paid \$1.07 million as consultants to secure accounts for Aon Limited with Biman Bangladesh Airways and Sudharam Bima Corporation, both of which are government-owned. A portion of the fees paid to the consultants were forwarded as “finder’s fees” to the son of a former high-ranking government official with important political connections.

In 2009, the UK Financial Services Authority (“FSA”) determined that between 2005 and 2007 Aon Limited violated Principle 3 of the FSA’s Principles for Business when it failed to take reasonable care to organize and control its affairs responsibly and effectively with adequate risk management systems. Because of these gaps in controls, the FSA found that a number of “suspicious” payments were made by Aon Limited to foreign third parties in Bahrain, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Aon Limited entered into a settlement

agreement with the FSA in 2009 and paid a penalty of £5.25 million. The DOJ stated that this settlement and the FSA's close supervision over Aon Limited contributed to its decision to grant an NPA and a reduced financial penalty.

### *Watts Water*

On October 13, 2011, the SEC imposed a cease-and-desist order and civil penalties totaling more than \$3.8 million against Watts Water Technologies, Inc. ("Watts") and Leesen Chang for violating the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. The SEC alleged that Watts, a Delaware corporation headquartered in Massachusetts, established a wholly owned Chinese subsidiary, Watts Valve Changsha C., Ltd., ("CWV"), for the purpose of purchasing Changsha Valve Works ("Changsha Valve") in 2005. Prior to purchasing Changsha Valve, Watts was not heavily involved in business with state owned entities.

The SEC charged that employees of CWV made improper payments between 2006 and 2009 to influence state owned design institutes to recommend CWV products to state owned entities and to draft specifications that favored CWV products.

Several compliance failings led to the payments being made. First, the SEC noted that, while Watts introduced an FCPA policy following its acquisition of Changsha Valve in 2006, it failed to conduct adequate FCPA training for its employees until Spring of 2009 and otherwise failed to implement adequate internal controls considering the risks involved in sales to state owned entities. More dramatically, the sales were "facilitated by a sales incentive policy" in place at Changsha Valve that incentivized and directly provided for the improper payments. This policy, which was never translated into English or submitted to Watts' U.S. management following the purchase of Changsha Valve, provided that all travel, meals, entertainment and "consulting fees" would be borne by the sales employees out of their own commissions. Further, the policy specifically provided that sales personnel could utilize commissions to make payments of up to 3% of the total contract amount (nearly half of the regular commissions) to the design institutes. The improper payments were recorded in CWV's books and records as sales commissions.

Chang, the former interim General Manager of CWV and Vice President of Sales for Watts' management subsidiary in China, approved many of the improper payments to the design institutes. Watts' senior management in the United States had no knowledge that these improper payments were being made. Chang knew and relied on their unawareness. In fact, the SEC found that Chang actively resisted efforts to have the Sales Policy translated and submitted to Watts' senior management for approval. Nevertheless, in March 2009, Watts General Counsel learned of an SEC enforcement action against another company, ITT, that involved unlawful payments to employees of Chinese design institutes. Considering the similarities between ITT and Watts' business model in the same region, Watts' senior management implemented anti-corruption and FCPA training for its Chinese subsidiaries. In July 2009, following FCPA training in China and through conversations with CWV sales personnel who participated in the training, Watts' in-house corporate counsel became aware of the potential FCPA violations in China. On July 21, 2009, Watts retained outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation of

CWV's sales practices. On August, 6, 2009, Watts self-reported its internal investigation to the SEC.

When the conduct was discovered, Watts took several immediate remedial steps including conducting a worldwide anti-corruption audit that included additional FCPA and anti-corruption training at its Chinese and European locations, a risk assessment and anti-corruption compliance review of their international operations in Europe, China, and any U.S. location with international sales, and conducted anti-corruption testing at seven international Watts sites, including each of the manufacturing and sales locations in China.

### ***Bridgestone***

On September 12, 2011, Bridgestone Corporation (“Bridgestone”) entered into a plea agreement with the DOJ for conspiring to violate the FCPA with respect to payments to foreign officials in Mexico and other Latin American countries, and for conspiring to violate the Sherman Act (governing anti-competitive practices) with respect to its marine hose business. In the wake of the DOJ investigation into the conspiracies, which lasted from 1999 to 2007, Bridgestone decided (i) to close the Houston office of Bridgestone Industrial Products of America (“Bridgestone USA”), (ii) to withdraw entirely from the marine hose business, (iii) to take disciplinary action against certain employees, and (iv) to terminate many of its third-party agent relationships. In addition, Bridgestone agreed to pay a \$28 million criminal fine and to adopt a comprehensive anti-corruption compliance program.

Tokyo-based Bridgestone is the world's largest manufacturer of tires and rubber products. The company was also, during the time of the events alleged by the DOJ, in the business of making and selling marine hose, a flexible rubber hose used to transfer oil between tankers and storage facilities. The marine hose was made and sold by Bridgestone's International Engineered Products Department (“IEPD”), which was also responsible for the export and sales of other industrial products, such as marine fenders, conveyor belts, and rubber dams.

In many countries, including throughout Latin America, IEPD sold various products through local third-party sales agents, after coordinating such activities with the help of Bridgestone's various subsidiaries. For countries in Latin America — including Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela — IEPD coordinated its sales via third-party agents with coordinating assistance from Bridgestone USA.

In certain Latin American countries, Bridgestone (through the IEPD division, assisted by Bridgestone USA) developed relationships with employees of Bridgestone customers that were state owned entities. The United States classifies the employees of these state owned entities as “foreign officials” under the FCPA. For example, in Mexico, Bridgestone cultivated a relationship with an employee of the state owned oil company, Petroleos Mexicanos (“PEMEX”). Bridgestone arranged to improperly pay these foreign officials bribes calculated on the total volume of sales by overpaying the third-party sales agent commissions, with the understanding that the agent would keep a portion of the commission while conveying the remainder to the foreign official. Bridgestone took steps to conceal these payments by

communicating orally and via telephone to avoid creating written records, and by avoiding e-mail, instead using faxes that contained information about the bribes and handwritten instructions to “\*\*READ AND DESTROY\*\*.”

The DOJ Criminal Information details the acts surrounding one improper transaction involving a PEMEX employee. It describes a 2004 e-mail from a Bridgestone employee in Japan to one in Houston explaining that a “source” at PEMEX could help Bridgestone win a contract for marine hose, and a subsequent e-mail from a Japan employee instructing the Houston employee to cease communicating on the subject by email in favor of voice and fax communication. In 2005, a Houston employee suggested sending a PEMEX employee on a trip to Japan to “have him at our side,” and in 2006, a Houston employee faxed a “\*\*READ AND DESTROY\*\*” document to Japan which discussed reserving 24% of a PEMEX contract for commissions, with 5% for “top level” commissions, and another 5% for commissions to other PEMEX employees. Two weeks later, a Houston employee emailed an employee in Japan first with confidential information received from PEMEX sources, and then with a description of steps being taken by certain PEMEX employees to help Bridgestone win the contract. In January 2007, Bridgestone won the contract and invoiced PEMEX for \$324,200, an amount from which PEMEX employees would receive kickbacks.

The DOJ also charged Bridgestone with conspiring to suppress and eliminate competition by rigging bids, fixing prices, and allocating market shares for sales of marine hose in the United States and elsewhere, all in violation of the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §1). The DOJ alleged that Bridgestone, in combination with other unnamed co-conspirators, used a third-party individual to act as a central point of coordination for price fixing and bid rigging activities. The Criminal Information alleged that Bridgestone, with other companies, discussed how to allocate shares of the marine hose market, set prices for marine hose, and refrained from competing for other conspirators’ customers by either not bidding or submitting purposefully inflated bids to specific customers. All of these activities were apparently coordinated through a third-party individual who arranged the price fixing and bid rigging activities.

Bridgestone did not enter into a DPA or NPA, but instead pleaded guilty to criminal charges. The application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines produced a fine range of \$6.72 to \$13.44 million for the antitrust charge, and a range of \$39.9 to \$79.8 million for the FCPA charges.

Departing from the guidelines, the DOJ agreed to a combined fine of \$28 million, with no term of organizational probation. The DOJ stated that it agreed to the greatly discounted fine in response to Bridgestone’s level of cooperation, which included “conducting an extensive worldwide internal investigation, voluntarily making Japanese and other employees available for interviews, and collecting, analyzing, and organizing voluminous evidence and information...” as well as “extensive remediation, including restructuring the relevant part of its business” which included dismantling its IEPD and closing its Houston office (Bridgestone USA). The DOJ also stated that Bridgestone’s remedial actions included “terminating many of its third-party agents and taking remedial actions with respect to employees responsible for many of the corrupt

payments.” Bridgestone additionally “committed to continuing to enhance its compliance program and internal controls....”

In 2011, Japanese companies including Bridgestone, JGC, and Marubeni paid significant FCPA fines to the U.S. government. Although Japan is a signatory of the OECD Convention and therefore has its own anti-corruption law, the Japanese law does not include criminal liability for corporations, and civil enforcement is generally perceived as being less aggressive than in the United States.

### *Diageo*

On July 27, 2011, the SEC charged London-based beverage company Diageo plc (“Diageo”), the world’s largest producer of spirits, with widespread FCPA books and records and internal controls violations stemming from more than six years of improper payments to government officials in India, Thailand, and South Korea. The SEC alleged that Diageo’s subsidiaries paid more than \$2.7 million to obtain lucrative sales and tax benefits relating to its Johnnie Walker and Windsor Scotch whiskeys, among other brands. Diageo, which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange as well as the London Stock Exchange, agreed to cease and desist from further violations and pay over \$16 million in disgorgement, prejudgment interest, and financial penalties without admitting or denying the SEC’s findings.

Diageo’s anti-corruption issues stemmed in part from a series of worldwide mergers and acquisitions. In 1997, Guinness plc and Gran Metropolitan plc merged to create Diageo. Following the merger, Diageo acquired Diageo India Pvt. Ltd. and an indirect majority interest in and operational control of Diageo Moët Hennessy Thailand, a Thai joint venture. In 2001, Diageo acquired the spirits and wine business of the Seagram Company Ltd., which included Diageo Korea Co. Ltd. After acquisitions Diageo identified — but did little to strengthen — the weak compliance programs of the acquired subsidiaries until mid-2008 in response to the discovery of the illicit payments made in India, Thailand, and South Korea.

According to the SEC, Diageo and its subsidiaries made more than \$1.7 million in illicit payments to Indian government officials between 2003 and 2009. The officials were responsible for purchasing or authorizing the sale of Diageo’s beverages in India; these payments yielded more than \$11 million in profit for the company. Specifically, Diageo’s Indian subsidiary used distributors to make over \$790,000 in payments to an estimated 900 employees of government liquor stores to obtain orders and more prominent product placement in stores. The distributors themselves received “cash service fees” totaling 23% of the illicit payments from Diageo for their efforts. Diageo also reimbursed sales promoters for improper cash payments made to the Indian military’s Canteen Stores Departments (“CSD”). In exchange, Diageo received better product promotion within the stores, annual label registrations, price revision approvals, favorable inspection reports, the release of seized products, and favorable promotion of Diageo holiday gifts to CSD employees. Diageo also made improper payments, through third parties, to officials responsible for label registrations and import permits. These payments were improperly recorded in Diageo’s books and records with vague descriptions such as “incentive,” “promotions,” miscellaneous,” “traveling expense,” or “special rebates.”

In Thailand, Diageo, through a joint venture, paid approximately \$12,000 per month from 2004 to 2008 to retain the consulting services of a Thai government and political party official. This official lobbied senior commerce, finance and customs officials extensively on Diageo's behalf in connection with pending multi-million dollar tax and customs disputes, contributing to Diageo's receipt of certain favorable decisions by the Thai government. Payments for the consulting services were provided in monthly disbursements of \$11,989 and described as advisory fees and out-of-pocket expenditures in various accounts labeled "Outside Services," "Corporate Social Responsibility," "Corporate Communications," "External Affairs Project," and "Stakeholder Engagement." According to the SEC, the joint venture's senior management was aware of the consultant's governmental and political positions as he was the brother of one of the joint venture's senior officers.

The SEC also alleged that Diageo paid more than \$86,000 to a customs official in South Korea as a reward for the key role that he played in the government's decision to grant Diageo approximately \$50 million in tax rebates. The rebates were supposedly justified by millions of dollars Diageo had overpaid due to use of a less advantageous transfer pricing formula of Windsor Scotch whiskey imported to South Korea. Sixty percent of the custom official's reward was paid by Diageo by way of an inflated invoice from a customs brokerage firm that was charged to a professional services and consulting fees account. The remainder was paid from the personal funds of a Diageo subsidiary manager, which was not recorded in its books and records.

In addition, a South Korean Diageo subsidiary improperly paid travel and entertainment expenses for customs and other government officials involved in the tax negotiations. In one instance, several officials travelled to Scotland to inspect production facilities. While this trip was "apparently legitimate," on its face, senior employees of the Diageo joint venture also took the officials on purely recreational side trips to Prague and Budapest. The cost of these trips was improperly recorded in Diageo's "Entertainment-Customer" account.

Further, Diageo's South Korean subsidiary routinely made hundreds of gift payments to South Korean military officials in order to obtain and retain liquor business in the form of gifts known either as "rice cakes" or "Mokjuksaupbi." The so-called "rice cake" payments were customary gifts made at various times during the year for holidays and vacations (in the form of cash or gift certificates) to officials responsible for purchasing liquor and ranged in value between \$100 and \$300. At times, the company used fake invoices to generate the cash for the "rice cake" payments. Diageo also paid military officials an estimated \$165,287 in "Mokjuksaupbi" payments, or "relationships with customer" payments. These payments were recorded in sales, promotion, and customer entertainment accounts. Diageo and its subsidiaries failed to properly account for these payments in their books and records. Instead, they concealed the payments to government officials by recording them as legitimate expenses for third-party vendors or private customers, or categorizing them in false or overly vague terms or, in some instances, failing to record them at all.

Diageo cooperated with the SEC's investigation and implemented remedial measures, including the termination of employees involved in the misconduct and significant enhancements to its FCPA compliance program.

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***Armor Holdings, Inc. & Richard Bistrong***

On July 13, 2011, Armor Holdings, Inc. (“Armor”), now a subsidiary of BAE Systems Inc. but at the time of the relevant conduct an issuer of securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange, entered into an NPA with the DOJ and a settlement agreement with the SEC to resolve FCPA violations relating to bribes paid to obtain contracts from the U.N. To resolve anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls allegations, Armor agreed to pay a \$10.29 million monetary penalty under the NPA and under its settlement with the SEC agreed to disgorge \$1,552,306, pay prejudgment interest of \$458,438, and pay a civil penalty of \$3,680,000. At the time of the conduct at issue, Armor manufactured security products, vehicle armor systems, protective equipment and other products primarily for use by military, law enforcement, security and corrections personnel. Prior to its acquisition by BAE, Armor was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Jacksonville, Florida with shares listed on the NYSE. Although Armor was not required to admit or deny the SEC’s allegations, it did admit to the facts underlying its NPA. Accordingly, the factual summary below is based on the facts stated in the NPA unless otherwise noted.

Armor accepted responsibility for more than \$200,000 in payments made by its wholly owned subsidiary Armor Products International (“API”) to a third-party intermediary. API was awarded the two contracts after it used an agent to obtain competitors’ confidential bid prices and adjust its bid based on this information. Armor acknowledged that employees involved knew that a portion these funds was to be passed on to a U.N. procurement official to induce the official to award two separate U.N. contracts for body armor that were collectively worth approximately \$6 million and, once awarded, produced a profit for the subsidiary of approximately \$1 million.

In 2001, Richard Bistrong, the Vice President for International Sales of Armor’s wholly owned division Armor Holdings Products Group (the “Products Group”), and an API managing director retained an agent to assist the company in obtaining a contract to supply body armor for U.N. peacekeeping forces.

Upon the agent’s advice, Bistrong and the API managing director submitted two pricing sheets, one of which was signed but was otherwise blank. The blank pricing sheet was to be used if API’s price needed adjustment after the bidding was closed. After submitting API’s bid, the agent obtained the prices of competitors’ non-public bids and used the information to adjust API’s bid price on the blank pricing sheet. When the U.N. awarded the 2001 body armor contract to API, Bistrong and the API authorized the payment of a commission to the agent, knowing that some portion of this money would be paid to the U.N. official for providing the confidential information used by API and the agent to secure the bid. Using the same bidding procedures, API worked with the same agent to secure another U.N. contract in 2003. According to the SEC’s complaint, API authorized at least 92 payments to its agent that totaled approximately \$222,750.

Under the NPA, Armor also admitted that Bistrong and another employee caused it to keep off of its books and records approximately \$4.4 million in payments to third-party

intermediaries used to obtain business from foreign governments from 2001 to 2006. Specifically, Armor's Products Group would submit an invoice to customers that included a fee for the Products Group's payment to an agent. Simultaneously, Bistrong and other employees caused the Products Group to create a false invoice that did not include the agent's commission. According to the SEC settlement, this accounting approach is commonly referred to by the SEC as a "distributor net" transaction. Under such an approach, the false internal invoice results in a credit balance in the client's accounts receivable that amounts to the commissions paid. The credit balance can be used to pay intermediaries through non-client accounts before finally being paid to the third-party consultants. Consequently, the commission payments are never recorded on a company's books and records.

The SEC further alleged that Armor was on notice of its improper accounting practices due to 2001 comments made by an outside auditor and a 2005 refusal by the comptroller of another Armor Holdings subsidiary to institute Armor's distributor net accounting practices in his division. The SEC alleged that, despite these warnings, Armor continued these accounting practices until 2007. Finally, under the NPA, Armor also admitted that it had failed to devise and maintain an adequate system for internal accounting controls.

Bistrong was also separately indicted for his involvement in several bribery schemes, including in regards to the U.N. contracts. On September 16, 2010, Bistrong pleaded guilty to a single conspiracy with several objects relating to the U.N. contracts described above: to violate the anti-bribery provisions (Bistrong himself was a domestic concern due to his U.S. citizenship), to falsify books and records, and to export controlled goods without authorization. This plea was pursuant to a plea agreement with the United States that Bistrong had accepted on February 17, 2009, ten months before the indictment of 22 defendants in the military enforcement products sting (discussed separately) — a sting in which Bistrong played a key role.

In addition to the allegations related to the U.N. contracts, Bistrong's plea was also based on improper payments to officials in the Netherlands and Nigeria, as well as the unlawful export of Armor materials to Iraq. Bistrong allegedly hired a Dutch agent to help Armor Holdings bid on a contract to supply pepper spray to the National Police Services Agency of the Netherlands. According to the information, Bistrong caused Armor Holdings to pay the Dutch agent \$15,000 intended to be passed on to a Dutch Procurement Officer in return for the procurement officer using his influence to effect the tender for the contract to specify a type of pepper spray manufactured by Armor Holdings. Bistrong attempted to conceal these payments by arranging for the agent to issue an invoice for marketing services allegedly, but not actually, performed. In Nigeria, Bistrong allegedly instructed another employee to pay a bribe to an official of the Independent National Election Commission ("INEC") in exchange for INEC's purchase of fingerprint inkpads from Armor Holdings. In order to conceal these payments, Bistrong instructed the employee to arrange for the bribe to be paid to a company or intermediary, which would then pass the kickback along to the official. Despite making payment to a company designated by the official, Armor Holdings never received an order from INEC for the fingerprint pads.

In the plea agreement, the parties agreed that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommended a sentence between seventy and eighty-seven months, which is automatically overridden by the statutory maximum of five years. In its Sentencing Memorandum, however, the DOJ moved for a downward departure of seventeen levels from the Sentencing Guidelines to a level corresponding to a prison term of zero to six months. Citing Bistrong's cooperation in his own investigation, the investigation into his co-conspirators, and his role in the wide-scale investigation into the Military and Law Enforcement Products Industries, including his role in the sting operation and resulting prosecutions, the DOJ recommended a sentence that includes a combination of probation, home confinement, and community service. Noticeably missing from this recommended sentence was any jail time.

Despite the DOJ's recommendation, on July 31, 2012, Bistrong was sentenced by Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia to 18-months in jail followed by 36 months of probation and community service. Due to financial hardship, he was not required to pay a fine. Bistrong was released from prison on January 15, 2014.

### ***Tenaris S.A.***

On May 17, 2011, the DOJ and SEC announced resolutions of their respective FCPA-related investigations of Tenaris S.A. ("Tenaris"), a Luxembourg-based manufacturer and supplier of steel pipe products and related services to oil and gas companies relating to payments to Uzbekistani officials to obtain confidential information about competitors' bids. Tenaris is subject to the FCPA as an issuer because its American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs") trade on the New York Stock Exchange

In total, Tenaris agreed to pay \$8.9 million to resolve the investigations. The SEC entered into its first-ever DPA to resolve its investigation of Tenaris, under which Tenaris agreed to disgorge \$4,786,438, pay prejudgment interest of \$641,900, and commit to several compliance-related undertakings. The latter included providing the SEC with a written certification of compliance with the DPA between 45 and 60 days before its expiration, to annually review and update, as appropriate, its Code of Conduct, to require all directors, officers, and managers to certify annually their compliance with the Code of Conduct, and to conduct effective training for certain groups of employees. Tenaris was not required to admit or deny the SEC's allegations and did not contest the SEC's statement of facts included in the DPA. Robert Khuzami, Director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, explained that Tenaris was "an appropriate candidate for the Enforcement Division's first Deferred Prosecution Agreement" following the SEC's January 2010 authorization of its Enforcement Division to enter into DPAs, because of "[t]he company's immediate self-reporting, thorough internal investigation, full cooperation with SEC staff, enhanced anti-corruption procedures, and enhanced training."

The DOJ entered into an NPA with Tenaris. Tenaris agreed to pay a \$3.5 million monetary penalty and admitted to truth and correctness of the statement of facts included in the NPA. The DOJ considered an NPA to be appropriate based on Tenaris's timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the conduct, its extensive, thorough, and real-time cooperation with the DOJ and SEC, its voluntary investigation of its business operations throughout the world,

specifically including the thorough and effective manner in which the investigation was carried out and information was disclosed to the Department and SEC, and its remedial efforts already undertaken and to be undertaken, including voluntary enhancements to its compliance program and others to which it committed under the NPA.

Tenaris ran its business operations in Uzbekistan through its offices in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Its operations in the Caspian Sea region, including Uzbekistan, amounted to 5% of its global oilfield services sales and only 1% of its total global sales and services from 2003 to 2008. It secured such business in part by bidding on contracts tendered by state-owned enterprises or government agencies, often with the assistance of third-party agents.

The conduct at issue related to potential Tenaris business with OJSC O'zashquineftgas ("OAO"), a wholly owned subsidiary of Uzbekneftegaz, the state holding company of Uzbekistan's oil and gas industry. Both Uzbekneftegaz and OAO were wholly owned by the Uzbekistani government during the relevant time periods. In or around December 2006, Tenaris was introduced to a third-party agent (the "OAO Agent") to help Tenaris bid on OAO contracts. The OAO Agent offered Tenaris access to competitors' confidential bidding information obtained from officials in OAO's tender department. These officials would then permit Tenaris to submit a revised bid. Tenaris employees described the OAO Agent's services in e-mails, noting that such a "dirty game" was "very risky" for the complicit OAO employees, "because if people caught while doing this they will go automatically to jail. So as [OAO Agent] said, that's why this dirty service is expensive." With the assistance of OAO Agent, whom Tenaris agreed to pay a 3% commission, Tenaris won four contracts.

After competitors complained that the bidding process on three of these contracts had been corrupted, Tenaris employees authorized payments to the Uzbekistani authority conducting an investigation. According to the NPA, no evidence was uncovered that the payments were actually made, however. Ultimately, OAO cancelled one of the contracts on which payments had not been made and cancelled the outstanding portions of the other three contracts. Before these cancellations, OAO had paid Tenaris approximately more than \$8.9 million, of which approximately more than \$4.7 million was profit.

### ***Rockwell Automation Inc.***

Rockwell Automation Inc. ("Rockwell"), whose shares trade on the NYSE, is a Wisconsin-based company that provides industrial automation power, intelligent motor control products, and information solutions for a range of sectors. On May 3, 2011, Rockwell settled an SEC administrative proceeding to resolve an investigation of alleged violations of the books and records and internal control provisions of the FCPA. The SEC's allegations involved a former Rockwell subsidiary, Rockwell Automation Power Systems (Shanghai) Ltd. ("RAPS-China"). Rockwell, without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, agreed to disgorge \$1,771,000, pay \$590,091 in prejudgment interest, and pay \$400,000 penalty. The DOJ declined to bring a parallel enforcement action for the same conduct, which Rockwell had disclosed to both the SEC and DOJ in 2006.

The SEC alleged that, between 2003 and 2006, employees of RAPS-China paid \$615,000 to state-owned design institutes that provided design engineering and technical integration services. These institutes, which have been at the center of other FCPA-related enforcement activity (*see, e.g.* Watts Water), have the ability to influence contract awards by end-user state-owned customers. The SEC alleged that the payments were made through third-parties at the direction of RAPS-China's Marketing and Sales Director in order that design institute employees would pass on the payments to employees at state owned entities to influence purchasing decisions. The SEC further alleged that Rockwell failed to properly record the payments in the company's books and records and failed to implement an adequate system of internal accounting controls sufficient to prevent and detect the improper payments.

During the relevant period, RAPS-China also paid \$450,000 to fund "sightseeing and other non-business trips" for design institute employees and for employees of other state-owned entities. Trip destinations included the United States, Germany, and Australia. According to the SEC, some of these trips did not appear to have any direct business component "other than the development of customer good will." Trips were nevertheless recorded as business expenses in Rockwell's books and records without any indication that they were not directly connected to the company's business.

Rockwell was able to take in \$1.7 million of net profit from sales contracts with Chinese state-owned entities that were related to RAPS-China's payments to the Design Institutes and other entities. Rockwell's improper payments to design institutes were discovered in 2006 during a normal financial review as part of the company's global compliance and internal controls program. Rockwell responded to this discovery by hiring counsel to investigate the payments, voluntarily self-reported the payments to the SEC and DOJ, and took several remedial measures (including employee termination and discipline). According to the SEC, the civil fine was not greater than \$400,000 due to the extent of Rockwell's cooperation with the Commission's investigation.

### ***Johnson & Johnson***

On April 8, 2011, Johnson & Johnson ("J&J"), a multinational pharmaceutical and medical device company headquartered in New Jersey, along with its subsidiaries, entered into a "global" settlement with the DOJ, SEC, and SFO to conclude enforcement actions regarding corrupt practices under the U.N. Oil for Food Program, as well as in Greece, Poland, and Romania. Under the DPA, J&J admitted and accepted responsibility for the acts of its officers, employees, agents, and wholly owned subsidiaries, including DePuy, Inc. ("DePuy"), an Indiana-based subsidiary against whom the DOJ filed a two-count complaint, and DePuy's U.K. subsidiary, DePuy International Limited ("DPI"). In total, J&J and its subsidiaries agreed to pay over \$76.9 million to resolve the charges, which included a \$21.4 million criminal penalty under J&J's DPA with the DOJ, disgorgements of \$38.2 million in profits and \$10.4 million in prejudgment of interest by J&J to the SEC, and a £4.8 million civil recovery order (plus prosecution costs) as imposed on DPI by the SFO. In parallel, Greek authorities froze the assets of J&J subsidiary DePuy Hellas worth €5.7 million.

The criminal information filed against DePuy alleged one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one count of violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. Similarly, the SEC charged J&J with violating the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal control provisions. The U.K. authorities only exercised jurisdiction over the conduct carried out in Greece. Working with the U.S. agencies, as to avoid double jeopardy, the SFO limited its enforcement action to a civil recovery order under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Recalling that "[t]he DOJ Deferred Prosecution Agreement has the legal character of a formally concluded prosecution and punishes the same conduct in Greece that had formed the basis of the Serious Fraud Office investigation," the Director of the SFO considered that a "a [criminal] prosecution was therefore prevented in this jurisdiction by the principles of double jeopardy," for "[t]he underlying purpose of the rule against double jeopardy is to stop a defendant from being prosecuted twice for the same offence in different jurisdictions." He concluded, "[c]ombined criminal and civil sanctions have therefore been imposed in the United States in respect of DePuy International Limited's parent and assets have been frozen in the ongoing Greek investigation, all relating to the same conduct in Greece. Consequently the Serious Fraud Office is satisfied that the most appropriate sanction is a Civil Recovery Order."

When reaching the settlement figures, apart from the existence of multiple enforcement actions, the authorities considered that J&J voluntarily and timely disclosed the misconduct, cooperated fully with the DOJ's investigations, conducted thorough internal investigations, and implemented extensive remedial measures.

- Greece

According to the facts as stipulated in the DPA, from 1998 through 2006, DePuy and its subsidiaries authorized improper payments of approximately \$16.4 million to two agents while knowing that a significant portion would be passed on to publicly employed Greek healthcare providers. DePuy and its subsidiaries sold products to Company X (an agent and distributor for DePuy and its subsidiaries in Greece that was later acquired by DePuy in 2001 and ultimately named DePuy Hellas) at a 35% discount, then paid 35% of sales by Company X to an offshore account of Company Y (a consultant for DePuy International, based in the Isle of Man) as a way of providing off-the-books funds to Agent A (a Greek national and beneficial owner of Companies X and Y) for the payment of bribes to Greek healthcare officials, in exchange for the purchase of DePuy products.

In 2000, three senior DPI officials recommended terminating Company X because Agent A was making cash payments to Greek surgeons to induce them to purchase DePuy products. However, after the meeting DPI instead began efforts to purchase Company X in a fashion that would allow Agent A to continue his payments so as not to lose sales. Correspondence during this period between senior DPI employees repeatedly demonstrated their awareness of Agent A's activities, and at one point the DPI VP Finance wrote that he was "very disappointed to read in [a] proposal that it contains reference to [Agent A's] activities which cannot be mentioned in written correspondence with [DPI]." The acquisition was concluded shortly thereafter and Agent A signed a consulting agreement with DePuy Hellas where he received an advance commission of 27%, which was deemed "sufficient to cover [DPI] and J&J cash incentives." Agent A

ultimately received nearly €8 million under this and subsequent agreements before being replaced by Agent B, who received both a 15% commission from DPI and a 16% commission from DePuy Hellas. When concerns were raised about Agent B's activities, DPI's VP Marketing responded by email that if DePuy ceased making improper payments it would lose 95% of its business. The issue eventually reached a senior DePuy executive in the US who conducted discussions about continuing the Greek business without intermediaries but conducted no investigation of past conduct. Agent B received over €7 million, "a significant portion of which" was used to induce Greek healthcare professionals to purchase DePuy products.

Finally, between 2002 and 2006, £500,000 was withdrawn by employees and directors of Company X/DePuy Hellas to cover payments owed to Greek healthcare officials and not yet paid. According to the SEC Complaint, the issues in Greece had been raised to an internal audit team in 2003 via an anonymous letter, but the auditors focused their investigation on conflict of interest issues rather than bribery. The issue was raised again in 2006 by a whistleblower complaint to a separate internal audit group.

- Poland

From 2000 to 2007, wholly owned subsidiary J&J Poland authorized the improper payment of approximately \$775,000 in Poland to publicly employed healthcare professionals. According to the DOJ, J&J Poland bribed publicly employed Polish healthcare professionals, in particular members of tender committees, by making payments in the form of phantom civil contracts (professional service contracts for which payment was made, but no proof of actual performance was ever required) or sponsoring travel and attendance to conferences, in order to unduly influence the officials to select or favor J&J Poland in tender processes. J&J Poland entered into approximately 4,400 of the civil contracts totaling approximately \$3.65 million.

J&J Poland also made approximately 15,000 payments totaling \$7.6 million to sponsor travel for Polish HCPs to attend conferences, "a portion of which were improper." Certain of these were directly targeted at officials who previously had or could positively influence J&J Poland business. The DOJ stated that many of these trips, "included spouses and family members to what amounted to vacations." Faked travel expenses were also used to generate cash to funnel to doctors as bribes.

- Romania

From 2005 to 2008, wholly owned J&J Romania authorized the improper payment of approximately \$140,000 in Romania. According to the criminal information, J&J Romania employees arranged for its distributors to make cash payments and provide gifts to publicly employed Romanian healthcare professionals, in exchange for prescribing pharmaceutical products manufactured by J&J and its subsidiaries. Payments were made in the form of envelopes of cash, electronics, laptops, and other gifts and were funded through discounts of 10 to 12% given to the distributors. On some occasions, though the payments were funded through the distributors, J&J Romania employees themselves delivered the payments.

When J&J's internal auditors uncovered the improper payments in Romania, J&J Romania employees shifted their schemes to provide improper travel benefits to doctors rather than cash, including by having travel agents overcharge J&J Romania so as to generate surplus cash for "pocket money."

- Iraq

In addition, J&J also admitted that its wholly owned subsidiaries Janssen Pharmaceutica, NV (headquartered in Belgium) and Cilag AG International (headquartered in Switzerland) had secured 18 contracts with the Iraqi Ministry of Health State Company for Marketing Drugs and Medical Appliances ("Kimadia") through the payment of approximately \$857,387 in kickbacks between 2000 and 2003, under the United Nations Oil for Food Program. The total contract value amounted to circa \$9.9 million, with approximately \$6.1 million in profits. The payments were made through an agent whose commission was inflated from 12% to 22% to accommodate the kickbacks to Kimadia.

- Robert John Dougall and Other Employees

In a related enforcement action in the United Kingdom, on December 1, 2009, Robert John Dougall, the former Vice President of Market Development of DPI, appeared before the City of Westminster Magistrates' Court in response to an SFO summons alleging conspiracy to corrupt contrary to the Criminal Law Act 1977. U.K. authorities alleged that Dougall conspired to provide inducements to medical professionals working in the Greek public healthcare system in relation to the supply of orthopedic products between February 2002 and December 2005. In April 2010, Dougall pleaded guilty and was sentenced to one year in prison, despite a request from the SFO for a lighter sentence in consideration of his service as a valuable witness in the case. In May 2010, the U.K. Court of Appeal reversed the ruling of the trial court and affirmed the suspended sentence requested by the SFO. However, the Court also reprimanded the SFO and their U.S.-style plea agreement approach, saying that "agreements between the prosecution and the defense about the sentences to be imposed in fraud and corruption cases were constitutionally forbidden," and that sentencing should be left entirely to judges.

Separately, various news articles reported in February 2013 that Greek prosecutors had brought criminal corruption and money laundering charges against five DePuy employees and eight state hospital doctors in connection with the conduct discussed above. The names of the DePuy officials were not released, and further details have not been available.

## **JGC**

In April 2011, JGC Corporation ("JGC"), a Japanese engineering and construction company headquartered in Yokohama, Japan, entered into a two-year DPA with the DOJ, agreeing to pay a criminal penalty of \$218.8 million to resolve charges of participating in a conspiracy to bribe Nigerian officials in violation of the FCPA.

JGC was the last of the four companies in the TSKJ joint venture to settle with the DOJ in the series of enforcement actions regarding the corruption scheme carried out between 1995

and 2004 to unlawfully obtain contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities in Bonny Island, Nigeria (*see KBR/Halliburton, Tesler and Chodan, Marubeni*). According to the DOJ, JGC authorized TSKJ (operating through a corporate entity based in Madeira, Portugal) to hire U.K. attorney Jeffrey Tesler and the Japanese company Marubeni Corporation as agents to arrange and pay bribes to high-level and working-level government officials, respectively. Over the course of the scheme, the joint venture caused wire transfers of over \$180 million for use in part to corrupt Nigerian officials. On several occasions preceding the award of engineering, procurement and construction (“EPC”) contracts to TSKJ, JGC’s co-conspirators met with officials of the executive branch of the Government of Nigeria to identify a representative to negotiate bribes with TSKJ or to determine their amount.

JGC was ultimately charged with, and plead guilty to, one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one count of aiding and abetting violations to the FCPA. Under the DPA, in addition to paying the criminal penalty, JGC agreed to cooperate with the DOJ’s ongoing investigations, to review and improve its compliance and ethics program, and to engage an independent compliance consultant for two years.

### *Comverse*

On April 6, 2011, the New York-based Comverse Technology Inc. (“CTI”) entered non-prosecution and settlement agreements with the DOJ and SEC, respectively, in connection with improper payments made by CTI’s Israel-based, second-level subsidiary, Comverse Ltd. (“Comverse”) between 2003 and 2006. CTI agreed to pay a combined \$2.8 million to the enforcement agencies, including a \$1.2 million criminal fine to the DOJ for violating the FCPA’s books and records provisions and an additional \$1.6 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC for violating those provisions as well as the FCPA’s internal controls provisions.

According to both the settlement and the NPA, Comverse engaged an Israeli agent to help the company pay bribes to its customers, including Hellenic Telecommunications Organisation S.A. (“OTE”), an Athens-based telecommunications provider partially owned by the Greek government, as well as other purely private customers.

In February 2003, several Comverse employees conspired with the unnamed agent to incorporate Fintron Enterprises Ltd. (“Fintron”), a Cyprus-based entity established “purely [as] a money laundering operation,” according to one witness quoted by the DOJ. The agent also opened a Cyprus bank account in Fintron’s name. Comverse employees used the new company and its bank account in a scheme to funnel bribes to OTE and other customers. Under the scheme, Comverse executed consultancy services contracts with Fintron, agreeing to pay “commissions” in connection with the purchase orders that the shell company purportedly helped to procure. Upon receipt of a purchase order, Comverse employees notified the agent of the value for a fraudulent “commission” invoice. The agent then issued an invoice to Comverse under Fintron’s name for the pre-agreed “commission” amount. Comverse submitted the invoices for payment and subsequently transferred the requested funds to Fintron’s bank account in Cyprus, falsely recording the transactions in the company’s books and records as legitimate

commission payments. The agent — or in some cases Comverse employees themselves — travelled to Cyprus to withdraw the money from Fintron’s account. The agent would hand deliver the funds — minus his own 15% commission — to one of three Comverse employees, who provided the cash to various Comverse customers in Israel, Italy, and Greece.

The scheme first came to light after the agent had been questioned at an airport in December 2005 about a same-day, round-trip flight he had taken between Rome and Tel Aviv. Because Comverse had purchased the agent’s ticket, an airline representative reported the matter to Comverse’s Director of Security, who undertook further investigation. The investigation revealed that the agent had taken sixteen same-day, round-trip flights between Israel and either Rome or Cyprus — as well as numerous other flights to Greece — over a period of eight months. Comverse had booked and paid for all the flights directly.

In a memorandum dated January 1, 2006, the Director of Security advised the President of the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (“EMEA”) division and the Head of Human Resources of his findings. Specifically, he explained that Comverse had arranged for the agent’s frequent same-day, round-trip flights so that he could transport large amounts of cash to Comverse employees, and that such actions could violate money laundering laws.

Rather than suggesting that the agent’s relationship be terminated with immediate effect, however, the memorandum recommended certain steps to minimize the risk that the agent’s actions could be traced back to the company. Thus, for example, the memorandum recommended that: (i) a separate travel agent make the agent’s bookings, (ii) the agent stay at hotels where he would not be recognized as a Comverse employee, and (iii) the agent return to Tel Aviv on a different flight than he had taken to leave Israel. Although the Director of Security argued that the agent should eventually be terminated (because “he knows too much”), he advised that “as long as the current system exists, [the agent] will need an appropriate cover story, that is grounded and backed-up with documents that Comverse has no part in.”

The incidents described in the memorandum were not reported to anyone else at Comverse, such as senior Comverse or CTI executives, nor did the company have a policy at the time that directed the employees to do so. Partly as a result, Comverse continued to make improper payments through the end of 2006. In total, Comverse made payments of \$536,000 to individuals connected to OTE (obtaining over \$1.2 million in profit through improperly obtained purchase orders), as well as unspecified amounts to other Comverse customers. Comverse voluntarily disclosed the matter to the SEC and DOJ on March 16, 2009.

Neither the DOJ nor the SEC directly argued that the employees of OTE were “foreign officials” under the FCPA, although the DOJ did characterize OTE as controlled by the Greek government, which owns slightly more than one-third of the issued share capital. OTE is listed currently on the Athens Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange, and it was listed on the NYSE until September 2010. While this may explain why the enforcement agencies did not allege that Comverse had violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, the charging documents’ vague characterization leaves open the possibility that the agencies did (or would, if pushed) consider OTE a state instrumentality, even at its one-third ownership level. In any event, the

lack of such a direct argument — combined with references to other bribes that Comverse paid to indisputably private entities — suggests that the DOJ and SEC remain willing to prosecute “private bribery,” by focusing on books and recordkeeping violations.

Interestingly, this marks OTE’s second appearance in three years in an FCPA settlement. In 2008, the DOJ referenced the company (then characterized as a state-owned entity) in the *Siemens* case, stating that a Siemens employee “had received substantial funds to make ‘bonus payments’ to managers at the Greek national telephone company, OTE.”

In its Form 20-F filed on June 17, 2011, OTE stated that it had “launched an internal audit within the Group in order to fully investigate the [Comverse] issue and safeguard the Group’s interests. The internal audit is ongoing.” OTE subsequently filed a Form 15F to terminate its reporting requirements with the SEC, however, and the results of the audit, if any, has not been made publicly available.

### ***Ball Corporation***

On March 24, 2011, the Ball Corporation (“Ball”), a publicly traded manufacturer of metal packaging for beverages, food, and household products based in Broomfield, Colorado, settled FCPA books and records and internal controls charges with the SEC. As part of the settlement, Ball agreed to pay a \$300,000 civil penalty and consented to a cease-and-desist order, while neither admitting nor denying the factual allegations.

The SEC charges stemmed from the actions of the company’s Argentinean subsidiary, Formametal S.A. (“Formametal”), which Ball acquired in March 2006. The SEC alleged that, beginning in July 2006 and continuing into October 2007, Formametal employees made at least ten illegal payments totaling approximately \$106,749 to local Argentinean government officials. Payments were made with the authorization or acquiescence of Formametal’s President and were in some instances arranged by the Vice President of Institutional Affairs (the “Vice President”), an Argentinean national who had previously been Formametal’s President and owner.

Over \$100,000 of the illegal payments was allegedly made to Argentinean customs officials, usually in hopes of circumventing local laws that prohibited the importation of used equipment and parts. These payments were improperly recorded as ordinary business expenses such as “fees for customs assistance,” “customs advisory services,” “verification charge,” or simply as “fees.” One of these bribes was paid by the Vice President from his own funds, after which he was reimbursed in the form of a company car. Formametal initially booked the transfer as an interest expense and, later, after two Ball accountants learned in February 2007 it was reimbursement of a bribe, changed it to a miscellaneous expense. The SEC found that neither description was sufficient as the transfer was not accurately described as a reimbursement for an illegal payment. The SEC also alleged that, in 2007, Formametal paid a bribe, authorized by its President, in hopes of obtaining an export duty waiver so as to avoid Argentina’s high tariff on the export of domestic copper, generally 40% of the copper’s value. The payment was funneled through Formametal’s third-party customs agent in five installments, although the company ultimately did not make any exports pursuant to the illegal payment. The payments were improperly recorded as “Advice fees for temporary merchandise exported.”

The SEC found that Ball had “weak” internal controls, which made it difficult for the company to detect the subsidiary’s repeated violations and allowed for the violations to continue into October 2007. Among the failings highlighted by the SEC was an insufficient response to an internal report produced by an analyst in Ball’s general accounting group in June 2006 — shortly after the subsidiary was acquired — identifying prior questionable payments, dishonest customs declarations, and document destruction. Although by the time of the report Ball had demoted Formametal’s President and replaced the Chief Financial Officer, it did not, in the SEC’s view, take further action sufficient to prevent future misconduct.

The SEC noted in the settlement order that it did not impose a higher civil penalty due to Ball’s cooperation in the SEC investigation and related enforcement action. The DOJ reportedly closed its investigation without taking any enforcement action.

### ***IBM***

On March 18, 2011, International Business Machines Corporation (“IBM”) agreed to settle FCPA books and records and internal controls charges with the SEC stemming from alleged improper cash payments, gifts, travel, and entertainment provided to government officials in South Korea and China. According to the SEC, IBM subsidiaries and an IBM joint venture provided South Korean government officials with approximately \$207,000 in cash bribes, gifts, and payments of travel and entertainment expenses and engaged in a widespread practice of providing overseas trips, entertainment, and gifts to Chinese government officials. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, IBM agreed to pay \$8 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a \$2 million civil penalty. IBM also consented to the entry of a final judgment that permanently enjoined it from violating the accounting provisions of the FCPA. The settlement agreement was approved in court on July 28, 2013.

- ***South Korea***

According to the SEC, from 1998 to 2003, employees of an IBM subsidiary, IBM Korea, Inc. (“IBM Korea”) and the IBM majority-owned joint venture LG-IBM PC Co., Ltd. (“LG-IBM”) provided approximately \$207,000 in cash bribes, gifts, travel, and entertainment to employees of South Korean government entities. Members of IBM Korea’s management personally delivered IBM Korea company envelopes and shopping bags filled with cash to these officials in exchange for their assistance to designate IBM Korea as the preferred supplier of mainframe computers to the South Korean government, to secure contracts for IBM Korea business partners, and to ensure that the South Korean government would purchase IBM computers at higher-than-normal prices.

A manager at LG-IBM also directed an LG-IBM business partner to “express his gratitude” — in the form of a cash payment — to a South Korean official who had facilitated the award of a contract to IBM despite performance problems identified in a benchmarking test of LG-IBM computers. The business partner was in turn “adequately compensated by generous installation fees” from LG-IBM in exchange for acting as an intermediary. Employees of the government entity were also given free LG-IBM laptop computers to entice them to purchase IBM products.

Separately, an employee of LG-IBM made a cash payment of over \$9,000 to a manager of a state-owned entity in order to secure a contract for personal computers. LG-IBM submitted a low bid to win the contract. After the contract was won, the employee and the manager went into the manager's office and replaced the tendered bid sheet with a new bid sheet showing a higher price that was closer to the state-owned entity's internal target price. After securing the contract, the LG-IBM employee directed an LG-IBM business partner to overbill LG-IBM for installation costs in order to conceal a cash payment to the agency manager.

Overbilled installation costs were also used on at least one other occasion to fund payments (in the form of cash and entertainment) to a South Korean government official in exchange for confidential information and to secure government contracts.

The complaint further alleged that LG-IBM paid the business partner for non-existent software services, funds from which the business partner then kicked back to an LG-IBM Direct Sales Manager who used the money to pay for gifts, entertainment (including entertainment provided by a "hostess in a drink shop"), and travel expenses for officials at South Korean government entities. The LG-IBM Direct Sales Manager also funded entertainment expenses by billing the South Korean government for laptop computers that it did not provide. Key decision-makers were also given free computers and computer equipment to encourage them to purchase IBM products or assist LG-IBM in securing government contracts.

- *China*

The SEC also alleged that, from at least 2004 to 2009, more than 100 employees of IBM (China) Investment Company Limited and IBM Global Services (China) Co., Ltd. (collectively, "IBM China"), including "two key IBM China managers," created slush funds to finance travel expenses, cash payments, and gifts provided to officials of government-owned or controlled customers in China. IBM China provided improper travel and travel reimbursement in spite of an IBM policy requiring IBM China managers to approve all expenses and require customers (in this case, government officials) to personally fund any non-training-related travel and side trips. According to the SEC, IBM's internal controls failed to detect at least 114 instances where IBM China submitted false travel invoices, invoices for trips not connected to customer training, invoices for unapproved sightseeing for Chinese government employees, invoices for trips with little or no business content, and invoices for trips where per diem payments and gifts were provided to Chinese government officials. Employees at IBM China also funded unauthorized travel by designating travel agents as "authorized training providers," who then submitted fraudulent purchase requests for "training services" that could be billed to IBM China.

### ***Tyson Foods, Inc.***

On February 10, 2011, Tyson Foods, Inc. ("Tyson") entered into a DPA with the DOJ and settled with the SEC for FCPA violations in connection with improper payments by Tyson's wholly owned Mexican subsidiary, Tyson de México ("TM"). Tyson is one of the world's largest processors of chicken and other food items. TM comprises approximately 1% of Tyson's total net sales.

According to the DPA's statement of facts, which Tyson stipulated was true and accurate, meat-processing facilities in Mexico must undergo an inspection program administered by the Mexican Department of Agriculture ("SAGARPA") called *Tipo Inspección Federal* ("TIF"), before the facilities may export products. As part of this certification process, on-site government veterinarians supervise the inspection program at the facility and ensure that all products are in conformity with Mexican health and safety laws. As described in the DPA, Mexican law has two categories of government TIF veterinarians: "approved" and "official." Mexican law permits "approved" veterinarians to charge the facility they supervise a fee for their services in addition to their government salary. However, once a veterinarian becomes "official," they receive all of their salary from the Mexican government and are not permitted to receive any payment from the facility.

The DPA indicates that from the time of Tyson's acquisition of TM in 1994 to May 2004, TM made \$260,000 in improper payments to two TIF veterinarians, who for a majority of that time period were of "approved" status. These payments took the form of "salaries" to the veterinarians' wives, even though the wives did not perform any service for the company, and, later, took the form of invoices submitted by one of the veterinarians. Between June 2003 and May 2004, the status of two TIF veterinarians was changed from "approved" to "official." Despite the change in status, TM continued to make payments to the veterinarians totaling at least \$90,000 from fiscal year 2004 through 2006 to influence the veterinarians' decision-making in the TIF process.

According to the DOJ, in June 2004, a TM plant manager discovered that the veterinarians' wives were on TM's payroll despite providing no services to the company and alerted a Tyson accountant of the situation. After a series of internal meetings between several Tyson and TM senior management officials in July 2004, it was agreed that the veterinarians' wives would no longer receive payments but several of the officials were tasked with exploring how to shift the payments directly to the veterinarians. On July 29, 2004, a senior executive at Tyson approved a plan to replace the payroll payments made to the veterinarians' wives with invoice payments made directly to the veterinarians. When an auditor at Tyson responsible for TM raised concerns in August 2004 about incomplete payroll accounting records from TM while noting "I am beginning to think they are being intentionally evasive," a Vice President in Tyson's Internal Audit department responded "Let's drop the payroll stuff for now." By the end of August 2004, TM began paying the veterinarians an amount equivalent to the wives' salaries through invoices submitted by one of the veterinarians.

In September 2005, a TM plant manager expressed discomfort with authorizing the invoice payments. In response, the general manager of TM emailed the plant manager that he had talked to a Tyson senior executive and "he agreed that we are OK to continue making these payments against invoices (not through payroll) until we are able to get TIF/SAGARPA to change." These payments were recorded as legitimate expenses in TM's book and records, and were consolidated with Tyson's reported financial results for fiscal years 2004, 2005 and 2006. During those years, Tyson recognized net profits of more than \$880,000 from TM.

Tyson discovered these improper payments in November 2006 during an internal investigation and, in 2007, the company voluntarily disclosed the misconduct to the DOJ and the SEC. Pursuant to the DPA, Tyson agreed to self-report to the DOJ periodically, at no less than six-month intervals, regarding its remediation and implementation of compliance activities for the duration of the two-year DPA.

In total, Tyson agreed to pay approximately \$5.2 million, of which \$4 million was a monetary penalty to the DOJ, which filed a two-count criminal information including one charge for conspiracy to violate the books and records, internal controls and anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and a second combined charge of violations of the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA and aiding and abetting such violations. The monetary penalty was approximately 20% below the minimum amount suggested by the guidelines as described in the DPA. A significant factor behind this lower monetary penalty was that “the organization, prior to an imminent threat of disclosure or government investigation, within a reasonably prompt time after becoming aware of the offense, reported the offense, fully cooperated, and clearly demonstrated recognition and affirmative acceptance of responsibility for its criminal conduct.”

The SEC had charged Tyson with violating the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Tyson consented to the entry of a final judgment ordering disgorgement plus pre-judgment interest of more than \$1.2 million and permanently enjoining it from violating the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.

### ***Maxwell Technologies***

On January 31, 2011, Maxwell Technologies, Inc. (“Maxwell”) entered into a DPA with the DOJ and settled with the SEC for FCPA-related violations stemming from improper payments to officials of various Chinese state-owned entities. Maxwell manufactures energy storage and power supply products in the United States, Switzerland, and China, and is an issuer under the FCPA because its shares, listed on NASDAQ, are registered with the SEC. The SEC and DOJ had charged Maxwell with violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions, while the SEC also alleged violations of the FCPA’s internal controls provisions as well as Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act and Rules 13a-1, 13a-13, and 12b-20. Maxwell agreed to pay an \$8 million criminal penalty to the DOJ and \$6.35 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC to resolve the U.S. authorities’ investigations. According to the DPA, which has a term of three years and seven days, the criminal penalty was 25% below the bottom end of the range recommended by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines due to, among other things, Maxwell’s voluntary disclosure, full cooperation with the U.S. authorities’ investigations, and agreement to cooperate with the government’s ongoing investigation. In addition, Maxwell agreed to report to the DOJ, at no less than 12-month intervals for three years, on the remediation and implementation of its compliance program and internal controls.

On October 15, 2013, Swiss citizen Alain Riedo, former Senior Vice President and General Manager of Maxwell S.A., was indicted on nine counts of violating the FCPA in connection with the conduct described in the 2011 Maxwell DPA. He remains a fugitive.

o Underlying Conduct

The DPA states that from July 2002 through May 2009, Maxwell made approximately \$2,789,131 in improper payments to Chinese officials through Maxwell Technologies S.A. (“Maxwell S.A.”), the company’s wholly owned Swiss subsidiary. Maxwell made these payments through a Chinese agent by, at the agent’s instruction, over-invoicing state-owned customers by approximately 20% and passing the surplus on to the agent, who then used the amount to bribe officials at the same state-owned customers. The 2013 Riedo indictment added some detail to the facts contained in the 2011 Maxwell DPA, including that the Chinese agent’s secret 20% mark-up was invoiced to Maxwell separately and characterized as an “extra amount,” “special arrangement,” or a “consulting” fee. The Riedo indictment listed and described a variety of communications that allegedly show that Riedo and other executives were well aware of, and complicit in continuing, the bribery scheme in China.

Maxwell admitted that members of its U.S. management “discovered, tacitly approved, concealed, and caused to be concealed” this bribery scheme in 2002. Its management discussed — over e-mail — that the scheme “would appear” to be “a kick-back, pay-off, bribe . . . given that we cannot obtain an invoice or other document that identifies what the payment is for.” In response, one senior executive advised that the issue was well known and instructed the others, “No more e-mails please.”

After the 2002 discovery, annual payments to the Chinese agent increased from \$165,000 to \$1.1 million by 2008. Maxwell then improperly recorded such payments as sales commissions in its books and records. According to the SEC, the improper payments generated approximately \$15.4 million in revenue and profits of more than \$5.6 million.

According to the SEC’s separate allegations, which Maxwell neither admitted nor denied in its settlement with the SEC, the bribery scheme again came to light during a 2008 internal review of Maxwell S.A.’s commission expenses after Maxwell’s management team learned of the unusually high commissions paid to the Chinese agent. During the review, Maxwell’s management team requested information about the high payments to the agent. In response, Riedo provided the Chinese Agent an “FCPA Letter,” asking him to sign it so as not to “disturb our business in China.” The agent signed the letter certifying that he was familiar with the FCPA and local laws on corruption, and conveyed the signed letter back to Riedo who forwarded it to Maxwell’s finance department; obtained a signed certification from the agent stating that he was familiar with the FCPA and local laws on corruption. Satisfied with the declaration, Maxwell took no further action in 2008. In 2009, however, Maxwell S.A.’s sales director was notified by the Chinese agent — in person while on a business trip to China — that cash transfers listed on the agent’s invoices to Maxwell as “extra amounts” were being transferred back to “customers” at state-owned entities.

The agent subsequently told the company that Alain Riedo, the Senior Vice President and General Manager of Maxwell S.A., “had known [of] and approved of the . . . arrangement . . . .” Maxwell’s CEO informed the audit committee and outside counsel of the agent’s disclosures

and, following the agent's statements concerning Riedo, Maxwell publicly disclosed the information to investors in its May 5, 2009 quarterly report for the period ended March 31, 2009.

Riedo left the company in July 2009. On October 15, 2013, a Grand Jury in the Southern District of California issued an indictment for Riedo on nine counts of violating the FCPA. The government identified specific emails that Riedo had sent to the United States that it argued established jurisdiction for certain counts, and listed specific financial records that Riedo allegedly caused to be falsified and that established jurisdiction for other counts. In addition, the indictment alleges that Riedo and another individual "hamper[ed] efforts by other Maxwell executives to learn the truth" regarding the company's operations in Switzerland with respect to Chinese sales, and that after Maxwell terminated the Chinese agent, Riedo attempted to secretly re-hire the agent under the name of a different intermediary company, against the instructions of the Maxwell's CEO. In the wake of the indictment, a warrant for Riedo's arrest has been issued, but he remains a fugitive.

o Settlement Disclosures

Maxwell provided relatively detailed disclosures in its March 31, 2010 10-Q quarterly report regarding the progress of its settlement talks with U.S. authorities and generated some media controversy as a result. Anticipating a monetary penalty in connection with a resolution of the DOJ and SEC investigations, Maxwell reported that the company recorded an accrual of \$9.3 million in the fourth quarter of 2009 and explained that this amount:

[W]as based on the Company's estimation of loss as required under GAAP and discussions with both government agencies. These discussions have resulted in an estimate of a potential settlement range of \$9.3 million to \$20.0 million. The top end of the range of \$20.0 million represents the combined first offer of settlement put forth by the relevant governmental agencies.

On July 28, 2010, during the Q2 2010 earnings call, Maxwell's CFO informed investors that Maxwell had negotiated "an agreement in principle" to pay the SEC approximately \$6.35 million over two installments. The CFO further disclosed that the DOJ had indicated that it would accept a penalty of \$8 million to resolve the investigation, but that the company was still negotiating with DOJ and had offered \$6.35 million. During the call, the CFO stated that because the settlement offers were ongoing there could be no assurance that the settlement with the SEC would be approved or that the company could settle with the DOJ for \$6.35 million. Maxwell released a press release regarding this call on July 29, 2010. One day later, on July 30, 2010, Maxwell issued another press release with the statement as shown below:

The Department of Justice has not indicated a specific settlement amount or other terms that would be acceptable to settle the ongoing investigation of alleged FCPA violations. As with all potential settlements with the DOJ, there are numerous other aspects of the settlement, in addition to the monetary penalties, that also need to be resolved.

Media reports speculated that the immediate clarification was the result of DOJ displeasure with the detailed public disclosure concerning the DOJ's negotiating position. However, although Maxwell did later increase its accrual to \$8 million, the final penalty amount was no different than the DOJ's position that Maxwell disclosed during the June 28, 2010 earnings call.

## **2010**

### ***Alcatel-Lucent***

Alcatel-Lucent S.A. is a French telecommunications company that provides products and services to voice, data, and video communication service providers. Alcatel-Lucent, and Alcatel S.A. before the November 30, 2006, merger that created Alcatel-Lucent (collectively, "Alcatel"), registered American Depositary Shares with the SEC that were traded on the New York Stock Exchange as American Depositary Receipts ("ADRs"). Accordingly, Alcatel was an issuer covered by the FCPA. An FCPA investigation into Alcatel S.A.'s merger partner, Lucent Technologies, Inc., was resolved in 2007 and is described later in this Alert.

On December 27, 2010, Alcatel-Lucent formally resolved investigations into FCPA violations in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, Taiwan, Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Angola, Ivory Coast, Uganda, and Mali. This resolution had been previously disclosed on February 11, 2010, when Alcatel-Lucent stated that in December 2009 it reached agreements in principle with the SEC and DOJ to resolve their ongoing investigations. Alcatel-Lucent entered into a DPA with the DOJ and three Alcatel-Lucent subsidiaries — Alcatel-Lucent France, S.A. (formerly Alcatel CIT, S.A.), Alcatel-Lucent Trade International A.G. (into which Alcatel Standard A.G. was merged in 2007), and Alcatel Centroamerica S.A. (formerly Alcatel de Costa Rica S.A.) — have pleaded guilty to criminal informations charging them with a conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery and accounting provisions. These three subsidiaries were persons other than issuers or domestic concerns who were subject to the FCPA for acts in the United States in furtherance of the FCPA violations.

Pursuant to its DPA, Alcatel-Lucent paid a monetary penalty of \$92 million, agreed to retain an independent compliance monitor for three years, and agreed to enhance its compliance program. As is the case with Technip, Alcatel-Lucent's DPA states that the monitor is to be a "French national" and contains language designed to ensure that the monitorship is compliant with French law, including French data protection and labor laws, such as the French Blocking Statute. The DOJ stated that the monetary penalty was higher due to "limited and inadequate cooperation" by Alcatel S.A. "for a substantial period of time" until, after the 2006 merger with Lucent Technologies, Inc., Alcatel-Lucent "substantially improved its cooperation." The DOJ further stated that it gave Alcatel-Lucent credit for, "on its own initiative and at a substantial financial cost, making an unprecedented pledge to stop using third-party sales and marketing agents in conducting its worldwide business."

To resolve the SEC's investigation, Alcatel-Lucent, without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, consented to an injunction against further FCPA violations, agreed to improve its compliance program, and paid \$45,372,000 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. The

SEC alleged that corrupt payments made by Alcatel or its subsidiaries were either undocumented or recorded improperly as consulting fees and that “leaders of several Alcatel subsidiaries and geographical regions, including some who reported directly to Alcatel’s executive committee, either knew or were severely reckless in not knowing about the misconduct.”

The combined monetary penalty of more than \$137 million is one of the largest-ever FCPA settlements. The DOJ also acknowledged the “significant contributions” to its investigation by numerous U.S., Costa Rican, and French authorities.

The following summary of the underlying facts is from Alcatel-Lucent’s admissions in its DPA and from public information regarding U.S. or foreign enforcement investigations or actions. Many of the admissions provide concrete examples of facts and circumstances that, at least in the eyes of U.S. authorities, constitute “red flags” that require additional anti-corruption due diligence of potential business partners or establish a sufficient basis for FCPA liability due to an awareness of merely a high probability that payments to third parties will be passed on to foreign officials to assist in obtaining or retaining business.

- *Business Practices and Internal Controls*

A significant portion of the facts admitted by Alcatel-Lucent concerned the failure of Alcatel’s business practices and internal controls to detect and prevent corruption. The inadequate practices and controls singled out in Alcatel’s DPA included:

- Pursuing business through the use of third-party agents and consultants even though this was a business model “shown to be prone to corruption” because such third parties “were repeatedly used as conduits for bribe payments”;
- Allowing decentralized initial vetting of third parties by local employees “more interested in obtaining business than ensuring that business was won ethically and legally”; and
- Allowing review of such initial vetting by the CEO at another subsidiary, Alcatel Standard (the “Alcatel Standard Executive”), who “performed no due diligence of substance and remained, at best, deliberately ignorant of the true purpose behind the retention and payment to many of the third-party consultants.”

Specifically, the Alcatel Standard Executive’s due diligence included “no effort, or virtually no effort, to verify” information gathered under Alcatel’s approval procedures, beyond using Dun & Bradstreet reports to confirm the consultant’s existence and physical address. Where the Dun & Bradstreet reports showed problems, inconsistencies, or red flags, “typically nothing was done.”

Alcatel also admitted that “[o]ften senior executives... knew bribes were being paid, or were aware of the high probability that many of these third-party consultants were paying bribes, to foreign officials to obtain or retain business.” As evidence of the executives’ knowledge, Alcatel admitted that many consultants’ contracts were not executed until after Alcatel had

already obtained the customer's business, that consultants' commissions were excessive, that multiple consultant companies owned by the same person were sometimes hired for the purpose of obscuring excessive commission payments, and that lump sum payments that did not correspond to a contract were made to consultants. Alcatel, certain subsidiaries, and certain employees also knew, or purposefully ignored, that internal due diligence forms were not accurate, that many of the invoices submitted by third parties falsely claimed that legitimate work had been completed, and that payments were being passed to foreign officials.

- Costa Rica

Alcatel-Lucent admitted that corrupt payments to Costa Rican officials earned Alcatel CIT a profit of more than \$23.6 million on more than \$300 million in contracts.

Christian Sapsizian, a French citizen and Alcatel CIT's Director for Latin America, and Edgar Valverde Acosta, a Costa Rican citizen and president of Alcatel de Costa Rica ("ACR") negotiated consultancy agreements with two third-party consultants on behalf of Alcatel CIT for the purpose of making improper payments to Costa Rican officials to assist in obtaining business in Costa Rica. Alcatel Standard (on behalf of Alcatel CIT) signed at least five consulting contracts with Servicios Notariales, which was headed by Valverde's brother-in-law, a fact Valverde omitted from the company profile he prepared. The contracts contained commissions as high as 9.75%, which was "a much higher commission rate" than Alcatel "normally awarded to a legitimate consultant," in exchange for "vaguely-described marketing and advisory services." Servicios Notariales created 11 false invoices between 2001 and 2003, totaling approximately \$14.5 million. The other consultant, Intelmar, received at least four consulting agreements for "vaguely-described advisory services," under which Intelmar submitted inflated invoices for \$3 million between 2001 and 2004. These payments were made through a bank in New York.

These payments and other moneys were corruptly given to foreign officials to secure three contracts for Alcatel CIT with Costa Rica's government-owned telecommunications company, the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad ("ICE"). Sapsizian and Valverde obtained the first two contracts in 2001, together worth approximately \$193.5 million, after promising an ICE official between 1.5% and 2.0% of the value of the second contract. The ICE official assisted with ensuring that the second contract would be based on a technology offered by Alcatel, rather than a technology offered by a competitor that Alcatel did not offer, and later agreed to share part of his payment with a senior Costa Rican official. In 2002, Alcatel secured the third contract, worth approximately \$109.5 million, through payments to Costa Rican officials of \$7 million passed through Servicios Notariales and \$930,000 passed through Intelmar. Sapsizian and Valverde also enriched themselves through kickbacks of \$300,000 and \$4.7 million, respectively, from the payments made to Servicios Notariales.

Sapsizian, on behalf of Alcatel CIT, also rewarded ICE officials for selecting Alcatel for the third contract with \$25,000 in travel, hotel, and other expenses incurred "during a primarily pleasure trip to Paris" in October 2003. Alcatel admitted that these reimbursements were not bona fide promotional expenses under the FCPA.

Alcatel's internal controls failed to detect or prevent these improper payments. The regional president supervising Sapsizian approved the payments to Servicios Notariales, despite telling Sapsizian "on several occasions" that the regional president "knew he was 'risking jail time' as a result of his approval of these payments," which the regional president "understood would, at least in part, ultimately wind up in the hands of public officials." The Alcatel Standard executive, mentioned above, also improved the retention and payment of these consultants "despite... obvious indications" that they were performing "little or no work yet receiving millions of dollars... reflecting a significant percentage of the payments in question." Neither Alcatel nor its subsidiaries "took sufficient steps" to ensure the consultants' compliance with the FCPA or "other relevant anti-corruption laws."

Sapsizian and Valverde were charged with criminal offenses relating to their conduct. On June 7, 2007, Sapsizian pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and conspiring to do so. On September 30, 2008, he was sentenced to 30 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and ordered to forfeit \$261,500 in criminal proceeds. Valverde was charged as Sapsizian's co-defendant, but remains a fugitive.

French and Costa Rican authorities are also investigating the above conduct. French authorities are investigating Alcatel CIT's use of consultants in Costa Rica. Costa Rican authorities and ICE instituted criminal, civil, and administrative proceedings relating to the improper payments. In January 2010, Alcatel-Lucent France, as the successor to Alcatel CIT, settled for \$10 million civil charges brought by the Costa Rican Attorney General for the loss of prestige to the nation of Costa Rica (characterized as "social damage"). Criminal proceedings are ongoing against several Costa Rican individuals. Alcatel continues to face a variety of civil and administrative actions in Costa Rica as well, and in 2008 ICE's board terminated the operations and maintenance portion of the third contract described above.

o *Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad*

In May 2011, ICE, became the first party to seek victim status under U.S. law in an FCPA enforcement action. In June 2011, the Southern District of Florida denied ICE's petition, and the Eleventh Circuit denied ICE's subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus requesting that the appellate court direct the district court to grant victim status to ICE.

On May 3, 2011, ICE objected to the DPA and the plea agreements by Alcatel-Lucent's subsidiaries. ICE claimed that it was a victim of Alcatel-Lucent's bribery scheme and that the agreements violated the victims' rights to which it was entitled by statute, including mandatory restitution. Thus, ICE petitioned the court for "the protection of its rights as a victim of [Alcatel-Lucent] and for appropriate sanctions resulting from the [DOJ's] failure to protect those rights." In addition, ICE objected to the DPA plea agreements on the grounds they failed to satisfy the legal standards required for court approval, including those related to victim restitution under 18 U.S.C. § 3771.

In order to establish its right to restitution as a victim, ICE faced the preliminary hurdle of establishing that it was actually a victim. Prior to ICE's petition, both the SEC and DOJ had rejected ICE's claim that it was a victim. The SEC had denied without explanation ICE's

request to create a “Fair Fund” for the benefit of victims. Similarly, the DOJ rejected ICE’s claim of victim status apparently, in part, because it considered ICE to be a participant in Alcatel-Lucent’s bribery scheme through the ICE employees that accepted bribes. In its memorandum of law in support of its petition and objections, ICE argued that it was a victim because it “suffered massive harm as a result” of Alcatel-Lucent’s criminal conduct. Specifically, ICE alleged that it incurred losses due to contractual “obligations [Alcatel-Lucent] never satisfied, services it never rendered, and hardware that was inferior to what was promised or never delivered.” Furthermore, ICE challenged the suggestion by DOJ that it was a participant, stating, “[t]he notion that acceptance of bribes by five of ICE’s more than 16,500 employees, managers, and directors necessarily renders ICE an active participant in Alcatel’s admitted bribery scheme is nonsense.”

As a victim, ICE argued, it was entitled to certain statutory rights under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act and the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act. The Crime Victims’ Rights Act provides certain rights to crime victims, including restitution as provided by law. Further, the Act imposes an obligation on DOJ employees to make their best efforts to notify victims of and accord victims these statutory rights. The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act requires courts to order restitution to victims of Title 18 crimes, including conspiracy.

Specifically regarding the plea agreements, ICE argued in its memorandum that they were flawed, in part, because they failed to account for victim losses or restitution and waived a pre-sentence investigation and report upon which the court could order restitution. More generally, ICE argued that the court should reject the DPA and plea agreements because they “fail[ed] to satisfy the best interests of justice [and] the public” and failed to provide assurances that the punishment was commensurate with the defendants’ history and conduct. Thus, ICE concluded it was entitled to restitution under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act.

In its petition, ICE also noted that the SEC settlement called for the “illegal proceeds obtained from *victims* [to] be distributed to the federal government.”

On May 23, 2011, the United States and Alcatel-Lucent filed oppositions to ICE’s petition and objections. In response to ICE’s request for victim status, both the government and Alcatel-Lucent argued that ICE could not be considered a victim because it was a participant in the underlying conduct, and consequently, it was not entitled to restitution. The government alternatively argued that, regardless of whether ICE was a victim, the government had afforded ICE the rights provided to victims under the Crime Victims’ Rights Act. On the same day, the government filed a separate sentencing memorandum in support of the plea agreements and DPA. The government argued that, even if ICE were a victim, the Crime Victims’ Rights Act did not “give [ICE] veto power over prosecutorial decisions, strategies, or tactics.” The government also questioned in a footnote whether ICE had standing to challenge the DPA.

On May 27, 2011, ICE filed replies. In its reply to the United States, in relevant part, ICE argued that the government’s contention that ICE was a co-participant should fail because “(1) as a matter of law, ICE cannot be imputed with the conduct of its few personnel who accepted Defendants’ bribes; and (2) ICE did nothing to warrant the label of ‘co-participant.’”

Furthermore, on May 31, 2011, ICE submitted a sworn statement by Edgar Valverde Acosta, Alcatel's former president in Costa Rica, who was incarcerated for his conviction in the Costa Rican criminal court of corruption allegations related to Alcatel-Lucent's sales to ICE. Acosta stated that "no one at ICE, other than the individuals who were receiving the payments had knowledge of these matters, nor, do I believe, they could have known of these matters. . . ."

At a hearing on June 1, 2011, Judge Marcia G. Cooke found that ICE was not a victim to Alcatel-Lucent's bribery, and thus, was not entitled to restitution. Judge Cooke explained that corruption was rampant at ICE, and the issues regarding whether ICE was a victim or an offender were too intertwined.

On June 15, 2011, the ICE filed a petition for mandamus asking the Eleventh Circuit to effectively overturn Judge Cooke's ruling. ICE argued that the district court's determination that ICE was not a victim was incorrect because the court wrongly found that ICE was a co-conspirator. On June 17, 2011, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied ICE's petition for mandamus. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that ICE functioned as a co-conspirator, explaining that the "district court identified the pervasive, constant, and consistent illegal conduct conducted by the 'principals' (*i.e.* members of the Board of Directors and management) of ICE." The court also held that ICE failed to show it was directly and proximately harmed by Alcatel-Lucent's criminal conduct.

- Honduras

Alcatel CIT, ACR, and Sapsizian also pursued business opportunities in Honduras with the assistance of Alcatel Mexico. Until late 2002, the state-owned telecommunications company Empresa Hondureña de Telecomunicaciones ("Hondutel") was responsible for evaluating and awarding telecommunications contracts on behalf of the Honduran government. The Comisión Nacional de Telecomunicaciones ("Conatel") was the Honduran government agency that oversaw Hondutel's activities and regulated the telecommunications industry in Honduras. From 2002 to 2003, Alcatel was awarded approximately \$48 million of Honduran government contracts and was able to retain its business despite "significant performance problems." Alcatel earned profits of approximately \$870,000 on these contracts.

To assist with its efforts to obtain or retain business in Honduras, Alcatel hired a local third-party consultant to provide vaguely described services that included "maintaining liaisons with appropriate government officials." Alcatel admitted that Alcatel Standard knowingly failed to conduct appropriate due diligence on the consultant by failing to follow-up on "numerous, obvious red flags," including:

- The consultant had no experience in the telecommunications industry; instead, a company profile of the consultant, which was submitted as part of Alcatel's due diligence process and signed by the consultant and Alcatel's local area president, listed the consultant's main business as the distribution of "fine fragrances and cosmetics in the Honduran market," while the Dun & Bradstreet report on the consultant described him as a door-to-door cosmetics salesman;

- The consultant was selected by the brother of a senior Honduran government official. The official's brother regularly communicated with Alcatel using an e-mail address from a domain name associated with the senior official; and
- The senior official's brother once contacted the local area president in an attempt to collect commissions owed to the consultant, and the senior official personally followed-up on this request.

Alcatel also admitted that Alcatel CIT executives approved unspecified payments to the consultant while knowing that a significant portion of the payments would be passed on to the family of the senior Honduran official, with the high probability that some or all of the payments would be passed on to the senior government official. In addition to these commissions, Alcatel reimbursed numerous "primarily pleasure" trips to Europe for an official who provided Alcatel with confidential information about competitors' bids for Hondutel contracts, a trip to Europe for another official and his spouse, an educational trip for that official's daughter, and a trip to Paris for a Hondutel in-house attorney who worked on one of the contracts awarded to Alcatel.

- Malaysia

The largest client of Alcatel Network Systems Malaysia Sdn. Bhd. ("Alcatel Malaysia"), a majority-owned Alcatel subsidiary, was Telekom Malaysia Bhd. Telekom Malaysia was the largest telecommunications company in Malaysia and was controlled by the Malaysian government, which held a 43% ownership interest. Celcom was the Telekom Malaysia subsidiary that handled mobile communications services. In connection with an \$85 million contract tender, which Alcatel won, and other unspecified business opportunities, Alcatel Malaysia and Alcatel Standard knowingly circumvented Alcatel's internal controls and caused Alcatel's books and records to contain inaccurate and false information.

Efforts to circumvent Alcatel's internal controls took a variety of forms. From 2004 to 2006, Alcatel Malaysia's management approved 17 improper payments to Telekom Malaysia employees for nonpublic information about Celcom public tenders. Eight of the payments related to the public tender of the \$85 million contract. Many of these payments were made against false invoices for "document fees," although one invoice was for the "purchase of tender documents." In 2005 and 2006, despite being aware of "significant risk" that two Malaysian consultants were merely conduits for passing improper payments on to Malaysian government officials, Alcatel Standard retained the consultants at \$500,000 each to generate reports that were never prepared. One the consultants also worked for Alcatel Malaysia under a series of "gentlemen's agreements" before any formal contract was executed. Finally, Alcatel Malaysia's complete lack of policies and controls concerning gifts, travel, and entertainment for customers allowed Alcatel Malaysia to give unspecific "lavish gifts" to Telekom Malaysia officials.

On February 28, 2013, former Alcatel Malaysia account executive Radziah Ani was convicted under Malaysia's Anti-Corruption Act 1997 of offering bribes to Telekom Malaysia officials to obtain confidential tender information. According to the press release of Malaysia's Anti-Corruption Commission, the court rejected Ani's "claim that she was a victim of circumstances as well as her claim that the corrupt practices were a common practice in the

company.” Ani was sentenced to a term of two years imprisonment and fined RM125,000 (approximately \$40,000).

- Taiwan

Taiwan’s Ministry of Justice investigated an Alcatel-Lucent subsidiary, Alcatel-Lucent Deutschland A.G. (formerly known as Alcatel SEL, A.G.), and an Alcatel-Lucent joint venture (and Siemens A.G. distributor), Taiwan International Standard Electronics, Ltd. (“Taisel”), regarding allegations of bid-rigging and improper payments to officials surrounding the state-owned Taiwan Railway Administration’s (“TRA”) awarding of an axle-counter supply contract to Taisel in 2003. Following an internal investigation by Alcatel, it terminated Taisel’s president and accepted the resignation of an Alcatel-Lucent Deutschland director of international sales. In criminal proceedings from 2005 through 2009, Taiwanese courts acquitted, and subsequently affirmed the acquittal of, criminal charges brought against Taisel relating to the alleged scheme. Taisel’s former president and other individuals were, however, convicted for violating the Taiwanese Government Procurement Act.

In resolving the U.S. authorities’ investigations, Alcatel admitted that Alcatel Standard retained two consultants on behalf of Alcatel SEL to assist with the axle-counting, that these consultants claimed to have close relationships with Taiwanese legislators who were believed to have influence over the awarding of the axle-counter contract, that Alcatel paid these consultants more than \$950,000 even though they had no telecommunications experience and provided no legitimate services, and that Alcatel used the consultants to make indirect, corrupt payments to Taiwanese legislators who could influence the award of the axle-counting contract.

As was the case with the consultants in Costa Rica and Honduras, Alcatel Standard retained these consultants without conducting adequate due diligence. Regarding one consultant, the Dun & Bradstreet report indicated that the contact information provided did not relate to the consultant, and a company profile (that was not signed by the required internal personnel until after-the-fact) indicated that the consultant had no relevant market experience or knowledge. Alcatel SEL wired a purported commission of more than \$900,000 to this consultant after Alcatel had won the TRA contract, which the consultant then passed on to two legislators, one of whom had argued to TRA that Alcatel SEL met the technical requirements of the contract. The consultant also promised \$180,000 in campaign contributions to one of the legislators and paid for travel and gifts to staff of the other legislator and a government minister, including a \$3,000 set of crystal given to the minister’s secretary.

A second Taiwanese consultant retained by Alcatel was the brother of a third legislator who had influence over TRA matters. At a meeting between an Alcatel SEL executive, the consultant, and the legislator, the legislator demanded a 2% success fee, paid through his brother, in exchange for the axle-counting contract. Alcatel SEL subsequently made payments to the brother through a bogus consulting contract for \$383,895 between Taisel and the consultant, under which the consultant was never expected to provide any legitimate services to Taisel.

Ultimately, Alcatel SEL was awarded a \$19.2 million axle-counting contract from TRA, on which Alcatel earned approximately \$4.34 million in profits.

- Kenya

Alcatel's improper payments in Kenya concerned competition for an \$87 million frame supply contract to a telecommunications joint venture. The joint venture was between an unnamed French "telecommunications and entertainment company" and a Kenyan company. Although the particular ownership structure of this joint venture is not disclosed, the joint venture had to have been at least 60%-owned by the Kenyan partner for the joint venture to have won the underlying telecommunications license. The frame supply contract included construction of a switching center, operations and maintenance center, and mobile network base stations. Alcatel CIT bid on the contract and was short-listed to make a final bid against one competitor.

Although bids were to be made formally to the joint venture, personnel from the French telecommunications and entertainment company handled the bidding process itself. The French company informed Alcatel CIT that it would win the bid if an Alcatel entity paid \$20 million to an intermediary. Alcatel agreed to this condition.

The improper payment was not made until after Alcatel was formally awarded the contract in February 2000. At the French company's direction, Alcatel hired the intermediary and rolled the intermediary's fees into the contract price. The French company was then able to restructure Alcatel's contract with the joint venture to increase the price to cover the intermediary's fees. The French company explained to Alcatel that the purpose of this arrangement was to pass money directly to its Kenyan joint venture partner. Alcatel Standard approved of this arrangement and was the entity that formally hired the intermediary. Alcatel reflected this arrangement on its books by increasing the price of its contract with the joint venture, which was not an accurate and fair reflection of the transaction. Alcatel also entered into a side agreement that had the effect of entitling it to reimbursement of its payments to the intermediary if Alcatel's contract with the joint venture were canceled.

Alcatel admitted that, because Alcatel Standard knew that it would be difficult to justify a \$20 million payment to one consultant, the payment was structured into several smaller transactions through three different banks to two different consulting companies, both of which were affiliated with the intermediary and one of which Alcatel Standard knew to be an offshore holding of the Kenyan joint venture partner. Payment to one of the companies was also made under a separate contract relating to a second telecommunications license. Although the intermediary provided monthly reports and economic intelligence on the telecommunications market in Africa, the intermediary failed to provide any information related to a second license or the Kenyan telecommunications market.

Ultimately, Alcatel admitted that there was "a high probability" that all or part of the payments to the intermediary would be ultimately passed on to Kenyan officials who had played a role in awarding the contract to the unnamed French company because of the following facts known to Alcatel: (i) the payments to the intermediary were "huge"; (ii) the intermediary performed "little legitimate work" in connection with the second license purportedly underlying

one of the consulting contracts; and (iii) the intermediary's second company was an offshore holding of the Kenyan joint venture partner.

Alcatel has also disclosed that it understands that French authorities are "conducting an investigation to ascertain whether inappropriate payments were received by foreign public officials" in connection with payments by Alcatel CIT to a consultant "arising out of a supply contract between CIT and a privately-owned company in Kenya," which was the same supply contract that Alcatel had disclosed to the DOJ and SEC. Alcatel is cooperating with the French authorities and has submitted to them the findings of an internal investigation regarding those payments, which Alcatel had also submitted to the DOJ and SEC.

- Nigeria

Alcatel admitted that its books and records failed to fairly and accurately describe numerous payments by Alcatel subsidiaries to Nigerian officials for several purposes, including to reduce tax or other liabilities, to obtain security services from Nigerian police, to recover a debt legally owed to Alcatel subsidiary ITT Nigeria of \$36.5 million, and to benefit a political party official. Alcatel also failed to properly record a payment of \$75,000 to a former Nigerian Ambassador to the United Nations to arrange meetings between Alcatel and a high-ranking Nigerian executive branch official.

Alcatel also paid more than €9.9 million to three consultants for the benefit of a senior executive at a private Nigerian telecommunications company. Some of the payments were made through a consultant known to have "significant connections" to a senior Nigerian government official, after which an affiliate of the Nigerian telecommunications company won the bid for a telecommunications license but then lost the license for failure to pay the required fee. The other payments were made through three different banks to consultants owned, at least partially, by a relative of the senior executive. Alcatel admitted that these payments were for the purpose of securing contracts between Alcatel subsidiaries and the private Nigerian telecommunications company and that this purpose was not reflected on Alcatel's books.

Following a voluntary disclosure to French and U.S. authorities, Alcatel disclosed that French authorities have "requested . . . further documents related to payments made by its subsidiaries to certain consultants in Nigeria" and that Alcatel responded to the request as part of its continued cooperation with French and U.S. authorities.

- Bangladesh

Alcatel admitted to paying a consultant \$626,492 in commissions after Bangladesh's state-controlled telecommunications services provider abandoned a prior project being performed by a competitor for a project by Alcatel that was allegedly inferior on a cost/benefit basis. Alcatel paid the same consultant more than \$2.5 million from 1997 to 2006 in connection with upgrades to an older telecommunications project. Alcatel admitted, without providing a detailed basis, that Alcatel Standard "was aware of a significant risk" at the time the payments were made, that the consultant "would pass all or part of these payments to foreign officials."

- *Ecuador & Nicaragua*

Alcatel paid a consultant, a wealthy local businessman with a “longstanding relationship” with the Alcatel Standard Executive who approved third-party consulting contracts, 10% to 14% commissions for assistance with obtaining or retaining business from three state-owned telecommunications companies in Ecuador. Because 10% to 14% was a “much higher” rate than Alcatel typically paid consultants, the Alcatel Standard Executive structured the commission payments to be paid through several different entities controlled by the consultant, each of which received a commission of between 3% and 5%.

From 1999 to 2004, Alcatel and its subsidiaries executed at least 58 separate consulting agreements with such entities and paid a total of more than \$8.8 million in commissions. Although Alcatel’s agreements with the consulting entities stated that the payments were for market evaluations, client and competition analysis, and assisting with contract negotiations, Alcatel admitted that “it was anticipated” that the consultant would pass a portion of the payments on to officials at the state-owned telecommunications companies in order to secure business and improper benefits for Alcatel. Alcatel also paid for trips taken by telecommunications officials that were principally for leisure.

The Ecuadorian consultant also assisted Alcatel CIT, through Alcatel’s Costa Rican subsidiary ACR, in obtaining business from the Nicaraguan state-owned telecommunications company Empresa Nicaraguense de Telecomunicaciones S.A. (“Enitel”). Although the Ecuadorian consultant appeared to provide no legitimate work in support of two contracts between Alcatel CIT and Enitel worth nearly \$2 million, Alcatel CIT paid the consultant \$229,382 while admitting that the consultant “likely used a portion of these payments to bribe certain key Enitel officials” whom the consultant later identified to Sapsizian as his “amigos.” Alcatel CIT also paid for two Enitel officials to travel, largely for pleasure, to Madrid and Paris in late 2001.

- *Other Consultancy Agreements Not Subject to Proper Due Diligence*

Alcatel further admitted to failing to conduct adequate due diligence on, and to fairly and accurately record in its books, \$3.5 million in payments to Angolan consultants, \$3 million in payments under 65 contracts to an Ivory Coast consultant, \$382,355 in payments to a Ugandan consultant, and less than \$50,000 in payments to a Malian consultant. These payments were made, in most instances, despite the fact that Alcatel was aware, should have been aware, or was aware of a significant risk that such consultants would pass on all or part of these payments to foreign officials.

### ***RAE Systems***

On December 10, 2010, RAE Systems, Inc. (“RAE”) settled FCPA charges with the DOJ and SEC relating to improper payments made by and on behalf of two Chinese joint ventures. Under its agreement with the SEC, RAE will pay \$1,147,800 in disgorgement and \$109,212 in pre-judgment interest to settle FCPA anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls charges. Under a three-year NPA with the DOJ, RAE will pay a \$1.7 million penalty to settle

FCPA books and records and internal controls charges. RAE, based in San Jose, California, develops and manufactures chemical and radiation detection monitors and networks. RAE's common stock is traded on the NYSE Alternext exchange.

According to the SEC and DOJ, between 2004 and 2008, RAE, through two Chinese joint ventures, paid approximately \$400,000 to third-party agents and government officials to influence foreign officials in order to obtain or retain business. RAE's due diligence of the Chinese company KLH, then owned by the Beijing Academy of Sciences, revealed various red flags, including that KLH's main clients were state-owned entities and government departments, KLH sales personnel financed their sales through cash advances and reimbursements, and KLH sales personnel used cash advances to bribe government officials. RAE also discovered that KLH's accounting and control mechanisms for the cash advances were flawed; specifically, sales personnel were submitting unsupported and inaccurate tax receipts (known as "fapiao") to account for their use of the cash advances. The due diligence report, submitted to RAE's Board of Directors, detailed kickback mechanisms and concluded that "[t]o some extent, the financial statements have been distorted by these commissions." Separately, a RAE employee who had met with KLH personnel reported to high-ranking RAE executives that "KLH sales team is good at and used to selling cycle that is highly dependent on 'guanxi'—whatever it takes to spec and close deal . . . to kill the sales model that has worked for them all these years is to kill the JV deal value or hurt sales momentum."

Despite this information, RAE acquired a 64% stake in KLH (then renamed RAE-KLH) in 2004, and two years later raised their interest to approximately 96%. Upon acquiring its stake in the company, RAE orally communicated to RAE-KLH personnel that bribery practices must stop; however, RAE did not impose sufficient internal controls or make changes to the cash advance practices. The DOJ described the efforts as "half-measures."

In 2005, RAE's Vice President and CFO visited RAE-KLH and observed that the company had approximately \$500,000 in cash advances for which it had no fapiao. He then emailed RAE's U.S. headquarters that "[t]here is the possibility that cash may also be used for grease payments, to supplement sales employees' incomes and as bribes..." The company responded by implementing FCPA training and required its employees to sign anti-bribery certifications, but again, it made no changes to the problematic cash advance system. Consequently, sales personnel continued to use cash advances to bribe foreign officials. In 2006, RAE-KLH entered into a consultancy agreement with an agent, whom it paid approximately \$86,195. The agent used the funds to bribe employees of state-owned enterprises to obtain business for RAE-KLH related to the Dagang Oil Field.

Later that year, RAE-KLH's recently terminated General Manager emailed the company's U.S. headquarters alleging that RAE-KLH had entered into a \$48,000 money laundering contract to mask kickbacks paid to clients. The company responded to the allegations, and the money paid by RAE-KLH under the contract was returned to it. The company did not, however, perform an internal audit or other investigation into the general allegation that bribery was continuing, nor did it impose any additional internal controls or make significant changes to the cash advance system. During 2007, RAE-KLH personnel continued to

use cash advances to bribe government officials, including by purchasing a notebook computer for the Deputy Director of a state-owned chemical plant. RAE-KLH also entered into another contract with the same agent, who again used the funds to pay bribes to obtain two contracts.

In December 2006, RAE acquired a 70% interest in a separate Chinese company, Fushun Anyi, which then became RAE-Fushun. Despite the experience with KLH, RAE conducted no pre-acquisition due diligence and failed to implement an effective system of internal controls. In 2007, RAE-Fushun personnel engaged in bribery of government officials, including providing gifts such as fur coats, expensive liquor, and kitchen appliances.

In addition to the financial penalties, RAE also agreed to implement various enhanced compliance and reporting measures, cooperate with the government's investigation, and provide periodic reports to the DOJ and SEC over a three-year period.

### ***Panalpina-Related Oil Services Industry Sweep***

On November 4, 2010, the DOJ and SEC announced the resolution of seven FCPA investigations within the oil services industry. Touted as the first ever FCPA-related sweep of a particular industrial sector, these investigations centered on Panalpina World Transport (Holding), Ltd. ("PWT" or, together with its subsidiaries, "Panalpina") and FCPA violations related to its international freight forwarding and logistics services. The SEC and the DOJ conducted this industry-wide sweep as a proactive tactic to combat what they described as "widespread corruption in the oil services industry."

This investigation resulted in criminal and/or civil actions against GlobalSantaFe Corporation, Noble Corporation, PWT and its U.S.-based subsidiary Panalpina Inc., Pride International, Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary Pride Forasol S.A.S., Tidewater Inc. and its wholly owned subsidiary Tidewater Marine International, Inc., Transocean Inc. (a subsidiary of Transocean Ltd.), and two Royal Dutch Shell plc. subsidiaries, Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company Ltd. and Shell International Exploration and Production. These actions originated in 2007, when three wholly owned subsidiaries of Vetco International Ltd. pleaded guilty to criminal FCPA violations. A fourth Vetco affiliate, Aibel Group Ltd., entered into a DPA and agreed to cooperate with the DOJ by identifying, among other parties, the consultants, contractors, and subcontractors related to its subsidiaries' FCPA violations.

Collectively, these seven companies, their subsidiaries, and parent companies agreed to pay over \$236 million to resolve U.S. authorities' investigations. In announcing the simultaneous dispositions on November 4, 2010, Chief of the SEC's recently created FCPA Unit Cheryl J. Scarborough promised that the Unit will "continue to focus on industry-wide sweeps," and warned that "no industry is immune from investigation." By varying penalty reductions with regard to the companies' respective degrees of cooperation and self-disclosure, these agreements also represent a concerted effort by the DOJ to demonstrate its willingness to extend "meaningful credit" to business organizations that voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations and cooperate with resultant FCPA investigations.

With the exception of Noble Corporation, each of the companies involved in the November 4, 2010, FCPA settlements employed the services of PWT and its subsidiaries (collectively, “Panalpina”). In particular, the actions of Panalpina World Transport (Nigeria) Limited (“Panalpina Nigeria”), a former, majority-owned subsidiary and agent of PWT, was the common tie between the violations by Panalpina, Pride, Transocean, Tidewater, and Shell. Between 2002 and 2007, Panalpina Nigeria paid over \$30 million in bribes to Nigerian officials, \$19 million of which were made on behalf of Panalpina’s U.S. customers and their foreign subsidiaries.

- *Panalpina World Transport (Holding), Ltd. and Subsidiaries*

On November 4, 2010, PWT and its wholly owned, U.S.-based subsidiary, Panalpina, Inc. (“Panalpina U.S.”) resolved DOJ and SEC FCPA investigations under which PWT and Panalpina U.S. agreed to pay \$70.56 million in penalties to the DOJ, while Panalpina U.S. agreed to disgorge \$11.33 million in illicit profits to the SEC. (Both PWT and Panalpina U.S. agreed to separate, corresponding \$70.56 million penalties. However, as part of the agreement, the Panalpina U.S. fine is deducted from the PWT fine.)

To resolve the DOJ charges, PWT and Panalpina U.S. stipulated to the DOJ’s factual allegations. According to the DOJ, from approximately 2002 to 2007, Panalpina paid approximately \$49 million in bribes to foreign officials through wholly owned subsidiaries in Angola, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Russia, and Turkmenistan to help both itself and its U.S. and foreign customers obtain preferential customs, duties, and import treatment for international freight shipments. Some of these improper payments continued as late as 2009. Panalpina admitted to paying approximately \$27 million of those bribes on behalf of customers who were U.S. issuers or domestic concerns.

In addition, Panalpina admitted to improperly recording and invoicing the bribes paid on behalf of clients to make them appear to be legitimate charges, in violation of the books and records provisions, by using approximately 160 different terms to falsely describe bribes and related payments on its invoices. Panalpina further admitted to authorizing bribes to secure foreign government contracts for itself.

PWT resolved the two criminal charges that the DOJ filed against it by entering into a three-year DPA. The DOJ charged PWT with conspiring to violate and violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. Panalpina U.S. agreed to plead guilty to a two-count criminal information alleging conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s books and records provisions and aiding and abetting violations of the those same provisions by its issuer customers. Panalpina U.S. was specifically identified as the vehicle through which PWT engaged in bribery on behalf of its U.S. issuer customers. Panalpina U.S. simultaneously resolved SEC charges, without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, by consenting to being permanently enjoined from violating or aiding and abetting violations of the FCPA and agreeing to disgorge \$11.33 million in illicit profits. Panalpina U.S. is not itself an issuer, but was subject to DOJ jurisdiction as a domestic concern. The SEC claimed jurisdiction to bring its complaint against Panalpina U.S. because the

SEC considered Panalpina U.S. to be an agent of customers who were U.S. issuers and also because Panalpina U.S. allegedly aided and abetted its issuer clients' FCPA violations.

The DOJ considered multiple factors when agreeing to enter into a DPA with PWT, including PWT's comprehensive compliance investigations and reviews, prompt and voluntary reports of its findings from these investigations, efforts to require and encourage employee cooperation with government investigations, PWT's (eventual) cooperation with DOJ and SEC investigations, and PWT's "substantial remedial measures." These remedial efforts included the creation of a compliance department with direct reporting to the Board of Directors, implementation of a compliance program and related policies, conducting systematic risk assessment in high-risk countries, developing internal review mechanisms, retaining/promoting/firing employees and management based on their individual commitments to compliance, implementation of internal compliance and audit functions, voluntarily and independently hiring outside compliance counsel, and PWT's decision to independently and at substantial cost close down operations in Nigeria to avoid future potential improper conduct.

○ *Panalpina Conduct in Nigeria*

According to charging documents, Panalpina Nigeria expedited customer shipments by bribing officials in the Nigerian Customs Service ("NCS"), the government office responsible for assessing and collection duties and tariffs on goods imported into Nigeria. Panalpina used the term "special" on invoices to describe cash payments made to expedite customs paperwork. Payments made to NCS officials in order to resolve customs problems or to avoid Nigerian regulations were invoiced to customers as "intervention" or "evacuation" payments. Many of the improper payments were made as part of Panalpina's express courier service, Pancourier.

In addition, Panalpina Nigeria also bribed NCS officials to help its customers secure new Temporary Import Permits ("TIPs") and extensions to existing TIPs. Under Nigerian law, a TIP allows a foreign company to temporarily import expensive equipment or vessels into Nigerian waters without paying the standard import tax, which is typically at least 10% of an imported item's total value. Any equipment or vessels not removed before a TIP's expiration, however, are subject to a fine of up to six times that equipment or vessel's value. Panalpina Nigeria's corrupt payments to NCS officials enabled its customers to effectively receive permanent TIPs, thereby avoiding both the costly import tax and the harsh post-expiration penalties.

As well as providing such transaction-specific payments to NCS officials, Panalpina Nigeria provided hundreds of officials in the Nigerian Port Authority, Maritime Authority, police, Department of Petroleum, Immigration Authority, and the National Authority for Food and Drug Control with weekly or monthly payments to obtain preferential treatment for itself and its customers.

Panalpina also admitted to paying foreign government officials to secure contracts for itself. In 2005, Panalpina directed \$50,000 to a National Petroleum Investment Management Services ("NAPIMS") official to gain preferential treatment and secure a logistics contract on an oil project jointly operated by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation and a major oil company.

- Panalpina Conduct Outside Nigeria

PWT also operated subsidiaries in Angola, Azerbaijan, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan that provided similar freight forwarding services by bribing customs, tax, and health and safety officials to secure preferential treatment for PWT and its clients.

From approximately 2002 to 2008, Panalpina Transportes Mundiais, Navegação e Transitos, S.A.R.L. (“Panalpina Angola”) paid approximately \$4.5 million in bribes to Angolan government officials. Panalpina Angola made hundreds of “special intervention” or “SPIN” payments, which ranged from *de minimis* values to amounts of up to \$25,000 per transaction, to get officials to overlook incomplete documentation, to help customers avoid paying customs duties, and to avoid fines and legal problems when Panalpina Angola or its customers failed to comply with Angolan legal requirements. Additionally, from 2006 to 2008, Panalpina Angola paid over \$300,000 to two Angolan officials to secure two separate Angolan oil and gas logistics contracts. In one case, the money for the payments came from profits made on the contract, while in the other case Panalpina invoiced the government-controlled entity for salary payments to a non-existent “ghost employee” and used the funds to make cash payments to an Angolan official.

Schemes in other countries followed similar patterns. Panalpina Azerbaijan LLC (“Panalpina Azerbaijan”) paid approximately \$900,000 in bribes to Azerbaijani government officials to overlook incomplete or inaccurate documentation, receive reduced customs duties, and avoid fines levied against both Panalpina Azerbaijan and its customers. Panalpina Azerbaijan also made payments to Azerbaijani tax officials in order to secure preferential tax treatment. Panalpina Limitada (“Panalpina Brazil”) paid over \$1 million in bribes to Brazilian officials in order to expedite customs clearance and resolve customs and import-related issues on behalf of its customers. Panalpina Kazakhstan LLP (“Panalpina Kazakhstan”) made over \$4 million in what it described internally as “sunshine” or “black cash” payments to Kazakh government officials to cause the officials to overlook incomplete or inaccurate customs documentation, avoid levying proper customs duties, and to discourage them from fining Panalpina or its customers for failing to comply with legal requirements. Panalpina Kazakhstan also made payments to Kazakh tax officials responsible for conducting annual tax audits in order to both expedite the audits and avoid or reduce any resultant tax-related fines. Panalpina World Transport Limited (Russia) (“Panalpina Russia”) paid over \$7 million in bribes to Russian officials to expedite customs delays, avoid administrative fines, resolve problems with temporary import permits, and to occasionally bypass the customs process in total. Finally, Panalpina World Transport Limited (Turkmenistan) (“Panalpina Turkmenistan”) paid over \$500,000 to Turkmen government officials responsible for enforcing Turkmenistan’s customs, immigration, tax, and health and safety laws.

- GlobalSantaFe Corporation

The SEC filed a complaint against GlobalSantaFe Corporation (“GSF”) alleging violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. GSF is now known as Transocean Worldwide, Inc., and is a subsidiary of the Swiss-based

Transocean Ltd. According to the SEC's complaint, GSF paid a customs broker \$87,000 to obtain two TIP extensions for the oil rig *Adriatic VIII* after its initial TIP expired in 2003, including false documentation showing the *Adriatic VIII* had left Nigerian waters. While these "paper moves" allowed the *Adriatic VIII* to remain in Nigerian waters, \$3,500 of the payment was invoiced as "additional charges for export." GSF management in Nigeria knew the *Adriatic VIII* had not left Nigerian waters and knew or was aware of the high probability that the "additional charges for export" on the invoice was an attempt to disguise a bribe. GSF used its customs broker to carry out several other paper moves for the oil rigs *Adriatic I* and *Baltic I*. The SEC alleged that these payments helped GSF avoid \$1.5 million in costs by not moving their oil rigs out of Nigerian waters and enabled GSF to gain an additional \$619,000 in revenue by avoiding related work interruptions. The SEC also identified \$82,000 in additional "intervention" and "retaining" payments related to expired or expiring oil rig TIPs that allowed GSF to earn an additional \$268,000 in avoided costs and gained revenues. The SEC further alleged that, through customs brokers, GSF made approximately \$300,000 of similarly improper payments to government officials in Angola, Gabon, and Equatorial Guinea, and that none of the payments in Angola, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, or Nigeria were properly recorded in GSF's books and records.

Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, GSF agreed to the entry of a court order enjoining it from violating the FCPA, to disgorge approximately \$2.7 million of ill-gotten gains and pay prejudgment interest of approximately \$1 million, and pay a civil penalty of \$2.1 million.

- *Pride International, Inc.*

The DOJ and the SEC also settled investigations of Pride International, Inc. ("Pride") relating to corrupt payments to foreign officials in eight different countries. According to the SEC, from 2001 to 2006, Pride, often through its subsidiaries, allegedly paid or authorized payments of approximately \$2 million to foreign officials in India, Kazakhstan, Libya, Mexico, Nigeria, the Republic of the Congo, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. Of these payments, the DOJ brought enforcement actions against Pride and its subsidiary Pride Forasol S.A.S. ("Pride Forasol") for \$804,000 in payments made to foreign officials in Venezuela, India, and Mexico to extend drilling contracts, influence customs officials, gain favorable customs duties and tax assessments, extend the temporary importation status of drilling rigs, and influence court rulings.

The DOJ charged Pride with violating and conspiring to violate the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA. Pride resolved these charges by entering into a three-year DPA with the DOJ, while Pride Forasol pleaded guilty to charges of conspiring to violate the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA, violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, and aiding and abetting Pride's books and records violations. Together the companies will pay approximately \$32.6 million in monetary penalties, a total fine roughly 55% below the minimum one recommended by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. This reduced penalty reflects, in part, the assistance that Pride provided in regards to the DOJ and SEC investigation into Panalpina and its subsidiaries. Pride voluntarily disclosed the results of an internal investigation into misconduct occurring in Venezuela, India, and Mexico to the DOJ,

as well as the fact that Panalpina subsidiaries in Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and Saudi Arabia acted as intermediaries in making payments to Kazakh tax officials, NCS officials, and Saudi customs officials, respectively. The DOJ viewed this disclosure as one that “substantially assisted” its Panalpina-related investigations because “the extent of Panalpina’s conduct was unknown by the Department at the time of the Companies’ disclosure.” Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Pride agreed to a permanent injunction against future violations of the FCPA, to disgorge over \$19.3 million in ill-gotten gains, and to pay prejudgment interest of roughly \$4.2 million.

In August 2010, two former Pride International, Inc. employees, Joe Summers and Bobby Benton, entered settlements with the SEC for their involvement in the alleged misconduct, both directly as the employees of an issuer and indirectly as aiders and abettors of Pride’s violations, by agreeing to injunctions and paying civil penalties. On August 5, 2010, Joe Summers, Pride’s former Venezuela country manager, consented to the entry of a permanent injunction prohibiting future FCPA violations and agreed to pay a \$25,000 civil penalty. On August 9, 2010, Benton, Pride’s former Vice President of Western Hemisphere Operations, consented to a settlement of FCPA charges that included a permanent injunction from future FCPA violations and the payment of a \$40,000 civil penalty.

- Venezuela

Summers authorized payments totaling approximately \$384,000 to third parties, believing that all or portions of the money would be passed on as bribes to an official of Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (“PDVSA”), Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, to extend three drilling contracts between 2003 and 2005. The PDVSA official had requested and been paid \$60,000 for each month of additional drilling he was able to secure. In another instance, Summers authorized payments of \$12,000 per rig per month for extended drilling rights. Finally, when the company faced a large backlog of outstanding accounts receivable from PDVSA, Summers authorized the payment of a \$30,000 to a third party to be used as a bribe to another PDVSA employee to secure the payment of the receivables.

On February 12, 2005, Benton received a draft report from Summers’ replacement that included details of the improper payments described above, which had been discovered during an audit of Pride’s vendors in Venezuela. Benton deleted from the report all references to the improper payments. Four days later, on February 16, 2005, Benton emailed the new Venezuela country manager regarding Benton’s “cleaned up” version of the draft and advised, “As you continue to improve the Venezuela Vender [*sic*] Review audit, use the attached version to update. All other draft versions should be deleted.” Benton’s follow-up email ensured that his version of the action plan was the version submitted to Pride’s internal and external auditors.

- Mexico

In 2004, in Mexico, a customs official inspected port facilities leased to various local Pride subsidiaries and identified various customs violations related to the importation status of equipment on a supply boat. Benton allegedly authorized a \$10,000 bribe solicited by the customs official in order to garner more favorable treatment regarding these customs violations.

The payment was made in cash through a representative of the customs official and was recorded falsely on Pride's books as an electricity maintenance expense. In December 2004, Benton became aware that one of Pride's customs agents had made a payment of approximately \$15,000 to a Mexican customs official to avoid delays during the exportation process of a Pride rig from Mexico. After the payment was made, the customs agent submitted invoices to a Pride subsidiary in Mexico for fictitious "extra work" that had been performed during the export of the rig, and a Pride manager informed Benton by email that "[n]ow we need to find out a way to justify the extra payment to customs." The invoices were paid and falsely recorded in Pride Mexico's books as payments for customs agency services. Benton did not inform Pride's management, legal department, or internal auditors of the matter and allowed false records to remain on Pride's books and records.

Despite his knowledge and authorization of bribe payments, Benton falsely signed certifications in connection with Pride's 2004 and 2005 annual reports in March 2005 and May 2006, respectively, stating that he had no knowledge of FCPA violations. Benton executed the March 2005 certification less than three weeks after he redacted all references to bribery from the internal audit action plan. "But for Benton's false statements," the SEC concluded, "Pride's management and internal and external auditors would have discovered the bribery schemes and the corresponding false books and records."

○ India

In 2001, India's Commissioner of Customs initiated an administrative action against the Indian branch of a Pride subsidiary, Pride Foramer India, claiming that the entity had intentionally understated the value of a rig it had imported in 1999. After an unfavorable ruling, Pride Foramer India appealed to an administrative tribunal. A France-based in-house lawyer at Pride Forasol S.A.S. was advised by a customs consultant that a payment to one of the administrative judges could secure a favorable result. In 2003, the lawyer authorized three payments totaling \$500,000 to Dubai bank accounts of third-party companies for the benefit of the administrative judge. Later that year, Pride received a favorable ruling overturning the Customs Commissioner's determination. A U.S.-based finance manager of Pride, believing that all or a portion of the payments would be given to a foreign official, authorized recording the payments under a newly created accounting code for "miscellaneous expenses."

○ Kazakhstan

The SEC alleged that in 2004 Pride Forasol made three payments totaling \$160,000 to Panalpina's Kazakh affiliate "while knowing facts that suggested a high probability" that all or a portion of the money would be used as bribes to Kazakh officials in relation to various customs issues. Also in 2004, in connection with a tax audit, Kazakh officials indicated to Pride Forasol Kazakhstan that it could lower its substantial tax liabilities by making a payment to the tax officials. The tax officials instructed the company to retain a particular tax consultant, whom the company ultimately paid \$204,000 while knowing that all or a portion of the funds would be passed on to the tax officials.

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- Nigeria

The SEC alleged that, from 2001 to 2006, Panalpina, acting on behalf of Pride Forasol Nigeria (“Pride Nigeria”), paid NCS officials a series of bribes ranging from \$15,000 to \$93,000 to extend oil rig TIPS in Nigeria and in 2002 paid a NCS official a \$35,000 lump-sum fee to bypass future customs inspections of imported consumable goods. The payment was invoiced and recorded as “handling of consumables.” The SEC also alleged that Pride Nigeria paid at least \$172,000 to tax officials or, later, to a Nigerian tax agent who passed on a portion of the money to tax officials to avoid or reduce outstanding expatriate income taxes. Pride recorded the payments as “expatriate taxes,” “settlement of expatriate taxes,” or “Vat Audit Report Settlement.”

- Saudi Arabia, Libya, and The Congo

The SEC further alleged a series of illicit payments in 2005, including a \$10,000 payment from a petty cash fund to secure a Saudi customs official’s help in expediting customs clearance for an oil rig and a \$8,000 payment to the Congo Merchant Marine to avoid an official penalty for improper oil rig certification. Lastly, the SEC accused Pride Forasol Libya of paying a Libyan Tax Agent \$116,000 to resolve unpaid social security taxes, \$84,000 of which Pride surrendered “without adequate assurances that the Libyan Tax Agent would not pass some or all of these fees to [Libyan social security agency] officials.”

- Tidewater Inc.

Caymans Island corporation Tidewater Inc. (“Tidewater”) and its wholly owned subsidiary Tidewater Marine International, Inc. (“TMII”) settled charges with both the SEC and the DOJ related to alleged bribery of foreign government officials in Azerbaijan and Nigeria. The DOJ charged TMII with conspiring to violate both the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA. Additionally, the DOJ charged TMII with aiding and abetting a violation of the books and records provisions of the FCPA. The SEC separately alleged that Tidewater violated the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.

In 2001, 2003, and 2005, the Azerbaijani Tax Authority initiated tax audits of TMII’s business operations in Azerbaijan. According to both the DOJ and the SEC, TMII paid roughly \$160,000 to a Dubai entity while knowing that some or all of the money would be paid as bribes to Azerbaijani officials to resolve the tax audits in TMII’s favor. TMII received roughly \$820,000 in benefits from these bribes, which it improperly recorded as “payment of taxes,” “tax and legal consultancy,” or agent expenses in a “Crew Travel” account. With the exception of the 2003 “consultancy” fees (which were recorded by a TMII joint venture and were not rolled-up into Tidewater’s financial statements), Tidewater incorporated these records into statements it filed with the SEC.

Additionally, the SEC and the DOJ alleged that, from 2002 to 2007, Tidex Nigeria Limited, a Nigerian company 60% owned by a Tidewater subsidiary, authorized payments totaling \$1.6 million to Panalpina as reimbursements for bribes (described as “intervention” or

“recycling” payments) to NCS employees in exchange for their help in unlawfully extending TIPs and expediting customs clearance for Tidewater vessels. By August 2004, TMII managers and employees were aware of and condoned the payments. The total benefit in avoided costs, duties, and penalties received by TMII in exchange for these payments was approximately \$5.8 million. These payments were improperly recorded as legitimate business expenses by Tidex, whose books and records were consolidated into Tidewater’s SEC filings.

Tidewater and TMII resolved the DOJ’s allegations by entering into a DPA requiring, among other things, that TMII pay a \$7.35 million criminal penalty. Tidewater also resolved the SEC’s allegations by agreeing to a court order enjoining it from violating any provision of the FCPA, disgorging roughly \$7.2 million in profits, paying \$881,146 in prejudgment interest, and paying a \$217,000 civil penalty. On March 3, 2011, Tidewater settled related bribery charges brought by the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission by agreeing to pay a \$6.3 million monetary penalty.

- *Transocean, Inc.*

The DOJ charged Transocean Inc., a Caymans Island subsidiary of Switzerland’s Transocean Ltd. (collectively “Transocean”), with both conspiring to violate and violating the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA. The SEC similarly alleged violations of anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. According to the DOJ, from 2002 to 2007, Transocean conspired to make and made corrupt payments to NCS officials through Panalpina’s courier service to resolve and avoid violations stemming from its oil rigs’ expired TIPs. These bribes, which Transocean improperly recorded as “clearance” expenses, allowed Transocean to gain approximately \$2.13 million in profits during the extended TIP periods. The SEC also claimed that Transocean paid \$207,170 in “intervention” charges to operate its oil rigs without proper paperwork.

Additionally, the DOJ claimed that Transocean used Panalpina’s Pancourier service, which paid “local processing charges” to NCS officials to help Transocean bypass the normal customs clearance process in order to avoid paying official taxes and duties. According to the SEC, Transocean used Pancourier to bypass the normal customs process 404 times and avoid \$1.48 million in customs duties. The SEC also alleged that Transocean used Panalpina to pay \$32,741 to NCS officials in order to expedite the delivery of medicines and other goods.

Transocean, Inc., Transocean Ltd., and the DOJ entered into a three-year DPA that requires, among other things, that Transocean, Inc. pay a \$13.44 million penalty. This penalty is 20% below the minimum penalty suggested by the United States Sentencing Guidelines in recognition of Transocean’s prompt and thorough internal investigation, establishing a team of experienced auditors to oversee FCPA compliance, cooperation with the DOJ and SEC, agreeing to self-monitor and report to the DOJ, and implementation of a revised FCPA compliance policy. Transocean also received credit because a subsidiary of Transocean Ltd., Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling Inc., hired a new chief compliance officer with substantial experience in corporate ethics and anti-corruption compliance policies. Transocean similarly resolved the SEC’s charges, without admitting or denying the allegations, by consenting to a permanent

injunction against violating the FCPA and agreeing to pay nearly \$7.3 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.

- Royal Dutch Shell plc

Royal Dutch Shell plc (“Shell”) and its wholly owned subsidiary, the Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (“SNEPCO”), entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ, while Shell and another wholly owned subsidiary, Shell International Exploration and Production (“SIEP”), agreed to an SEC administrative order. According to the DOJ, SNEPCO and SIEP paid approximately \$2 million to subcontractors (who, in turn, hired Panalpina) knowing that some or all of that money would be used by Panalpina to bribe NCS officials. These payments resulted in roughly \$7 million worth of savings from avoided taxes, duties, and penalties. SNEPCO improperly recorded these payments as “local processing fees” and “administrative/transport charges.” The SEC estimated that these fees and savings were actually higher and claimed that SIEP authorized the payment of approximately \$3.5 million to NCS officials to obtain preferential customs treatment that resulted in roughly \$14 million in additional profits, neither of which were accurately reflected in Shell’s books and records.

The DOJ claimed that “red flags” existed for SNEPCO employees regarding Panalpina’s Pancourier service because it rarely, if ever, provided official documentation of duties or taxes being paid. Additionally, the DOJ alleged that SNEPCO employees developed actual knowledge that Panalpina was paying money to NCS officials because, in 2003 and 2004, a subsea engineering, procurement, installation and commissioning (“EPIC”) contractor explained to SNEPCO employees that Pancourier operated outside the “normal customs clearing process,” reduced customs fees by 85% to 90% by replacing them with “local process fees,” and made it impossible to obtain official receipts to provide evidence of paying customs duties or taxes. In 2004, a Houston-based subsea contract engineer sought advice from two of SNEPCO’s Nigeria-based lawyers on the legality of the Pancourier freight-forwarding service. SNEPCO’s Nigerian lawyers concluded that the “local process fees” were being made in lieu of official customs duties and that “[o]rdinarily, this sort of concession granted by SNEPCO could be extra contractual and illegal.” Numerous other internal communications similarly indicated that SNEPCO and SIEP employees had knowledge that the Pancourier service involved paying bribes to NCS officials.

Despite internal concerns regarding the legality of Panalpina’s freight forwarding services, SNEPCO and SIEP employees continued to authorize the use of the Pancourier service. Additionally, the SNEPCO Bonga Logistics Coordinator informed the Subsea Epic Contractor and Panalpina employees in Nigeria that SNEPCO would reimburse Pancourier invoices containing improper payments to NCS officials if the term “local processing fee” were replaced with the term “administrative/transport charge.” SNEPCO continued to reimburse invoices that used the term “administrative/transport charge” to describe improper payments to NCS officials until around February 2005, at which point Panalpina changed its invoices to simple, non-descriptive flat fees in an effort to better conceal the payments it made on SNEPCO’s behalf. The DOJ did note that certain SNEPCO employees refused to pay some fees absent official documentation, but that these efforts were the exception rather than the rule.

Although SNEPCO was the nominal defendant in the DOJ proceeding, both Shell and SNEPCO jointly entered into the DPA with the DOJ and agreed to share responsibility for the corresponding \$30 million monetary penalty. The SEC alleged a similar agent relationship between SIEP and Shell to hold Shell accountable for actions taken by Panalpina. Shell and SIEP resolved the related administrative action brought by the SEC by agreeing to cease and desist from further FCPA violations and pay approximately \$18.1 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest.

- *Noble Corporation*

Unlike several of the companies discussed above, Switzerland-based Noble Corporation (“Noble”), an issuer whose stock trades on the New York Stock Exchange, was able to secure an NPA, rather than a DPA, from the DOJ relating to corrupt payments to NCS officials. Noble entered into a three-year NPA with the DOJ on behalf of the Cayman-based Noble Corporation, which became a wholly owned subsidiary of Noble through a 2009 stock transaction. Prior to the stock transaction, the Cayman corporation was also an issuer within the meaning of the FCPA. This enforcement actions stem primarily from the actions of a group of Nigeria-based, wholly owned subsidiaries of the Cayman corporation (collectively “Noble Nigeria”) that became wholly owned subsidiaries of Noble during the 2009 stock transaction.

As part of the NPA, Noble admitted that, from 2003 to 2007, it utilized a Nigerian customs agent to submit false paperwork on Noble Nigeria’s behalf to extend expired TIPs and conduct paper moves of oil rigs located in Nigerian waters. In 2004, as part of its compliance program, Noble initiated an audit of its West Africa Division, which included the operations of Noble Nigeria. This audit uncovered Noble Nigeria’s paper move process, and in July 2004, the Audit Committee was advised the paper process would be discontinued. Despite this, by February 2005, Noble personnel determined that alternatives to the paper process were too expensive and time-consuming and chose to resume the paper process. Five subsequent paper moves occurred between roughly May 2005 and March 2006. During those paper moves, certain Noble and Noble Nigeria managers authorized Noble Nigeria to funnel roughly \$74,000 in “special handling charges” through a Nigerian customs agent to NCS officials to avoid complications and costs associated with expired TIPs. By extending its TIPs through paper moves, Noble avoided \$2.97 million in costs, duties, and penalties. Noble improperly recorded these “special handling charges” as “facilitation payments” in its books and records.

Noble’s Audit Committee was not notified of the resumption of the paper process, and Noble’s Head of Internal Audit repeatedly excluded information regarding the process from reports and presentations to the Audit Committee and affirmatively misled the Audit Committee regarding the company’s FCPA compliance. In 2007, the Audit Committee became aware that a competitor had initiated an internal investigation of its import process in Nigeria, and Noble responded by engaging outside counsel to conduct a review of its own conduct. Noble subsequently voluntarily disclosed its conduct to the DOJ and the SEC. Under the NPA, Noble agreed to a \$2.59 million monetary penalty. The DOJ expressly recognized Noble’s voluntary, timely, and complete disclosure of the misconduct, the quality of its remedial measures, and its full cooperation with the DOJ’s investigation.

In its parallel enforcement action, the SEC alleged that the FCPA policy Noble had in place during the period of alleged misconduct lacked sufficient procedures, training, and internal controls to prevent payments made to NCS officials to obtain TIPs and TIP extensions. To support this conclusion, the SEC cited Noble's 2004 internal audit, which both uncovered the use of payments to obtain TIPs and TIP extensions and concluded that Noble Nigeria personnel did not understand the relevant provisions of the FCPA. In particular, the SEC claimed that Noble's personnel did not understand the concept of "facilitating payments" and that its internal controls were insufficient to prevent what the SEC considered bribes as being recorded as facilitating payments. Noble settled FCPA anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls charges with the SEC, without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, by consenting to a court order enjoining it from violating the FCPA, disgorging roughly \$4.3 million, and paying roughly \$1.3 million in judgment interest.

o *SEC Enforcement Action against Noble Executives*

On February 24, 2012, the SEC filed charges against (i) Noble's former President, CEO and Chairman (and previously, CFO and COO), Mark A. Jackson, (ii) Noble's highest executive in Nigeria, James J. Ruehlen (Division Manager of Noble Nigeria), and (iii) former Noble Director of Internal Audit, Vice President of Internal Audit, and Corporate Controller, Thomas F. O'Rourke, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas. The SEC complaints allege that the Noble executives violated and/or aided and abetted violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions among other offenses. The SEC charged Jackson and Ruehlen together and O'Rourke separately.

According to the SEC complaint, Jackson and Ruehlen were directly involved in arranging, facilitating, approving, making, or concealing payments made by Noble to NCS officials in connection with the paper process Noble Nigeria used to secure TIPs and TIP extensions. The SEC alleged that Ruehlen would obtain a price proposal from customs agents detailing the costs associated with obtaining a TIP or a TIP extension, including the "special handling" or "procurement" charges that would not have any supporting documentation. Ruehlen then allegedly sought authorization for, and Jackson authorized, payments to NCS officials. According to the SEC, Jackson and Ruehlen were aware that portions or all of the "special handling" charges were being passed along to NCS officials. Altogether, the SEC alleged that Jackson and Ruehlen participated in paying hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes to obtain 11 permits and 29 permit extensions.

Jackson and Ruehlen allegedly concealed payments to government officials by orchestrating an elaborate trail of false invoices that disguised the payments as shipping fees, handling charges, and tax. Despite orchestrating this false paperwork, Jackson and Ruehlen signed quarterly representation letters to Noble's upper management falsely stating that Noble Nigeria had complied with Noble's code of business conduct and internal controls, not violated any laws or regulations, and not violated the FCPA. Jackson, as CFO of Noble Nigeria, also signed quarterly and annual certifications that falsely represented that he had maintained effective internal controls and was unaware of any material weakness or fraud or suspected fraud affecting Noble and signed false personal certifications that were attached to Noble's quarterly

annual public filings. When Noble's internal audit contacted Ruehlen expressing concern over FCPA compliance in its West Africa Division, Ruehlen had the customs agent involved in the payment scheme sign false, backdated FCPA compliance certifications. Even after Noble hired a new CFO to replace Jackson, Ruehlen was able to continue to receive CFO approval for payments to government officials by representing the payments as "the same as we have paid in the past for [the temporary import] process." The SEC alleged that, by making false certifications and by concealing payments to government officials as legitimate operating expenses, Jackson and Ruehlen knowingly circumvented Noble's internal controls, knowingly created false books and records, and caused Noble's financial statements to be inaccurate.

The SEC complaint alleged that Jackson and Ruehlen directly violated the FCPA's anti-bribery and internal controls and false records provisions and aided and abetted Noble's violations of the FCPA's books and records and internal controls provisions. Additionally, the SEC alleged that Jackson signed false personal certifications attached to annual and quarterly Noble public filings, violated the provision of the Exchange Act that deals with issuing false or misleading statements to investors, and that Jackson was liable as a control person for violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions by Noble, Ruehlen, and O'Rourke.

Jackson and Ruehlen have both denied the SEC's allegations. Ruehlen's lawyer also stated that he was "disappointed" in the SEC for charging Ruehlen when Ruehlen himself was the individual who had initially raised concerns about the paper process internally at Noble and had "fully cooperated throughout the [SEC's] investigation." On May 8, 2012, Jackson and Ruehlen both filed motions to dismiss that, separately, argued that the SEC had ignored the FCPA's exception for facilitation payments and argued nevertheless that the SEC's claims were time-barred.

On December 11, 2012, the defendants' motions were granted in part and denied in part. First, the court declined to dismiss the entire complaint on the basis of the defendants' facilitation payment arguments. Although U.S. District Judge Ellison agreed with the defendants that the FCPA required the SEC to allege that the activities in question were not facilitation payments as a threshold pleading requirement — which itself is an interesting aspect to the case — he found that the SEC had met that burden in its complaint. Judge Ellison reasoned that though the FCPA "specifically included 'obtaining permits' as an example of the type of action that typically qualifies as routine, the Court interprets the example to refer to obtaining permits to which one is properly entitled." Because the SEC had alleged that the defendants sought to obtain the TIPs using false paperwork in violation of Nigerian law, the SEC met its burden in pleading that the defendants had not sought to speed "the proper performance of a foreign official's duties."

Judge Ellison granted the defendants' motions as to the SEC's older claims, but granted the SEC leave to re-file. The Judge noted in particular that the fraudulent concealment and continuing violation rules might be applicable to toll the statutes.

The SEC filed an amended complaint on January 25, 2013, but following the Supreme Court's holding in *Gabelli v. SEC* on February 27, 2013 regarding the inapplicability of the discovery rule in connection with civil penalty actions, the SEC filed a second amended complaint on March 25, 2013 that dropped requests for civil penalties for violations that occurred prior to May 12, 2006.

In July 2014, Jackson and Ruehlen settled with SEC. Without admitting or denying the allegations of the amended complaint, both defendants consented to a final judgment that only prohibited them from further violations of the FCPA.

O'Rourke also settled with the SEC. The SEC complaint against O'Rourke alleged that he directly violated the FCPA's internal controls and false records provisions and aided and abetted Noble's violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions. Specifically, the SEC alleged that O'Rourke permitted and/or failed to prevent "special handling charges" from being improperly entered into Noble Nigeria's books and records as legitimate operating expenses. The SEC also emphasized that O'Rourke's positions within Noble Nigeria (Director of Internal Audit, Controller, and Vice President of Internal Audit) indicate that he personally reviewed and approved requests from Noble Nigeria to pay "special handling charges" for false paperwork TIPs. Without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, O'Rourke consented to the entry of a court order requiring him to pay a \$35,000 penalty and permanently enjoying him from future violations of the FCPA.

#### ***ABB Ltd., Fernando Basurto & John O'Shea***

On September 29, 2010, ABB Ltd. ("ABB") resolved U.S. authorities' investigation into FCPA violations related to the company's activities in Mexico and the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Programme. According to U.S. authorities, ABB and its subsidiaries made at least \$2.7 million in improper payments in exchange for business that generated more than \$100 million in revenues. ABB is a Swiss engineering company that is an issuer under the FCPA because its American Depositary Receipts are publicly traded on the New York Stock Exchange. Previously, in July 2004, ABB and two subsidiaries had resolved unrelated DOJ and SEC FCPA investigations by paying a \$10.5 million criminal penalty, disgorging \$5.9 million in ill-gotten gains and prejudgment interest, and engaging an independent consultant to review ABB's internal controls. (Vetco International Ltd. subsequently acquired one of the subsidiaries, and this same subsidiary and three other Vetco International subsidiaries would later plead guilty to additional FCPA violations and pay more than \$30 million in combined criminal fines.)

ABB's U.S. subsidiary, ABB Inc. — a domestic concern under the FCPA — pleaded guilty to violating, and conspiring to violate, the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. ABB Inc. received a criminal fine of \$17.1 million. ABB itself entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ, paid a monetary penalty of \$1.9 million, and consented to the filing of a criminal information against its Jordanian subsidiary, ABB Ltd. – Jordan, for conspiring with an unnamed employee and unknown others to violate the FCPA's books and records provision by failing to accurately record kickbacks relating to the Oil-for-Food Programme. In the DPA, ABB also agreed to "enhanced" compliance obligations, including: (i) the use of chief, regional, and

country compliance officers; (ii) the retention of legal counsel for compliance; (iii) the ongoing performance of “risk-based, targeted, in-depth anti-bribery audits of business units” according to an agreed-upon work plan; (iv) the use of “full and thorough” pre-acquisition anti-corruption due diligence; (v) changes to its business model to eliminate the use of agents wherever possible; (vi) thorough anti-corruption due diligence of all third-party representatives; (vi) country-specific approval processes for gifts, travel, and entertainment; and (viii) biannual reporting to the DOJ, SEC, and U.S. Probation Office.

Under the DPA, the parties had agreed to steeper fines; however, at sentencing, Judge Lynn Hughes of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, noting that “the guidelines are just guidelines,” reduced the culpability score by two points, leading to a reduction in ABB Inc.’s fine from the \$28.5 million contemplated in ABB’s DPA and ABB Inc.’s plea agreement to \$17.1 million. Judge Hughes appeared to take issue with the DOJ’s contention that ABB should be punished more harshly as a recidivist because different individuals were involved in the charged misconduct than were involved in the misconduct leading to ABB’s 2004 guilty plea. The DOJ’s contention that this was irrelevant given that ABB’s compliance procedures had failed (or simply did not exist) in both instances fell on deaf ears: “[The DOJ is] arguing that somehow ABB is more culpable and it should be punished more severely because it didn’t have procedures,” Judge Hughes stated at the hearing. “My point is procedures don’t work.”

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, ABB agreed to disgorge \$22,804,262 in ill-gotten gains and pre-judgment interest to the SEC, pay a \$16,510,000 civil penalty, and report periodically to the SEC on the status of its remediation and compliance efforts. The combined monetary penalties against ABB Ltd. and its subsidiaries exceeded \$58 million.

As is common in negotiated FCPA dispositions, the parent company — here, ABB — was able to avoid a criminal conviction through the DPA and pleas by its subsidiaries. ABB Inc., although a wholly owned subsidiary of ABB Ltd., was treated as a stand-alone domestic concern under the anti-bribery provisions, and ABB Ltd. – Jordan (through its own subsidiary ABB Near East Trading Ltd.) was guilty of an FCPA books and records conspiracy because its books were rolled into ABB Ltd.’s books at the end of the fiscal year. In support of its agreement to the DPA with ABB, the DOJ stated that it considered, among other things, the fact that ABB Ltd.’s “cooperation during this investigation has been extraordinary,” ABB Ltd. “conducted and continues to conduct” an “extensive, global review of its operations and has reported on areas of concern to the Fraud Section [of the DOJ] and the SEC,” and “following the discovery of the bribery, ABB Ltd. and ABB Inc. voluntarily and timely disclosed to the Fraud Section and the [SEC] the misconduct.”

ABB had announced that it voluntarily disclosed to the DOJ and SEC suspected FCPA violations involving employees of ABB subsidiaries in Asia, South America, and Europe in 2007. In December 2008, ABB announced the accrual of an \$850 million total charge for the expected resolutions of a European anti-competition investigation and the DOJ and SEC FCPA investigations.

- Mexican Bribery Scheme

ABB Network Management (“ABB NM”), a Texas-based business unit of ABB, Inc., allegedly bribed officials of two electric utilities owned by the government of Mexico, Comisión Federal de Electricidad (“CFE”) and Luz y Fuerza del Centro (“LyFZ”), between 1997 and 2004. ABB NM, through an agent, Grupo Internacional de Asesores S.A. (“Grupo”) and two other Mexican companies serving as intermediaries, allegedly provided checks, wire transfers, cash, and a Mediterranean cruise vacation to officials and their spouses. ABB failed to conduct due diligence on the transactions, which were improperly recorded on ABB’s books as commissions and payments for services in Mexico. As part of its guilty plea, ABB, Inc., admitted that ABB NM paid approximately \$1.9 million in bribes to CFE officials alone between 1997 and 2004. Such improper payments resulted in contracts from CFE and LyFZ that generated \$13 million in profits on \$90 million in revenues for ABB.

ABB NM’s primary business involved providing electrical products and services to electrical utilities around the world, many of which are described as state-owned. ABB NM worked with Grupo on a commission basis to obtain contracts from Mexican governmental utilities, including CFE. John Joseph O’Shea, the General Manager of ABB NM, and Fernando Maya Basurto, a principal of Grupo, allegedly conspired with a number of individuals and intermediary companies to make illegal payments to various officials at CFE. In return, ABB

NM secured two contracts with CFE that generated revenues of over \$80 million. A number of different schemes were used to make and conceal the corrupt payments.

In or around December 1997, ABB NM obtained the SITRACEN Contract from CFE to provide significant improvements to Mexico’s electrical network system. The SITRACEN contract generated over \$44 million in revenue for ABB NM. During the bidding process, certain CFE officials informed Basurto and O’Shea that in order to receive the contract, they would have to make corrupt payments. O’Shea arranged for these payments to be made in two ways. First, he authorized ABB NM to make payments for the benefit of various CFE officials to an intermediary company that was incorporated in Panama and headquartered in Mexico. Second, O’Shea authorized Basurto and an individual identified as Co-Conspirator X, who was also a principal of Grupo, to make payments to a particular CFE official by issuing checks to family members of this official.

In or around October 2003, O’Shea and Basurto conspired with Co-Conspirator X and CFE officials to ensure that ABB NM received the Evergreen Contract, an extension of the earlier SITRACEN Contract, and that the contract contained certain terms that were favorable to ABB NM. In return, Basurto and O’Shea agreed that the officials would receive 10% of the revenue generated by the Evergreen Contract. The Evergreen Contract generated over \$37 million in revenue for ABB NM.

Over the course of the Evergreen Contract, ABB NM allegedly utilized Basurto and Grupo to funnel approximately \$1 million in bribes to various CFE officials. The co-conspirators referred to these payments as “payments to the Good Guys.” In order to make these payments, O’Shea caused the wire transfer of funds from ABB NM, often in a series of small

transactions, to Basurto and his family members. Basurto then received instructions from a CFE official as to how and where the funds should be transferred. Basurto wired some of the funds to a Merrill Lynch brokerage account, a portion of which the CFE official then transferred to his brother, and a separate portion of which he transferred to the son-in-law of another official. The official also provided instructions to Basurto regarding the funds that were not sent to the Merrill Lynch account; these funds were used, among other things, for a \$20,000 cash payment to the official. The charging documents further allege that \$29,500 was wired to the U.S. bank account of a military academy to pay for the tuition expenses of the son of a CFE official.

The conspirators attempted to conceal the corrupt nature of the payments by creating false invoices from two companies headquartered in Mexico. It is alleged that O'Shea, fully aware of the false nature and corrupt purposes of these invoices, approved their payment and had funds from ABB NM wire-transferred to accounts in Germany and Mexico and held by intermediary companies in order to make the payments. The conspirators referred to these payments as a "Third World Tax."

Basurto and an unnamed Co-Conspirator X received approximately 9% of the value of the SITRACEN and Evergreen Contracts for all of the services that they performed for ABB NM, both legitimate and illegal in nature. A portion of those commissions was also apparently used to make kickback payments to O'Shea. In order to keep the true nature of the kickback payments hidden, Basurto and Co-Conspirator X made them from a number of different bank accounts and to a number of different payees. These payees included O'Shea himself, his friends and family members, and his American Express credit card bill.

Upon discovering evidence of corrupt payments made by ABB NM, ABB Ltd. conducted an internal investigation and voluntarily disclosed the potential violations to the DOJ, SEC, and Mexican authorities. In August 2004, ABB Ltd. terminated O'Shea's employment.

After O'Shea's termination, Basurto, O'Shea, and other conspirators attempted to conceal their actions and thereby obstruct the DOJ's investigation in a number of ways. Basurto and O'Shea worked with certain CFE Officials to create false, backdated correspondence that was designed to show a legitimate history of business relationships between ABB NM and the two Mexican intermediary companies. This correspondence also purported to justify the false invoices submitted by the Mexican intermediary companies as part of the "Third World Tax" scheme. The indictment cites to an e-mail apparently sent by O'Shea that instructs Basurto to "never deliver or e-mail electronic copies of any of these documents" for fear that the electronic versions' metadata would have revealed their true date of composition.

Basurto and certain CFE officials also created false work product and documentation relating to the work for which the false invoices purported to claim payment. They plagiarized a study that had been previously commissioned by CFE from legitimate outside consultants and represented the plagiarized study as being authored by one of the Mexican intermediary companies. These CFE officials also created documentation that indicated that the funds that had been transferred to the Merrill Lynch bank account as part of the "Good Guys" scheme were part of a legitimate real estate investment. Finally, O'Shea avoided meeting Basurto in particular

locations and avoided using his personal telephone or work e-mail address to communicate with Basurto in an attempt to conceal the alleged conduct.

- *Oil-for-Food Kickbacks*

From 2000 to 2004, ABB also participated in the U.N.'s Oil-for-Food Programme for Iraq ("OFFP"). Six ABB subsidiaries participated in the program and allegedly paid more than \$300,000 in kickbacks to the Iraqi government in exchange for at least 11 purchase orders from entities connected to the Iraqi Electrical Commission under the OFFP. The kickbacks were allegedly paid through ABB's subsidiary in Jordan, ABB Near East Trading Ltd. ABB improperly recorded the kickbacks, some of which were in cash, on its books as legal payments for after-sales services, consulting, and commissions. According to the SEC, ABB secured Oil-for-Food contracts that generated \$3.8 million in profits on \$13.5 million in revenues.

- *Prosecutions of Individuals*

The DOJ has charged several individuals in connection with the Mexican bribery scheme described above. On November 18, 2009, U.S. authorities arrested O'Shea, charging him with criminal conspiracy, twelve counts of violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, four counts of money laundering, and falsification of records in a federal investigation. The DOJ is also seeking the forfeiture of more than \$2.9 million in criminal proceeds from the offenses and any money or property illegally laundered.

On September 30, 2010, Judge Hughes ordered the government to proceed to trial on the FCPA charges alone, after which the court would schedule a trial on the remaining charges if necessary; in so ordering, the court considered the non-FCPA charges to be "derivative" of the "substantive" FCPA counts and expressed concern that a trial on all of the charges might result in the defendant being "pilloried by other stuff that's not part of the substantive counts."

In March 2011, O'Shea filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the DOJ's assertion that CFE employees are "foreign officials" under the FCPA. In opposition, the DOJ argued that O'Shea's challenge was premature at pre-trial because it was premised on a question of fact. The DOJ further argued that its definition of "foreign official" was supported by the plain language and legislative history of the FCPA as well as relevant case law. On January 3, 2012, Judge Hughes denied O'Shea's motion to dismiss in a single sentence, without explanation, as part of a management order addressing several other issues. In the same management order, the Court took judicial notice of three facts relating to the governmental nature of the CFE, including that the CFE holds a monopoly over the public service of electricity, that the President of Mexico appoints the General Director of the CFE, and that the governing board of the CFE includes Secretaries of the Mexican Ministry of Energy, Mines, and State-Owned Industry. Along with (i) Nguyen & Nexus Technologies, (ii) Haiti Teleco, (iii) Lindsey Manufacturing, and (iv) Carson, the O'Shea case marked the fifth challenge to the definition of "foreign official" under the FCPA. All five challenges have failed.

Although he lost on his motion to dismiss based on the definition of "foreign official," O'Shea soon won his case. After one week of trial in January 2012, the Court granted O'Shea's

motion to dismiss the twelve FCPA counts and one conspiracy count against him. Pinpointing the weakness in the government's case, Judge Hughes explained that, "The problem here is that the principal witness against O'Shea is Basurto, Jr., who knows almost nothing . . . His answers were abstract and vague, generally relating gossip. And as I indicated, even hearsay testimony must be something other than a conclusion." On February 9, 2012, the remaining counts against O'Shea for conspiracy, money laundering, and obstruction were dismissed.

Basurto — the star witness who knew "almost nothing" — was O'Shea's and ABB's sales agent in Mexico. A January 2009 criminal complaint alleged that Basurto, a Mexican citizen, illegally structured transactions to avoid triggering financial institutions' reporting requirements. In June 2009, Basurto was indicted for that offense. In November 2009, however, he agreed to cooperate fully with the United States and pleaded guilty to one count of conspiring with O'Shea and others to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, launder money, and obstruct justice. While he faced up to five years of incarceration, Basurto was released on bail in July 2011 after spending 22 months in prison. In April 2012, after all charges against O'Shea had been dropped, Basurto was sentenced to time served and released. According to the terms of his plea agreement, Basurto will forfeit roughly \$2 million in illegal profits.

The directors of Grupo, Enrique and Angela Aguilar, were separately indicted for their role in another alleged FCPA offense involving Grupo on September 15, 2010. Enrique Aguilar was charged with anti-bribery violations, conspiracy to violate the FCPA, money laundering, and conspiracy to commit money laundering. Angela Aguilar was charged only with the money laundering-related offenses. Their cases are discussed separately below in connection with the Lindsey Manufacturing disposition.

### ***Lindsey Manufacturing, Enrique & Angela Aguilar***

On May 21, 2011, Lindsey Manufacturing Company ("Lindsey Manufacturing"), Dr. Keith E. Lindsey (President and majority owner, Lindsey Manufacturing), and Steve K. Lee (Vice President, Lindsey Manufacturing) (collectively, "Lindsey Defendants") were convicted by a federal jury on one count each of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and five substantive counts of violating the FCPA in connection with bribes paid to officials of the Mexican state-owned electric utility company, Comisión Federal de Electricidad ("CFE"). The jury conviction of Lindsey Manufacturing was the first ever conviction of a company by jury trial under the FCPA. However, on December 1, 2011, following a post-conviction motion from the Lindsey Defendants, U.S. District Judge Howard Matz vacated the convictions of the Lindsey Defendants and dismissed the case with prejudice, citing pervasive government misconduct in the investigation and prosecution of the case. While he did not make a finding of actual innocence, Judge Matz found that the conduct of the government, taken as a whole, was egregious and that dismissal could serve as a deterrent for similar behavior on the part of the government.

Judge Matz focused in particular on his findings that the government allowed a key FBI agent to provide material false testimony to the grand jury, included material falsehoods in affidavits in support of search warrants, improperly reviewed potentially privileged information between a defendant in her lawyer, improperly withheld documents from the defense, and

engaged in questionable behavior in examining witnesses and providing closing arguments. Although the DOJ initially appealed Judge Matz's dismissal of its case, on May 25, 2012, the DOJ voluntarily dismissed its appeal and thereby officially dropped its prosecution of the Lindsey Defendants.

Despite the ultimate failure of the prosecution, a review of the substantive allegations underlying the charges against the Lindsey Defendants is a valuable exercise, particularly considering the relative rarity of FCPA cases proceeding to jury trial.

On October 21, 2010, a federal grand in Los Angeles returned a superseding indictment against the Lindsey Defendants as well as Enrique Faustino Aguilar Noriega and his wife, Angela Maria Gomez Aguilar, both directors of Grupo Internacional de Asesores S.A. ("Grupo"). Grupo is a Panamanian company serving as a commercial agent for transactions with CFE, a government owned Mexican electrical utility. The indictment alleged that the Aguilars laundered money from Lindsey Manufacturing, a privately held company that manufactures emergency restoration systems and other equipment supporting the electrical utility industry, to pay bribes to the head of CFE.

The FCPA conspiracy for which the Lindsey Defendants had been convicted began in or around February 2002 and continued until March 2009. Beginning in 2002, Lindsey Manufacturing hired Grupo as its sales representative in Mexico. Mr. and Mrs. Aguilar, as directors of Grupo, were to assist the company in obtaining business from CFE and served as the intermediaries for payments between Lindsey Manufacturing and CFE. The indictment alleged that Grupo was hired because of Mr. Aguilar's close personal relationship with certain government officials, in particular the Sub-Director of Operations and Director of Operations, and others, at CFE during the period in question.

The government had alleged that Lindsey Manufacturing agreed to pay Grupo a 30% commission on all contracts obtained from CFE, a significantly higher rate than the company had paid to its previous representatives. The government had also alleged that for each CFE contract Lindsey Manufacturing won, Lindsey Manufacturing then inflated its invoices to CFE by thirty percent so that CFE bore the full cost of the "commissions" paid to the Aguilars, which the government contended the co-conspirators knew would be passed on, in whole or in part, as bribes to CFE officials. As a result, CFE ultimately would pay the costs of the bribes paid to its own officials. Further, to hide the unusually large percentage of the Grupo's commission, the government alleged that the Aguilars created false invoices to Lindsey Manufacturing purporting to show that only 15% of the contract price as paid to Grupo as a true commission on the CFE contracts and the other 15% was paid to Grupo for additional services, which the government contended were fictitious. Specifically, the government identified 29 separate wire transfers from Lindsey to Grupo that included more than \$5.9 million in allegedly improper payments for CFE officials.

The government further alleged several improper payments beyond these wire transfers. In July 2006, Mr. Aguilar began using funds from Grupo's Houston brokerage account to pay the monthly American Express credit card bill of a CFE executive, Nestor Moreno. When

instructing the Houston brokerage firm to make these regular payments, Mr. Aguilar justified the payments from Grupo's accounts by falsely explaining that the head of CFE was the brother-in-law of Grupo's owner.

In August 2006, Mr. Aguilar purchased an 82-foot, \$1.8 million yacht, *Dream Seeker*, which he then gave to Mr. Moreno. To complete this purchase, Mr. Aguilar used funds from Grupo as well as funds from the Swiss bank account of another company, Sorvill International S.A. ("Sorvill"), which was also controlled by the Aguilars.

In early 2007, the Aguilars purchased a 2005 Ferrari Spider for \$297,500 from Ferrari of Beverly Hills, using funds from Grupo's Houston account and from Sorvill's Swiss account. According to an affidavit filed with the court, Angela Aguilar authorized Mr. Moreno to take possession of the new Ferrari. Mr. Aguilar also purchased a car insurance policy for the Ferrari in his name, but that listed Mr. Moreno as the Ferrari's driver. And in March 2007, Mr. Aguilar wired \$45,000 from Sorvill's Swiss bank account to an escrow account at Banner Bank on behalf of Moreno's half brother.

The Aguilars also allegedly funneled cash to a second CFE executive, Arturo Hernandez CFE Director of Operations until 2007 (when Moreno took that job). In November 2006, Mr. Aguilar allegedly transferred \$500,000 from Grupo's Houston brokerage account into accounts at Banco Popular controlled by Hernandez. False documentation allegedly purported to show that the first \$250,000 was for a female relative of Hernandez, while the second \$250,000 was for a male relative of Hernandez. Aguilar allegedly supplied documentation falsely indicating that Hernandez's relatives were Grupo employees being paid for "professional services advice." Additionally, in March 2007, Aguilar allegedly caused \$100,000 in "consulting fees" to be transferred to bank accounts benefiting Mr. Hernandez, although the fees were ostensibly earned by, and paid to, Hernandez's mother and brother.

### ***James H. Giffen and Mercator Corporation***

On August 6, 2010, The Mercator Corporation ("Mercator"), a merchant bank with offices in New York, pleaded guilty in federal court to one count of making an unlawful payment to a senior government official of the Republic of Kazakhstan in violation of the FCPA. Mercator was sentenced to a \$32,000 fine and a \$400 assessment and agreed to withdraw and relinquish any and all right, title, or interest in a series of Swiss bank accounts, including \$84 million frozen by the Swiss government and subject to a civil forfeiture action.

More than seven years earlier, Mercator's CEO and principal shareholder, now 69-year-old James H. Giffen, had been indicted on 62 counts linked to activities in Kazakhstan. The indictment charged Giffen with a criminal conspiracy to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and to commit mail and wire fraud, violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, mail and wire fraud, money laundering, conspiracy to commit money laundering, and filing false personal income tax returns. In announcing the April 2003 indictment, the DOJ alleged that Giffen had made "more than \$78 million in unlawful payments to two senior officials of the Republic of Kazakhstan in connection with six separate oil transactions, in which the American

oil companies Mobil Oil, Amoco, Texaco and Phillips Petroleum acquired valuable oil and gas rights in Kazakhstan.”

However, by 2010, those multiple serious charges had been reduced to one relatively minor charge, willful failure to supply information regarding foreign bank accounts in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203, to which Giffen pled guilty in a Manhattan federal district court. Specifically, Giffen admitted that he had failed to disclose his control of an \$84 million Swiss bank account on his March 1997 income tax return.

For his guilty plea on the one remaining charge, Giffen still faced a statutory maximum imprisonment of up to a \$25,000 fine, up to one year in federal prison, or both. However, on November 2010, the sentencing judge essentially repudiated the government’s charges by sentencing Giffen — who had been released on a personal recognizance bond after his 2003 arrest — to “time served” and to pay a total lump-sum assessment of only \$25. How a high-profile bribery indictment involving tens of millions of dollars ended with a fine less than most parking tickets is a story with as many twists as the spy novels to which it has been compared.

Giffen was the Chairman of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, and principal shareholder of Mercator Corporation, a New York-based merchant bank. Giffen and Mercator represented the Kazakh government in connection with a series of large oil and gas rights negotiations. Giffen held the title of counselor to the President of Kazakhstan, and he and Mercator provided Kazakh officials with advice on strategic planning, investment priorities, and attracting foreign investment to the Kazakh government. Between 1995 and 2000, Mercator was awarded \$69 million in success fees for helping to broker large oil and gas deals between U.S. oil companies and the Kazakh government.

The DOJ alleged that, between 1995 and 2000, Giffen caused at least four U.S. oil companies — Mobil Oil, Texaco, Amoco, and Phillips Petroleum — to make payments totaling approximately \$70 million into escrow accounts in connection with some of Kazakhstan’s most lucrative oil and gas projects, in particular the Tengiz field, one of the world’s largest oil fields, and the Karachaganak field, one of the world’s largest gas condensate fields. Then, through a series of sham transactions with two Swiss banks, Giffen was able to divert these payments into secret Swiss bank accounts beneficially held for two Kazakh government officials. For example, in 1996, Mobil Oil purchased a 25% stake in the large Tengiz oil field in Kazakhstan and agreed to pay Giffen the success fee he was owed by the Kazakh government for helping to broker the deal. Giffen diverted \$22 million of this fee into secret Swiss bank accounts and made unlawful payments to two government officials out of the accounts.

According to the criminal information filed and to which Mercator pleaded guilty in 2010, Giffen used parts of the \$67 million in success fees and the \$70 million diverted to the Swiss bank to make unlawful payments to three senior, unnamed Kazakh government officials (KO-1, KO-2, and KO-3). The funds were also used to purchase luxury goods — notably two snowmobiles — for KO-1, KO-2, and KO-3. In 2004, prosecutors identified one of the recipients of Giffen’s bribes as Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev, the oligarchic ruler of that country since its independence in 1991.

Few predicted that Giffen would emerge from this case after seven years with a guilty plea merely to a relatively paltry tax-related misdemeanor, a charge that has been described as “a face-saver for the government.” But Giffen’s defense strategy was both bold and novel: Giffen sought discovery in support of a possible public authority defense, claiming that the U.S. government had effectively authorized his conduct through its secret intelligence agencies.

The discovery requests, sustained over government objection, triggered the Classified Information Procedures Act (“CIPA”) procedures that govern the handling of classified information in federal trials. As a result, there followed a complicated series of discovery tie-ups, including *in camera* judicial reviews of classified documents and the government’s unsuccessful interlocutory appeal of the District Court’s denial of its motion *in limine* to preclude Giffen from presenting a public authority defense. As the Second Circuit recognized, “regulating Giffen’s access to classified information has presented the district court with a significant challenge.”

During Giffen’s November 19, 2010 sentencing, media reports indicate that U.S. District Judge William Pauley took the dramatic and unusual step of praising Giffen from the bench for approximately 20 minutes, describing Giffen as a patriot and voluntary instrument of U.S. foreign policy during and after the Cold War. The judge admonished the government for prosecuting a case for seven years that, the judge said, should never have been brought, and he commended “the prosecutors for having the courage to take another look at this case.” The judge further reportedly noted that since his initial arrest, Giffen’s fortune had shrunk, not only from the \$10 million bail he had posted until prosecutors dropped the serious charges in 2010, but also from enormous legal bills that forced him to cut staff from his company, Mercator, even while the Government of Kazakhstan continued to consult with him. Expressing deep sympathy with Giffen’s long and expensive legal battle at the twilight of his career, the judge asked rhetorically, “In the end, at the age of 69, how does Mr. Giffen reclaim his good name and reputation?” The judge then reportedly stated, “This court begins that process by acknowledging his service.”

According to the judge, with access “to the highest levels of the Soviet Union,” Giffen acted as “a conduit for secret communications to the Soviet Union and its leadership during the Cold War” and, later, as a “trusted adviser to Kazakhstan’s president,” all while advancing American “strategic interests.” The judge continued, “These [Kazakh] relationships, built up over a lifetime, were lost the day of his arrest.” In these and other comments, the Judge showed that he had been thoroughly persuaded by Giffen’s defense and by the many still-classified U.S. diplomatic and intelligence documents reviewed by the Judge alone, although the Judge did not divulge any specifics learned from those documents.

Giffen’s alleged activities are also at the core of the civil litigation filed by businessman Jack Grynberg against BP, Statoil, British Gas, and others with the European Commission. Grynberg alleges in his civil suit that BP, Statoil and the other defendants paid approximately \$12 million in bribes to Kazakh officials through Giffen.

Giffen's \$84 million Swiss bank account had also been the focus of a 2007 civil forfeiture action brought in U.S. District Court of Manhattan. The account was in the name of Condor Capital Management, a corporation controlled by Giffen and incorporated in the British Virgin Islands. The \$84 million was allegedly related to unlawful payments to senior Kazakh officials involved in oil and gas transactions arranged by Mercator Corporation in Kazakhstan. However, the forfeiture action failed because a special 2007 agreement among the governments of the United States, Switzerland, and Kazakhstan specifically designated the funds to be used by a Kazakh NGO benefiting underprivileged Kazakh children.

### *General Electric*

On July 27, 2010, General Electric Company ("GE"), agreed to settle FCPA books and records and internal controls charges with the SEC for its involvement in a \$3.6 million kickback scheme as part of the now infamous Iraqi Oil-for-Food Programme. GE agreed to pay \$23.4 million in fines, disgorgement, and interest to settle the charges against it as well as two wholly owned subsidiaries for which GE had assumed liability through acquisition — Ionics, Inc. and Amersham plc ("Amersham"). In addition, GE, Ionics, Inc. (now GE Ionics, Inc.) and Amersham (now GE Healthcare Ltd.) consented to the entry of a court order enjoining them from future violations of the FCPA books and records and internal control provisions.

The allegations in the SEC's complaint involve separate schemes by two subsidiaries of GE (Marquette-Hellige and OEC-Medical Systems (Europa) AG ("OEC Medical")) and two subsidiaries of companies that would later be acquired by GE (Ionics, Inc. and Amersham).

According to the complaint, Marquette-Hellige and OEC-Medical made approximately \$2.04 million in kickbacks through a third-party agent to the Iraqi government under the Oil-for-Food Programme. Marquette-Hellige allegedly agreed to pay illegal in-kind kickbacks valued at approximately \$1.45 million in the form of computer equipment, medical supplies, and services on three contracts that generated profits of approximately \$8.8 million. OEC-Medical, using the same agent, made similar in-kind kickback payments worth approximately \$870,000 to secure a bid on a contract that generated a profit of \$2.1 million. Similar to other OFFP schemes, OEC-Medical and the third-party agent created fictitious services in the contract in order to justify increased commissions for the agent to conceal the illegal payment from U.N. inspectors.

Separately, Norway-based company Nycomed Imaging AS, a subsidiary of Amersham, made approximately \$750,000 in improper payments between 2000 and 2002 on nine contracts that earned the company approximately \$5 million in profits. The contracts were negotiated by a Jordanian agent and authorized directly by Nycomed's salesman in Cyprus, who increased the agent's commission to 27.5% to cover the kickbacks. When a U.N. official inquired about the basis of the 27.5% commission, a Nycomed manager sent a letter to the U.N. falsely describing work the agent had performed to justify the commission.

In addition, Italian company Ionics Italba, a subsidiary of Ionics, Inc., earned \$2.3 million in profits through illegal kickbacks of nearly \$800,000 on five separate contracts to sell water treatment equipment to the Iraqi Oil Ministry. Side letters documenting the kickbacks for four of the contracts were concealed from U.N. inspectors.

GE acquired Amersham in 2004 and Ionics, Inc. in 2005 and assumed liability for the conduct of each entity and its subsidiaries. According to a statement from Cheryl Scarborough, Chief of the SEC's FCPA Enforcement Unit, "GE failed to maintain adequate internal controls to detect and prevent these illicit payments by its two subsidiaries (Marquette-Hellige and OEC Medical) to win Oil-for-Food contracts, and it failed to properly record the true nature of the payments in its accounting records. Furthermore, corporate acquisitions do not provide GE immunity from FCPA enforcement of the other two subsidiaries involved."

### ***Technip and Snamprogetti***

On July 7, 2010 and June 28, 2010, respectively, Snamprogetti Netherland B.V. ("Snamprogetti"), a Dutch subsidiary of the Italian oil and gas company ENI S.p.A. ("ENI"), and Technip S.A. ("Technip"), a French-based construction, engineering and oilfield services company, each settled FCPA charges with the SEC and DOJ. The SEC separately charged Technip and Snamprogetti with violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions, while the DOJ entered into DPAs with the two companies and charged each with two counts of violating and conspiring to violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions. ENI was also charged by the SEC with violating the FCPA's books and records and internal controls provisions.

Under the terms of the agreements, Technip will pay a combined \$338 million in fines, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest. Snamprogetti will pay \$240 million in fines to the DOJ, and Snamprogetti and ENI will jointly pay \$125 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to the SEC. Technip's DPA provides for an independent compliance monitor to be appointed for a term of two years. The agreement specifically provides for a "French national" to serve as the monitor and for the monitor's charge to include monitoring compliance with French anti-corruption law as well as the FCPA. The charges stem from Technip and Snamprogetti's participation in the TSKJ joint venture in Nigeria between 1994 and 2004, which is discussed in greater detail in connection with the KBR/Halliburton case.

On January 30, 2013, two former managers of Technip were sentenced by a Paris tribunal for their role in the TSKJ affair. These two individuals were the only two former executives from Technip to face prosecution. Former general manager Jean-Marie Deseilligny and former commercial manager for Africa Etienne Gory were fined €10,000 and €5,000, respectively, for their participation in the TSKJ corruption scheme. French prosecutors had sought financial penalties of €100,000 from each of the two individuals, but the fines were significantly lowered by the French tribunal.

### ***Veraz Networks, Inc.***

On June 29, 2010, Veraz Networks, Inc. ("Veraz") consented to the entry of a proposed final judgment in a SEC civil enforcement action, without admitting or denying the allegations in the SEC's Complaint. Veraz consented to a \$300,000 civil penalty for violations of the FCPA's books and records and internal controls provisions.

The California-based company describes itself as “the leading provider of application, control, and bandwidth optimization products,” including Voice over Internet Protocol communications, with products and services ranging from flexible network design to industry-leading voice compression technology.

The SEC alleged that Veraz engaged a consultant in China who sought to secure business for Veraz with a telecommunications company controlled by the government of China. The SEC alleged that Veraz’s books and records did not accurately reflect \$4,500 in gifts from the consultant to officials at the telecommunications company, which a supervisor at Veraz approved and described in email as a “gift scheme,” or the promise of a \$35,000 “consultant fee” in connection with a deal worth \$233,000. Veraz discovered the improper fee and canceled the sale prior to receiving payment.

The SEC further alleged that a Veraz employee used a Singapore-based reseller as an intermediary to make or offer improper payments to the CEO of a telecommunications company controlled by the government of Vietnam. The SEC alleged that Veraz approved the employee’s conduct and reimbursed the employee for questionable expenses, including gifts and entertainment for employees of the telecommunications company and flowers for the CEO’s wife. The SEC did not allege any specific value for the gifts or entertainment provided to this telecommunications company. Regarding both the China and Vietnam violations, the SEC alleged that Veraz had failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal accounting controls.

### ***Dimon, Inc. and Universal Corporation***

On April 28, 2010, the SEC filed a settled civil enforcement action against four former employees of the tobacco merchant Dimon, Inc. (“Dimon”), now Alliance One International, Inc. (“Alliance One”), for violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and aiding and abetting violations of the internal controls and books and records provisions. From 1996 to 2004, the time of the alleged conduct, Dimon was a U.S. issuer. Alliance One is a U.S. issuer that was formed in May 2005 by the merger of Dimon and Standard Commercial Corporation. The SEC and DOJ enforcement actions stemmed from payments allegedly made to foreign officials at a Kyrgyzstan regulatory entity established to regulate the sale and export of Kyrgyz tobacco, and at the state-owned Thailand Tobacco Monopoly (“TTM”).

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Bobby J. Elkin, Jr. (a former country manager for Kyrgyzstan), Baxter J. Myers (a former regional financial director), Thomas G. Reynolds (a former international controller), and Tommy L. Williams (a former senior vice president for sales) consented to the entry of final judgments permanently enjoining each of them from further such violations. Myers and Reynolds also each agreed to pay a \$40,000 civil penalty.

On August 3, 2010, Elkin pleaded guilty to a criminal conspiracy to violate the FCPA and was sentenced on October 21, 2010, to three years’ probation and a \$5,000 fine. Although the government had requested that Elkin receive 38 months’ imprisonment, the sentencing court imposed only probation. The court determined probation was appropriate because Elkin had

substantially assisted the U.S. government in its investigation, that Elkin had faced a choice of either making the corrupt payments or losing his job, and it likened Elkin's payments to the CIA's payments to the Afghan government, which the judge noted were not violations of federal law but were relevant to "the morality of the situation."

In August 2010, U.S. authorities also announced the resolution of several related investigations. On August 6, 2010, the DOJ and the SEC settled FCPA complaints against both Alliance One and Universal Corporation, Inc. ("Universal Corporation"), another large tobacco company that issued securities in the United States. Collectively, the monetary penalties imposed on Alliance One and Universal Corporation in these April and August 2010 dispositions exceeded \$28.5 million.

As part of the DOJ's NPA with Alliance One, it and two subsidiaries pleaded guilty to criminal conspiracies to violate, and substantive violations of, the FCPA's anti-bribery and accounting provisions. Collectively, the Alliance One subsidiaries paid a criminal fine of \$9.45 million and the parent company agreed to cooperate with the DOJ's investigation and retain an independent compliance monitor for a minimum of three years. This independent monitor would oversee Alliance One's implementation of an anti-bribery and anti-corruption compliance program while periodically reporting to the DOJ. To settle the related SEC investigation, Alliance One also agreed to disgorge \$10 million in ill-gotten gains.

Universal Corporation, one of Alliance One's competitors, similarly pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA and to violating the anti-bribery provisions relating to the corrupt payments to officials at TTM as part of its NPA with the DOJ. Universal Corporation simultaneously settled FCPA anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls charges with the SEC, which in addition to the improper payments in Thailand, had alleged FCPA violations relating to Universal's conduct in Mozambique and Malawi. (The DOJ's charges were limited to Universal's conduct in Thailand.) Universal Corporation agreed to disgorge more than \$4.5 million in ill-gotten gains with the SEC settlement and its Brazilian subsidiary, Universal Leaf Tabacos Ltda. ("Universal Brazil"), agreed to pay a \$4.4 million criminal fine in connection with the DOJ NPA. Like Alliance One, Universal Corporation also agreed to cooperate with the DOJ investigation and retain an independent compliance monitor for a minimum of three years.

The following factual summary is based on the stipulations in the criminal investigations resolved in August 2010 against the former Alliance One employees and the corporate defendants, except where otherwise noted.

- Kyrgyzstan

From 1996 through 2004, Dimon's wholly owned Kyrgyz subsidiary, Dimon International Kyrgyzstan, Inc. ("DIK"), paid over \$3 million in bribes to Kyrgyzstan officials, including officials of a Kyrgyz government entity, JSC GAK Kyrgyztamekisi ("Tamekisi"), which regulates the sale and export of Kyrgyz tobacco, and local officials, known as Akims, who controlled various tobacco regions. Tamekisi, which owns and operates all the tobacco fermentation plants in Kyrgyzstan, signed an agreement with Dimon International Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of DIK, which included a five cent-per-kilogram charge for "financial

assistance.” Elkin allegedly paid this charge by delivering bags of U.S. currency to a high-ranking Tamekisi official upon request. These cash payments had no legitimate business purpose and a total of approximately \$2.6 million was paid to this Kyrgyz official under the arrangement. Elkin also paid approximately \$260,000 in bribes to the Akims for allowing DIK to purchase tobacco from the regions under their control.

Additionally, Kyrgyz tax officials repeatedly conducted extortive tax audits of DIK but, according to U.S. authorities, the extortive nature of these audits did not excuse the resulting corrupt payments. On one occasion, according to the SEC’s complaints, the tax officials determined that DIK failed to submit two reports, imposed a fine of approximately \$171,741, and threatened to satisfy the fine through the seizure of DIK’s local bank accounts and inventory if DIK did not make a cash payment to tax authorities. In total, DIK made payments of approximately \$82,850 to the Kyrgyz tax authorities from 1996 through 2004.

Elkin made the payments to Kyrgyz officials through a bank account, held in his name, known as the “Special Account.” Dimon’s regional finance director was not only aware of the Special Account, but also of authorized transfers to the Special Account from Dimon subsidiaries. The regional finance director had traveled to Kyrgyzstan to discuss the records associated with the Special Account and was aware of the transaction activity in the Special Account. The SEC further alleged that Dimon’s international controller was aware of the Special Account, knew that the Special Account was used to make cash payments, revised the manner in which payments from the Special Account were recorded, and received but failed to act upon a 2002 internal audit report that concluded that DIK management was challenged by a “cash environment,” that DIK had potential internal accounting control issues relating to cash, and that corruption in Kyrgyzstan exposed Dimon to financial risk.

- Thailand

From 2000 to 2003, Dimon colluded with Standard Commercial and another competitor to pay bribes of more than \$1.2 million to government officials of TTM while realizing approximately \$7 million in profits. The bribes were part of the parties’ contracts with TTM that included “special expenses” or “special commissions” calculated on a per-kilogram basis. As part of this scheme, Dimon paid nearly \$700,000 in bribes to TTM officials and secured more than \$9.85 million in contracts from TTM. In addition to the payments, Dimon arranged for trips by the TTM officials to Brazil on the pretext of looking at tobacco blends and samples, which included unrelated activities such as piranha fishing, trekking in the Amazon jungle, and trips to Argentina, Milan, and Rome. The kickbacks were paid through Dimon’s local agent and recorded as sale commissions to the agent. The payments were authorized by Dimon personnel, including a senior vice president of sales who allegedly knew that the payments were going to TTM officials. This Dimon senior vice president instructed one such payment to be transmitted as eight smaller payments to several different bank accounts over several days and in an email discussion with an unidentified employee about the “special commission,” he stated “[i]t would be better if I did not have to answer too many questions” in the United States. According to the SEC’s complaint, after the senior vice president stopped authorizing the payments in 2004

(because the TTM officials' demands had grown too large), TTM stopped purchasing tobacco from Dimon.

Similar to Dimon, Universal Corporation made "special expenses" payments on a per kilogram basis to the TTM from 2000 to 2003. In this time period, its Brazilian subsidiary, Universal Brazil, paid \$697,800 in "special expenses." In return, Universal Brazil realized net profits of approximately \$2.3 million from its sales to TTM. The bribes took the form of direct payments by Universal Brazil employees to bank accounts in Hong Kong provided by the local agent. Universal also partially paid for a "purported inspection" trip to Malawi in 2000 by TTM officials, including a portion of the airfare, more than \$3,000 in "pocket money" to certain officials, and more than \$135,000 in "special expenses" to a TTM agent. In addition to the kickbacks, the SEC complaint also alleges that Universal Brazil colluded with two unidentified competitors to apportion tobacco sales to TTM and coordinate sales prices. In the DOJ Plea Agreement, it was noted that Universal Corporation maintained insufficient oversight or review over its subsidiaries' financial records, including that Universal Corporation never audited their records from 2000 to 2004.

- Malawi and Mozambique

According to the SEC complaint, between October 2002 and November 2003, a Universal subsidiary, Universal Leaf Africa (Pty) Ltd. ("Universal Leaf Africa"), made payments totaling \$850,000 to two high-ranking Malawian officials and a Malawian political opposition leader. The SEC alleged that such payments were routed through Universal's Belgian subsidiary, and were improperly recorded as service fees, commissions, expenses related to local law purchasing requirements, and donations to the government. According to the SEC, Universal had no effective internal controls in place to ensure that these payments were proper.

Regarding Mozambique, the SEC alleged that between 2004 and 2007 Universal Leaf Africa made payments of more than \$165,000 through Universal subsidiaries in Belgium and Africa to five Mozambican officials and their family members. These Mozambique payments were alleged to have been made at the direction, or with the authorization, of the Universal Leaf Africa's regional director. The bribes took the form of cash payments, debt forgiveness, and gifts, including supplies for a bathroom renovation and personal travel on a company jet. These bribes were meant to assist Universal Corporation secure a land concession that gave its subsidiary the exclusive right to purchase tobacco from regional growers, avoid export taxes, and procure beneficial legislation.

The SEC alleged that Universal failed to have and maintain adequate internal controls to ensure that such payments were not made in order to obtain or retain business. Specifically, that Universal did not require supporting documentation for the payments, which were improperly recorded as, among other things, commissions, consulting fees, and travel advances.

### ***Daimler***

On April 1, 2010, Daimler AG ("Daimler"), a German automotive company and foreign issuer traded on the New York Stock Exchange, paid \$185 million dollars to resolve DOJ and

SEC FCPA investigations. According to Daimler's 2004 Annual Report, the SEC first notified Daimler of its investigation in August 2004 after a former employee in DaimlerChrysler Corporation's Corporate Audit Department filed a whistleblower complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor and, subsequently, in a U.S. district court. According to court records, the whistleblower alleged that Daimler wrongfully terminated him for questioning Daimler's use of secret bank accounts to make improper payments to foreign officials in violation of the FCPA. Daimler's July 28, 2005 quarterly report disclosed that it was also cooperating with a DOJ investigation into the same conduct.

Ultimately, Daimler and three of its subsidiaries resolved DOJ criminal prosecutions. A U.S. district court accepted pleas of guilty to criminal violations of, and conspiracies to violate, the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions by two Daimler subsidiaries, DaimlerChrysler Automotive Russia SAO ("DCAR," now known as Mercedes-Benz Russia SAO) and Daimler Export and Trade Finance GmbH ("ETF"). The court approved DPAs between the DOJ and Daimler and a Daimler subsidiary, DaimlerChrysler China Ltd. ("DCCL") (now known as Daimler North East Asia Ltd.). Prior to the court's approval of the DPAs, the DOJ had charged DCCL with a criminal violation of, and a conspiracy to violate, the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, and the DOJ had charged Daimler with a criminal violation of, and a conspiracy to violate, the FCPA's books and records provisions.

As part of its DPA, Daimler admitted to making tens of millions of dollars in improper payments to foreign officials in at least 22 countries between 1998 and January 2008 and that the corrupt transactions with a territorial connection to the United States earned Daimler more than \$50 million in pre-tax profits.

Collectively, Daimler and its subsidiaries paid a criminal penalty of \$93.6 million. The United States asserted that the criminal fine was approximately 20% below the low end of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' recommended fine range, but the nature and extent of Daimler's cooperation warranted the reduced criminal fine. The DOJ specifically commended Daimler's extensive internal investigation and its remediation efforts, the latter of which included terminating 45 employees and sanctioning another 60. In addition, the DOJ noted Daimler's efforts to reform its anti-bribery compliance program before its resolution with the DOJ. Daimler agreed to adopt internal accounting controls, adopt a compliance code with the minimum elements specified in Daimler's DPA (including direct reporting by one or more senior corporate officials with compliance responsibility to Daimler's Board of Management and Supervisory Board), and engage former FBI Director Louis J. Freeh as a corporate compliance monitor for a term of three years from the date of DCAR's and ETF's guilty pleas.

To resolve the SEC's investigation, Daimler agreed to disgorge more than \$91 million in ill-gotten gains and consented to a final judgment in a civil enforcement action, without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations that Daimler violated the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal accounting controls provisions of the FCPA.

- General Allegations

As part of its DPA with the DOJ, Daimler stipulated to the truth and accuracy of a sixty-five page Statement of Facts that describes “many of the details” of Daimler’s “practice of making improper payments in violation of the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA,” although the DOJ only formally charged Daimler with books and records violations. Daimler also expressly admitted responsibility for the acts of its subsidiaries, employees, and agents described in the Statement of Facts. Daimler admitted to the following general allegations about its improper practices.

Daimler paid bribes to foreign officials through the use of corporate ledger accounts known internally as “third-party accounts” or “TPAs,” corporate “cash desks,” offshore bank accounts, deceptive pricing arrangements, and third-party intermediaries. Daimler then recorded the bribes as “commissions,” “special discounts,” or “nützliche Aufwendungen” (“N.A.,” which translates to “useful” or “necessary” payments). Daimler’s FCPA violations resulted from an inadequate compliance structure, the lack of centralized oversight of its operations, a culture that encouraged or tolerated bribery of foreign officials, and the involvement of several key executives in the improper conduct.

In 1999, Germany’s legislation implementing the 1998 amendments to the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions came into force. The same year, at the request of Daimler’s head of internal audit, Daimler’s Board of Management discussed the need for an integrity code that would include anti-bribery provisions. Some participants at this meeting expressed concern at the impact of such a code on Daimler’s business in certain countries. Daimler nonetheless adopted a written integrity code, but in practice the company did not make sufficient efforts to enforce the code, train employees regarding compliance with the FCPA or other applicable anti-bribery statutes, audit the use of TPAs, or otherwise ensure that Daimler was not continuing to make improper payments. Daimler’s internal audit department continued to raise concerns about the propriety of the TPAs and the controls relating to TPAs, eventually recommending in 2001 that all TPAs be shut down. However, not until 2005, after the SEC and DOJ investigations had begun, did Daimler eliminate the use of TPAs and adopt the internal accounting controls necessary to prevent, detect, and deter improper payments to foreign officials.

Below are summaries of selected stipulated violations.

- Russia

Daimler, through DCAR, sold vehicles and spare parts in Russia to various government customers including the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian military, and several city governments. Between 2000 and 2005, Daimler made approximately €65 million in sales to Russian government customers. In connection with these sales, Daimler and DCAR made over €3 million in improper payments to Russian government officials, either directly or indirectly.

Daimler and DCAR allegedly used various methods to make the improper payments to Russian government officials. Sometimes these payments were made by over-invoicing the

government customer and paying the excess back to the foreign official, directly or indirectly. Payments were often wired to U.S. or Latvian bank accounts owned by shell companies — including shell companies registered in the United States — to disguise the true beneficiary of the payment. In addition, cash payments were occasionally made directly to government officials or to third parties with the knowledge that the payment would be passed on in whole or in part to government officials.

According to media reports, on November 12, 2010, the Investigative Committee of the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation announced that it had initiated criminal proceedings against Daimler. Reportedly, the Committee specifically announced, "Due to results of a preliminary audit . . . a criminal case has been initiated . . . into fraud committed through deception and breach of confidence in concluding contracts for the delivery of Mercedes-Benz automobiles to state bodies." Russia's President, Dmitry Medvedev, and Russia's Interior Minister, Rashid Nurgaliev, are reported to have ordered the investigation after Daimler admitted the above conduct to resolve U.S. authorities' investigation.

- China

Daimler, with the assistance of DCCL, sold vehicles to government customers in China. Daimler's government customers included the Bureau of Geophysical Prospecting, a division of the China National Petroleum Corporation, and Sinopec Corp., a state-owned energy company. Between 2000 and 2005, Daimler made improper payments of over €4 million in the form of commissions, travel, and gifts to Chinese government officials in connection with more than €112 million in sales to government customers. Daimler allegedly inflated the sales price on vehicles sold to Chinese government or government-owned customers and maintained the overpayments in a "special commissions" account, from which improper payments were made. Some payments were made by DCCL's head of sales and marketing, who had authority to wire funds from another account in Germany to Chinese officials or third parties. Often the payments were made into U.S. bank accounts of third parties — several of which were U.S.-registered corporations — that performed no services for Daimler and on which no due diligence was done. Daimler made these payments with no system in place to check their legitimacy.

- Vietnam

Daimler sold vehicles in Vietnam through its joint venture with a government entity. Daimler owned 70% of the joint venture, Mercedes Benz Vietnam ("MBV"), through a Singapore subsidiary. Between 2000 and 2005, Daimler employees working for MBV made improper payments to foreign officials to obtain or retain business. The highest levels of MBV management knew of, and openly encouraged, such payments. MBV made, or promised to make, more than \$600,000 and €239,000 in improper payments to foreign officials, and incurred \$22.3 million in debt investing in a government-owned high tech park that was then transferred to a U.S. company for only \$223,000, to obtain business that generated more than €4 million in profits and more than an additional €890,000 in revenue.

Daimler and MBV used sham consulting agreements with third parties, including U.S. companies, to disguise the payments. MBV's CFO questioned the legitimacy of one such consulting agreement with Viet Thong Limited Company, which did not exist until after the date of its consulting agreement with MBV. Other MBV employees provided the CFO with Viet Thong's purported 2004 analysis of Mercedes-Benz vehicle emissions in Vietnam; however, the employees plagiarized this analysis from a public 1998 report of Ford Escort emissions and pasted the Viet Thong letterhead on the plagiarized report.

- Turkmenistan

In 2000, Daimler gave a high-level Turkmen government official an armored Mercedes-Benz S Class passenger vehicle, worth more than €300,000, as a birthday gift. Daimler employees believed that Daimler would receive large government contracts in exchange for this gift. In 2002, Daimler provided the same official with golden boxes with an inscription of his personal manifesto translated into German, worth approximately \$250,000, in exchange for the official's long-term commitment to Turkmenistan's purchase of Daimler vehicles. The golden boxes were recorded on Daimler's books as "expenses to develop Commonwealth of Independent States' successor market —Turkmenistan." From 1999 to 2003, the stipulated payments also include "N.A." payments of \$45,000 and more than DM2.5 million in cash, and €195,000 in cash and a vehicle, in connection with contracts valued at more than €3 million and DM21.8 million.

- Nigeria

Daimler operated in Nigeria through a joint venture with the Nigerian government. Daimler only owned 40% of the joint venture, Anambra Motor Manufacturing Company ("Anammco"), but it controlled the joint venture through its power to appoint the managing director, who had unfettered discretion to run the joint venture's business. Daimler also appointed three of the seven directors on Anammco's board.

The stipulated payments included improper payments to Nigerian officials from TPAs, either in cash or to the officials' Swiss bank accounts. For example, from 1998 to 2000, Daimler made more than DM1.5 million and €1.4 million in improper payments to officials at the Nigerian president's official office and residence in exchange for sales of more than \$350,000 and DM15.8 million. Daimler also made improper payments of more than €550,000 to officials of a sugar company majority-owned by the Nigerian government in exchange for a \$4.6 million contract. Other improper payments related to the sale of a heavy vehicle to the Nigerian Police Force, buses to the Nigerian government for a world youth soccer tournament, vehicles for the 8th All-Africa Games in 2003 (including the transfer of an improper payment to a bank account in the United States), and buses to a local Nigerian government.

- West Africa

Daimler operated in West Africa through a majority-owned subsidiary, Star Auto S.A. ("Star Auto"). Daimler made improper payments to foreign officials in the Ivory Coast and Ghana, including a \$170,000 commission to an agent who negotiated a sale to the Army of

Ghana, through a TPA. In 1999, Daimler was awarded a contract worth \$14.5 million to supply trucks to a logging operation in Liberia. Daimler's local dealer gave a senior Liberian government official an armored Mercedes-Benz passenger car, worth approximately €267,000, in connection with the contract.

- Latvia

Between 2000 and 2006, EvoBus GmbH ("EvoBus"), a wholly owned Daimler subsidiary, made approximately €1.8 million in "commission payments" to third parties, with the understanding that such payments would be passed on to members of the Riga City Council, to win contracts to supply buses to two public transportation entities valued at approximately €30 million. Two of the third parties were U.S.-based entities that entered into sham consulting contracts with EvoBus.

On June 13, 2013, the Latvian Prosecutor General's Office alleged that Daimler had made as much as €5 million in bribes, including almost €1 million meant for an individual official. In 2013, Latvian authorities charged three government officials in connection with the improper conduct: former mayor of Riga Gundars Bojars, his advisor Armands Zeihmanis, and Riga City Council deputy chairman Leonards Tenis. According to local press reports, three other individuals have been officially charged, including "the director of a company registered in Sweden, Raimonds Krastins, businessman Sergejs Zambers, [and] a certain Agris Korosevskis."

- Austria and Hungary

In 2005, EvoBus Hungarian Kft. ("EvoBus Hungary") acquired 17 buses from EvoBus Austria GmbH ("EvoBus Austria") and resold them to Volanbusz, a state-owned public transport company in Budapest. EvoBus Austria agreed to pay a "commission" of €333,370 to a U.S. company, USCON Ltd., knowing that all or part of the payment would be passed on to Hungarian government officials. During the SEC and DOJ investigation, the CEO of EvoBus Austria attempted to conceal the true nature of the payments by creating and backdating a phony consulting agreement; however, USCON had been dissolved two years before the commission payment was made.

- Turkey

In the fall of 2006, during the internal investigation, Daimler's Corporate Audit department discovered a safe in the offices of Daimler's majority-owned distributor in Turkey, MB Turk. The safe contained binders labeled "N.A." that recorded more than €6 million in third-party payments in connection with sales to non-Turkish government customers in North Korea, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and other countries. These sales generated approximately €95 million in revenue. Of the more than €6 million in third-party payments, at least €3.88 million were improper payments and gifts to non-Turkish foreign officials.

- Indonesia

Between 1998 and 2006, Daimler's largest government customer in Indonesia was Perum Damri, a state-owned bus company. During this time period, Daimler's local affiliates in Indonesia provided unspecified gifts, travel, and entertainment to foreign officials associated with Perum Damri. Daimler earned approximately \$8.36 million in revenue from Perum Damri during this period. Daimler affiliates also made large cash payments (totaling as much as \$120,000 in the case of one affiliate) to Indonesian tax officials in order to reduce tax obligations. The affiliates attempted to roll the amounts of the improper payments into their internal record of their tax payments, but the tax payments were paid only by wire and the improper payments were made only in cash.

- Croatia

ETF provided financing for Daimler exports to countries without a local Daimler Financing Company, such as Croatia. In connection with a public tender for the sale of fire trucks to the government of Croatia, valued at €85 million, the Croatian government required ETF to partner with a former weapons manufacturer that the Croatian government controlled and partially owned. Between 2002 and 2008, ETF made more than €3 million in improper payments to this entity, with the understanding that all or part of these payments would be paid to Croatian officials in connection with the fire truck contract. ETF also made more than €1.6 million in improper payments to shell companies in the United States with the same understanding.

- Oil-for-Food

In connection with the sale of vehicles and spare parts to the Iraqi government under the United Nations' Oil-for-Food Programme, Daimler inflated the book value of the contracts to hide 10% commissions to the government of Iraq. In total, Daimler paid approximately \$5 million in commissions to the Iraqi government.

### ***Terra Telecommunications (Haiti Teleco)***

Since May 2009, numerous indictments, arraignments, and guilty pleas have come down relating to a scheme by the U.S. telecommunication companies Terra Telecommunications Corp. ("Terra") and Cinergy Telecommunications Inc. ("Cinergy") to bribe foreign officials at the Republic of Haiti's state-owned telecommunications company, Telecommunications D'Haiti ("Haiti Teleco").

The DOJ's investigation has cast a wide net, with indictments filed against officers of Terra, individuals associated with intermediary companies, and the Haiti Teleco officials themselves. As U.S. Attorney Jeffrey H. Sloman stated upon announcing the guilty plea of one of the Teleco officials, "[t]oday's conviction should be a warning to corrupt government officials everywhere that neither they nor their money will find any safe haven in the United States."

Perhaps most notably, the investigation resulted in a decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of *US v Esquenazi* (discussed above) that provided a list of non-exclusive factors that should be considered in determining whether an entity constitutes an “instrumentality” of a foreign government for purposes of the FCPA.

The DOJ’s investigation has cast a wide net, with indictments filed against officers of Terra, individuals associated with intermediary companies, and, perhaps most notably, the Haiti Teleco officials themselves. As U.S. Attorney Jeffrey H. Sloman stated upon announcing the guilty plea of one of these officials, “[t]oday’s conviction should be a warning to corrupt government officials everywhere that neither they nor their money will find any safe haven in the United States.”

- *Haiti Teleco Officials*

Haiti Teleco is the only provider of landline telephone service to and from Haiti, and accordingly, all international telecommunications companies must contract with the state-owned company to provide their customers with non-cellular telephone access to Haiti. The DOJ’s investigation arose from a scheme wherein executives at Terra, a Nevada corporation based in Miami, Florida, made improper payments to two foreign officials at Haiti Teleco through several intermediary shell companies between November 2001 and March 2005. Two of the officials implicated in the scheme — Robert Antoine and Jean Rene Duperval — both worked as Director of International Relations for Haiti Teleco (Antoine from May 2001 to April 2003; Duperval from June 2003 to April 2004). In that position, they had responsibility for negotiating contracts with international telecommunications companies on behalf of Haiti Teleco. Other officials — including former Haiti Teleco director Patrick Joseph — were also involved in the conspiracy. In return for the corrupt payments, the officials granted Terra preferred telecommunication rates, reduced the number of minutes for which payments were owed, and provided various credits to reduce the debt that the companies owed to Haiti Teleco.

The prosecutions of Antoine, Duperval, and Joseph are notable because they are among the few foreign officials have been charged in connection with an FCPA matter. Because the officials could not be charged with violations of the FCPA insofar as the statute criminalizes the provision but not the receipt of bribes, Antoine, Duperval and Joseph were instead indicted for conspiracy to commit money laundering and, in Duperval’s case, substantive money laundering charges. Antoine pleaded guilty on March 12, 2010, and was later sentenced to four years in prison, ordered to pay \$1,852,209 in restitution, and required to forfeit \$1,580,771. After years of cooperating against other defendants, Antoine’s sentence was reduced in May 2012 to 18 months on a Rule 35 motion by the government. Duperval pleaded not guilty but was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit money laundering and 19 counts of money laundering on March 13, 2012. From 2003 to 2006, Duperval used Florida-based Cinergy Telecommunications (“Cinergy”) and Uniplex Telecom Technologies (“Uniplex”) to launder \$500,000 paid to him in exchange for various business advantages, including the issuance of preferred telecommunications rates, a continued telecommunications connection with Haiti and the continuation of a particularly favorable contract with Haiti Teleco. Duperval concealed these payments by having the shell companies and their executives create false documents describing

the payments as “consulting services,” despite the fact that no actual services were performed. When the shell companies channeled the money to Duperval and his family, Duperval continued to conceal the payments by describing them as “commissions” and “payroll.” Duperval was sentenced on May 21, 2012, to 9 years’ imprisonment and was ordered to forfeit \$497,331.

Joseph, on the other hand, agreed to cooperate with prosecutors. After initially pleading not guilty to a superseding indictment, on February 8, 2012, Joseph agreed to plead guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering in exchange for a potentially lighter sentence. Joseph agreed to forfeit \$955,000, and on July 6, 2012, he was sentenced to one year and one day in prison.

Former Haiti President Jean-Bertrand Aristide has also been implicated. Commentators suggest that Aristide is the “Official B” described in the DOJ’s January 19, 2012 second superseding indictment. According to that indictment, Official B was among those who received over \$2 million in payments through the shell-companies Cinergy and Uniplex (*see further discussion below*). According to the second superseding indictment, Official B received his share of the payments through “Company A,” which commentators believe to be Digitek, a suspected front owned by Aristide’s brother-in-law Lesly Lavelanet. To date, neither Aristide nor Digitek have been charged by the DOJ.

- *Terra Telecommunications*

The DOJ has also charged several former executives at Terra. On April 27, 2009, the former controller of Terra, Antonio Perez, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and money laundering laws. On January 21, 2011, Perez was sentenced to two years in prison followed by two years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay a \$100 fine and to forfeit \$36,375. As a result of his cooperation with law enforcement, Perez’s sentence was reduced to a total term of ten months in December 2011.

On December 4, 2009, the DOJ indicted Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez, the president and Vice President, respectively, of Terra, for their alleged involvement in the scheme. According to the indictment, Esquenazi and Rodriguez paid more than \$800,000 in bribes to foreign officials at Haiti Teleco to obtain improper business advantages. The indictment stated that Esquenazi and Rodriguez disguised these bribes as payments for consulting services to intermediary companies, reporting such payments as commissions and consulting fees on its books and records, though no consulting services were provided by the intermediaries. The indictment also alleges that Esquenazi provided Duperval with a Rolex watch. Each individual was charged with (i) conspiring to violate the FCPA and to commit wire fraud; (ii) seven substantive FCPA violations; (iii) conspiring to commit money laundering; and (iv) twelve substantive money laundering violations.

Both Esquenazi and Rodriguez pleaded not guilty in January 2010. Esquenazi went a step further on November 10, 2010, by filing an amended motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that the DOJ’s interpretation of the term “foreign official” in the FCPA was unsustainable. He argued that employees (including executives) of state-owned or state-controlled commercial entities did not fall within the definition of “foreign official” because that

definition only applied to “officials performing a public function.” In a nod to then-current political dialogue in the United States, Esquenazi argued:

Mere control or partial control or ownership (or partial ownership) of an entity by a foreign government no more makes that entity’s employees “foreign officials” than control of General Motors by the U.S. Department of Treasury makes all GM employees U.S. officials.

In the alternative, Esquenazi argued that the court should dismiss the indictment because the FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” was unconstitutionally vague.

In its response, filed on November 17, 2010, the DOJ declined to defend its interpretation, although it asserted that, if the court required, “the government [would be] more than willing to elaborate on how the FCPA’s plain text, its current interpretation by courts, its legislative history, and U.S. treaty obligations... confirm that the definition of ‘foreign official’ includes officials of state-owned and state-controlled companies.” Instead, the DOJ argued that Esquenazi’s motion was a premature request for a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence. Two days later, the Court agreed with the DOJ and issued a fairly perfunctory decision in its favor and, on August 5, 2011, Esquenazi and Rodriguez were convicted on all counts.

On August 24, 2011, Esquenazi and Rodriguez filed a motion for judgment of acquittal or a new trial based on a July 26, 2011, signed statement sent to the DOJ by Haitian Prime Minister Jean Max Bellerive on behalf of Haiti’s Ministry of Justice, which asserted that Haiti Teleco “has never been and until now is not a State enterprise.” Prime Minister Bellerive made this statement in connection with the Patrick Joseph case described below. In a surprising development, the day after Esquenazi and Rodriguez filed their motion, Bellerive signed a declaration filed by DOJ that retracted his prior statement that asserted that his prior statement was “strictly for internal purposes” and that his prior statement had “omit[ted] the fact that, after the initial creation of Teleco and prior to its modernization, it was fully funded and controlled by [the Bank of the Republic of Haiti], which is a public entity of the Haitian state.”

The district court summarily denied the defendants’ motion, noting simply that it “properly instructed the jury through a non-exclusive multi-factor definition that permitted the jury to determine whether Teleco was an instrumentality of a foreign government.” The jury instructions permitted the jury to consider factors including, but not limited to, whether Teleco provides services to the public, whether its “key officers and directors” are government officials or are appointed by government officials, the extent of Haiti’s ownership interest in Teleco, Teleco’s obligations and privileges under Haitian law, and whether Teleco is “widely perceived and understood to be performing official or governmental functions.” Esquenazi and Rodriguez appealed, among other things, the district court’s holding regarding Haiti Teleco’s status as a foreign instrumentality.

On October 25, 2011, the Court sentenced Esquenazi to 15 years’ imprisonment, a record for an FCPA-related conviction (10 of the 15 years were consecutively imposed for Esquenazi’s conviction on a related money-laundering count), and Rodriguez was sentenced to 7 years’ imprisonment. Both defendants were further ordered to jointly and severally forfeit \$3.09

million and pay \$2.2 million in restitution. Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer called the record-setting sentence “a stark reminder to executives that bribing government officials to secure business advantages is a serious crime with serious consequences,” and proof that the DOJ “will continue to hold accountable individuals and companies who engage in such corruption.”

Esquenazi and Rodriguez continued to make FCPA history through their appeal. On May 9, 2012, Esquenazi and Rodriguez filed the first-ever appeal to challenge the definition of a “foreign official” under the FCPA. They argued that, “[b]ecause no evidence was presented at trial that Haiti Teleco performed governmental functions, Esquenazi’s conviction for violation of, and conspiracy to violate, the FCPA should be reversed.” The appellants further argued that the DOJ’s current interpretation of a government instrumentality — which includes employees at state-owned enterprises — is overbroad and beyond the scope intended by Congress. On May 16, 2014 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions in a decision that essentially adopted the DOJ’s definition of government instrumentality.

On October 14, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari for Esquenazi and Rodriguez. According to information available online, Esquenazi is currently serving his term at a minimum security prison in New Jersey, with a scheduled release date of August 22, 2024.

- *Intermediaries*

The DOJ also indicted several individuals who served as intermediaries for Terra’s corrupt payments. On May 15, 2009, Juan Diaz (President of J.D. Locator Services) pleaded guilty to money laundering and one count of conspiring to violate the FCPA in connection with his role in the scheme. According to his criminal information, Diaz received over a million dollars from Terra in the account of his company, J.D. Locator, to be delivered to the two foreign officials. Diaz admitted that he kept over \$73,000 as commissions for facilitating the bribes. On July 30, 2010, Diaz was sentenced to four years and nine months in prison and three years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay \$73,824 in restitution and to forfeit \$1,028,851. On May 22, 2012, Diaz’s sentence was reduced to a term of 20 months, with three years of supervised release.

In addition, on February 19, 2010, Jean Fourcand (former President and Director of Fourcand Enterprises, Inc.) pleaded guilty to a single count of money laundering for his role in facilitating the improper payments. According to the indictment and other documents, Fourcand received checks from J.D. Locator, which he deposited and then used to purchase real property valued at over \$290,000. Fourcand sold the property and issued a check for approximately \$145,000 to Haiti Teleco official Antoine. The indictment also states that Fourcand received nearly \$15,000 worth of pre-paid calling cards from Esquenazi and Rodriguez, the cash proceeds from the sales of which he also gave to Antoine. Fourcand was sentenced to six months in prison for his involvement in the scheme. On April 16, 2012, the court agreed to reduce Fourcand’s sentence to two months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release.

The DOJ also indicted Marguerite Grandison (former President of Telecom Consulting Services Corp. (“Telecom Consulting”)) for allegedly assisting in directing payments from Terra to J.D. Locator. Grandison, who is Duperval’s sister, was initially charged in February 2010 with (i) conspiracy to violate the FCPA and commit wire fraud; (ii) seven substantive FCPA violations; (iii) conspiracy to commit money laundering; and (iv) twelve substantive money laundering violations. In a July 13, 2011 superseding indictment, Grandison was charged with two counts of conspiracy to commit money laundering and 19 counts of money laundering. Grandison pleaded not guilty to all charges in February 2012.

- *Cinergy Telecommunications Inc.*

On July 12, 2011, the DOJ filed a superseding indictment that charged Cinergy Telecommunications Inc. (“Cinergy”), a privately owned telecommunications company incorporated in Florida, for its alleged role in the foreign bribery, wire fraud, and money laundering scheme related to Haiti Teleco. The July superseding indictment similarly charged Washington Vasconez Cruz (President of Cinergy and Uniplex Telecom Technologies, Inc. (“Uniplex”)), Amadeus Richers (then-director of Cinergy and Uniplex), and Marguerite Grandison (former President of Telecom Consulting Services Corp.). The superseding indictment also included allegations against “Co-conspirator CZ;” on January 19, 2012, the DOJ filed a second superseding indictment that identified “co-conspirator CZ” as Cecilia Zurita (former Vice President of Uniplex and Cinergy).

The indictments alleged that, from December 2001 through January 2006, Cinergy, Uniplex, Cruz, Richers, and Zurita (among others) participated in a conspiracy to pay approximately \$2.65 million in “fictional ‘consulting services’” to shell companies. The DOJ alleged that these “consulting services” payments were actually payments used to bribe foreign officials at Haiti Teleco in exchange for contracts that allowed Uniplex and Cinergy customers to place calls to Haiti. Cruz and Richers allegedly authorized these payments to help Cinergy and Uniplex to secure preferred telecommunications rates and to obtain credits towards money owed to Haiti Teleco. The indictment identifies 19 separate deposits of “Telecom Consulting checks” into bank accounts owned by Duperval from March 2004 through the end of March 2005.

Cinergy, Cruz, and Richers were each charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit wire fraud, six counts of violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, and 19 counts of money laundering. Zurita is charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and to commit wire fraud, four counts violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions, one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, and 19 counts of money laundering.

On February 24, 2012, the DOJ prepared and received an Order for Dismissal dismissing, with prejudice, the indictment as to Cinergy. In the Order, the DOJ claimed that it had been misled into believing that Cinergy was an active company rather than, as described by the DOJ, a “non-operational entity that effectively exists only on paper for the benefit of two fugitive defendants, Washington Vasconez Cruz and Cecilia Zurita.” The trials against Cruz, Richers, and Zurita are pending their arrests.

### ***Innospec***

On March 18, 2010, Innospec, Inc. and its U.K. subsidiary, Innospec Limited, (together “Innospec”) settled criminal and civil charges with the DOJ, the SEC, OFAC, and the U.K. Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”) regarding activities in Iraq, Indonesia, and Cuba. Most of the charges relate to Innospec’s sale of tetra ethyl lead (“TEL”), a lead-based gasoline additive that had seen its market decline as leaded gasoline fell into global disuse.

The SEC, DOJ, and SFO also brought civil and criminal cases against various individuals involved in the conduct. In the United States, Naaman pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court to conspiring to violate the books and records provision of the FCPA in connection with securing OFFP contracts and to conspiring to violate and violating the anti-bribery provisions with respect to other payments to Iraqi officials. In March 2012, Naaman was sentenced to thirty months in prison and fined \$250,000. The SEC also settled enforcement actions against Naaman, Turner, and Jennings. In August 2010, Turner agreed to disgorge \$40,000 but avoided paying additional fines and penalties as a reward for his extensive cooperation with the SEC. After his extradition to the United States, Naaman also cooperated in the SEC’s investigation. In his August 2010 SEC settlement, Naaman agreed to disgorge \$810,076, an additional \$67,030 in prejudgment interest, and to pay a civil penalty of \$438,038, although the SEC agreed that Naaman’s financial penalty (but not the disgorgement or interest) would be deemed satisfied by a criminal order requiring him to pay a criminal fine that is at least equal to the civil penalty amount. In January 2011, Jennings agreed to disgorge \$116,092 plus prejudgment interest of \$12,945, and to pay a civil penalty of \$100,000.

In the United Kingdom, the SFO pressed corruption-related charges against (1) former Business Director David Turner; (2) former CFO and CEO Paul W. Jennings; (3) another former CEO, Dennis Kerrison; and (4) former Regional Sales Director Miltiades Papachristos. Turner and Jennings pleaded guilty. On August 4, 2014, Jennings was sentenced to two years in prison, and Turner was given a sixteen-month suspended sentence and was required to perform 300 hours of community service.

Messrs. Papachristos and Kerrison pleaded not guilty. On June 18, 2014, following an investigation conducted by the SFO, a Crown Court found both men guilty of conspiracy and bribery. Kerrison was sentenced to four years in prison (later reduced to three), while Papachristos was sentenced to eighteen months. On September 19, 2014, a U.K. appellate court upheld the convictions of Kerrison and Papachristos, stressing their participation in “prolonged, cynical and serious corruption of public officials in a foreign country” through which “bribes were used to persuade public authorities artificially to extend the life of a product that was being phased out elsewhere in the world because of its adverse impact.”

### ***Charles Paul Edward Jumet & John W. Warwick***

Charles Paul Edward Jumet and John W. Warwick pleaded guilty on November 13, 2009, and February 10, 2010, respectively, to conspiring to violate the FCPA by bribing Panamanian officials to obtain contracts with Panama’s National Maritime Ports Authority (“APN”). Jumet

also pleaded guilty to making a false statement to federal agents about the purpose of an \$18,000 payment to a Panamanian official, which Jumet had claimed was a campaign contribution.

On April 19, 2010, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia sentenced Jumet to (i) more than seven years' imprisonment, consisting of five years for the FCPA conspiracy and 27 months for making the false statement to federal agents, to be served consecutively, (ii) three years' supervised release, and (iii) a \$15,000 fine. The DOJ's press release heralded Jumet's 87-month sentence as "the longest prison term imposed against an individual for violating the FCPA." On June 25, 2010, the court sentenced Warwick to 37 months' imprisonment and two years' supervised release. Warwick also agreed in his February 10, 2010 plea agreement to forfeit \$331,000, representing the proceeds of the bribery conspiracy.

In late 1996, Warwick and Jumet created two companies under the laws of Panama: the Ports Engineering Consultants Corporation ("PECC") and Overman de Panama, a subsidiary of the Virginia-based engineering firm Overman Associates. Warwick and Jumet served as the President and Vice President, respectively, of PECC and both Overman entities.

With the assistance of APN's Administrator and Deputy Administrator, Warwick and Jumet submitted a proposal to privatize APN's engineering department. The submission proposed that Overman de Panama would provide APN's engineering services through PECC, and in January 1997, the APN Administrator awarded PECC a no-bid provisional contract to collect certain tariffs, maintain lighthouses and buoys, and provide other engineering services. By the end of 1997, APN had awarded PECC separate twenty-year concessions to (i) collect lighthouse and buoy tariffs and (ii) service lighthouses and buoys along waterways outside of the Panama Canal. According to the DOJ's press release, PECC received approximately \$18 million in revenue from these contracts between 1997 and 2000.

Warwick and Jumet used several means to make corrupt payments to Panamanian officials in exchange for these no-bid contracts. Warwick and Jumet allowed two shell corporations to hold ownership interests in PECC, which then made "dividend" payments to its shareholders. The first entity, a British Virgin Islands entity called Warmspell Holding Corporation ("Warmspell"), owned 30% of PECC and Warmspell's corporate officers were the relatives of the APN Deputy Administrator (who later became the APN Administrator). A second entity, Soderville Corporation ("Soderville"), established in Panama and also owning 30% of PECC, was owned directly by the APN Administrator.

Jumet and Warwick admitted that Warmspell and Soderville were created for the purpose of "conceal[ing] the receipt of corrupt payments by Panamanian government officials." In December 1997, PECC issued "dividend" payments of \$81,000 each to Warmspell and Soderville. Warwick and Jumet also provided a third government official, described in the DOJ's charging documents as a "very high-ranking executive official of the Republic of Panama," with an \$18,000 dividend issued to the unspecified "bearer" of the dividend check. This same high-ranking official also indirectly received portions of payments of unspecified amounts made to someone called "El Portador."

Although court documents do not specify the names of the above officials, Panamanian newspapers and the former Comptroller General of Panama have identified the three individuals as former APN Administrator Hugo Torrijos, former APN Deputy Administrator Ruben Reyna, and former President of Panama Ernesto Pérez Balladares, who held office from 1994 to 1999.

In 1999, Panama's Comptroller General began investigating possible impropriety surrounding APN and PECC, and as a result, the Panamanian government made few payments to PECC from 1999 until 2003. In discussing his investigation with the media, the Comptroller General pointed to the \$18,000 check deposited by former President Balladares. At the time, both Balladares and Jumet asserted that the check was intended for Balladares' reelection campaign, and Jumet later repeated this assertion to U.S. federal agents in January 2005. Due to a Panamanian court ruling that granted Balladares immunity, the Comptroller's investigation ceased and government payments to PECC resumed.

Following Jumet's and Warwick's U.S. settlements, Panamanian interest in the scandal had revived. As of January 2010, Panama's Tribunal de Cuentas, which has jurisdiction over the misuse of public funds, has reopened the case and is investigating twenty-one individuals, including APN Administrator Torrijos and APN Deputy Administrator Reyna. Further information has not been available.

Due to his immunity, President Balladares is not a subject of the investigation. But Balladares was placed under house arrest on January 15, 2010, pending the outcome of an investigation of corruption and money laundering allegations unrelated to the PECC affair. In March 2010, the house arrest was lifted, but Balladares was required to report to the Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime twice each month.

### ***BAE Systems***

In August 2007, BAE Systems plc ("BAES"), Europe's largest defense contractor by sales and the fifth largest in the United States, confirmed that the DOJ had opened a formal investigation in June 2007 of potential violations of U.S. anti-corruption laws. On March 1, 2010, BAES pleaded guilty in U.S. district court to a criminal conspiracy to make false statements to the U.S. government regarding three subjects: (i) BAES's commitment to create and implement policies and procedures to ensure compliance with provisions of the FCPA and relevant provisions of the OECD Convention; (ii) BAES's failure to inform the U.S. government of material failures to comply with these undertakings; and (iii) BAES's disclosures and statements required by U.S. arms export regulations.

The DOJ did not charge BAES with violating the FCPA or conspiring to do so. But, rather than entering into a DPA with BAES, the DOJ required BAES to plead guilty to a criminal offense. BAES and the DOJ entered into a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C), which requires the sentencing court to accept the parties' recommended sentence if it accepts the defendant's plea of guilty. On March 2, 2010, a U.S. district court accepted BAES's plea of guilty and, accordingly, sentenced BAES to the parties' recommended three years of corporate probation and a fine of \$400 million. As conditions of

corporate probation, BAES is required to engage an independent corporate monitor for three years and to implement and maintain an effective compliance program subject to U.S. approval.

BAES was not charged with bribery or corruption in either the United States or the United Kingdom, a disposition that could have prevented BAES from bidding on U.S. and European defense contracts. The U.S. plea agreement also specifically excluded any activities of BAES's wholly owned U.S. subsidiary, BAE Systems, Inc., which is subject to a Special Security Agreement ("SSA") with the U. S. government restricting the amount of control BAES is able to exercise over BAE Systems, Inc. On Friday February 5, 2010, the same day it announced its plea agreement with the DOJ, BAES announced that it had reached a settlement with the U.K.'s Serious Fraud Office ("SFO") that would require BAES to pay £30 million in connection with the long-running bribery probe of BAES's worldwide activities, to be split between a criminal fine in the United Kingdom and a charitable donation to benefit the people of Tanzania, whose officials had received payments from BAES. In March 2012, the SFO announced that BAES, the SFO, and Tanzania had reached an agreement that the money would be spent on textbooks, teacher's guides, syllabi, and syllabus guides; the SFO also stated that the procurement process would be monitored to ensure that the funds are "used solely for the benefit of the Tanzanian people." As part of its settlement with BAES, the SFO agreed not to pursue further action against BAES for prior conduct, with a few exceptions. The dropped investigations included the SFO's investigation and prosecution of Count Alfons MenOSDrff-Pouilly from Austria, a BAES agent who had been charged with conspiracy to corrupt in connection with BAES's sales to European countries.

On May 16, 2011, the U.S. State Department entered a civil settlement with BAES for alleged violations of the Arms Export Control and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations, under which BAES would pay a civil penalty of \$79 million. The State Department charges related in part to front companies set up in the British Virgin Islands through which BAES funneled corrupt payments.

- Specific Allegations

The following summary of the specific U.S. allegations against BAES comes from the Statement of Offense included in BAES's plea agreement with the DOJ, unless otherwise noted. BAES stipulated to the truth and correctness of the Statement of Offense as part of its plea agreement and plea of guilty. Information regarding the SFO's settlement is from the SFO's February 5, 2010 press release, unless otherwise noted.

In 2000, BAES expanded its business in the United States through the acquisition of several U.S. defense companies. In response to U.S. national security concerns, BAES's CEO John Weston wrote a letter to the U.S. Secretary of Defense stating that BAES and its non-U.S. affiliates were "committed to conducting business in compliance with the anti-bribery standards in the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention," that BAES's U.S. affiliates would comply with the FCPA, and that BAES's non-U.S. affiliates would adopt compliance programs to ensure OECD compliance. Weston further stated that such compliance programs would include training, procedures, and internal controls "concerning payments to government officials and the use of

agents.” At the time of this letter, BAES allegedly did not have and was not committed to the practices and standards represented to the Secretary of Defense.

On May 28, 2002, BAES reiterated these commitments in another letter to the U.S. Secretary of Defense. At the time of this letter, however, BAES had not created and was not intending to create sufficient mechanisms to ensure its non-U.S. affiliates were complying with applicable provisions of the FCPA and the OECD Convention. Additionally, BAES’s failure to disclose its actual and intended policies and procedure prevented the DOJ and the Department of Defense from investigating BAES’s practices and imposing remedial actions.

Despite its commitments to the Secretary of Defense, BAES regularly retained “marketing advisors” to assist in securing sales. BAES attempted to conceal some of these relationships and misrepresented the amount of oversight and scrutiny the company gave to substantial payments under these agreements. BAES established various offshore shell companies through which it paid these marketing advisors and encouraged some of the advisors to establish their own shell companies to receive the payments in an effort to conceal the relationships. Through one entity in the British Virgin Islands, BAES made payments of over £135 million and \$14 million to marketing advisors and agents without subjecting the payments to the level of internal scrutiny and review that BAES represented to the Secretary of Defense it would apply. These shell companies were formed to hide the name of the agent and how much the agent was compensated, to create obstacles for investigative authorities, to circumvent laws of countries that do not allow agents, or to assist the agents in avoiding tax liability. BAES further failed to take adequate steps to ensure that its advisors and agents were compliant with the standards of the FCPA. For example, in many instances BAES had no adequate evidence that its advisors performed legitimate activities, and in others the due diligence material purportedly produced was designed to give the appearance that legitimate services were being provided but the material was not, in fact, useful to BAES.

Finally, beginning in 1993, BAES knowingly and willfully failed to identify commissions paid to third parties for assistance with arms sales, in violation of U.S. arms control regulations. Had these commissions been disclosed, the United States might not have approved the sales of certain defense articles.

BAES gained more than \$200 million from these false statements to the U.S. government.

- *Saudi Arabia*

Since the mid-1980s, BAES served as the prime contractor for the sale of fighter aircraft to the U.K. government that were then re-sold to Saudi Arabia pursuant to a series of agreements between the two countries. Media reports suggest that these agreements have generated more than £43 billion in revenue for BAES.

At least one of these agreements identified “support services” that BAES was required to provide. BAES considered itself obligated by this provision to provide substantial benefits to one Saudi Arabian public official, who was in a position to exercise significant influence, and it

did so through payment mechanisms in U.S. territory and elsewhere. These benefits included travel, security services, real estate, automobiles, and personal items, and one employee submitted to BAES more than \$5 million in invoices for such benefits between May 2001 and early 2002. BAES also concealed payments to advisors assisting with the fighter aircraft sales; in one case, BAES agreed to transfer more than £10 million and \$9 million to the Swiss bank account of a marketing advisor while knowing there was a high probability that the marketing advisor would transfer a portion of these funds to Saudi officials in order to influence the decision on these contracts. BAES failed to perform adequate due diligence on the payments, in contradiction of BAES's commitments to the Secretary of Defense.

According to U.K. court documents and media reports, the SFO abruptly halted its investigation of BAES's Saudi Arabia activities in December 2006 due to national security concerns after Saudi Arabia threatened to withdraw all cooperation on security and intelligence. Following the decision to halt the investigation, two anti-arms trade groups brought suit challenging the decision. In April 2008, Britain's High Court condemned the decision to drop the investigation, but the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords sided with the U.K. government and ruled that the SFO Director was entitled to drop an investigation if, in his judgment, British lives were at risk.

- Czech Republic & Hungary

In 1999, both the Czech Republic and Hungary sought bids by major defense contractors for the sale of fighter jets. Ultimately, the two countries separately decided to lease Griphen fighter jets, produced by BAES, from the government of Sweden. BAES made payments of more than £19 million to various entities associated with an individual identified in the Information only as "Person A." These payments were allegedly made even though BAES knew there was a high probability that part of the payments would be used to make improper payments so that the bid processes would favor BAES. Additionally, BAES did not perform proper due diligence with respect to its relationship with entities associated with Person A, contradicting what the company had reported to the U.S. government. Finally, because U.S. defense materials were used in the jets, the government of Sweden was required to apply for and obtain arms export licenses from the U.S. for each contract. BAES's failure to disclose the existence of payments to Person A caused Sweden to provide false information in its application submitted with the U.S. government.

- Tanzania

The SFO had investigated \$12.4 million in payments that BAES made to a purported Tanzanian marketing agent in connection with BAES's sale of a £28 million air traffic control radar system to Tanzania.

According to court documents, a local businessman, Shailesh Vithlani, had been recruited and retained by a Siemens entity (later acquired by BAES) as a marketing advisor to assist in negotiations. Vithlani had entered into a contract with a subsidiary of the Siemens entity, however, shortly before the radar contract was signed, two new adviser agreements with Vithlani

were concluded. One agreement was made between Red Diamond Trading Company (“Red Diamond”), a British Virgin Islands entity created by BAES for the purposes of the transaction to ensure confidentiality, and a Vithlani-controlled Panama-incorporated company, Envers Trading Corporation. The fee for Vithlani’s services under this contract was to be not more than 30.025% of the radar contract price. The other arrangement was for services direct to BAES by another Vithlani-controlled business, Merlin International, registered in the B.V.I. The fee under this agreement was 1% of the radar contract value. Between January 2000 and December 2005 around \$12.4 million was paid to Vithlani’s companies by BAES or Red Diamond.

BAES and the SFO entered a settlement agreement, under which BAES admitted to failing to keep accurate accounting records regarding the payments to the Tanzanian marketing agent “sufficient to show and explain the transactions of the company,” in violation of Section 221 of the U.K.’s Companies Act of 1985. BAES also admitted that there “was a high probability that part of the \$12.4m would be used in the negotiation process to favour BAE,” and agreed to make a payment of up to £30 million, less any fines imposed by the court, to the Tanzanian government without admitting any liability to the Tanzanian government. Media reported that, at a December 20, 2010, plea hearing, the SFO also stressed that BAES had “gone to very considerable lengths to ensure that the conduct giving rise to the offence is never again repeated” and had “instituted appropriate standards of compliance.”

In exchange, the SFO agreed to a series of express declinations of further actions against BAES that went beyond the conduct BAES had disclosed to the SFO. The SFO agreed to “terminate all its investigations into the BAE Systems Group,” that — with the exception of conduct related to the Czech Republic or Hungary — “there shall be no further investigation or prosecutions of any member of the BAE Systems Group for any conduct preceding 5 February 2010,” that there would be no civil proceedings “against any member of the BAE Systems Group” relating to matters the SFO investigated, and that “[n]o member of the BAE Systems Group shall be named as, or alleged to be, an unindicted co-conspirator or in any other capacity in any prosecution the SFO may bring against any other party.”

At the plea hearing, Justice David Michael Bean of the Crown Court at Southwark challenged the propriety of the plea agreement. Justice Bean harshly criticized the plea agreement’s failure to include a corruption-related offense, stating, according to media reports, that the “obvious inference” from the accounting plea was that part of the secret payment was, in fact, a bribe to a Tanzanian official to win the contract. “I do not read that the money paid was just payments reflecting the fact Mr. Vithlani was a busy man. I read that part of the 12.4m was used to make corrupt payments. Is that what it means?” inquired Justice Bean. Media reports stated that Mr. Justice Bean further criticized BAES for taking a “hear no evil, speak no evil” posture by arranging the payment so that it would not know how much was paid to foreign officials. Justice Bean continued the hearing over to December 21 because he would not approve the settlement until he knew the intended use of the \$12.4 paid to the marketing agent. In subsequent formal remarks, Justice Bean further commented that he was “surprised to find a prosecutor granting a blanket indemnity for all offences committed in the past, whether disclosed or otherwise.”

On December 21, 2010 however, Justice Bean approved the settlement despite his misgivings. Although noting that U.K. law did not require him to accept the purported basis of the plea — which included suggestions by the SFO, seriously doubted by Justice Bean, that the payments to the agent were for his lobbying efforts and that “public relations and marketing services” would have been an appropriate description for the payments under Section 221— Justice Bean concluded that he had no power to modify the settlement agreement or sentence BAES for an offense to which it did not admit. Justice Bean also considered the fact that BAES had already paid U.S. authorities \$400 million for unrelated conduct and observed that the settlement agreement’s offset of any criminal fines against the £30 million payment to Tanzania placed “moral pressure on the Court to keep the fine to a minimum so that the reparation is kept at a maximum.” Accordingly, Justice Bean sentenced BAES to a fine of £500,000 and a payment of £225,000 towards the SFO’s costs.

### ***Military and Law Enforcement Products Sting***

On January 18, 2010, twenty-two individuals from sixteen different companies in the military and law enforcement products industry were arrested for FCPA violations in a first-of-its-kind undercover sting operation conducted by the FBI and the DOJ. All of the individuals were arrested on the same day, and all except for one were arrested in Las Vegas, where they were each attending a major industry conference and exposition, the Shooting, Hunting, Outdoor Trade Show and Conference (known as the “SHOT Show”). The other individual was arrested in Miami. The DOJ’s prosecution of these individuals represents the single largest prosecution against individuals in the history of FCPA enforcement.

The arrests followed an undercover operation involving approximately 150 FBI agents and focusing on allegations of bribery in the military and law enforcement products industry. The companies associated with the charged individuals provide military and law enforcement equipment such as armored vehicles, weapons, body armor, ballistic plates, and various accessories. The defendants were charged with violations of, and conspiracy to violate, the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, aiding and abetting violations of the FCPA, and a money laundering conspiracy. Together, these charges covered the waterfront of U.S. FCPA jurisdiction. Sixteen individuals were charged as domestic concerns because they are U.S. citizens. Four U.K. citizens and one Israeli citizen were charged as “other persons” subject to the FCPA for acts in U.S. territory. And one U.S. citizen was charged both as a domestic concern and for causing his employer, a U.S. issuer for the purposes of the FCPA, to commit an act in violation of the FCPA.

At the time, then-Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer hailed the operation and stated that the DOJ was prepared “to bring all the innovations of our organized crime and drug war cases to the fight against white-collar criminals.”

What began as an innovative sting operation, however, ultimately collapsed. Initially, the 22 individuals were charged in sixteen separate indictments. At a February 3, 2010, arraignment in U.S. district court, U.S. prosecutors announced that the DOJ believed the defendants were involved in one large, overriding conspiracy. Prosecutors asserted that documents, audio

recordings, and video recordings that support this theory. According to media reports, among these materials was a video of all 22 defendants, a cooperating witness, and the FBI undercover agent posing as a representative of Gabon's Minister of Defense toasting to the success of the operation at a well-known restaurant in Washington, D.C. Accordingly, on April 19, 2010, the DOJ filed a single superseding indictment against all 22 defendants consistent with the single-conspiracy theory. On April 28, 2010, 21 of the defendants entered pleas of not guilty. The final defendant, Daniel Alvarez, pleaded guilty to two counts of conspiracy to violate the FCPA on March 1, 2011. Prior to trial, two other defendants changed their pleas to guilty: Jonathan Spiller pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA on March 29, 2011, and Haim Geri pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA on April 28, 2011.

The government divided the original 22 defendants into four groups for trial. The trial of the first four defendants started in May 2011, but ended on July 7, 2011, when the jury failed to reach a verdict after five days of deliberations and the judge declared a mistrial and set retrial for May 2012. The second trial, of six defendants, also failed to result in any guilty verdicts: one defendant who had only been charged with conspiracy was acquitted in December 2011 prior to the case went to the jury when the judge ruled the government had presented insufficient evidence of the "single conspiracy" theory to sustain a conviction; in January 2012, the jury acquitted two defendants and failed to reach a verdict on the remaining three, resulting in the judge declaring a mistrial as to the latter. The government ultimately determined in February 2012 that continuing its prosecution would be a waste of government resources, and the judge granted its motions to dismiss the still-pending charges and, later, to dismiss with prejudice the indictments against the three defendants who had pleaded guilty.

Despite the government's failure to secure convictions in this case, the defendants still suffered the reputational and financial costs of fighting the charges at trial and had their personal and professional lives severely affected. Accordingly, there are still valuable lessons to learn from the tactics the DOJ employed and allegations it made. The DOJ alleged that the defendants each met with a former executive in the industry, identified in court documents as "Individual 1," and representatives of the Minister of Defense for an unnamed African country (which media reports indicate was Gabon). In actuality, the former executive was a person facing unrelated FCPA charges who had decided to cooperate with the DOJ and FBI as an undercover informant. Undercover FBI agents posed as a representative of Gabon's Minister of Defense and as a procurement officer for Gabon's Ministry of Defense.

During these meetings, which took place in both Miami and Washington, D.C., the defendants were informed that a potential contract worth approximately \$15 million to provide equipment to the unnamed African country's Presidential Guard was available. The defendants allegedly agreed to a scheme in which they would provide the agent a 20% "commission" on the contract with the understanding that half of the "commission" would be passed along directly to the Minister of Defense, with the other half split between Individual 1 and the sales agent. The defendants allegedly planned to conceal the payments by overstating the contract value and providing two price quotes: one representing the actual cost of the goods, another representing the cost of the goods plus the 20% "commission."

The DOJ alleged that the defendants agreed to proceed in two phases. In Phase 1, the defendants were to fill a small order as a test run. The second phase would involve a larger, more complete order. The DOJ alleges several overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracies, including receiving payment during Phase 1 from a bank account purportedly held by the unnamed African country, filling the order, providing the faulty price quotations for Phase 1, providing the 20% commission to the sales agent's bank account for Phase 1, signing a purchase agreement for Phase 2, and using U.S. mails or means or instrumentalities of U.S. interstate commerce in furtherance of the FCPA violations.

- Allied Defense Group

Allied Defense Group Inc. ("Allied"), a Virginia-based ammunition company, announced in its April 7, 2010, Annual Report for 2009 that it had received a subpoena from the DOJ related to the ongoing criminal investigation of one of the individuals involved in the sting, an employee of Allied's subsidiary, Mecar USA ("Mecar"). According to the Annual Report, the individual's alleged criminal conduct was done on behalf of a Decatur, Georgia company unrelated to either Mecar or Allied. Mecar fired the individual shortly after receiving the subpoena. Though Allied did not reveal the identity of the individual, the indictment of two individuals, John Gregory Godsey and Mark Frederick Morales, referenced their affiliation with a Decatur, Georgia company. Allied indicated that it would cooperate fully with the DOJ as well as launch its own internal investigation into the Mecar employee's conduct.

A sale to Chemring Group PLC subsequently left Allied with no significant operating assets, and on October 1, 2010, Allied announced that its stockholders had approved the dissolution of the company once the company had resolved matters with the DOJ. In a letter to shareholders on August 15, 2013, Allied stated that its external counsel had received a letter from the DOJ advising that the enforcement agency "had decided to close their inquiry of [Allied] without any charge or penalties," and that it would "now proceed with our dissolution of the Company."

- Smith & Wesson

On July 1, 2010, Smith & Wesson Holding Corporation ("Smith & Wesson") disclosed in its Annual Report that the DOJ and SEC were investigating the company for potential violations of the FCPA and federal securities laws. Smith & Wesson disclosed that it is the U.S. issuer mentioned above, that one of the SHOT Show defendants, Amaro Goncalves, was its Vice President in charge of sales to U.S. and international law enforcement agencies, and that it was served with a grand jury subpoena for documents. Smith & Wesson further disclosed that the SEC is conducting a "fact-finding inquiry" that "appears" to have been "triggered in part" by the DOJ's FCPA investigation. Smith & Wesson stated that it is cooperating with the DOJ and SEC investigations and has undertaken a comprehensive review of its policies and procedures. Smith & Wesson has since disclosed two shareholder derivative actions brought against the company stemming from the potential FCPA violations.

### *NATCO Group*

On January 11, 2010, the SEC filed a settled civil enforcement action against NATCO Group, Inc. (“NATCO”), an oil and gas equipment manufacturer headquartered in Houston, Texas. NATCO was an “issuer” for the purposes of the FCPA until its purchase by Cameron International Corporation in November 2009.

The SEC alleged that NATCO violated the FCPA’s accounting provisions as a result of payments made by TEST Automation & Controls, Inc. (“TEST”), a wholly owned NATCO subsidiary, in response to extortion by Kazakh officials. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, NATCO agreed to pay a \$65,000 civil penalty and consented to entry of a cease-and-desist order prohibiting further violations of the accounting provisions.

In June of 2005, TEST’s branch office in Kazakhstan (“TEST Kazakhstan”) won a contract to provide instrumentation and electrical services in that country. TEST Kazakhstan hired both Kazakh expatriates and local Kazakh employees to work on the contract.

In February and September 2007, Kazakh immigration prosecutors conducted audits of TEST Kazakhstan’s compliance with immigration laws and claimed to have found that the Kazakh expatriates did not have proper documentation. The prosecutors threatened the expatriates with fines, incarceration, or deportation unless the prosecutors received cash fees of \$25,000 in February and \$20,000 in September. The SEC alleged that TEST Kazakhstan employees believed in good faith that the prosecutors’ threats were genuine. According to the complaint, TEST senior management authorized the employees to make the cash payments and reimbursed the employees for the payments. TEST, however, recorded the payments as a salary advance and “visa fines,” which the SEC alleged was not accurate. Additionally, the SEC alleged that TEST failed to describe accurately the payments to the banks involved and separately submitted false invoices totaling over \$80,000 to banks to reimburse a consultant, who had ties to the ministry issuing the visas. The cease and desist order notes that “[i]t is not known how the consultant used these funds, or to whom they were paid.”

The Cease and Desist order lists several remedial measures that NATCO took upon discovering the conduct as part of an internal audit in late 2007, including: (i) an internal investigation and self-reporting to the SEC; (ii) employee termination and disciplinary action; (iii) revisions to its agent form agreement; (iv) institution of new due diligence procedures for vetting and retaining third parties; (v) increased compliance staffing, including the creation of a Chief Compliance Officer position; (vi) participation in a non-profit organization relating to anti-bribery due diligence; (vii) increased training worldwide; (viii) additional investment in internal control software; and (ix) restructuring of its internal audit department. The SEC noted that NATCO expanded its review of TEST’s operations to include those in Nigeria, Angola, and China, areas described as having “historic FCPA concerns.”

Because the FCPA imposes strict civil liability on issuer parents, such as NATCO during the relevant time period, for the books and records of wholly owned foreign subsidiaries, it was no defense for NATCO that the payments were made in response to extortive threats against the Kazakh expatriates.

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2009

*UTStarcom*

On December 31, 2009, UTStarcom Inc. (“UTStarcom”), a global telecommunications company based in Alameda, California, and whose stock trades on NASDAQ, resolved DOJ and SEC investigations into potential FCPA violations by its wholly owned subsidiaries in China, Thailand, and Mongolia.

UTStarcom entered into an NPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay a monetary penalty of \$1.5 million. The DOJ stated that it agreed to an NPA because, in part, of UTStarcom’s timely, voluntary, and complete disclosure of the violations, its thorough, “real-time” cooperation with the DOJ and the SEC, and the “extensive remedial efforts” it had already taken and will be taking. UTStarcom agreed to cooperate fully with any DOJ or SEC investigations arising out of the conduct underlying the agreement, to strengthen its compliance, bookkeeping, and internal accounting controls standard and procedures, and to provide periodic reports to the DOJ regarding its compliance with the NPA. The SEC also noted that in 2006, after learning of some of the improper payments described below, UTStarcom’s audit committee conducted an internal investigation that eventually expanded to cover all of UTStarcom’s operations worldwide. UTStarcom adopted new FCPA-related policies and procedures, hired additional finance and internal compliance personnel, improved its internal accounting controls, implemented FCPA training in its major offices worldwide, and terminated a former executive officer who allegedly knew of or authorized much of the improper conduct.

Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations that it violated the anti-bribery and accounting provisions, UTStarcom consented to the entry of a final judgment requiring it to pay a \$1.5 million civil penalty and to file four annual reports and certifications with the SEC regarding its FCPA compliance. UTStarcom agreed that such annual reports would identify any reported or suspected anti-bribery violations, any material violations of the accounting provisions, all material changes to its FCPA-related policies and controls, all gifts, travel, and entertainment provided to foreign officials, and all payments to consultants or agents in connection with contracts or bids for contracts with majority foreign government-owned enterprises.

According to the civil complaint filed by the SEC and the facts set forth in the NPA’s Statement of Facts — the latter of which UTStarcom admitted, accepted, and acknowledged — UTStarcom subsidiaries engaged in several improper practices in Asia, including providing gifts, travel, and employment to employees of state-owned telecommunications companies as well as providing money to an agent knowing that part of the money would be passed on to government officials.

- *Travel*

At least since 2002, according to the NPA’s Statement of Facts, UTStarcom China Co. Ltd. (“UTS-China”) included a provision in initial sales contracts with government-controlled municipal and provincial telecommunications companies whereby UTStarcom would pay for

these entities' employees to travel to the United States for purported training. Instead, the employees visited popular tourist destinations where UTStarcom had no facilities. Between 2002 and 2007, UTStarcom spent nearly \$7 million on approximately 225 such trips. Specifically regarding ten such initial contracts, UTStarcom paid for and improperly accounted for approximately \$670,000 in expenses. The SEC further alleged that most of these trips lasted up to two weeks and cost \$5,000 per employee.

The SEC also alleged that UTStarcom paid for employees of Chinese government customers to attend executive training programs at U.S. universities. The programs were not specifically related to UTStarcom's products or business and instead covered general management topics. The SEC alleged that UTStarcom paid for all expenses related to the programs, including field trips to tourist destinations and cash allowances of up to \$3,000 per person, which totaled more than \$4 million between 2002 and 2004. UTStarcom allegedly recorded these expenses as marketing expenses. In 2002, UTStarcom's CEO and UTStarcom's Executive Vice President, the latter of whom also served as the CEO of UTS-China, approved a 2003 budget increase for these programs to provide a specific program for UTStarcom's biggest customer, a Chinese state-owned telecommunications company.

- Employment

According to the SEC, UTStarcom provided or offered full time employment in the United States to employees of government customers (or their families) in Thailand and China on at least 10 occasions. In at least three of these instances, UTStarcom allegedly provided benefits to individuals even though they never performed any work. To conceal their lack of work, fake performance reviews were prepared and kept in a personnel file and the payments were recorded as employee compensation. UTStarcom allegedly also sponsored U.S. permanent residency applications that falsely stated these three individuals would be full-time employees of UTStarcom in New Jersey, resulting in each of them receiving green cards.

- Gifts and Entertainment

The SEC alleged that, in 2004, in an attempt to expand UTStarcom business in Thailand, UTStarcom's general manager in Thailand allegedly spent nearly \$10,000 on French wine (including several rare bottles) as gifts to agents of the government customer with which UTStarcom had a contract under consideration. The manager also allegedly spent an additional \$13,000 in entertainment expenses in order to secure the same contract. These expenditures were approved by UTStarcom's Executive Vice President and CEO of UTS-China and reimbursed and recorded as marketing expenses by UTStarcom.

- Improper Consultant Payments

In 2005, in an effort to break into the telecommunications business in Mongolia, UTStarcom's Executive Vice President and CEO of UTS-China authorized a \$1.5 million payment to a Mongolian company pursuant to a consultancy agreement. The payment was recorded as a license fee; however, the license actually cost only \$50,000, and the company knew that at least a portion of additional money would be used to pay a Mongolian government

official to help UTStarcom obtain a favorable ruling on a dispute over its Mongolian license. In 2007, the same UTStarcom executive authorized a \$200,000 payment to a Chinese company as part of a consulting agreement. The SEC alleged that this was, in fact, a sham consulting company and that the payment was simply part of an effort to obtain a contract from a government customer.

### **AGCO**

On September 30, 2009, AGCO Corporation (“AGCO”) and its subsidiaries, sellers of farm equipment and machinery, agreed to pay over \$20 million in criminal and civil penalties to resolve international investigations into kickbacks paid to the Iraqi government to obtain contracts under the U.N.’s Oil-for-Food Programme (“OFFP”).

The SEC alleged that AGCO subsidiaries made approximately \$5.9 million in kickback payments to the government of Iraq that had the effect of diverting funds from the U.N.’s escrow account established to provide humanitarian goods and services to the Iraqi people. The SEC alleged that AGCO violated the FCPA’s accounting provisions by failing to keep accurate records of the kickbacks or to devise and maintain internal accounting controls to prevent and detect the kickbacks. The SEC identified AGCO Ltd. (based in England), AGCO Denmark A/S, and AGCO S.A. (based in France) as the offending subsidiaries, with AGCO Ltd. arranging the sales and kickbacks through AGCO Denmark A/S, AGCO S.A., and a third-party agent in Jordan. The SEC alleged that AGCO’s profits from the OFFP contracts were nearly \$14 million. Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, AGCO disgorged these profits and agreed to pay \$2 million in prejudgment interest and a civil penalty of \$2.4 million.

The DOJ filed a criminal information charging only AGCO Ltd. with a conspiracy to commit wire fraud and to violate the FCPA’s books and records provisions and entered into a three-year DPA with AGCO. As part of the DPA, AGCO agreed to pay a \$1.6 million penalty and, if the DOJ were to initiate the prosecution deferred, that AGCO would not contest its responsibility for the acts described in an attached Statement of Facts relating to three AGCO Ltd. contracts. AGCO was required to implement a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent violations of applicable anti-corruption laws and to submit annual brief, written reports on its compliance progress and experience.

The same day that it resolved the SEC and DOJ investigations, AGCO agreed to resolve an investigation by the Danish State Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime regarding two OFFP contracts that AGCO Denmark A/S executed. AGCO agreed to disgorge approximately \$630,000 in profits related to those contracts.

- *Specific Allegations*

The following factual summary is based on the allegations in the SEC’s complaint, unless otherwise noted.

From 2000 to 2003, the Iraqi Ministry of Agriculture awarded 16 OFFP contracts to the three AGCO subsidiaries identified above. For three of these contracts, each executed by AGCO

Ltd. and involving the sale of tractors and spare parts, AGCO subsidiaries paid the Iraqi government a total of over \$550,000 in kickbacks. The first contract totaled €2.2 million including an extra 14.05% to be used for kickbacks, the second totaled €10.9 million including an extra 21% to be used for kickbacks, and the third contract totaled €4.8 million including an extra 13.47% to be used for kickbacks.

For all of its OFFP contracts, AGCO worked through a Jordanian agent who was paid through a mixture of fixed and variable commissions as well as legitimate after-sales service fees. For the contracts requiring kickbacks, the AGCO subsidiaries secretly inflated the contract price between 13 and 21 percent per contract before submitting the contracts to the UN for approval and payment under the OFFP. When the UN approved the payment, the Jordanian agent received the extra money in a separate account in a manner that made it appear as though the payment was a second after-sales commission, rather than an improper kickback. In its books and records, AGCO Ltd. mischaracterized the second account used to effect kickbacks as “Ministry Accruals.”

Yet this method of accounting did not hide the fact that the commission payments occasionally varied significantly from the percentages provided for in the agent’s contract or that the invoicing statements sometimes did not match the amounts actually paid. Indeed, several e-mails made public by the DOJ show that the scheme was known within the company. For example, after the first kickback was paid, the Jordanian agent emailed an AGCO Ltd. employee with details of the contract costs, noting that the “extra commission which you know” was a “third-party expense” to be paid to the Iraqi “Ministry.” Regarding the second kickback, another AGCO Ltd. employee wrote to a colleague “as these contracts were negotiated and signed by your good self in Baghdad ... you would of course have a better understanding of the commercials of these contracts, i.e. you mention [sic] up to 30% kickbacks to the ministry etc.”

AGCO also failed to impose adequate internal controls over its sales and marketing staff at AGCO Ltd., who were able to enter into contracts without review from either the legal or finance departments. AGCO Ltd. marketing staff members were even able to create accrual accounts — such as the Ministry Accrual account used to pay the kickbacks — without any oversight. Additionally, on at least two occasions, the Jordanian agent asked for and received money for “car payments” and these payments were made without any due diligence.

Both the SEC and DOJ expressly noted that they considered the prompt remedial acts taken by AGCO and AGCO’s cooperation in reaching the above dispositions. These efforts included a significant internal investigation and implementation of enhanced compliance procedures.

### ***William J. Jefferson***

On August 5, 2009, former congressman William J. Jefferson, the first elected official ever charged with violating the FCPA, was convicted on 11 of 16 counts of corruption, including conspiracy to violate the FCPA (albeit with a wrinkle described below), soliciting bribes, money-laundering, honest services fraud, obstruction of justice, and racketeering. The jury found Jefferson guilty of soliciting and receiving hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes for himself

or his family members in the form of “consulting fees,” ownership interests in various businesses, shares of revenue or profit from companies he aided, and monthly fees or retainers. On November 13, 2009, he was sentenced to 13 years in prison, far less than the 27 to 33 years requested by prosecutors.

Jefferson participated in numerous executed and attempted schemes involving telecommunications deals in Ghana and Nigeria, oil concessions in Equatorial Guinea, and satellite transmission contracts in Botswana, Equatorial Guinea, and the Republic of Congo. In many of the schemes, Jefferson used his position and influence as a member of the U.S. House of Representatives to further the interests of businesses in which he owned a stake or that had agreed to pay him bribes.

Jefferson also faced a substantive charge of violating the FCPA, but was ultimately acquitted of that charge. The FCPA charge stemmed from Jefferson’s alleged offer to bribe an official of the Nigerian state-owned telecommunications company Nitel in exchange for the official’s assistance in obtaining telecommunications approvals on behalf of a Nigerian joint venture in which Jefferson held an interest. The indictment alleged that Jefferson offered \$500,000 as a “front-end” payment and a “back-end” payment of at least half of the profits of one of the joint venture companies to the official in exchange for the official’s assistance in obtaining approvals that would have allowed the Nigerian joint venture to locate its equipment at Nitel’s facilities and use Nitel’s telephone lines. As part of the “front-end” payment, Jefferson promised to deliver \$100,000 in cash to the Nigerian official, which Lori Mody, a partner in the joint venture, provided to Jefferson. Several days later, on August 3, 2005, \$90,000 of the \$100,000 was discovered in the freezer in Jefferson’s Washington, D.C. home during a raid by federal authorities.

The government’s FCPA case was weakened when Mody did not testify. The judge instructed the jury that to convict Jefferson on the FCPA charge, they had to find that he had offered to bribe the Nigerian official or authorized such a bribe. Defense counsel argued that, as the \$90,000 had been found in the freezer, it could not have been used to bribe the Nigerian official and that Jefferson had not intended to use it so.

Jefferson was found guilty of 11 counts, including a count of conspiracy, which included conspiracy to (i) solicit bribes, (ii) deprive citizens of honest services, and (iii) violate the FCPA. The jury’s verdict form did not require it to specify which conspiracy charges were proven. The guilty verdict, however, is recorded as an FCPA conspiracy charge under Count 1 of the indictment. Jefferson was acquitted on three counts of honest services wire fraud, one count of obstruction of justice, and the lone count of violating the FCPA.

Jefferson appealed his conviction on the grounds that the district court’s jury instructions erroneously characterized the definition of an “official act” and the “*quid-pro-quo*” element of U.S. law prohibiting the bribery of public officials, that Jefferson’s failure to disclose his and his family’s interest in business he promoted did not constitute honest services wire fraud, and that the venue was improper on one of the wire fraud offenses. Among Jefferson’s arguments was that the definition of an “official act” under the domestic bribery statute should be narrowly

interpreted and limited to those acts that “concern a question resolvable through the formal legislative process or, at most ... through a governmental process.” On March 27, 2012, however, a three-judge panel at 4th Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously affirmed ten of the eleven counts of Jefferson’s conviction, including the count of conspiracy to commit (among other offenses) a violation of the FCPA. The appellate panel rejected Jefferson’s “official act” argument by noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has long-held that official acts can include activities that have been clearly established by settled practice as part of a public official’s position. The appellate panel also affirmed the district court’s “*quid pro quo*” jury instruction and rejected Jefferson’s argument that the government need to demonstrate that payments he received were tied to specific official acts (or omissions). The appellate panel confirmed the district court’s reasoning that services performed on an “as needed” basis could still be linked to payments Jefferson received. Jefferson’s singular victory was the appellate panel’s dismissal of a single wire fraud count, which it found to be improperly prosecuted in Virginia because the misconduct involved a phone call between Africa and Kentucky.

***Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc., Douglas Faggioli, and Craig D. Huff***

On July 31, 2009, the SEC filed a settled enforcement action against Nature’s Sunshine Products, Inc. (“NSP”), its Chief Executive Officer Douglas Faggioli and its former Chief Financial Officer Craig D. Huff for violations of the anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA as well as antifraud and issuer reporting provisions of the Exchange Act. NSP is a Utah corporation that manufactures, among other things, vitamins and nutritional supplements. Without admitting or denying the allegations, NSP, Faggioli and Huff consented to final judgments enjoining them from future violations of the FCPA and the Exchange Act. The judgment ordered NSP to pay a civil penalty of \$600,000 and Faggioli and Huff each to pay a civil penalty of \$25,000.

According to the SEC’s Complaint, between 2000 and 2001, NSP’s wholly owned Brazilian subsidiary, Nature’s Sunshine Produtos Naturais Ltda. (“NSP Brazil”), made over \$1 million in cash payments to customs brokers, some of which were later passed on to Brazilian customs officials. NSP recorded the payments as “importation advances.” NSP Brazil began making the payments after the Brazilian governmental agency responsible for regulating nutritional products reclassified many NSP products as medicines, which led to a significant decline in NSP’s sales in Brazil. As a consequence of the reclassification, NSP Brazil was required to register its products in order to legally import and sell them, but was unable to obtain registration for several of its products. From 2000 to 2003, NSP’s sales in Brazil dropped from \$22 million to \$2.3 million. NSP Brazil thus paid the customs agents to facilitate the illegal importation of its products.

In December 2000, NSP Brazil’s Operations Manager informed two NSP controllers, who were visiting NSP Brazil and had responsibility for maintaining NSP’s books and records and preparing NSP’s financial statements with respect to its foreign subsidiaries, including NSP Brazil, that he was concerned about the products NSP Brazil was importing because the company did not have the proper registrations. He told the controllers that, as a result of pressure from the Brazilian government, it was costing NSP Brazil 25% of the value of its

product to find customs brokers willing to assist in the importation of the unregistered products. He also claimed to have informed NSP Brazil's General Manager about these issues but was told that NSP was aware of the problems. One of the controllers claimed to have informed a senior manager at NSP about the statements made to him by the operations manager.

In approximately November 2001, NSP Brazil hired a new controller who discovered entries reflecting approximately 80 cash payments, including payments to customs brokers in Brazil, for which no supporting documentation existed. Nevertheless, NSP accounted for the payments in its 2001 financial statements as if they were legitimate importation expenses. In 2002, in an effort to conceal the payments, NSP Brazil purchased fictitious supporting documents.

In its 2001 Form 10-K filed with the SEC in March 2002, NSP stated that it had experienced a significant decline in sales in Brazil, but failed to disclose any material information regarding the payments to customs brokers.

The SEC complaint alleges that in 2000 and 2001, Faggioli, as COO during the relevant period, and Huff, as CFO during the relevant period, failed to adequately supervise NSP personnel (i) to make and keep books and records at NSP in reasonable detail and (ii) in devising and maintaining a system of internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that the registration of NSP products sold in Brazil was adequately monitored. The complaint does not allege any personal knowledge or participation in any of improper payments on behalf of Faggioli and Huff. This represents the SEC's first use of "control person liability" in the FCPA context of which we are aware.

The Complaint alleges that NSP violated Sections 10(b), 13(a), 13(b)(2)(A), 13(b)(2)(B) and 30A of the Exchange Act, and Rules 10b-5, 12b-20, 13a-1 and 13a-13, and that Faggioli and Huff violated Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and 13(b)(2)(B) as control persons pursuant to Section 20(a) of the Exchange Act.

In its statement, NSP indicated that it self-reported the results of its internal investigation to the SEC and the DOJ and "fully cooperated in the government investigations."

### ***Helmerich & Payne***

On July 30, 2009, following a voluntary disclosure, Helmerich & Payne ("H&P") — an oil-drilling company headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma and listed on the New York Stock Exchange — entered into agreements with the SEC and DOJ in connection with improper payments by H&P subsidiaries to customs officials in Argentina and Venezuela in relation to the shipment of drilling equipment parts. Under a cease and desist order with the SEC and a two-year NPA with the DOJ, H&P is required to pay approximately \$1.375 million in fines and profit disgorgement, implement rigorous internal controls and cooperate with the agencies.

H&P provides rigs, equipment, and personnel to national and international oil companies on a contract basis in the United States and South America. Between 2003 and 2008, two of H&P's subsidiaries, the financial results of which are components of the consolidated financial

statements in H&P's filings with the SEC, Helmerich & Payne (Argentina) Drilling Company ("H&P Argentina") and Helmerich & Payne de Venezuela, C.A. ("H&P Venezuela"), made improper payments to government officials to skirt Argentine and Venezuelan customs laws. Both subsidiaries directed payments to officials through their customs brokers in order to facilitate imports and exports. H&P Argentina paid approximately \$166,000 to customs officials to permit the importation and exportation of its equipment without required licenses or on an expedited basis, and, in some instances, when Argentine law forbade such imports. H&P Venezuela paid nearly \$20,000 to customs officials to secure partial inspections or to import equipment not in compliance with local customs regulations. Together, the subsidiaries avoided through such payments over \$320,000 in expenses they would have otherwise incurred.

The subsidiaries falsely or misleadingly recorded the brokerage service payments in their books and records. H&P Argentina received and paid invoices from its customs broker that described the payments to customs officials as "additional assessments," "extra costs," or "extraordinary expenses." Similarly, the improper payments that H&P Venezuela made were described on invoices as "urgent processing," "urgent dispatch," or "customs processing."

H&P first learned of the improper payments during an FCPA training session. In early 2008, H&P designed and implemented stand alone FCPA policies and procedures, which included worldwide FCPA training for its key employees. (The company's Corporate Code of Business Ethics had historically contained anti-bribery provisions.) During one such training session, an H&P employee volunteered information about the improper payments H&P Argentina was making. In response, H&P hired outside counsel and independent forensic accountants to conduct an internal investigation of the subsidiaries' customs practices in Latin America. Both the DOJ and SEC pointed to the company's voluntary disclosure of the improper payments as well as its prompt remedial actions as mitigating factors.

### ***Avery Dennison Corporation***

On July 28, 2009, the SEC filed two settled enforcement proceedings against Avery Dennison Corporation ("Avery"), a California-based company that manufactures, markets and sells a wide range of products such as adhesive materials, office products, labels and graphics imaging media, relating to attempted and actual payments and other benefits provided to Chinese government officials, payments made to customs officials in Indonesia and Pakistan and additional unspecified payments discovered in China. In a civil action filed in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, the SEC charged Avery with violations of the books and records and internal control provisions of the FCPA. Avery agreed to pay a civil penalty of \$200,000 in settlement. In the parallel administrative proceeding, the SEC ordered Avery to cease and desist its violations of the FCPA and to disgorge and pay pre-judgment interest totaling \$318,470.

According to the SEC complaint and administrative order, Avery's fourth-tier, wholly owned subsidiary, Avery (China) Co. Ltd. ("Avery China"), sells reflective materials used in printing, on road signs and on emergency vehicles. From 2002 to 2005, Avery China's Reflectives Division paid or authorized payments of several kickbacks, sightseeing trips, and

gifts to Chinese government officials, primarily officials of the Wuxi, Jiangsu Province Traffic Management Research Institute (“Wuxi Institute”). China’s Ministry of Public Security sets safety standards that products used in road communications must meet. The Ministry is assisted by various institutes, including the Wuxi Institute, that help “formulate project plans, draft product and project specifications, and test[] pilot projects” and, as such, “could play an important role in awarding government contracts.”

The benefits Avery provided to the Chinese officials took several forms. For example, in 2002 and 2005, Avery China managers offered sightseeing trips for a total of nine government officials collectively valued at nearly \$20,000 and submitted false or multiple reimbursement requests to conceal the true nature of the expenses. In January 2004, an Avery China sales manager accompanied four Wuxi Institute officials to a meeting and purchased each a pair of shoes with a combined value of approximately \$500. In May 2004, Avery China hired a former Wuxi Institute official because his wife, also a Wuxi Institute official, was in charge of two projects that Avery China was pursuing.

In August 2004, Avery China’s former national manager for the Reflectives Division offered or approved two attempted kickbacks to government entities. The first attempted kickback, which would have amounted to \$41,138, was in connection with two contracts awarded to Avery China, which the Reflectives China National Manager obtained by agreeing to increase the sales prices of the contracts artificially and then refund the amount back to the Wuxi Institute with the understanding that at least a portion of the amount would be for the benefit of Wuxi officials. The scheme, however, was discovered by Avery’s Asia Pacific region and the payment was never made. The second payment, which would have amounted to \$2,415, was designed to secure a sales contract with Henan Luqiao, which is described only as “a state-owned enterprise,” was discovered by Avery China and was also never made.

In May and June 2005, however, a Reflectives Division sales manager agreed to pay a “commission” to a state-owned customer by having Avery China’s distributor make the payment out of the distributor’s profit margin. The sale was booked as a sale to the distributor and not to the ultimate customer and the distributor claimed to have paid \$24,752 out of its profit margin to the customer. The sale generated a net profit for Avery China of \$273,213, the amount the company was required to disgorge in the SEC administrative proceeding (in addition to \$45,257 in prejudgment interest).

After discovering the improper conduct in relation to the Wuxi Institute in September 2004, Avery conducted an internal review of the Reflectives Division and another Avery division in China before voluntarily approaching the SEC regarding the possible improper payments in 2005. The company subsequently discovered and self-reported additional instances of “possible improper payments” to customs officials in Indonesia by two companies that it acquired. The first series of payments were made by employees of an Indonesian contractor acquired by Avery, and involved payments of approximately \$100 each to three customs officials who regularly inspected the company’s goods. Employees funded the payments by collecting petty cash disbursements in \$10 increments, which were recorded as travel expenses. These payments continued after Avery’s acquisition of the contractor.

The company also discovered that employees of Paxar Corporation (“Paxar”), a publicly traded company that Avery acquired in June 2007, made illegal payments to customs and tax officials in Indonesia in order to overlook bonded zone regulations or obtain bonded zone licenses. A former Paxar general manager instructed employees to fabricate invoices to conceal the illegal payments, which amounted to \$5,000, and the conduct was reported to Avery by a whistleblower in September 2007. Through a series of internal reviews, including a “comprehensive FCPA review in ten high-risk countries,” Avery further discovered problematic payments in connection with the activities of Paxar Pakistan and Paxar China. The Paxar Pakistan payments, amounting to \$30,000, were made to customs officials through a customs broker. The SEC’s cease and desist order does not provide details on the potentially problematic payments in China, aside from noting that they amounted to \$16,000.

### ***United Industrial Corporation & Thomas Wurzel***

On May 29, 2009, the SEC settled actions against United Industrial Corporation (“UIC”), an aerospace and defense systems provider, and the former president of one of its previously wholly owned, indirect subsidiaries, ACL Technologies, Inc. (“ACL”). The settlements relate to allegations that former ACL president Thomas Wurzel authorized illicit payments to a foreign agent in connection with an Egyptian Air Force project which Wurzel knew or consciously disregarded the high probability that the agent would offer, provide, or promise at least a portion of to active Egyptian Air Force officials. Under the settled administrative proceeding against UIC, the company was ordered to cease and desist from future violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records, and internal control provisions and was ordered to pay disgorgement and prejudgment interest of \$337,679.42. In the settled complaint against Wurzel, he consented to entry of a judgment enjoining him from violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions and from aiding and abetting violations of the FCPA’s books and records provision, and agreed to pay a civil penalty of \$35,000.

According to the SEC, Wurzel employed a retired Egyptian Air Force general (“EAF Agent”) in late 1996 to help ACL obtain contacts in connection with an Egyptian Air Force project to construct an F-16 combat aircraft depot as well as to provide, operate, and train Egyptian labor to use associated testing equipment (“Egyptian F-16 Depot Project”). ACL correspondence from the time indicated that ACL believed that the EAF Agent’s status as a former general would be instrumental in influencing the “very small community of high-level military people,” and Wurzel was aware that the EAF Agent had a personal relationship with at least one active official of the Egyptian Air Force.

Wurzel authorized monthly stipends to the EAF Agent of \$4,000 per month by at least December 1997, which rose to \$20,000 per month by March 1998. These payments were made without “any due diligence files” and, until March 1998, without a formal consulting agreement between ACL and the EAF Agent. The settlement documents indicate that ACL did not submit due diligence forms on the agent until 2002 despite company policy requiring that such forms be instituted in 1999. The SEC also noted that the forms, when submitted, “were largely completed by the EAF Agent himself.”

In October 1999, the United States Air Force awarded the Egyptian F-16 Depot Project to ACL as part of the U.S. Department of Defense's foreign military sale ("FMS") program, under which foreign governments purchase weapons, defense items, services and training from the U.S. government through contracts typically fulfilled by private defense contractors. Under the FMS program, a foreign government has the potential to select a particular contractor through a "sole source" request, which the EAF did with respect to ACL. The F-16 Depot Project was originally valued at \$28 million with the potential for additional "add-on" contracts for ACL.

The EAF Agent's compensation after the 1999 contract was awarded took several forms. First, the retired general continued to act as ACL's "consultant," earning a monthly stipend of \$20,000 per month until his consulting agreement expired in mid-2001. Second, Wurzel separately authorized the EAF Agent to act as the local labor subcontractor in connection with ACL's work on the Egyptian F-16 Depot Project. In this position, the EAF Agent was reimbursed for "program manager" expenses (among other things) that varied between \$4,300 and \$11,100 per month in exchange for his service in coordinating local labor subcontractors to assist with the project. Finally, payments continued to the EAF Agent even after the consultant agreement expired in mid-2001, through what the SEC described as "requests for additional funds in circumstances that strongly indicated they would be used to make illicit payments." Wurzel had apparently promised to continue paying "the consultant fee either through the service contract or any other way."

Wurzel authorized three types of illicit payments to the EAF agent between 2001 and 2002: (i) payments for labor subcontracting work that included a cushion out of which payments could be made; (ii) a \$100,000 advance for rental equipment and materials; and (iii) a payment of \$50,000 for marketing services. The SEC alleged that Wurzel made the improper payments to the EAF Agent to secure two "add-on" contracts: a Contract Engineering and Technical Services ("CETS") contract and a surface treatment facility contract.

The CETS contract involved providing personnel for technical assistance at the air force base in Cairo where the F-16 depot was being constructed to allow EAF personnel to receive hands-on training to test and repair their aircraft. In December 2001, several months before the CETS project was officially awarded, the EAF Agent told Wurzel that ACL should expect to receive the contract soon because the agent had "succeeded to make the [Egyptian Air Force] give all the pressure on the USAF to finalize the sole source," adding that it was "very important to start giving motivation that we discussed to give it before the year end." Accordingly, the EAF Agent requested an advance of funds in addition to the compensation due under his local labor subcontracts. ACL wired \$114,000 to the EAF Agent against invoices for labor subcontract services within a week of the agent's request.

In January 2002, the EAF Agent emailed a request for addition funds to "secure our team loyalty... as you have started to have some doubts about ou[r] commitment with them." Another email followed shortly thereafter thanking "God that our key persons are still on their positions till now" but noting that "[w]e should satisfy our people and really we can not do that from our resources as we used to do before." The EAF Agent requested approximately \$171,000 for past due labor subcontract work, a separate \$300,000 advance payment, and a lump sum payout of

half of his agreed upon 8% fee from the contract value. ACL wired the EAF Agent the requested fees in March 2002 for his labor subcontract work, but did not forward the additional requested fees.

In April 2002, however, the EAF Agent emailed another request to Wurzel for additional money “to motivate people and secure our business specially [*sic*] the **CETS**.” (Emphasis in original.) Wurzel responded the same day that ACL would advance payments to the agent, but that it would offset such payments against pending labor subcontract invoices. ACL received the official CETS award later in April 2002.

In June 2002, the EAF Agent requested additional payments in connection with the surface treatment facility contract. Wurzel initially responded by noting that ACL paid the EAF Agent \$40,000 per month for services under the CETS contract, which “will permit you to meet all of your obligations,” but also suggested that ACL could advance the EAF Agent another payment. The EAF Agent responded with a request for \$200,000 in past due labor subcontract invoices and an additional \$100,000 advance payment, noting that “[t]his could help us fulfil [*sic*] the commitment.”

Although there was no indication that the project required rental equipment or advance payments for other services, Wurzel told the EAF Agent to type an invoice that specified that “THIS INVOICE IS FOR ADVANCE PAYMENT OF RENTAL OF EQUIPMENT AND CONTRACTING OF MATERIAL AND SERVICES UNDER THE F-16 EAF DEPOT INTEGRATION CONTRACT.” (Capitalization in original.) The EAF Agent provided an invoice with the specified language, and a \$100,000 advance payment was approved by Wurzel, which a corporate UIC employee inaccurately recorded by ACL as a bona fide “material” expense for the Egyptian F-16 Depot Project.

The SEC further noted that Wurzel and the EAF Agent concocted a scheme by which the latter would “repay” the \$100,000 advance. Under the plan, the EAF Agent submitted false monthly labor subcontract invoices, which included a \$10,000 “credit” to ACL. To offset any real repayment of the advance, the EAF Agent’s expenses were inflated by at least the amount of the \$10,000 credit.

Over the next several months, the EAF Agent continued to make requests for additional payments that were necessary to “keep the momentum.” By the end of 2002, ACL had paid the EAF Agent \$50,000 against an invoice for marketing services despite the parties never having entered into a marketing agreement.

As a result of the above conduct, the SEC found that the parent company UIC lacked internal controls sufficient to detect or prevent these improper payments. The SEC noted that from 1997 through 2002, “ACL paid the EAF Agent in total approximately \$564,000 for consulting or marketing services without meaningful records detailing the services being provided.” The SEC also sharply criticized UIC’s legal department, noting that the EAF Agent was subject to insufficient due diligence and approved by the legal department despite the fact that the agent’s agreement with the company “did not contain FCPA provisions required by corporate policy” and “despite learning that ACL had already been using the EAF Agent without

prior approval and that the EAF Agent's existing agency agreement did not conform to UIC's existing policies prohibiting contingent arrangements on government contracts." The SEC noted that it considered UIC's promptly undertaken remedial acts and cooperation in determining whether to accept the settlement offer.

### *Novo Nordisk*

On May 11, 2009, Novo Nordisk, a Danish manufacturer of insulin, medicines and other pharmaceutical supplies whose American Depository Receipts trade on the New York Stock Exchange, entered into a DPA with the DOJ and settled related charges with the SEC resulting from illegal kickbacks paid to the former Iraqi government in connection with the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme ("OFFP"). As part of the three-year DPA, Novo agreed to pay a \$9 million fine and cooperate fully with the DOJ's ongoing OFFP investigation for conspiring to violate the FCPA's books and records provision and to commit wire fraud. Under the SEC's settlement, Novo agreed to pay over \$6 million in disgorgement of profits and prejudgment interest and a \$3,025,066 civil penalty and is permanently enjoined from violating the FCPA's books and records and internal control provisions.

According to the criminal information, Novo paid over \$1.4 million in kickbacks to Kimadia, the Iraq State Company for the Importation and Distribution of Drugs and Medical Equipment, in connection with eleven different contracts. The SEC complaint also indicates that Novo authorized, but did not pay, illicit kickbacks valued at over \$1.3 million on two additional contracts.

According to the charging documents, in late 2000 or early 2001, a Kimadia import manager informed Novo's long-time Jordanian agent tasked with submitting bids on Novo's behalf that a 10% kickback would be required in order to obtain contracts under the OFFP. Novo's agent notified the general manager of Novo's Near East Office ("NEO," based in Jordan) and the business manager of Novo's Regional Office Near East ("RONE," based in Greece) of the demand. The request was raised internally to a Novo Senior Vice President and later to a Novo officer, who refused to comply. Despite this refusal, other Novo employees ultimately authorized the payments and agreed to increase the agent's commission from 10% to 20% to facilitate the illicit payments.

Novo made the payments in three ways: (i) by wiring money to the agent's bank account, who would then pass it on to Iraqi government accounts; (ii) by issuing bank guarantees to Kimadia; and (iii) by depositing money directly into Kimadia accounts. Novo improperly recorded these payments on its books and records as "commissions." The SEC also noted that Novo did not memorialize an increase in the agent's commission until nine months after the first commission payment was made.

In their releases announcing the settlement, both the DOJ and SEC acknowledged Novo's cooperation and remediation, with the DOJ noting that Novo conducted a "thorough review of the illicit payments and [implemented] enhanced compliance policies and procedures."

***Latin Node Inc./eLandia International Inc.***

On April 7, 2009, Latin Node, Inc. (“Latin Node”), a formerly privately held telecommunications company headquartered in Miami, Florida, pleaded guilty to one count of violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions in connection with corrupt payments made to government officials in Honduras and Yemen. As part of its plea, Latin Node agreed to pay a \$2 million fine over three years. According to a spokesman, the fine will be paid by Latin Node’s parent company, eLandia International Inc. (“eLandia”).

In 2007, eLandia, a publicly traded global provider of information technology communications and other services, acquired an 80% stake in Latin Node. On September 14, 2007, eLandia disclosed that as part of its acquisition of Latin Node, it had discovered certain past payments by Latin Node to consultants in Central America that were made in the absence of adequate records and controls for a U.S. public company. eLandia initiated an investigation into the payments and began establishing a new system of internal legal and accounting controls. In its May 2008 Form 10-Q, eLandia reported that the preliminary investigation had revealed certain pre-acquisition payments by Latin Node made in violation of the FCPA. eLandia subsequently reported the potential violations to the DOJ, SEC, and FBI and an investigation ensued. In its press release, the DOJ acknowledged that “resolution of the criminal investigation of Latin Node reflects, in large part, the actions of Latin Node’s corporate parent, eLandia,” including the fact that eLandia “voluntarily disclosed the unlawful conduct to the Department promptly upon discovering it; conducted an internal FCPA investigation; shared the factual results of that investigation with the Department; cooperated fully with the Department in its ongoing investigation; and took appropriate remedial action, including terminating senior Latin Node management with involvement in or knowledge of the violations.”

According to the Latin Node criminal information, between March 2004 and June 2007, Latin Node paid or caused to be paid nearly \$1.1 million to foreign officials or third parties knowing that all or some of the payments would be used to bribe officials at the Honduran state-owned telecommunications company, Empresa Hondureña de Telecomunicaciones (“Hondutel”). The charging documents alleged that, as early as November 2003, Latin Node began seeking the assistance of a Hondutel official (identified as “Official A” in the Statement of Offense against Latin Node) who “headed the evaluation committee responsible for awarding interconnection agreements with private telecommunications companies....” Latin Node subsequently was awarded an interconnection agreement with Hondutel in December 2005 despite what it knew to be “financial weaknesses” in its proposal. Shortly thereafter, Latin Node’s wholly owned subsidiary, LN Comunicaciones, entered into a sham “consulting” agreement with a company called Servicios IP, S.A. (“Servicios”) nominally owned by two LN Comunicaciones employees. Servicios in turn entered into a sham “consulting” agreement with a company called AAA Telefonica (“AAA”), that was controlled by an individual believed to be Official A’s brother. Latin Node and LN Comunicaciones then made payments to Servicios knowing that some or a portion of those payments would be passed along to Hondutel officials, including Official A. In June 2007, Latin Node hired Official A and made her responsible for business development in Latin America and the Caribbean.

Additionally, Latin Node, at the direction of its founder and former CEO and Chairman Jorge Granados and former Vice President of Business Development Manuel Caceres agreed to pay kickbacks to three Hondutel officials to reduce rates Latin Node was to pay on calls terminating in Honduras. Granados and Caceres allegedly orchestrated the payments with the Hondutel officials and certain unnamed co-conspirators, and caused the illicit payments to be made by a series of checks and wire transfers chiefly from a Latin Node account at Citibank in Miami.

Granados and Caceres allegedly instructed Latin Node employees to submit fraudulent billing statements to Hondutel to help disguise the discrepancy between Hondutel's normal rates and those paid by Latin Node, which had been identified by the Hondutel Collections Department. Granados also allegedly directed a Latin Node employee to delete emails relating to Hondutel from Latin Node's computer servers.

In total, according to the DOJ, approximately \$1,099,899 in improper payments were made. Of this amount, \$440,200 of the payments were made directly from Latin Node to the Honduran officials, while an additional \$141,000 Latin Node paid to its own employees while knowing that some or all of the funds would be passed on to government officials. In addition, Latin Node paid approximately \$517,689 to LN Communications, knowing that some or all of the funds would be passed on to government officials.

From June 2005 to April 2006, Latin Node also made improper payments in connection with its business activities in Yemen. Beginning as early as 2004, Latin Node explored ways to enter the Yemeni market, and learned that an individual identified as "Yemen Partner A" (who is described as a dual United States and Egyptian citizen) had, through his own company, obtained an interconnection agreement with TeleYemen, the state-owned telecommunications company, at a favorable rate. In March 2004, Latin Node entered into a revenue sharing agreement with Yemen Partner A with the understanding that some or all of the money paid to Yemen Partner A would be passed to TeleYemen officials in exchange for continued favorable rates. Email communications revealed that Latin Node executives were aware that Yemen Partner A was making payments to TeleYemen officials and that he claimed to have connections to the son of Yemen's president. The DOJ pointed out, however, that "[c]ourt documents do not allege or refer to evidence showing that the son of the Yemeni president received any payments from Latin Node. No foreign government officials are the subjects of U.S. investigations in this matter." According to court documents, Latin Node made over \$1.1 million in corrupt payments either directly to Yemeni officials or through Yemen Partner A. Granados and Caceres were implicated in the Yemeni scheme in the Latin Node charging documents; however, their indictment relates only to the Hondutel scheme.

On December 14, 2010, Granados and Caceres were indicted by a federal grand jury in Miami. Shortly after, on December 17, 2010, the DOJ charged Manuel Salvoch, Latin Node's former CFO, and Juan Vasquez, a former senior commercial executive, in a sealed criminal information. Granados and Caceres were arrested on December 20, 2010, and their 19-count indictment was unsealed. Granados and Caceres were charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA, twelve counts of violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, one count of

money laundering conspiracy, and five counts of money laundering. Salvoch was arrested on January 11, 2011, and Juan Vasquez was arrested on January 20, 2011. The charges against these individuals relate only to the payments to government officials in Honduras. According to the court documents, Caceres' principal role was to negotiate the payment of bribes with the Honduras officials, Granados' principal role was to authorize and direct the bribe payments; and Vasquez and Salvoch were responsible for facilitating the payment of bribes.

These four former Latin Node executives all pleaded guilty and three of these executives have been sentenced. Jorge Granados pleaded guilty on May 19, 2011 and in September 2011 was sentenced to 46 months in prison. Manuel Caceres pleaded guilty on May 18, 2011 and in April 2012 was sentenced to 23 months, followed by one-year supervised release. Juan Vasquez pleaded guilty on January 21, 2011, and in April 2012, was sentenced to 3 years probation, community service, home detention and monitoring, and ordered to pay a \$7,500 criminal fine. Manuel Salvoch, who pleaded guilty on January 12, 2011, was sentenced on June 8, 2012 to a ten-month prison term, followed by three years of supervised release, six months of home detention, monitoring, and community service.

### ***Control Components***

On July 31, 2009, Control Components, Inc. ("Control Components") pleaded guilty to FCPA and Travel Act violations in connection with a conspiracy to pay bribes to both foreign officials and officials of foreign and domestic private companies in order to secure contracts in over 30 countries. Control Components is a Delaware company based in California that manufactures and sells industrial service valves for use in nuclear, oil and gas, and power generation facilities, including to many state-owned entities worldwide. It is owned by IMI plc, a British company traded on the London Stock Exchange. Control Components was ordered to pay an \$18.2 million criminal fine, implement a compliance program, and retain an independent compliance monitor for three years. It was also placed on three years' organizational probation.

According to the company's admissions in connection with its plea of guilty, the conspiracy began in approximately 1998 and lasted through 2007. From 2003 to 2007 alone, Control Components made 236 corrupt payments totaling approximately \$6.85 million to foreign officials at state-owned entities in more than 36 countries including, but not limited to, China (Jiangsu Nuclear Power Corp., Guohua Electric Power, China Petroleum Materials and Equipment Corp., PetroChina, Dongfang Electric Corporation, China National Offshore Oil Corporation ("CNOOC")), Korea (KHNP), United Arab Emirates (National Petroleum Construction Company), and Malaysia (Petronas). On August 15, 2009, CNOOC issued a statement that none of its employees or officials received bribes from CCI.

From 2003 to 2007, Control Components specifically paid or caused to be paid \$4.9 million to foreign officials in violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA and another \$1.95 million in bribes to officers and employees at both domestic and foreign private companies located in California, China, Italy, Russia, and Texas in violation of the Travel Act. The company admitted that these payments resulted in net profits of \$46.5 million.

The indictments and Control Components' guilty plea are notable for the inclusion of charges that Control Components and the individuals violated the Travel Act by making corrupt payments to privately owned customers in violation of California state law against commercial bribery. Such payments would not violate the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions.

Control Components admitted to a detailed scheme for making improper payments to foreign officials. Control Components developed a sales practice of maintaining "friends-in-camp" ("FICs") at the company's customers and cultivating these relationships through "commission payments" to assist it in obtaining business. The FICs were often officers and employees of state-owned entities, and thus considered to be "foreign officials" within the meaning of the FCPA, who were in a position to direct contracts to Control Components or adjust technical specifications to favor the use of Control Components' valves. The illegal kickbacks were often referred to by employees of Control Components as "flowers," and were either: (i) wired directly to the FICs from the Control Components' Finance Department; (ii) made through company representative and sales staff; or (iii) made through third-party "consultants" who acted as pass-through entities.

In addition, the Company admitted that it: (i) arranged for and provided overseas holidays to Disneyland and Las Vegas to officers and employees of state-owned and private entities under the guise of "training and inspection trips"; (ii) purchased extravagant vacations, including first-class airfare to Hawaii, five-star hotel accommodations and other luxuries, for executives of state-owned and private customers; (iii) paid for the college tuition expenses of children of at least two executives of state-owned customers; (iv) hosted lavish sales events for current and potential state-owned and private customers; and (v) provided expensive gifts to officers and employees of state-owned and private customers.

Control Components also admitted that its employees sought to, and did, frustrate an internal audit in 2004 by its parent, IMI plc, into the company's commission payments. Among other things, the employees provided false information to the auditors, created false invoices and a spreadsheet in an attempt to mislead the auditors and instructed other employees not to use certain language in e-mail communications that would potentially alert the auditors to the existence of the scheme.

- *Individuals*

On January 8, 2009, Mario Covino, the former director of worldwide factory sales for Control Components, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA. Covino also admitted that he caused other employees and company agents to make corrupt payments of over \$1 million to employees of state-owned entities. The illegal kickbacks directed by Covino earned Control Components an estimated \$5 million.

One month later, Control Components former finance director Richard Morlok pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA in connection with his involvement in the scheme. As finance director, Morlok was responsible for both approving the commission payments and signing off on the wire transfers to FICs. While his plea related specifically to one particular payment of almost \$58,000 to Korean company KHNP, Morlok admitted to directing a

total of approximately \$628,000 to foreign officials at state-owned companies between 2003 and 2006 that resulted in contracts worth approximately \$3.5 million.

On April 8, 2009, six additional former executives of Control Components were charged in connection with the same course of conduct.

- Stuart Carson, the former chief executive officer, was charged with two counts of violating the FCPA and one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and Travel Act. According to the indictment, Carson was the architect of the “Friends-in-Camp” system Control Components employed. Between 2003 and 2007, Carson allegedly directed approximately \$4.3 million in corrupt payments to employees at state-owned entities and approximately \$1.8 million to officers and employees of private companies.
- Hong Carson, the wife of Stuart Carson and the former director of sales for China and Taiwan, was charged with five counts of violating the FCPA, one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and Travel Act and one count of obstruction. According to the indictment, between 2003 and 2007, Mrs. Carson directed approximately \$1 million in corrupt payments to employees at state-owned entities and approximately \$43,000 to officers and employees at private companies. The obstruction charge was added because, just before her interview with attorneys hired by Control Components to conduct an internal investigation into the company’s commission payments, Mrs. Carson allegedly intentionally destroyed documents by tearing them up and flushing them down the toilet in a company restroom. On March 3, 2011, however, the DOJ dismissed the obstruction charge against Mrs. Carson “in the interests of justice” without further explanation.
- Paul Cosgrove, a former executive vice president and the former director of worldwide sales, was charged with six counts of violating the FCPA, one count of violating the Travel Act and one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and Travel Act. According to the indictment, between 2003 and 2007, Cosgrove directed approximately \$1.9 million in corrupt payments to employees at state-owned entities and \$300,000 to officers and employees at private companies.
- David Edmonds, the former vice president of worldwide customer service, was charged with three counts of violating the FCPA, two counts of violating the Travel Act, and one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and Travel Act. According to the indictment, between 2003 and 2007, Edmonds directed approximately \$430,000 in corrupt payments to employees at state-owned entities and \$220,000 to officers and employees of private companies.
- Flavio Ricotti, the former Vice President and head of sales for Europe, Africa and the Middle East, was charged with one count of violating the FCPA, three counts of violating the Travel Act, and one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and Travel Act. According to the indictment, between 2003 and 2007, Ricotti directed approximately \$750,000 in corrupt payments to employees at state-owned entities and approximately

\$380,000 to officers and employees of private companies. An Italian citizen, Ricotti is described as an “agent” of a “domestic concern” in the charging documents.

- Han Yong Kim, the former president of Control Component’s Korean office, was charged with two counts of violating the FCPA, and one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and Travel Act. According to the indictment, between 2003 and 2007, Kim directed approximately \$200,000 in corrupt payments to employees at state-owned entities and approximately \$350,000 to officers and employees of private companies. As a citizen of Korea, Kim is described as an “agent” of a “domestic concern.”

Mr. and Mrs. Carson, Cosgrove, and Edmonds filed a motion to dismiss two of the FCPA counts and one Travel Act count based on the five-year statute of limitations. The Government had asked for and received a tolling order in November 2008 on the premise that the grand jury investigation hinged on foreign discovery, specifically a request to Switzerland for assistance in obtaining certain documents. The four defendants contended, first, that the conduct underlying these three counts was unrelated to the documents produced by the Swiss discovery request and, second, that, in the case of the one of the counts, the tolling order was issued after the statute of limitations had already run. The court denied both claims. With regards to the first argument, the court held that the tolling order related to the general subject of the grand jury investigation and was not count-specific. Further, the court explained that the foreign discovery request need not yield essential documents for each count to uphold the tolling order, as so holding would place a prosecutor in the position of needing to “be clairvoyant to know whether his request would produce essential documents, and hence whether he had in fact secured an effective tolling order.” With regards to the second argument, the court held that the effective date for statute of limitations purposes was not the date of the tolling order, but rather the date of the foreign discovery request.

The four defendants also asked the court to allow them to obtain discovery of Control Components’ internal investigation, including the company’s electronic database, through the DOJ, as opposed to through Control Components. They argued that Control Components’ plea agreement gave the DOJ constructive possession of all of Control Components’ records of foreign bribery, even those not actually possessed by the DOJ. The court disagreed and held that the Government only had to produce those materials of which it had physical possession.

On February 21, 2011, the four defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the FCPA did not apply to their conduct, as employees of state-owned enterprises should not be considered to be “foreign officials.” Their motion, reminiscent of previous unsuccessful motions filed in the *Nguyen* and *Esquenazi* cases, argued that the plain wording of the statute and the legislative history suggest that the term “instrumentality” of a foreign government — routinely interpreted by the DOJ and SEC to include state-owned entities — should be read to include only entities that are “innately governmental,” such as government boards, bureaus, or commissions. They further argued that, particularly given the DOJ’s continued refusal to provide specific guidance on the definition of “instrumentality,” the term is unconstitutionally vague. On May 18, 2011, the court denied their motion, suggesting that the criteria for establishing that a state-

owned enterprise is an instrumentality of a foreign government are even broader than expected. According to the court:

Several factors bear on the question of whether a business entity constitutes a government instrumentality, including:

- The foreign state's characterization of the entity and its employees;
- The foreign state's degree of control over the entity;
- The purpose of the entity's activities;
- The entity's obligations and privileges under the foreign state's law, including whether the entity exercises exclusive or controlling power to administer its designated functions;
- The circumstances surrounding the entity's creation; and
- The foreign state's extent of ownership of the entity, including the level of financial support by the state (*e.g.*, subsidies, special tax treatment, and loans).

Such factors are not exclusive, and no single factor is dispositive.

This holding, and other contemporaneous rejections by federal district courts of similar challenges to the meaning of "foreign official," are stark reminders of the importance of identifying which foreign customers of an organization subject to the FCPA are state-owned and imposing internal accounting controls and conducting due diligence on third parties reasonably designed to detect and prevent corrupt payments.

Flavio Ricotti was arrested in Frankfurt, Germany and was extradited to the United States in 2010. On April 29, 2011, Ricotti pled guilty to a single count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act. Ricotti admitted to conspiring with other CCI employees to bribe an official of Saudi Aramco, as well as an employee of a private company in Qatar in an effort to secure contracts.

On March 5, 2012, defendants Stuart and Rose Carson, Cosgrove, and Edmonds filed another motion to dismiss. On the same day, defendants Edmonds, Cosgrove, and Rose Carson filed a motion to suppress. They cited Control Components' cooperation with DOJ during the company's 2007 internal investigation, in which Control Components compelled the defendants to "answer all questions regardless of their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination or be fired." The court held that Control Components' counsel were not acting as government agents in conducting their internal investigation and denied the motion.

Stuart and Rose Carson pleaded guilty on April 16, 2012 to single-count superseding criminal informations. Stuart Carson pleaded guilty to corruptly causing to be sent a single e-mail authorizing a \$16,000 payment to state-owned Turow Power Plant in Poland. Rose Carson pleaded guilty to corruptly causing to be sent an e-mail authorizing a \$40,000 payment to officials at Taiwan's Kuosheng Nuclear Power Plant. In November 2012, Carson was sentenced to four months in prison and eight months of home detention for his role in the foreign bribery scheme. Rose Carson was sentenced to six months home confinement. In addition, Stuart and Rose Carson were each ordered to pay a fine of \$20,000.

In May 2012, Cosgrove pleaded guilty to a single anti-bribery violation relating to payments to officials in China. A month later, Edmonds also pleaded guilty to a one-count superseding indictment that charged Edmonds with making a corrupt payment to a foreign government official in Greece in violation of the FCPA. Cosgrove was sentenced to 13 months home confinement, and Edmonds was sentenced to serve four months in prison, in addition to serving four months of supervised release. Both individuals were ordered to pay a \$20,000 fine.

In February 2013, DOJ recommended probation for Covino and Morlok, citing the significance of their cooperation that led to the guilty pleas of the Carsons, Cosgrove, and Edwards, along with the settlement of Control Components. On March 11, 2013, U.S. District Judge Selna sentenced Covino and Morlok to three years probation with three months home detention, in addition to fines of \$7,500 and \$5,000, respectively.

Prosecutors also recommended time-served for Ricotti, who had spent eleven months in jail following his extradition from Germany in 2010. Judge Selna accepted the recommendation and waived the fine at Ricotti's sentencing hearing on March 18, 2013.

There is thus one defendant remaining in the Control Components case. Han Yong Kim remains a fugitive in South Korea despite a recent challenge from Kim's lawyers. According to court documents filed by Kim's lawyers in May 2013, South Korea will not extradite Kim to the United States because they do not consider the employees of KHNP to be public officials. Kim contends that his fugitive status prevents him from fighting the charges or engaging in talks for a plea deal.

### ***Jeffrey Tesler & Wojciech Chodan***

On December 6, 2010, Wojciech Chodan pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA, and on March 11, 2011, Jeffrey Tesler pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate and violating the FCPA. Tesler and Chodan's legal troubles stem from their central involvement in the Bonny Island, Nigeria bribery scheme described below.

In their original indictment in a Houston court in February 2009, the DOJ charged both individuals with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and ten counts of violating the FCPA, and sought forfeiture of over \$132 million from them. The London Metropolitan Police arrested Tesler, a lawyer, in March 2009 at the request of United States authorities. According to the charging document, Tesler, Chodan, KBR's Albert "Jack" Stanley and other co-conspirators began discussions in 1994 among themselves and with Nigerian officials about how to structure

bribe payments associated with contracts to build liquefied natural gas facilities at Bonny Island in Nigeria. In 1995, a Gibraltar corporation allegedly controlled by Tesler called Tri-Star Investments (“Tri-Star”) was hired for the purpose of paying bribes to Nigerian government officials. According to the indictment, Tri-Star, which the U.S. government describes as an “agent” of the joint venture and all participating companies, was paid over \$130 million between 1995 and 2004. The complaint identifies eight payments, totaling just under \$19.6 million, that apparently were made from a joint venture-controlled bank account in Madeira, Portugal, through correspondent bank accounts in New York, to bank accounts in Switzerland and Monaco controlled by Tesler.

With respect to Chodan, the indictment alleged that he was a former employee and consultant of KBR’s U.K. subsidiary and participated in “cultural meetings” where he and co-conspirators discussed the use of Tesler and others, including a second agent identified as “Consulting Company B,” to pay bribes to Nigerian officials. Chodan was also a board member of one of the JV entities that entered into consulting agreements with Tesler and Consulting Company B. The indictment identifies several communications among Chodan, Tesler and others about the bribery scheme’s details, including payment structures and recipients. After indictment, the DOJ pursued Tesler and Chodan’s extraditions from the United Kingdom to face charges in the United States. Because both men are foreign citizens, and because neither was in the United States at any relevant time, the case raises interesting jurisdictional questions. The indictment asserts jurisdiction by classifying the men as “agents” of a “domestic concern” (KBR) and alleging that certain actions in furtherance of the violations touched U.S. instrumentalities of interstate commerce. In addition to the payments noted above that were routed through U.S. correspondent banks, the complaint identifies two email communications between KBR personnel in the United States and Tesler and Chodan. In one, the government alleges a KBR salesperson emailed Tesler details of the consulting agreements with Tri-Star and Consulting Company B, and details of a paid trip to the United States for a Nigerian official. The other email was apparently sent by Chodan to KBR officials in Houston and contained a draft release to French authorities investigating the Bonny Island project that included false statements as to Tesler’s role in assisting the joint venture.

Both Tesler and Chodan fought extradition to the United States. On November 23, 2009, at a hearing in a London court, Tesler’s attorney argued that extradition would be unfair as he also faces prosecution in the United Kingdom by the SFO and that the charged offense was against Nigeria rather than the United States. Chodan’s attorney made a similar argument on his behalf at Chodan’s extradition hearing on February 22, 2010. On March 25, 2010, District Judge Caroline Tubbs, sitting at Westminster magistrates’ court in London, ruled that Tesler’s alleged crimes had “substantial connection” to the United States and ordered extradition. On April 20, 2010, Judge Tubbs similarly ordered extradition for Chodan.

Both Tesler and Chodan appealed to the High Court in London to block their respective extradition orders. On Appeal, Chodan’s attorney argued that it would be “unjust and oppressive” to “haul” then-72-year-old Chodan “out of his domestic bliss” with his wife and extradite him to the United States where he could die in prison. Without explanation, Chodan withdrew his High Court challenge on November 8, 2010, and was extradited to the United

States. Chodan appeared in a United States District Court in Houston, Texas, and on December 6, 2010, pled guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA and agreed to forfeit \$726,885. On February 22, 2012, he was sentenced to serve one year of probation and to pay a \$20,000 fine. His sentence, which can be considered light given that he faced up to 5 years in prison for the conspiracy charge, took into account his assistance in the investigation and prosecution of Tesler.

At Tesler's January 2011 hearing at the High Court in London, two Lord Justices ruled that Tesler's extradition to the United States could also go forward. As quoted by the BBC, the Lord Justices stated that as a conspirator, Tesler could not escape liability for his corrupt activities by remaining physically outside the United States when "as a result of [his conduct] very substantial sums of money were planned to be made in the United States.... The effects of his actions were to be felt in the United States and were intended to be felt there. A United States entity [KBR] was intended to be one of the beneficiaries of his corrupt conduct." Tesler subsequently withdrew all appeals in the United Kingdom and was extradited to the United States. On March 11, 2011, Tesler pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate and violating the FCPA. As part of his plea agreement, Tesler agreed to forfeit approximately \$149 million. On February 23, 2012, he was sentenced to serve 21 months in prison, followed by two years of supervised release, and to pay a \$25,000 fine.

In parallel, Tesler is also being prosecuted in France on charges of corruption of foreign public officials, and is scheduled to face prosecution in France after his release from U.S. prison in October 2013. His defense denies that corruption took place.

The Tesler and Chodan cases exemplify increasing cross-border cooperation in anti-corruption investigations and prosecutions. In its press releases regarding Tesler and Chodan, the DOJ acknowledges assistance from the DOJ Criminal Division's Office of International Affairs, the SFO's Anti-Corruption Unit and the police forces of the City of London, as well as authorities in France, Italy, and Switzerland.

### *ITT*

On February 11, 2009, New York-based conglomerate ITT settled civil charges with the SEC for violating the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA in connection with improper payments made by its wholly owned subsidiary, Nanjing Goulds Pumps Ltd. ("NGP"), to Chinese government officials. ITT agreed to pay more than \$1.4 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest as well as a \$250,000 civil penalty.

According to the SEC Complaint, from 2001 to 2005, NGP, a part of ITT's Fluid Technology division, made approximately \$200,000 in illegal payments to employees of Chinese state-owned entities. Employees and agents of NGP made most of the payments, directly or indirectly, to employees of Design Institutes (some of which were state-owned entities) that assisted in planning large infrastructure projects in China.

The complaint alleges that the payments were inducements to the Design Institute employees to formulate request for proposals ("RFPs") that contained specifications that corresponded to the pumps manufactured by NGP. The Design Institute then evaluated NGP's

response to the RFPs and made favorable recommendations to the state-owned entities responsible for the oversight and construction of the projects. In return, if NGP was granted the contract, it made kickback payments either directly or through third parties to the Design Institute employees. Direct payments to the Design Institute employees were sent via wire transfer to the employees' personal bank accounts or through checks made out to "cash." Alternatively, NGP paid inflated commissions to agents with the understanding that some of the commission would be passed on to the employees of the Design Institutes.

NGP improperly recorded the illegal payments, whether made directly or through an agent, as commission payments. These entries were eventually rolled into ITT's financial statements and contained in its filings with the SEC from 2001-2005.

ITT learned of the illicit payments in December 2005 when its Corporate Compliance Ombudsman received an anonymous tip from an NGP employee. The company began investigating and determined that NGP employees had made illegal payments in connection with at least one contract for each of 32 different state-owned entities that were ITT customers from 2001-2005. Overall, the SEC asserts that illegal bribes paid by employees of NGP resulted in approximately \$1 million of profit for ITT. The SEC "considered that ITT self-reported, cooperated with the Commission's investigation, and instituted subsequent remedial measures."

### ***KBR/Halliburton Company***

On February 11, 2009, engineering and construction services provider Kellogg Brown & Root LLC ("KBR"), a subsidiary of KBR, Inc. ("KBR, Inc."), pleaded guilty to a five-count criminal information for violations of the FCPA in connection with an alleged bribery scheme in Nigeria. Simultaneously, KBR, Inc. and its former parent company Halliburton Company ("Halliburton") settled FCPA books and records and internal controls charges with the SEC. Combined, the companies will pay \$579 million in fines and disgorgement, the largest combined settlement for U.S. companies since the FCPA's inception and the second-largest anti-corruption settlement in history. In total, as alleged, the bribery scheme involved over \$180 million worth of improper payments used to assist in obtaining or retaining engineering, procurement and construction ("EPC") contracts valued at over \$6 billion to build liquefied natural gas ("LNG") facilities on Bonny Island, Nigeria (the "Bonny Island project").

Under the DOJ settlement, KBR agreed to pay a \$402 million fine in eight installments over the next two years. Due to a prior agreement with its former subsidiary, Halliburton will indemnify KBR, Inc. for \$382 million of that amount, while KBR will pay the remaining \$20 million. KBR will also retain a compliance monitor for three years. In settling with the SEC, Halliburton agreed to be jointly and severally liable with KBR, Inc. and in turn pay \$177 million in disgorgement. Additionally, the SEC settlement requires Halliburton to retain an independent consultant for an initial review and a follow-up review a year later of its "anti-bribery and foreign agent internal controls and record-keeping policies."

As described below, in September 2008, former KBR CEO Albert "Jack" Stanley pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud in connection with the same alleged bribery scheme and other misconduct. He faces

up to ten years in prison. However, prosecutors have agreed to a sentence of seven years in prison and \$10.8 million in restitution.

KBR's U.K. subsidiary, M.W. Kellogg Limited ("MWKL") reached a civil settlement with the U.K. Serious Fraud Office ("SFO") on February 15, 2011, based on the same underlying facts. The SFO recognized that MWKL took no part in criminal activity, but it benefitted from the proceeds of the conduct in violation of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. MWKL agreed to pay £7,000,028 (approximately \$11.2 million), an amount equal to the share of dividends payable from profits generated by the Bonny Island project, and to overhaul its internal audit and internal controls functions. Fifty-five percent of the total settlement costs will be reimbursed by Halliburton under the companies' indemnity agreement.

## 2008

### *Fiat*

On December 22, 2008, Italian vehicle and equipment manufacturer Fiat S.p.A. ("Fiat"), which had American Depository Receipts ("ADRs") listed on the NYSE until November 2007, agreed to pay \$17.8 million in penalties and disgorgement to the DOJ and SEC to settle charges relating to approximately \$4.4 million in illegal kickbacks paid by three of Fiat's direct and indirect subsidiaries between 2000 and 2002 in connection with the U.N. OFFP. The DOJ charged Fiat's Italian subsidiaries Iveco S.p.A. ("Iveco") and CNH Italia S.p.A. ("CNH Italia") with conspiracy to commit wire fraud and to violate the books and records provisions of the FCPA, and charged a third Fiat subsidiary, CNH France S.A. ("CNH France"), with conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Although the DOJ did not bring charges against Fiat itself, the company agreed to pay a \$7 million criminal penalty to the DOJ for the conduct of its subsidiaries and entered into a DPA, which requires Fiat and its subsidiaries to cooperate with the DOJ and other law enforcement agencies in their investigations of the companies and their operations and to adopt or modify their anti-corruption controls, policies and procedures to include, among other things, (i) the assignment of one or more senior corporate officials to implement and oversee compliance measures; (ii) effective periodic anti-corruption training and required annual certifications for all directors and officers and, where appropriate, agents and business partners; and (iii) appropriate due diligence requirements governing the retention and oversight of agents and business partners.

In contrast to the DOJ, the SEC charged Fiat as well as another of its subsidiaries, CNH Global, a majority-owned Dutch company that owned CNH Italia and CNH France and which also had ADRs listed on the NYSE during the relevant period, with failure to maintain adequate internal controls in relation to the same payments. In settlement of these charges, Fiat agreed to pay \$3.6 million in civil penalties and \$7.2 million in disgorgement and interest.

According to the DOJ, from 2000 to 2001, Iveco and a Lebanese company that acted as its agent and distributor paid approximately \$3.17 million in kickbacks to the Iraqi Government to obtain sixteen contracts worth approximately €31.9 million to supply various trucks and parts under the OFFP. First, on four contracts, Iveco with the Lebanese company acting as its agent inflated the price of the contracts by approximately 10% to 15%, characterizing the increase as

ASSFs to cover the costs of the kickbacks before submitting them to the U.N. for approval. Then, on twelve additional contracts and in an alleged effort to conceal the kickback payments, the Lebanese company acting as Iveco's distributor engaged in the same practices. Similarly, in 2000-02, CNH Italia first directly and then indirectly through its Jordanian agent and distributor paid approximately \$1 million to obtain four contracts to supply agricultural equipment worth approximately €12 million, inflating the price of the contracts by 10% before obtaining U.N. approval. Iveco and CNH Italia improperly characterized the transactions in their books and records as "service and commission payments" or "service fees," respectively; and at the end of Fiat's fiscal year 2002, the books and records of the two subsidiaries, including the false characterizations of the kickbacks, were incorporated into the book and records of Fiat for the purposes of preparing Fiat's year-end financial statements.

In 2001, CNH France caused its Lebanese distributor to pay approximately \$188,000 in kickbacks to obtain three contracts worth approximately €2.2 million with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil to supply construction vehicles and spare parts, also inflating the price of the contracts by 10% prior to approval. Apparently, CNH France's books and records were not incorporated into Fiat's and thus the DOJ only charged the subsidiary with conspiracy to commit wire fraud.

The SEC asserted that Fiat and CNH Global knew or were reckless in not knowing that kickbacks were paid in connection with these transactions, emphasizing that the Fiat subsidiaries altered their relationships with their agents/distributors "to conceal their involvement in the sales of its products to Iraq in which ASSF payments were made" and the "extent and duration of the improper ASSF payments." As a result, the SEC charged that Fiat and CNH Global failed to maintain adequate internal controls or properly maintain their books and records.

### *Siemens*

On Monday, December 15, 2008, U.S. federal prosecutors and German regulators simultaneously ended their lengthy investigations into Siemens Aktiengesellschaft ("Siemens") and its worldwide operations by announcing settlements that included over \$1.3 billion in fines and disgorgement in connection with improper payments in Argentina, Bangladesh, China, Iraq, Israel, Mexico, Nigeria, Russia, Venezuela and Vietnam. Taking into account a previous settlement with the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office, Siemens has now incurred fines of over \$1.6 billion in connection with one of the most highly publicized and closely watched international bribery investigations carried out to date.

Siemens, a German corporation with its executive offices in Munich, Germany, is one of the world's largest industrial and consumer products manufacturers. Through its operating entities and subsidiaries, Siemens engages in a variety of activities including developing, constructing, selling and servicing telecommunications equipment and systems; power generation, transmission, and distribution equipment and systems; transportation equipment and systems; medical equipment and systems; and industrial and traffic equipment and systems. Siemens employs over 428,000 people and operates in approximately 190 countries worldwide.

Prior to a recent reorganization, Siemens operated in thirteen principal business groups: Communications ("Com"), Siemens Business Services ("SBS"), Automation & Drives ("A&D"),

Industrial Solutions and Services (“I&S”), Siemens Building Technologies (“SBT”), Power Generation (“PG”), Power Transmission and Distribution (“PTD”), Transportation Systems (“TS”), Siemens VDO Automotive (“SV”), Medical Solutions (“Med”), Osram Middle East, Siemens Financial Services (“SFS”), and Siemens Real Estate (“SRE”). Siemens became an “issuer” for purposes of the FCPA on March 12, 2001, when its American Depository Shares began trading on the NYSE.

In connection with the U.S. settlements, Siemens and three of its subsidiaries incurred total fines of \$800 million. Siemens was fined \$448,500,000 by the DOJ and three of its subsidiaries — Siemens Argentina, Siemens Bangladesh and Siemens Venezuela — were each fined \$500,000. Under its settlement with the SEC, Siemens was required to disgorge \$350 million. The U.S. settlements also require Siemens to implement a compliance monitor for a period of four years, and the company has chosen former German Finance Minister Dr. Theo Waigel as the first ever non-U.S. national to serve in that capacity. Siemens is also required to hire an “Independent U.S. Counsel” to counsel the monitor. Although the use of monitors has increased markedly in recent years, the four-year term is the longest such term instituted in connection with an FCPA settlement to date, and the dual monitor structure also appears to be novel.

The DOJ plea agreement charged Siemens with criminal violations of the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions, but did not include a claim that Siemens violated the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. The DOJ charged two Siemens subsidiaries — Siemens Venezuela and Siemens Bangladesh — with conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions, while the third subsidiary — Siemens Argentina — was charged only with conspiracy to violate the statute’s books and records provision. The SEC charged Siemens with violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls provisions.

In its settlement with the Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich, Siemens agreed to pay a fine of €395 million (approximately \$540 million), marking the end of legal proceedings against the company (but perhaps not against individuals) in Germany. In October 2007, Siemens paid a fine of €201 million (approximately \$285 million) to the Office of the Prosecutor General in Munich for activities relating to the company’s former Com group.

Several other countries have also investigated Siemens for bribery. Most notably, in January 2011, the Greek government indicated it would seek damages from Siemens following an 11-month parliamentary investigation into allegations Siemens paid bribes to secure various government contracts from the late 1990s up to 2009, including those related to the 2004 Athens Olympics. Greece estimated the bribery cost Greek taxpayers €2 billion. On April 5, 2012, the Greek Parliament approved a settlement agreement between Siemens and the Greek State which includes the following: Siemens waives public sector receivables in the amount of €80 million; Siemens agrees to spend a maximum of €90 million on various anti-corruption and transparency initiatives, as well as university and research programs; and Siemens agrees to provide €100 million of financial support to Siemens A.E. to ensure its continued presence in Greece. In exchange, the Greek State agrees to waive all civil claims and all administrative fines related to

the corruption allegations and to utilize best efforts to resolve all pending disputes between Siemens and the Greek state-companies or its public authorities.

Nigeria's Economic and Financial Crimes Commission also reached a settlement with Siemens and a Siemens subsidiary in November 2010, which is discussed further *below*.

- *Historical Context*

In a break from past practice, the SEC and DOJ both provided significantly more detail regarding the historical context of Siemens' conduct. As the charging documents describe, Siemens traces its origins to the mid-1800s and has long been one of Germany's most successful conglomerates. Following World War II, the company was left with many of its international facilities destroyed and found it difficult to compete for business in developed, Western nations. As a result, according to the SEC, Siemens focused its attention on developing economies where "corrupt business practices were common."

The DOJ classified what it described as "Siemens' historical failure to maintain sufficient internal anti-corruption controls" into three periods: pre-1999, 1999-2004, and 2004-2006. The SEC used approximately the same classifications. Prior to 1999, at a time when Siemens was not listed on the NYSE and bribery was not only legal but tax deductible under German law, the government describes a period where bribery was commonplace at Siemens. The DOJ indicates that Siemens operated in a "largely unregulated environment" and conducted business in many countries where "corruption was endemic."

In 1999, the legal and regulatory environment in which Siemens operated began to change. In February 1999, the German law implementing the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention") came into force. As noted, the company became listed on the NYSE in March 2001. During this second period, Siemens took certain steps, such as the creation of a "paper program" against corruption, that the government characterized as largely ineffective at changing the company's past business practices. It established a new position for a Compliance Officer, yet the office was severely understaffed and the officer worked only part time on compliance issues. The company issued principles and recommendations, but not mandatory policies, for agreements with business consultants. In addition, Siemens considered, yet rejected, the creation of a company-wide list of agents and consultants in order to review these relationships. Among the investigations that the company faced during this period was one by the Milan, Italy public prosecutor's office into €6 million in potentially improper payments by Siemens to the Italian energy company Enel. The DOJ underscored the fact that, in connection with the Enel investigation, a U.S. law firm informed Siemens that there was "ample basis for either the [SEC] or [DOJ] to start at least an informal investigation of the company's role in such a matter." Further, the DOJ emphasized that the U.S. law firm advised Siemens that U.S. enforcement officials would expect an internal investigation to take place, and suggested that Siemens immediately review and assure proper functioning of its FCPA compliance program, including disciplining any employees involved in wrongdoing.

During the third period, 2004-2006, the government alleges that members of senior management largely failed to respond to red flags that would have disclosed improper conduct. For example, the SEC notes that in the fall of 2003, Siemens' outside auditor identified €4.12 million in cash that was brought to Nigeria by Com employees. A Siemens compliance attorney conducted a one-day investigation into the matter and no disciplinary action was taken against any of the involved employees, despite evidence that the event was not an isolated occurrence. The charging documents indicate that senior management failed to follow up on government investigations in numerous countries and failed to take appropriate disciplinary action against potentially culpable employees. Specifically, the DOJ asserted "[f]rom in or about 2006, in addition to learning of the corruption issues involving Siemens in Nigeria, Italy, Greece, Liechtenstein, and elsewhere, Siemens' senior management became aware of government investigations into corruption in Israel, Azerbaijan, Taiwan, and China. Nevertheless, Siemens ZV members and other senior management failed to adequately investigate or follow up on any of these issues." Throughout this period, the Siemens compliance apparatus lacked sufficient resources and was faced with an inherent conflict in its dual roles of defending the company against prosecution and preventing and punishing compliance breaches.

In November 2006, the Munich Public Prosecutor's Office conducted raids on multiple Siemens offices and homes of Siemens employees as part of an investigation of possible bribery of foreign public officials and falsification of corporate books and records. Shortly after the raids, Siemens disclosed to the DOJ and SEC potential violations of the FCPA and initiated a "sweeping global investigation."

The investigative efforts undertaken by outside counsel and forensic accountants resulted in over 1.5 million hours of billable time throughout 34 countries. The SEC and DOJ noted, in particular, (i) Siemens' use of an amnesty and leniency program to encourage cooperation with the internal investigation; (ii) the company's extensive document preservation, collection, testing and analyses, which the DOJ described as "exemplary" and "a model" for other companies seeking to cooperate with law enforcement; and (iii) its "extraordinary" reorganization and remediation efforts.

Reportedly, the internal investigation and related restructurings cost the company more than \$1 billion.

- Challenged Payments, Arrangements, and Conduct

The breadth and scope of the improper payments made by Siemens is matched only by the audacity of certain of the described conduct. Siemens is alleged to have made improper payments in connection with, among others, power plant projects in Israel; metro train and signaling device contracts in China; telecommunications projects in Nigeria; telephone service contracts in Bangladesh; identity card projects in Argentina; and medical device contracts in Vietnam, China and Russia. Siemens entities are also alleged to have made improper "after service sales fee" payments in connection with the Iraqi Oil-for-Food Programme.

In total, the SEC alleges that Siemens made 4,283 improper payments worth over \$1.4 billion to government officials in order to obtain or retain business. The SEC also indicates that

Siemens made 1,185 payments that were not subject to proper controls and were used in connection with either commercial bribery or embezzlement. On the fourteen categories of payment schemes detailed within the SEC's complaint, Siemens is alleged to have earned over \$1.1 billion in profit.

Although by no means exhaustive of the company's conduct, the schemes described below are illustrative of the type of activities attributed to the parent company that pervade government documents.

- *Oil-for-Food Programme*

Although Siemens' conduct is much more pervasive than any associated with a previous Oil-for-Food Programme settlement, the DOJ requested that its settlements with Siemens and its three subsidiaries be filed as "related cases" to the DOJ's other OFFP cases. According to charging documents, from 2000 through 2002, four Siemens entities — Siemens France, Siemens Turkey, Osram Middle East and GTT, each of which was wholly owned by Siemens or one of its subsidiaries — made improper "after service sales fee" payments totaling over \$1.7 million to obtain 42 contracts with Iraqi ministries that earned a gross profit of over \$38 million. The Siemens France, Siemens Turkey and GTT contracts were all with the Iraqi Ministry of Electricity, and each entity used agents to facilitate the payment of ASSFs equal to approximately 10% of the contract value through Jordanian banks. After the agent made the requisite payments, it would invoice the Siemens entity using sham invoices for "commissions." In connection with the GTT contracts, GTT documents budgeted a commission of 20% for the agents the company used, understanding that half of that amount would be used to make the improper payments. In fact, after the war began in 2003, the U.N. requested that GTT decrease the value of its contracts by 10% to remove the ASSF component, but GTT nevertheless caused improper payments to be made by reimbursing its agents for kickbacks already paid. The Osram Middle East payments were to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and operated in a largely similar manner, with payments being facilitated through an agent. In all instances, the payments were improperly characterized on the relevant subsidiary's books and records, which were incorporated into Siemens' year-end financial statements.

- *Nigeria*

Siemens' former Com group (one of the company's largest) made approximately \$12.7 million in "suspicious" payments in connection with Nigerian projects. According to the SEC, \$4.5 million of those were paid as bribes in connection with four telecommunications projects with Nigerian government customers valued at over \$130 million. A high-ranking official of a Siemens Nigerian subsidiary estimated that corrupt payments between 2000 and 2001 commonly reached 15% to 30% of the contract value. Generally, these payments were documented in fictitious consulting agreements and were often hand-delivered in cash-packed suitcases. Requests for such "commissions" were forwarded from the Siemens subsidiary's CEO to Siemens' headquarters in Germany. Approximately \$2.8 million in bribes were routed through a bank in Maryland in the name of the wife of a former Nigerian Vice President. The Vice President's wife also served as the representative of a business consultant that entered into sham

contracts with Siemens for “supply, installation, and commissioning” services that were never performed. In addition to the above payments, Siemens apparently purchased \$172,000 in watches for Nigerian officials believed to be the then-President and Vice President.

- Russia

The SEC describes two separate schemes involving Siemens’ Russian operations. First, from 2004 to 2006, Siemens’ Industrial Solutions and Services group and a regional Russian company known as OOO Siemens paid over \$740,000 in bribes to government officials in connection with a \$27 million traffic control system project in Moscow funded by the World Bank. Siemens paid a business consultant who simultaneously worked (at Siemens’ recommendation) as a technical consultant for the quasi-governmental unit in charge of the project, the Moscow Project Implementation Unit (“MPIU”). Siemens proceeded to pay \$313,000 to three entities associated with the consultant, approximately \$140,000 of which the SEC claimed was in exchange for favorable treatment during the tender process. The consultant then utilized his position to (i) create tender specifications favorable to Siemens; (ii) provide tender documents to Siemens before their official publication; (iii) evaluate project bids in a way that ensured Siemens would be awarded the contract; and (iv) assist during the implementation phase of the contract. Siemens also colluded with a competitor who inflated its bid to ensure Siemens would win the contract. Siemens then hired the competitor at an inflated rate and also hired two of the competitor’s consortium members as subcontractors on the project. Siemens paid approximately \$2.7 million to the two subcontractors on sham contracts, and used the subcontractors to funnel at least \$600,000 in payments to senior officials at the MPIU.

In a separate scheme involving Russia, Siemens’ MED unit allegedly made over \$55 million in improper payments to a Dubai-based consultant between 2000 and 2007 in connection with medical equipment sales in Russia. The consultant was apparently used as an intermediary for bribes to government-owned customers, such as public hospitals, in Russia. In at least one instance — which consisted of over \$285,000 in payments being made in connection with a \$2.5 million contract — payments were routed through both the Dubai consultant and a second consultant registered in Des Moines, Iowa. The corruption was so pervasive within this unit that senior Siemens officials estimated that up to 80% of the MED unit’s business in Russia involved illicit payments.

- China

Siemens’ Power Transmission and Distribution (“PTD”) group paid approximately \$25 million in bribes to Chinese government officials in connection with two high-voltage transmission lines projects worth a combined \$838 million. These payments were made through several intermediaries including a consulting firm controlled by a former Siemens employee and were paid to entities associated with a Chinese business consultant who held a U.S. passport and resided in the United States. Siemens PTD managers in Germany were alleged to have approved the payments with the knowledge they would be shared with government officials.

- Israel

Siemens Power Generation (“Siemens PG”) paid approximately \$20 million in bribes to a former Director of the Israel Electric Company, a state-owned business, in connection with four contracts to build and service power plants. The payments were routed through a company owned by the brother-in-law of the CEO of Siemens’ Israeli subsidiary. The brother-in-law’s company was in fact a clothing company based in Hong Kong. Yet, it was engaged to “identify and define sales opportunities, provide market intelligence,” and support contract negotiations. Certain of the funds passed through U.S. bank accounts.

In addition to the above conduct, as noted above, the DOJ also entered into plea agreements with three Siemens subsidiaries: Siemens Venezuela, Siemens Bangladesh, and Siemens Argentina. Siemens Venezuela and Siemens Bangladesh pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery and books and records provisions. Siemens Argentina pleaded guilty to a single count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s books and records provision. All three entities are described in charging documents as “person[s] other than an issuer or domestic concern,” and thus were required to make “use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or [] do any other act in furtherance of” prohibited conduct “while in the territory of the United States” to satisfy the FCPA’s jurisdictional requirements. It appears that the DOJ failed to charge Siemens Argentina with an anti-bribery violation because it was not (unlike in the case of Siemens Venezuela and Siemens Bangladesh) able to establish a sufficiently “strong nexus” between its alleged improper payments and the United States. The conduct for which these entities were charged is summarized below.

- Venezuela

Siemens Venezuela was a wholly owned subsidiary headquartered in Caracas, Venezuela that contracted for and managed regional Siemens projects. Beginning around 1997, Siemens Venezuela became involved in bidding for two mass transit projects, the MetroMara and ValMetro projects. Beginning at least as early as 2001, Siemens Venezuela began making payments (estimated to total \$16.7 and \$18.7 million by the SEC and DOJ, respectively) to Venezuelan government officials in relation to the construction of the two metro transit systems that generated approximately \$642 million in revenue for Siemens. In its charging documents, the DOJ alleges several connections to the United States although it does not explicitly tie these connections to the improper conduct. For example, the DOJ indicates that a separate Siemens entity headquartered in Sacramento, California performed design and construction work on behalf of the contract. In addition, one of the agents used as a conduit for payments controlled four entities, three of which had offices in the United States, and a consulting firm also used as a conduit was headquartered in Georgia.

By contrast, in describing the four different schemes used in connection with the Venezuela payments, the SEC includes additional details more specifically alleging ties to the United States, at least in certain instances. The first involved off-book bank accounts in Panama and Miami controlled by two CEOs and two CFOs of Siemens’ regional subsidiary, out of which payments to Venezuelan officials were made. One of the regional CFOs routinely destroyed

account statements to cover up the scheme. The second scheme involved payments to U.S.-based entities controlled by a Siemens consultant known as a political “fixer” in Venezuela. The consultant, who provided no legitimate work, funneled the money to high-ranking government officials with influence over the projects. The third scheme, authorized by a former division CFO, involved using a Cyprus-based consultant as an intermediary. Siemens and the consultant entered into sham agreements purportedly related to other projects and the consultant used the money for bribes related to the ValMetro project. The final scheme involved sham agreements with a Dubai-based consultant, which purported to supply equipment. In fact, a separate company provided the equipment. When this consultant came under scrutiny during an investigation of Siemens’ activities in Italy, the division CFO simply moved the contract to a separate Dubai-based consultant who continued the scam. According to the DOJ, the former President of Siemens Venezuela kept a hand written document that recorded payments through these various intermediaries.

- Bangladesh

Siemens Bangladesh was a wholly owned subsidiary of Siemens headquartered in Dhaka, Bangladesh that was responsible for, among other things, contracting for and managing regional projects for Siemens. Beginning in 2000, Siemens Bangladesh became involved in bidding for a national cellular mobile telephone network for the Bangladeshi government known as the BTTP Project. The Bangladeshi government issued two initial tenders for the BTTP Project in 2000 and 2001. However, each of these tenders was canceled. In April 2001, Siemens Bangladesh executed letters of authority granting two “consultants,” with which they had a fifteen-year history of success, the authority to carry out “business promotion activities” with respect to the BTTP Project. Siemens Bangladesh also entered into oral agreements with the consultants at this time to pay them 10% of the BTTP Project value. Beginning shortly thereafter, Siemens Bangladesh began making payments to the consultants, often through other Siemens entities or intermediaries. In December 2002, Siemens discovered that its bid for the third tender of the BTTP Project had been rejected on technical grounds. It enlisted the assistance of a third consultant, described by the DOJ as a dual U.S. and Bangladeshi citizen, to “rescue” it from this disqualification. Throughout the next several years, Siemens Bangladesh made payments, through intermediaries, to the three consultants knowing that all or part of the payments would be passed on to members of the Bangladeshi government evaluation committee or their relatives in order to obtain favorable treatment for Siemens’ bid. The DOJ states that “at least one payment to be made to each of these purported consultants” came from a United States bank account. The SEC noted that “[m]ost of the money paid to the business consultants was routed through correspondent accounts in the United States.” In addition, at one point, one of the consultants moved to the United States in 2004. Siemens Bangladesh continued to funnel payments through him but used a Hong Kong bank account instead, ostensibly to avoid a U.S. connection. In June 2004, Siemens was awarded a portion of the BTTP Project worth over \$40 million. Between May 2001 and August 2006, Siemens Bangladesh is alleged to have made over \$5.3 million in payments (the majority of which were through the three consultants) in connection with the Bangladeshi BTTP Project.

- Argentina

Siemens Argentina was a controlled (but apparently not wholly owned) subsidiary of Siemens with its headquarters in Buenos Aires, Argentina that contracted for and managed regional projects for Siemens. Beginning in the 1990s, Siemens Argentina became involved in a national identity card project in Argentina valued at approximately \$1 billion. In February 1998, Siemens Argentina and its affiliates were awarded the national identity card project. Shortly thereafter, in September 1998, the Siemens subsidiary began making and promising payments to a “consulting group” with the understanding that these payments would be passed on to high-level Argentine officials with influence over the national identity card project. Regardless, in 2001, the national identity project was canceled, resulting in disputes between Siemens Argentina, the Argentine government and the consulting group that Siemens was using to funnel improper payments. In response to claims by the Argentine consulting group for outstanding payments, the Siemens Legal Department in Munich advised Siemens Argentina that payments to the Argentine consulting group were potentially problematic. Despite this advice, in July 2002, Siemens Argentina directed over \$5.2 million in payments to be made through a Uruguayan bank account based on a backdated invoice for purported consulting services in Chile and Uruguay that were never provided. These payments were made to partially offset the outstanding payments claimed by the Argentine consulting group.

In connection with the payment dispute, Siemens officials met with officials of the consulting group in the United States on at least one occasion. Despite the payments and attempts to negotiate a resolution, the consulting group brought an arbitration claim against Siemens Argentina, which settled in 2006 for \$8.8 million. An explicit condition of the settlement was that no information regarding the claims could be released to the public. In total, Siemens Argentina is alleged to have paid or caused to be paid over \$15.7 million directly to entities controlled by members of the Argentine government; over \$35 million to the Argentine consulting group; and over \$54 million to other entities. The SEC claims, although it does not provide specifics, that certain payments were routed “through U.S. bank accounts based on fictitious invoices for non-existent services.” Notably, in February 2007, Siemens was awarded \$217 million in a separate, International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”) arbitration arising out of the national identity card project dispute with the Argentine government for its cancellation of the project. ICSID does not have jurisdiction over claims based on contracts obtained through corruption.

- Payment Mechanisms and Schemes

The improper payments (both described above and more generally) were made using a variety of mechanisms, including the following:

- Widespread Use of Business Consultants and Intermediaries: According to the SEC, Siemens paid over \$980 million to third parties (all but \$27.5 of which occurred before November 15, 2006) in order to funnel payments to government officials. Although many of these payments were ostensibly made under “consulting” agreements, in reality the entities to which they were made provided

little or no service in return for the payments, but were rather used as conduits to make improper payments to foreign officials.

- Slush Funds: The SEC alleges that approximately \$211 million in improper payments were made through “slush fund” bank accounts held in the name of present or former Siemens employees or shell companies.
  - Cash: According to the SEC, Siemens employees were able to obtain large amounts of cash and cash equivalents that they could then use to pay government officials or intermediaries. The DOJ describes former Siemens telecommunications employees routinely filling up suitcases of cash from various cash desks, typically from the Siemens Real Estate group.
  - Intercompany Accounts: Siemens was also able to mask payments by making them to accounts maintained in the name of unconsolidated Siemens entities around the world. The SEC alleges that Siemens used these internal accounts to funnel over \$16.2 million to third parties. A Siemens Corporate Finance Financial Analyst who raised concerns about these accounts in 2004 was promptly phased out of his job.
  - Confidential Payment System: The DOJ indicates that at least one Siemens business unit used a confidential payment system that was outside of the normal accounts payable process and allowed for flexibility as to which project to charge for the payment. The DOJ alleges that over \$33 million was paid to business consultants and agents from 2001 through 2005 using the confidential system.
- Individual Charges

Facing pressure from Congress and the media that the DOJ was not prosecuting the individuals who participated in bribery schemes, the DOJ indicted eight former Siemens executives and agents on December 13, 2011. The indictment charges that defendants committed to paying nearly \$100 million in bribes to a series of Argentine government officials beginning in 1996 and until 2009 to win a billion dollar contract to produce national identity cards (the Documentos Nacionales de Identidad or “DNI” project). After the DNI contract was suspended in 1991, the defendants allegedly paid additional bribes to old and new Argentine officials in an attempt to reinstate the contract. Despite these efforts, the DNI project was terminated in 2001. At this point, the defendants caused Siemens AG to file a fraudulent ICSID arbitration claim against Argentina in Washington, D.C. The claim alleged wrongful termination of the contract for the DNI project and demanded nearly \$500 million in lost profits and expenses. The defendants continued to pay bribes to suppress evidence during the arbitration proceedings and actively hid from the tribunal the fact that the contract for the DNI project had been secured by bribery and corruption, which included tampering witness statements and pleadings that falsely denied the existence of corruption. As a result of the bribe payments it made, Siemens prevailed in the Washington arbitration and received an arbitration award in 2007 against the government of Argentina of over \$217 million plus interest for the DNI contract.

However, in August 2009, after settling bribery charges with the United States and Germany, Siemens waived the arbitration award.

The DOJ alleged that the defendants filtered money to the Argentine government officials in various ways, including offshore shell companies, fake consulting contracts, and large amounts of cash carried across national borders. Defendants also caused Siemens to pay \$8.8 million in 2007 under the legal cover of a separate arbitration initiated in Switzerland by their co-conspirator intermediaries to enforce a sham \$27 million contract that involved a company controlled by those intermediaries, which consolidated existing bribe commitments. The defendants caused Siemens to quietly settle the arbitration, keeping all evidence of corruption out of the proceeding.

The defendants named in the DOJ's indictment were: Uriel Sharef, a former member of the central executive committee of Siemens AG; Herbert Steffen, a former chief executive officer of Siemens Argentina; Andres Truppel, a former chief financial officer of Siemens Argentina; Ulrich Bock, Stephan Signer and Eberhard Reichert, former senior executives of Siemens Business Services; and Carlos Sergi and Miguel Czysch, who served as intermediaries and agents of Siemens in the alleged bribe scheme. The defendants live in Germany, Switzerland, or Argentina. The defendants were charged with conspiracy to violate the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal control provisions of the FCPA; conspiracy to commit wire fraud; conspiracy to commit money laundering; and substantive wire fraud. They have not yet been arrested or extradited.

In 2009, following a change in management and the initiation of proceedings by the Munich prosecutor's office, Siemens began cooperating with the DOJ and SEC as well as German prosecutors. The scheme was revealed at that time and the company decided to forego the right to the arbitration award.

The DOJ's press release that accompanied the indictment praised Siemens' laudable actions in disclosing these potential FCPA violations, noting that "Siemens AG disclosed these violations after initiating an internal FCPA investigation of unprecedented scope; shared the results of that investigation; cooperated extensively and authentically with the department in its ongoing investigation; and took remedial action, including the complete restructuring of Siemens AG and the implementation of a sophisticated compliance program and organization."

Also on December 13, 2011, the SEC filed a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in connection with the Argentina DNI project, charging seven former senior executives of Siemens AG and its regional company in Argentina with violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. According to the SEC complaint, Siemens paid an estimated total of over \$100 million in bribes, approximately \$31.3 million of which were made after March 12, 2001, when Siemens became subject to U.S. securities laws. The SEC alleges that in furtherance of the scheme, the defendants falsified documents, including invoices and sham consulting contracts, participated in meetings in the United States to negotiate the terms of bribe payments, and made use of U.S. bank accounts to pay bribes.

Six of the individuals charged in the SEC complaint were included in the DOJ's indictment: Uriel Sharef, Herbert Steffen, Andres Truppel, Ulrich Bock, Stephan Signer, and Carlos Sergi. Bernd Regendantz, CFO of Siemens Business Services from February 2002 to 2004, was not named in DOJ's indictment. However, Regendantz was the first of the Siemens' defendants to settle with the SEC, and he did so in 2011 without admitting or denying the allegations by consenting to the entry of a final judgment that permanently enjoins him from committing future violations. He agreed to pay a civil penalty of \$40,000 which was deemed satisfied by the payment of a €30,000 administrative fine ordered by the Munich prosecutor.

In October 2012, Uriel Sharef agreed to pay \$275,000 to settle the SEC charges that alleged he participated in a scheme to bribe government officials in Argentina. Sharef agreed to pay the fine without admitting or denying the charges against him, and a final judgment was entered against Sharef on April 15, 2013. Sharef's civil penalty was the second highest penalty ever assessed against an individual in an FCPA case.

Also in October 2012, Herbert Steffen filed a motion to dismiss the SEC's charges against him. Steffen argued that the claims against him should be dismissed because the Manhattan court lacked personal jurisdiction over him and the SEC's complaint was filed outside the statute of limitations. In February 2013, Judge Shira Scheindlin dismissed the SEC's charges against Steffen on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction.

As to the other defendants named in the SEC's complaint — Andres Truppel, Ulrich Bock, Stephan Singer, and Carlos Sergi — none have made court appearances, and they are presumed to be in Germany.

At least twelve individuals have been prosecuted by German authorities for their involvement in Siemens' misconduct as far back as 2007. So far, all have received probation or suspended sentences, as well as fines. Among them included Reinhard Siekazcek, who admitted to setting up slush funds while a manager at Siemens' ICN fixed-line telephone network division. Prosecutors alleged Siekazcek funneled money through various shell companies for use as bribes in order to secure various government and private contracts abroad over a period of years. Two of his assistants, Ernst Keil-von Jagemann and Wolfgang Rudolph, were later convicted of accessory to breach of trust. Keil-von Jagemann received two years of probation and a fine of €12,000, while Rudolph received 9 months of probation and was fined €20,000.

On April 20, 2010, a Munich court found two former Siemens managers guilty of breach of trust and abetting bribery for their roles in the scandal. Michael Kutschenreuter, the former financial head of Siemens' telecommunication unit, received two years' probation and a fine of €160,000. Hans-Werner Hartmann, the former head of accounting at the same unit, was given a suspended sentence of 18 months and ordered to pay €40,000 to charity. Kutschenreuter is the most senior Siemens executive to be found guilty of corruption; he admitted that he covered up slush funds and other corrupt practices by Siemens employees related to contracts in Nigeria and Russia.

***Misao Hioki***

On December 10, 2008, Misao Hioki, the former general manager of Bridgestone Corp.'s International Engineered Products ("IEP") Department, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the Sherman Act and conspiracy to violate the FCPA. Hioki, a Japanese national, was charged for his role in a conspiracy to rig bids, fix prices and allocate market shares of sales of marine hoses in the United States and elsewhere and also for his role in a conspiracy to violate the FCPA by making corrupt payments to government officials in Latin America.

The plea results from a broader investigation into a bid-rigging, price-fixing, and allocation conspiracy involving marine hose manufacturers and a consultant who acted as the coordinator of the cartel. Hioki was one of eight foreign executives arrested on May 2, 2007 in the United States following their participation in an alleged cartel meeting in Houston. He is the ninth individual to plead guilty in the hose-bid rigging investigation and first to plead guilty in the alleged FCPA conspiracy.

The DOJ charged that Hioki, along with his co-conspirators, negotiated with employees of government-owned businesses in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela to make corrupt payments in order to secure business for his company and its U.S. subsidiary. Hioki then approved the payments through local sales agents. The payments were coordinated through the U.S. subsidiary's offices in the United States. Hioki was sentenced to serve two years in jail and to pay an \$80,000 criminal fine. He was released from prison on November 23, 2010.

***Aibel Group Ltd.***

On November 21, 2008, Aibel Group Ltd. ("Aibel Group"), a U.K. corporation, pleaded guilty to conspiring to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA in connection with allegedly corrupt payments in Nigeria. The company further admitted that it was not in compliance with a DPA it had entered into with the DOJ in February 2007 regarding the same underlying conduct.

Aibel is owned by Herkules Private Equity Fund and Ferd Capital, both of Norway. They acquired the company in June 2007 from a private equity group led by Candover, 3i and JPMorgan Partners, which bought Vetco Gray U.K. Ltd. and its affiliate Aibel in July 2004 from ABB Oil & Gas. When its current Norwegian owners acquired Aibel, it was already subject to the DPA. The new owners were required by the DOJ to ensure the company's compliance with the terms of the DPA after the acquisition.

Aibel Group agreed to pay a \$4.2 million criminal fine and to cooperate with the DOJ and other law enforcement agencies, including providing the DOJ with access to all Aibel Group directors, officers, employees, agents and consultants for interviews and testimony regarding the improper payments; providing copies of relevant documents and records relating to the improper payments; submitting written reports twelve and twenty-four months after the settlement date by its Norwegian counsel describing the company's efforts to put in place controls and systems to comply with Norwegian and other applicable anti-bribery laws; and, if it determines that there is a reasonable basis to believe any of its subsidiaries, affiliates, officers, directors or employees

have violated Norwegian criminal law, reporting such violations to the appropriate Norwegian authorities.

Beginning in February 2001, Aibel Group's predecessor company Vetco Limited and several affiliated companies began providing engineering and procurement services and equipment for Nigeria's first deepwater oil drilling operation, known as the Bonga Project. Aibel Group admitted to conspiring with others, most prominently, an unidentified international freight forwarding service (believed to be Panalpina), to make at least 378 corrupt payments between September 2002 and April 2005 totaling approximately \$2.1 million to Nigerian Customs officials in order to provide preferential customs clearance treatment for the Aibel Group's shipments. The freight forwarding company's relationship with Aibel Group was coordinated through an affiliated company's Houston offices.

Three other entities affiliated with Aibel Group have pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA. As described further below, in 2004, Vetco Gray U.K. Ltd. and an affiliated company pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA by paying bribes to officials of Nigeria's National Petroleum Investment Management Services. In February 2007, three wholly owned subsidiaries of Vetco International Ltd., pleaded guilty to violating the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA, resulting in a \$26 million criminal fine.

### ***Shu Quan-Sheng***

On November 17, 2008, Shu Quan-Sheng ("Shu"), a physicist in Newport News, Virginia, pleaded guilty to charges that he illegally exported space launch technical data and defense services to the People's Republic of China and offered bribes to Chinese government officials. Shu, a native of China and a naturalized U.S. citizen, is the President, Secretary and Treasurer of AMAC International Inc. ("AMAC"), a high-tech company based in Newport News that also maintains offices in Beijing.

Shu pleaded guilty to a three-count criminal information. The first two counts alleged that Shu violated the Arms Export Control Act ("AECA") by (i) providing the PRC with assistance in the design and development of a cryogenic fueling system for space launch vehicles from January 2003 through October 2007, and (ii) willfully exporting to the PRC controlled military technical data, in each instance without first obtaining the required export license or written approval from the State Department.

The third count alleged that Shu violated the FCPA when he offered, paid, promised, and authorized the payment of bribes to officials of China's 101<sup>st</sup> Research Institute, one of the research institutes that makes up the China Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, to obtain for a French company that Shu represented a contract for the development of a 600 liter per hour liquid hydrogen tank system. In 2006, Shu allegedly offered "percentage points" worth a total of \$189,300 to PRC officials on three separate occasions. In January 2007, the \$4 million project was awarded to the French company. On April 7, 2009, Shu was sentenced to 51 months in prison. He was released from federal prison on February 15, 2013.

*Nexus Technologies, Inc*

On September 4, 2008, a federal grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania returned an indictment charging Nexus Technologies, Inc. (“Nexus”) and four of its employees with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and four substantive counts of violating, or aiding and abetting violations of, the FCPA. On September 5, 2008, the four individuals, Nam Nguyen (“Nam”), Joseph LU.K.as (“LU.K.as”), Kim Nguyen (“Kim”) and An Nguyen (“An”), were arrested in connection with the charges.

LU.K.as pleaded guilty to violating and conspiring to violate the FCPA on June 29, 2009. On March 16, 2010, Nexus pleaded guilty to conspiracy, violations of the FCPA, violations of the Travel Act in connection with commercial bribes and money laundering. Also on March 16, Nam and An each pleaded guilty to conspiracy, a substantive FCPA violation, a violation of the Travel Act, and money laundering, while Kim pleaded guilty to conspiracy, a substantive FCPA violation, and money laundering.

Nexus, a Delaware company with offices in New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Vietnam, is an exporter of a variety of equipment, including underwater mapping equipment, bomb containment equipment, helicopter parts, chemical detectors, satellite communication parts and air tracking systems. The company purchases goods from United States vendors and resells them to customers in Vietnam that include the commercial arms of several government agencies, including the Vietnam Ministry of Tourism, the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of Public Safety. The indictment describes these entities as “departments, agencies, or instrumentalities of the Government of Vietnam” making their employees “foreign officials” for purposes of the FCPA.

Nam was the founder and president of Nexus, and was primarily responsible for finding and negotiating with the company’s Vietnam customers. LU.K.as was involved in a joint venture with Nexus until around 2005, and was responsible for overseeing the company’s New Jersey office and coordinating with potential United States vendors. Kim and An were both Nexus employees and were responsible for, among other things, identifying potential United States suppliers. In addition, Kim handled certain of Nexus’s finances, including money transfers, while An arranged for goods shipments from suppliers to freight forwarders and customers.

From about 1999 through May 2008, Nexus and the defendants made payments to Vietnam officials in order to obtain or retain contracts associated with a variety of products, including safety equipment, computer workstations, and air traffic equipment. The payments were typically described as “commission” payments, and were improperly recorded in Nexus’s books and records as “subcontract fees” or “installment payments.” After negotiating a contract and payment arrangement with a Vietnamese customer, Nam instructed Nexus employees, including the defendants, to facilitate the payment by wire transfer from Nexus’s bank account in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The payments often were made to the Hong Kong bank account of an unaffiliated Hong Kong company in order to conceal the fact that they were intended for Vietnamese government officials. Nexus described the ultimate recipients as “supporters,” and

used the payments not only to generate business but also to obtain confidential information and engage in bid rigging.

For example, on one occasion, in February 2004, Nexus entered into a contract with a commercial unit of the Ministry of Transport for over \$14,000 worth of computer workstations. In August 2004, Nam instructed Kim to send a commission payment through the Hong Kong company for the benefit of a foreign official connected with the contract. In an email communication, Nam referenced the fact that the commercial agency could have purchased the same equipment cheaper from a local dealer, but was purchasing from Nexus because of its willingness to “add into the contract a fat markup for [the Vietnamese agency].” In total, Nexus and the Nguyens admitted to making over \$250,000 improper payments to Vietnamese officials to obtain or retain business between 1999 and 2008.

On September 15, 2010, the court sentenced Nexus and the individual defendants. Nexus was fined \$11,200.00 and, as a condition of its plea agreement, Nexus ceased all operations permanently and surrendered all of its net assets to the court. LU.K.as was sentenced to two years’ probation, community service, and a fine of \$1,000.00 in light of the substantial assistance he provided the government after his indictment. Kim, who also provided substantial assistance to the government, was sentenced to two years’ probation, community service, and a fine of \$20,000.

The other two defendants, who had not provided substantial assistance to the United States following their indictment, were incarcerated. An, who was on probation for an unrelated offense and who tested positive for cocaine at the time of his arrest, was sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. He was released from prison on October 4, 2011. Nam, the president and founder of Nexus, was sentenced to sixteen months’ imprisonment. Following his release on December 30, 2011, he was subject to two years’ supervised release.

### ***Jack Stanley***

On September 3, 2008, Albert “Jack” Stanley, former CEO and Chairman of KBR, pleaded guilty to a two-count criminal information charging him with one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one count of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud in connection with his participation in a bribery scheme related to the Bonny Island project in Nigeria. In a related civil proceeding, Stanley agreed, without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, to the entry of a final judgment enjoining him from violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records and internal control provisions. Further, Stanley agreed to cooperate with law enforcement authorities in the ongoing investigations.

In addition to the FCPA anti-bribery, books and records and internal control charges related to the Nigeria bribery scheme underlying the KBR/Halliburton settlements, Stanley also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud in connection with a separate scheme involving a former Kellogg employee, described in the DOJ’s criminal information as the “LNG Consultant.” From around 1977 through 1988, the LNG Consultant was employed by Kellogg and responsible for LNG and other projects in the Middle East. Beginning in 1988, he left

Kellogg and became a consultant for Kellogg and other firms. Beginning around 1991 and continuing through 2004, Stanley and the LNG Consultant, using various corporate vehicles, allegedly entered into a series of lucrative contracts purportedly for consulting services in connection with LNG projects. In return for the consulting contracts, the LNG Consultant agreed to make “kickback” payments to bank accounts owned or controlled by Stanley worth millions of dollars. Over the course of the scheme, Stanley caused Kellogg and KBR to make payments of over \$68 million to the LNG Consultant. For his role in the scheme, Stanley received approximately \$10.8 million in kickbacks.

Under the DOJ plea agreement, Stanley faced as much as ten years in prison and a fine of twice his pecuniary gain for his actions, and his original plea agreement with the DOJ contemplated a prison term of approximately 7 years. His sentencing was delayed several times, potentially to allow him to finish cooperating with the DOJ’s prosecution of other individuals and companies involved in the scheme. On February 23, 2012, he was sentenced to serve 30 months at a community correction facility in Houston, followed by three years of supervised release, and to pay restitution to KBR in the amount of \$10.8 million to compensate for his kickback scheme with LNG Consultant. Stanley has already paid KBR \$9.25 million as partial restitution, and, per the judgment, he will be allowed to pay the remaining \$1.55 million in monthly installments of \$1,000 after his release. He was released from prison on April 4, 2014.

***Con-Way, Inc.***

On August 27, 2008, Con-Way, Inc. (“Con-Way”), a publicly traded international freight transportation and logistics services company based in San Mateo, California, settled civil charges with the SEC for violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal control provisions in connection with hundreds of small payments totaling over \$417,000 made by one of Con-Way’s former subsidiaries to Philippine customs officials and to officials of several majority foreign state-owned airlines. Con-Way agreed to pay a \$300,000 fine to resolve the matter. In a related administrative proceeding, the SEC issued a settled cease-and-desist order against Con-Way in connection with the same payments.

Prior to 2004, Menlo Worldwide Forwarding, Inc. (“Menlo Forwarding”), a wholly owned, United States subsidiary of Con-Way, held a 55% voting interest in Emery Transnational, a Philippines-based entity that was engaged in shipping and freight operations in the Philippines. During the relevant period, Con-Way was named CNF, Inc., and Menlo Forwarding was named Emery Air Freight Corporation. In 2004, Con-Way sold Menlo Forwarding and Emery Transnational to United Parcel Service of America, Inc.

According to the SEC, between 2000 and 2003, Emery Transnational made over \$244,000 in payments to officials at the Philippine Bureau of Customs and Philippine Economic Zone Area to influence various customs decisions. The payments were primarily used either to (i) induce the officials to violate customs regulations and allow Emery Transnational to store shipments longer than otherwise permitted, or (ii) settle disputes with customs officials or induce them to reduce or not impose otherwise legitimate fines. Emery Transnational employees made

these payments from monies obtained by submitting cash advance requests that were not supported by receipts.

In addition, Emery Transnational made payments totaling at least \$173,000 to officials at fourteen state-owned airlines that did business in the Philippines either to (i) induce the airline officials to reserve space improperly for Emery Transnational on airplanes (“weight shipped” payments); or (ii) induce airline officials to under-weigh or consolidate shipments, thus lowering Emery Transnational’s shipping costs (“gain share” payments). Checks reflecting the amount of the improper payments were issued to Emery Transnational managers, who then distributed cash payments to the airline officials. According to the SEC, Emery Transnational did not identify the true nature of the payments to the customs and state-owned airline officials in its books and records.

The SEC determined that Con-Way and Menlo Forwarding exercised “little supervision or oversight over Emery Transnational.” The companies required only that Emery Transnational periodically report its net profits to Menlo Forwarding, from which Emery Transnational paid Menlo Forwarding an annual dividend of 55%. The companies (i) did not ask for or receive any additional financial information from Emery Transnational, or (ii) maintain or review the books of the Philippine company, which “should have reflected the illicit payments made to foreign officials.” In determining to accept Con-Way’s settlement offer, the SEC “considered the remedial acts undertaken by Con-Way and cooperation afforded the Commission staff.”

### ***Faro Technologies, Inc.***

On June 5, 2008, Faro Technologies, Inc. (“Faro”), a publicly traded company specializing in computerized measurement devices and software, settled civil charges with the SEC for violating the FCPA’s anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls provisions in connection with improper payments to Chinese government officials. In the SEC proceeding, Faro agreed to cease and desist from future violations, hire an independent compliance monitor for a period of two years, and pay approximately \$1.85 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest. In a related proceeding, Faro entered into a two-year NPA with the DOJ and agreed to pay a \$1.1 million criminal penalty.

According to the SEC, Faro began direct sales of its products in China in 2003 through its Chinese subsidiary, Faro Shanghai Co., Ltd. (“Faro China”), which was overseen by Faro’s Director of Asia-Pacific Sales, later identified as Oscar Meza. In May 2003, Faro hired a country sales manager to assist in selling its products. After receiving his employment contract, the country manager apparently asked if he could do business “the Chinese way.” Faro officers learned that this was a reference to paying kickbacks or providing other things of value in order to induce sales of Faro products. After seeking an opinion into the legality of such payments under Chinese law, Faro officers orally instructed Meza and country manager not to make such payments.

In 2004, however, Meza began authorizing the country manager to make corrupt payments to employees of state-owned or controlled entities in China to secure business for Faro. These payments were known as “referral fees” and ranged up to 20% to 30% of the

contract price. To conceal the payments, Meza instructed Faro China employees to alter account entries to remove any indication that the payments were going to Faro's "customers." In doing so, Meza stated that he "did not want to end up in jail" as a result of "this bribery."

In February 2005, a new Faro officer e-mailed an article to Meza regarding another U.S. company being prosecuted for bribery in China and instructed Meza to have the article translated for Faro China's employees. Rather than cease the payment scheme, however, Meza authorized the country manager to continue making payments through third-party intermediaries described as "distributors." Faro China continued making the improper payments in such a manner until early 2006.

Faro's Chinese subsidiary made over twenty improper payments totaling \$444,492 from which it generated a net profit of over \$1.4 million. The SEC complaint asserts that Faro lacked a system of internal controls appropriate to detect the improper payments and provided "no training or education to any of its employees, agents, or subsidiaries regarding the requirements of the FCPA" during the relevant time. Faro also improperly recorded the payments in its books and records, inaccurately describing them as legitimate "selling expenses." Faro voluntarily disclosed the payments to the government.

Meza, a United States citizen who resides in Canada, agreed to pay a \$30,000 civil penalty and \$26,707 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest to settle an SEC enforcement action based on the same facts on August 28, 2009.

### ***AGA Medical Corporation***

On June 3, 2008, AGA Medical Corporation ("AGA"), a privately held medical device manufacturer based in Minnesota, entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ relating to improper payments made to Chinese doctors employed by state-owned hospitals and a Chinese patent official, and agreed to pay a \$2 million criminal penalty. The DOJ filed a criminal information against AGA in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota charging the company with one count of conspiracy to violate, and one count of violating, the FCPA.

According to the criminal information, from 1997 through 2005, a high-ranking officer and part owner of AGA, two AGA employees responsible for international sales, and AGA's Chinese distributor agreed to pay kickbacks to physicians that made purchasing decisions for Chinese hospitals to induce them to purchase AGA's products.

The payments apparently started after the distributor informed AGA that the hospitals were requesting a 10% "discount" on AGA's products and the physicians were requesting a corresponding 10% "commission." Email records indicated that AGA officials approved the payments and were kept apprised of the scheme's progress and status. The criminal information does not provide a total dollar amount of payments to Chinese doctors, but states that as of 2001 over \$460,000 in such "commission" payments had been made. Although the criminal information indicates that AGA generated sales of approximately \$13.5 million during the relevant period, it does not specify what portion of these sales were linked to the improper conduct.

Further, according to the DOJ, between 2000 and 2002, AGA sought several patents in China, and a high-ranking AGA official agreed to make payments to a Chinese patent official through AGA's Chinese distributor in order to have the patent applications expedited and approved. The criminal information indicates that at least \$20,000 in payments were made or agreed to in connection with AGA's patent approvals.

The DOJ announced that it agreed to defer prosecution (and dismiss the criminal information after three years if AGA abides by the terms of the agreement) in recognition of AGA's voluntary disclosure, thorough review of the improper payments, cooperation with the DOJ's investigation, implementation of enhanced compliance policies and procedures, and engagement of an independent monitor.

### ***Willbros Group, Inc.***

On May 14, 2008, Willbros Group Inc. ("Willbros Group") an international oil and gas pipeline company with headquarters in Tulsa, Oklahoma prior to 2000 when it moved them to Houston, Texas, and four of its former employees settled civil charges with the SEC for violating the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records and internal controls provisions in connection with the payment of bribes to officials in Nigeria and Ecuador, and for violating the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act (Section 17(a)) and Exchange Act (Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 thereunder) in connection with a fraudulent scheme to reduce taxes in Bolivia. The SEC settlement requires Willbros Group to pay \$10.3 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and also contained civil penalties for certain of the former employees (discussed further below).

In a related proceeding, Willbros Group and its subsidiary Willbros International Inc. ("Willbros International") entered into a DPA with the DOJ in which they agreed to pay a \$22 million criminal penalty and engage an independent monitor for three years in connection with the Nigerian and Ecuadorian bribery schemes. In connection with the DPA, Willbros Group and Willbros International agreed to a limited waiver of attorney-client privilege, applicable to the DOJ only, and agreed to implement a compliance and ethics program designed to prevent further violations of the FCPA.

- ***Nigeria***

Beginning in at least 2003, Willbros Group, acting primarily through three operating subsidiaries, sought to obtain two significant Nigerian contracts: (i) the onshore Eastern Gas Gathering Systems ("EGGS") project, which was divided into Phases I and II; and (ii) an offshore pipeline contract. The EGGS and offshore pipeline projects were run by separate joint ventures, both of which were majority-owned by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation ("NNPC") and were operated by subsidiaries of major international oil companies. The SEC's complaint asserts that Willbros Group and its subsidiaries paid over \$6 million in bribes in connection with these projects, from which Willbros Group realized approximately \$8.9 million in net profits.

Willbros West Africa, Inc. (“Willbros West Africa”) formed a consortium with the subsidiary of a German engineering and construction firm to bid on the EGGS project. According to the SEC’s complaint, in late 2003, while Willbros West Africa was bidding on Phase I of the project, Willbros International’s then-president (who is not named in the complaint, but was later identified as James K. Tillery) and Jason Steph, Willbros International’s onshore general manager in Nigeria, devised a scheme with employees of Willbros West Africa’s joint venture partner to make payments to Nigerian officials, a Nigerian political party and an official in the executive branch of Nigeria’s federal government to obtain some or all of the EGGS work. The SEC’s complaint states that Tillery caused Willbros West Africa to enter into a series of “consultancy agreements” that called for 3% of the contract revenues to be paid out to a consultant. Certain of Willbros Group’s employees, including Steph, were allegedly aware that the consultant intended to use the money paid to him under the “consultancy agreement” to bribe Nigerian officials. In July and August 2004, after approval by the NNPC and its subsidiary, the National Petroleum Investment Management Services (“NAPIMS”), the Willbros West Africa consortium executed contracts with the EGGS joint venture operator for portions of the EGGS Phase I project.

In January 2005, Tillery resigned and the company’s audit committee began an internal investigation into allegations of unrelated tax improprieties. When the internal investigation expanded to include Willbros Group’s Nigerian operations, the “consulting” agreement was canceled and payments ceased. When Steph and Jim Bob Brown (a former executive of Willbros Group) learned that cutting off the payments could jeopardize Willbros International’s opportunity to seek a contract for Phase II of the EGGS project, they engaged a second consultant and agreed to pay \$1.85 million to cover the outstanding “commitments” to the Nigerian officials. To come up with the \$1.85 million, Brown caused Willbros West Africa to borrow \$1 million from its consortium partner and Steph borrowed \$500,000 on behalf of a separate Willbros Nigerian subsidiary from a Nigerian gas and oil company to cover the payments to Nigerian officials. In addition, Steph directed the withdrawal of \$350,000 from a Willbros petty cash account for the same purpose. These funds were transferred to the second consultant for payment to Nigerian officials.

As with the EGGS project, Willbros Group, through Tillery, agreed to pay at least \$4 million in bribes to Nigerian officials in connection with the offshore pipeline contract. According to the DOJ and SEC, by October 2004, some of these payments had been made, although an exact amount is not indicated.

Finally, the SEC’s complaint asserts that between the early 1990s and 2005, Willbros Group employees abused petty cash accounts to pay Nigerian tax officials to reduce tax obligations and to pay officials within the Nigerian judicial system to obtain favorable treatment in pending court cases. To facilitate the improper payments, certain Willbros Group employees used fictitious invoices to inflate the amount of cash needed in the petty cash accounts. Ultimately, at least \$300,000 of petty cash was used to make these types of improper payments.

- Ecuador

According to the SEC and DOJ, in late 2003, the then-president of Willbros International instructed an Ecuador-based employee to pursue business opportunities in that country. The employee advised Brown, who was supervising the company's business in Ecuador, that Willbros Servicios Obras y Sistemas S.A. ("Willbros Ecuador") could obtain a \$3 million contract (the "Santo Domingo project") by making a \$300,000 payment to officials of PetroEcuador, a government-owned oil and gas company. Brown approved the request, which required \$150,000 to be paid upfront and \$150,000 to follow after the completion of the project. After making this agreement, Willbros Ecuador received a letter of intent for the Santo Domingo project, and the company made the first \$150,000 payment.

While the Santo Domingo project was ongoing, however, the relevant officials at PetroEcuador were replaced. Both the original officials and the incoming officials insisted on receiving payments, and Brown and Tillery authorized the Ecuador employee to broker a deal. Brown attended the meeting with the Ecuadorian officials as well, where it was agreed that the company would pay the former officials \$90,000 and the new officials \$165,000. As a result of this agreement, Willbros retained the Santo Domingo project, which ultimately generated \$3.4 million in revenue for the company, and was awarded a second project. When the bribes relating to the second project were discovered in 2005, Willbros Group relinquished the project.

Willbros Group falsely characterized the payments made to the Ecuadorian officials as "consulting expenses," "platform expenses," and "prepaid expenses" in its books and records.

- Bolivia

According to the SEC complaint, Willbros Group, through certain of its former employees, further engaged in a fraudulent scheme to minimize the tax obligation of the company's Bolivian subsidiary, Willbros Transandina.

In late 2001, the subsidiary was awarded a contract to complete a pipeline as part of a joint venture. Willbros Transandina was required to pay 13% of its receipts for the project as a value added tax ("VAT"). It was, however, allowed to offset the taxes to a certain extent by the VAT it paid to its vendors. Tillery and others thus orchestrated a scheme whereby Willbros Transandina falsely inflated the VAT it owed to vendors through a series of fictitious transactions and invoices. Similarly, Tillery directed accounting personnel to materially understate the amount of Foreign Withholding Taxes that Willbros Group owed as a foreign company doing business in Bolivia.

- Individuals

In addition to its action against Willbros Group, the SEC settled charges against several Willbros employees.

On September 14, 2006, Jim Bob Brown, a former executive of, pleaded guilty to violations of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA in connection with conspiring with others

to bribe Nigerian and Ecuadorian government officials. On that same day, the SEC filed a civil action related to the same conduct, alleging civil violations of the FCPA and of the Exchange Act. Without admitting or denying the allegations in the complaint, Brown consented to the entry of a judgment that permanently enjoins him from future violations of these provisions. Brown was not ordered to pay a civil penalty.

Among other things, Brown's plea agreement indicates that he "loaned" a suitcase filled with \$1 million in cash to a Nigerian national with the intent that it be passed on to Nigerian officials. Brown was sentenced on January 29, 2010 to 12 months and one day in prison. The judge ordered Brown to serve two years of supervised release after his prison term and pay a fine of \$1,000 per month while he is on supervised release.

On November 5, 2007, Steph pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA as a result of his role in the fraudulent payments made to Nigerian government officials. Steph was sentenced on January 28, 2010, to 15 months in prison. In addition to the prison sentence, the judge ordered Steph to serve two years of supervised release following his prison term and to pay a \$2,000 fine. Steph was also civilly charged by the SEC of violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions, knowingly circumventing Willbros Group's internal controls or knowingly falsifying its books and records, as well as aiding and abetting Willbros Group's FCPA violations and will pay a civil penalty in connection with the judgment that has yet to be determined.

On May 14, 2008, the SEC settled allegations with three former Willbros employees. First, without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations, Gerald Jansen agreed to pay a civil penalty of \$30,000 and to be permanently enjoined from future violations of securities laws. Jansen was a former employee of Willbros International who served as an Administrator and General Manager in Nigeria. He allegedly routinely approved payments of invoices out of petty cash which he knew were false and which were used to make payments to Nigerian tax and court officials. The SEC charged Jansen with aiding and abetting Willbros Group's violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions and knowingly circumventing internal controls or falsifying books and records. The DOJ has not taken action against Jansen.

Second, Lloyd Biggers agreed to be permanently enjoined from future violations of securities laws, without admitting or denying the SEC's allegations. Biggers was a former employee of Willbros International who allegedly knowingly procured false invoices used to make payments to Nigerian tax and court officials. The SEC charged Biggers with knowingly circumventing Willbros Group's internal controls or knowingly falsifying its books and records and with aiding and abetting Willbros Group's violations of the anti-bribery and books and records provisions. Biggers was not ordered to pay a civil penalty, and the DOJ has not taken action against him.

Third, Carlos Galvez agreed to pay a civil penalty of \$35,000 and to be permanently enjoined from future violations of securities laws. Galvez was a former employee of Willbros International who worked in Bolivia and used fictitious invoices to prepare false tax returns and other records. The SEC charged Galvez with knowingly circumventing Willbros Group's

internal controls or knowingly falsifying its books and records and with aiding and abetting Willbros Group's violations of the Securities Exchange Act Section 10(b) and the Exchange Act's books and records and internal controls provisions. The DOJ has not taken action against Galvez.

On December 19, 2008, Tillery and Paul G. Novak, a former Willbros International consultant, were charged in an indictment unsealed in U.S. District Court in Houston with conspiring to make more than \$6 million in corrupt payments to Nigerian and Ecuadorian government officials as part of the schemes described above. The indictment was unsealed after Novak was arrested on arrival at George Bush Intercontinental Airport in Houston from South Africa after his U.S. passport was revoked. Tillery and Novak were specifically charged with criminal conspiracy, two FCPA anti-bribery violations, and a money-laundering conspiracy.

On November 12, 2009, Novak pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and one count of violating the FCPA in connection with the payments authorized in the EGGS projects in Nigeria. He was sentenced on May 3, 2013 to serve 15 months in prison, two years of supervised release after his prison term and to pay a \$1 million fine. Tillery remains at large.

- *Bilfinger SE*

As described in detail above, in 2013, Willbros Group's consortium partner, Bilfinger SE ("Bilfinger") settled charges with the DOJ related to the EGGS Project. As part of the settlement, Bilfinger agreed to pay a criminal penalty of \$32 million.

***Leo Winston Smith & Martin Self (Pacific Consolidated Industries LP)***

On May 8, 2008, Martin Self, a partial owner and former president of Pacific Consolidated Industries LP ("PCI"), a private company that manufactured air separation units and nitrogen concentration trolleys for defense departments throughout the world, pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions in connection with payments to a relative of a U.K. Ministry of Defense ("U.K.-MOD") official in order to obtain contracts with the Royal Air Force valued at over \$11 million. Previously, on June 18, 2007, Leo Winston Smith, former executive vice president and director of sales of PCI, was arrested after being indicted by a federal grand jury in Santa Ana, California on April 25, 2007 in connection with the same scheme. On September 3, 2009, Smith pleaded guilty to charges of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and corruptly obstructing and impeding the due process of the internal revenue laws.

According to the charging documents, in or about October 1999, Self and Smith caused PCI to enter into a marketing agreement with the U.K.-MOD official's relative. The marketing agreement provided for the relative to receive commission payments, from which he made payments to the U.K.-MOD official. The plea agreement with Self indicates that, beginning in late 1999, he "was aware of the high probability that the payments to the [r]elative were made for the purpose of obtaining and retaining the benefits of the U.K.-MOD contracts...." Despite such awareness, Self "failed to make a reasonable investigation of the true facts and deliberately avoided learning the true facts." Between 1999 and 2002, Self and Smith caused over \$70,000 in

payments to be made to the relative of the U.K.-MOD official through the bogus marketing agreement. In addition, Smith's indictment indicates that beginning around 2002, Smith caused approximately \$275,000 in payments to be made on behalf of the U.K.-MOD official for the purchase of a villa in Spain. In return, the U.K.-MOD official awarded a contract to PCI valued at approximately \$6 million, on which Smith received commissions of approximately \$500,000. The indictment alleges that Smith did not report these commissions on his 2003 United States tax returns.

On November 17, 2008, Self was sentenced to two years probation and fined \$20,000. On December 6, 2010, Smith was sentenced to six months of imprisonment followed by six months of home confinement and three years of supervised release. He was also ordered to pay \$7,700 in fines and special assessments. The DOJ had sought a significantly harsher prison sentence of 37 months; however, Smith argued that his age, ill health, and lengthy pretrial supervision justified a lighter sentence. He was released from prison on September 29, 2011.

In late 2003, after the alleged conduct, PCI was acquired by a group of investors and re-named Pacific Consolidated Industries, LLC ("PCI LLC"). PCI LLC discovered the payments in a post-acquisition audit and referred the matter to the DOJ.

### ***Ramendra Basu***

On April 22, 2008, former World Bank employee Ramendra Basu was sentenced to 15 months in prison, two years of supervised release and 50 hours of community service for conspiring to steer World Bank contracts to consultants in exchange for kickbacks and assisting a contractor in bribing a foreign official in violation of the FCPA. Basu is a national of India and a permanent legal resident alien of the United States. He was released from prison on August 7, 2009.

Basu pleaded guilty on December 17, 2002, and subsequently cooperated with U.S. and Swedish authorities. In September 1997, Basu left the World Bank to join a Swedish consulting firm. Three months later, in December 1997, Basu returned to the World Bank, where he continued to receive commissions from the consultant. Soon thereafter, the consultant was awarded three contracts by Basu's co-conspirator, Gautam Sengupta, a World Bank Task Manager. In February 2002, Sengupta pleaded guilty to the same charges as Basu. In February 2006, he was sentenced to two months in prison and fined \$6,000.

Basu admitted that between 1997 and 2000, he conspired with the Swedish consultant and Sengupta to steer World Bank contracts for business in Ethiopia and Kenya to certain Swedish companies in exchange for \$127,000 in kickbacks. Basu also assisted the Swedish consultants in bribing a Kenyan government official by arranging for \$50,000 to be wire transferred to the official's account. Basu pleaded guilty in 2002, but unsuccessfully attempted to withdraw his plea in 2006.

***AB Volvo***

On March 20, 2008, AB Volvo (“Volvo”), a Swedish transportation and construction equipment company, settled civil charges with the SEC for violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions in connection with improper payments made under the Oil-for-Food Programme (“OFFP”) for Iraq from approximately 1999 to 2003. AB Volvo and two of its wholly owned subsidiaries also entered into a DPA with the DOJ for conspiracy to commit wire fraud and violate the FCPA’s books and records provisions. Under the agreements, Volvo agreed to pay over \$19.6 million in combined fines and penalties, including over \$8.6 million in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest, a \$4 million civil penalty and a \$7 million criminal penalty.

During the OFFP, Volvo participated in the sale of trucks, construction equipment and spare parts to the Iraqi government through a French subsidiary, Renault Trucks SAS (“Renault”), and a Swedish subsidiary, Volvo Construction Equipment, AB (“VCE”). Between 1999 and 2003, Renault and VCE made or authorized nearly \$8.6 million in improper kickback payments in connection with approximately 35 contracts. Volvo’s total gain from contracts involving improper payments was nearly \$7.3 million.

According to the government, Renault entered into approximately 18 contracts with Iraqi ministries for specialty vehicles. Renault typically subcontracted out the body-building work associated with these contracts. Between November 2000 and July 2001, Renault devised a scheme whereby its subcontractors would inflate the price of their body-building work by approximately 10% and then pass this amount to the Iraqi government. Renault internal documents indicated that had Renault made the payments in its own name, “we would have been caught red-handed.” Renault made approximately \$5.1 million in improper payments in connection with these contracts and authorized an additional \$1.25 million.

According to the SEC, as early as 1999, VCE’s corporate predecessor, Volvo Construction Equipment International, AB (“VCEI”), made improper payments to Iraqi ministries in connection with OFFP contracts. VCEI made the payments through a Jordanian agent on two contracts with SOMO and one contract with the Ministry of Housing and Construction. VCEI, also through the agent, purchased a car for the Ministry of Housing and Construction. Collectively, the payments and cost of the car totaled over \$100,000.

After the imposition of ASSFs in 2000, VCEI and its distributors entered into five additional contracts that involved improper payments. In a November 2000 internal memo, VCEI employees noted that the ASSF demands were a “clear violation of the UN Embargo Rules.” VCEI sought counsel from the Swedish Embassy in Amman, Jordan. The embassy contacted the U.N. regarding the kickback demands, indicating that VCEI (which was not identified by name) had informed the embassy that it would refuse to sign the contract. Nevertheless, VCEI went forward with the transaction, which included the ASSF payments.

Initially, VCEI made the ASSF payments on its own behalf through its agent. Later, VCEI attempted to distance itself from the scheme by having the agent act as its distributor in Iraq. In this capacity, the agent would purchase vehicles from VCEI and then resell the vehicles

to the Iraqi government at an inflated price. VCEI knew that the agent was submitting inflated contracts and sold its products to the agent at a price that allowed the agent to make improper ASSF payments. When VCEI's relationship with the Jordanian agent faltered, it began using a Tunisian distributor to facilitate the improper ASSF payments. In total, VCEI made or authorized over \$2.2 million in improper ASSF payments.

As a result of the "extent and duration" of the improper payments, the improper recording of those payments and Volvo management's failure to detect the payments, the SEC determined that Volvo violated the FCPA's internal controls provisions. The SEC specifically noted that "[a]lthough Volvo knew of endemic corruption problems in the Middle East, it appeared to take on faith, without adequate confirming steps, that its managers and employees were exercising their duties to manage and comply with compliance and control issues." The SEC also determined that Volvo failed to properly record in its books and records the improper payments, characterizing them instead as commission payments, body-building fees or costs of sales.

### ***Flowserve Corporation***

On February 21, 2008, Flowserve Corporation ("Flowserve"), a Texas-based supplier of oil, gas and chemical industry equipment, agreed to settle civil charges with the SEC for violating the FCPA's books and records and internal controls provisions in connection with illegal payments to Iraq under the OFFP. Flowserve and its wholly owned French subsidiary Flowserve Pompes SAS ("Flowserve Pompes") also entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ charging Flowserve Pompes with conspiracy to violate the wire fraud statute and the FCPA's books and records provision. In total, Flowserve agreed to pay over \$10.5 million in fines and penalties, including over \$3.5 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest, a \$3 million civil penalty, and a \$4 million criminal fine. In Holland, Flowserve's Dutch subsidiary, Flowserve B.V., also agreed to enter into a criminal disposition with Dutch prosecutors and pay an undisclosed fine.

Flowserve participated in the OFFP through Flowserve Pompes and Flowserve B.V. According to the SEC's complaint, from 2001 to 2003, these subsidiaries entered into twenty sales contracts with Iraqi government entities that involved illegal surcharge payments. Flowserve Pompes and Flowserve B.V., with the assistance of Jordanian agents, made \$646,488 in improper surcharge payments and authorized an additional \$173,758 in such payments.

Flowserve Pompes entered into 19 contracts that included improper ASSF payments. The 10% surcharges were memorialized in a side letter to the Iraqi Ministry of Oil that described the charges as "engineering services, installation, and commissioning." The payments were made through a Jordanian agent by having the agent submit inflated invoices for reimbursement to Flowserve Pompes, and were recorded as if they were installation and service payments. The contract documents that Flowserve Pompes submitted to the U.N. omitted any reference to the ASSF payments, instead inflating the price of the equipment sold without discussing the price increase. The French subsidiary ultimately made \$604,651 in improper payments and authorized an additional \$173,758 in payments that were not ultimately made.

The SEC's complaint also charges Flowserve B.V. with making a \$41,836 kickback payment in connection with a contract to provide water pump parts to an Iraqi government-owned gas company. In August 2001, Flowserve B.V.'s agent advised the company that it was required to make a 10% kickback payment in connection with the contract, and expected to be reimbursed for such payment. Flowserve B.V. rejected a proposal to conceal the kickbacks by having the agent serve as a distributor and pay the ASSF out of his margin. Instead, Flowserve B.V.'s controller increased the cost of the purchase order and passed the difference to the agent. Flowserve B.V. agreed to, and ultimately did, pay the agent a "special project discount" commission that covered the amount of the kickback and effectively doubled the agent's standard 10% commission to 20%.

The SEC charged that Flowserve failed to devise and maintain an effective system of internal controls sufficient to prevent or detect the transactions by its two subsidiaries. In addition, Flowserve violated the FCPA's books and records provisions by improperly recording payments to its agents as legitimate expenses.

### *Westinghouse*

On February 14, 2008, Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies Corporation ("Wabtec") settled civil charges with the SEC for violating the FCPA's anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions in connection with improper payments made by Wabtec's fourth-tier, wholly owned Indian subsidiary Pioneer Friction Limited ("Pioneer") to employees of India's state-controlled national railway system. In the SEC proceeding, Wabtec agreed to pay over \$288,000 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and a civil penalty of \$87,000. Wabtec also entered into a three-year NPA with the DOJ relating to the same and other similar conduct. Under that agreement, Wabtec agreed to pay a \$300,000 fine, implement rigorous internal controls, undertake further remedial steps and continue to cooperate with the DOJ.

The Indian Ministry of Railroads ("MOR") controls the national railway system and is responsible for soliciting bids for various government contracts through the Indian Railway Board ("IRB"). Pioneer sells railway brake blocks to, among other customers, train car manufacturers owned or controlled by the Indian government. According to the SEC's complaint, from at least 2001 to 2005, Pioneer made more than \$137,400 in improper payments to employees of India's state-run railway system to induce them to consider or grant competitive bids for government contracts to Pioneer. In 2005, the IRB awarded Pioneer contracts that allowed it to realize profits of \$259,000.

In order to generate the cash required to make the payments, Pioneer directed "marketing agents" to submit invoices for services rendered. Marketing agents are companies that submit invoices and collect payments on behalf of other companies. Although the invoices indicated that payments were due for services rendered in connection with various railway projects, they were in fact fictitious and no such services were ever rendered. Once Pioneer paid the invoice, the "marketing agent" would return the cash to Pioneer minus a service fee that the agent kept for itself. Pioneer then used the cash to make the improper payments.

The SEC complaint indicates that Pioneer kept the cash generated from the false marketing agent invoices in a locked metal box and also kept separate records (that were not subject to annual audits) reflecting the improper payments. In addition, contrary to Indian law and Wabtec policy, Pioneer destroyed all records relating to the improper payments after a single year, leaving only records from 2005 available for review.

Although the DOJ agreement is based in part on the improper payments discussed in the SEC's complaint, the DOJ also noted that Pioneer made improper payments in order to "schedule pre-shipping product inspections; obtain issuance of product delivery certificates; and curb what Pioneer considered to be excessive tax audits." The DOJ noted that after discovering the payments, Wabtec engaged outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation, voluntarily reported its findings to, and cooperated fully with, the DOJ, and instituted remedial measures.

### ***Gerald and Patricia Green***

On September 11, 2009, a jury convicted Gerald and Patricia Green, co-owners of Film Festival Management, Inc. ("FFM"), of conspiracy, violating the FCPA and money laundering for masterminding a sophisticated bribery scheme that led the couple to obtain several Thai government contracts, including contracts for Thailand's annual film festival. The jury also found Patricia Green guilty of falsely subscribing U.S. income tax returns in connection with this scheme. The DOJ had sought significant prison sentences and had argued that the appropriate Sentencing Guidelines range (if not necessarily the sentence imposed) for Mr. Green should have been calculated at life in prison. The Greens' attorneys pled for clemency based on a number of factors, including Mr. Green's age and health issues.

On August 12, 2010, the Greens were both sentenced to only six months in prison and three years of supervised release (six months of which must be served in a home detention program). Although the court did not impose criminal fines because it determined that the Greens did not have the ability to pay, the Greens were ordered to pay restitution, jointly and severally, in the amount of \$250,000. On August 13, 2010, the court further ordered the forfeiture of the Greens' property derived from their criminal conduct, or substitute property if such derived property cannot be found or is comingled with other property, up to \$1,049,456 plus each defendant's share in their company's benefit plan. In October 2010, the DOJ appealed the sentences imposed, which were far lower than the sentences the DOJ sought, and the Greens cross-appealed the order to pay restitution.

Neither appeal was successful. First, on August 23, 2011, the Justice Department filed a Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of the previously filed protective notice of appeal with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, effectively ending its efforts to overturn the District Court's sentencing decision. Prosecutors had requested a 90-day extension to file an appellate brief — during the extension period, it was reported that the Solicitor General was determining whether to authorize the appeal. The Department's dismissal included this statement: "After consideration of this matter within the United States Attorney's Office, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, and the Office of the Solicitor General, the government now moves to dismiss its appeal of the district court's determination of sentence." The Government provided no further

explanation for the decision and reportedly declined to provide comments to media outlets. The Greens have served their six-month sentences and have been released from custody.

Second, on July 11, 2013, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's restitution order, rejecting the Greens argument that the order violated Supreme Court precedent of *Apprendi v. New Jersey*, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that a jury must make a finding of any facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum) or *Southern Union Co. v. United States*, 132 S. Ct. 2344 (2012) (applying *Apprendi* to criminal fines).

The original January 16, 2008, indictment alleged that, from 2002 to 2007, Mr. and Mrs. Green conspired to, and ultimately did, bribe a senior Thai government official in order to secure contracts to run the annual Bangkok International Film Festival ("Bangkok Film Festival"), which was funded and administered by the Tourism Authority of Thailand ("TAT"). Initially identified simply as the "Governor," the Thai official was later revealed to have been Juthamas Siriwan, the senior government officer of the TAT from 2002 to 2006. The Governor also served as the president of the Bangkok Film Festival and, in this position, had the ability to select businesses to provide goods and services for the festival. According to the indictment, in 2002 Ms. Siriwan selected Mr. Green to run the 2003 Bangkok Film Festival. In return, Mr. Green agreed to pay a percentage of the 2003 Bangkok Film Festival contract value to Ms. Siriwan. One of the Greens' business entities made a \$30,000 payment to a United Kingdom bank account held by Ms. Siriwan's daughter for the benefit of Ms. Siriwan.

According to the DOJ, the Greens were also selected to run the Bangkok Film Festival for 2004, 2005, and 2006, and made payments for Ms. Siriwan's benefit in connection with these contracts. The payments typically ranged between ten and twenty percent of the total amount of the Bangkok Film Festival contracts and were disguised in the Green entities' books and records as "sales commissions." The payments were primarily made by wire transfer to bank accounts in the United Kingdom, Singapore, and the Isle of Jersey held by the daughter or a friend of Ms. Siriwan, although the Greens also made cash payments directly to Ms. Siriwan during her visits to Los Angeles.

The indictment asserted that the Greens took considerable efforts to hide their scheme, including moving money through several business entities, some with fraudulent addresses and telephone numbers. Because Ms. Siriwan was authorized to approve payments on behalf of the TAT up to a certain dollar amount, the Greens purposely sought contracts under different business names to create the appearance that the money was being paid to different entities. In reality, all the work related to the film festivals was managed by the same personnel out of the same Los Angeles-based office run by the Greens. In structuring the transactions in such a manner, the Greens were able to avoid scrutiny into the large amounts of money being paid by the TAT to the Greens' business entities.

The government alleged that, in total, the Greens' business entities received over \$13.5 million from the TAT in connection with Bangkok Film Festival contracts between 2002 and 2007. As Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Kozinski explained in his July 2013 opinion:

The Greens looked to be on their way to silver-screen success, but there was a dark secret that would get in the way: The Greens had secured their lucrative contracts thanks, at least in part, to \$1.8 million in payments to the governor of Thailand's Tourism Authority.

The government twice superseded the original indictment to bring additional charges against the Greens. In October 2008, a superseding indictment was filed that included the charges that Mrs. Green filed two false tax returns when she took deductions for "commissions" that were, in fact, bribes. Later, in March 2009, the government added obstruction of justice charges against Mr. Green in a second superseding indictment. The government dismissed a substantive money laundering count prior to the case going to the jury. The jury found the Greens guilty of the charged conduct, except that it was unable to reach a verdict on the obstruction of justice count against Mr. Green.

Although the FCPA itself does not apply to the foreign officials who receive bribes, in January 2010 a federal court granted the DOJ's request to unseal January 2009 indictments of Ms. Siriwan and her daughter for money laundering and conspiracy to commit money laundering relating to the Greens' conduct. Ms. Siriwan's daughter, Jittisopa "Jib" Siriwan, was alleged to have been actively involved in the bribery scheme by traveling to Singapore, the United Kingdom, and the Isle of Jersey to open bank accounts for the purpose of facilitating the Greens' bribery of her mother. The payments originated at accounts held by the Greens in West Hollywood, California. The money laundering offenses carry statutory maximum terms of imprisonment of 20 years, but both mother and daughter remain fugitives. The DOJ is also seeking forfeiture of more than \$1.7 million from four existing bank accounts, plus all commissions, fees, proceeds, and a sum of money equal to the total amount of criminally derived proceeds. In the fall of 2011, the Siriwans filed a motion to dismiss the indictments on various grounds. In January 2012, the Federal Court in the Central District of California (Western Division – Los Angeles) held hearings for oral arguments on the motion to dismiss. The case was stayed at that time pending a decision by the Thai government on the U.S. government's request to extradite the Siriwans. In an oral hearing on March 20, 2013, the court continued to stay the trial in light of information that the Thai National Anti-Corruption Commission ("NACC") intended to file a criminal case against Juthamas Siriwan and potentially against her daughter as well.

The Bangkok Post published a report on November 13, 2014 that the NACC "has agreed to indict former Tourism Authority of Thailand (TAT) governor Juthamas Siriwan in a film bribery case." As of the end of 2014, however, no formal indictment had been issued, and a status conference has been set for March 12, 2015.

## 2007

### *Lucent Technologies*

On December 21, 2007, Lucent Technologies, Inc. ("Lucent") settled charges with the DOJ and the SEC for violating the FCPA's books and records and internal controls provisions in

connection with its payment of more than \$10 million for over 300 trips by approximately 1,000 employees of Chinese state-owned or controlled telecommunications enterprises, which were either existing or prospective Lucent customers. In the SEC proceeding, without admitting or denying the allegations, Lucent consented to an injunction from violating the books and records and internal controls provisions, and agreed to pay a civil monetary penalty of \$1.5 million. Lucent also entered into a two-year NPA with the DOJ, which requires the company to pay a \$1 million criminal penalty and to adopt new or modify existing internal controls, policies and procedures. The settlements concluded a multi-year investigation into Lucent's activities prior to its November 2006 merger with Alcatel SA.

According to the SEC and DOJ, the majority of the trips were ostensibly designed either to allow Chinese officials to inspect Lucent's factories in connection with a proposed sale ("pre-sale" trips) or to train the officials regarding the use of Lucent's products in connection with ongoing contracts ("post-sale" trips). The SEC alleged that Lucent spent more than \$1 million on 55 "pre-sale" visits and more than \$9 million on 260 "post-sale" visits.

The settlement documents assert that despite the supposed business purpose for the trips, in fact, the Chinese officials spent little to no time visiting Lucent's facilities. Rather, the officials spent the majority of their time visiting popular tourists destinations, including Las Vegas, Disney World and the Grand Canyon.

For example, on one pre-sale trip in 2002, Lucent paid more than \$34,000 for the Deputy General Manager and Deputy Director of the Technical Department of a Chinese-government majority-owned telecommunications company to visit the United States. During the trip, the Chinese officials spent three days on business activities and more than five days on visits to Disney World and Hawaii. Internal documents associated with the trip indicated that Lucent employees considered the Deputy General Manager to be a "decision maker" and described the trip as an important opportunity to enhance Lucent's relationship with this individual prior to the award of an important project. According to the SEC, in October 2002, Lucent was awarded a portion of this project worth a reported \$428 million. The travel-related expenses associated with these "pre-sale" visits were recorded in Lucent's books and records in expense accounts designated for items such as international freight costs or "other services."

The "post-sale" trips were typically characterized as "factory inspections" or "training" visits. The factory inspections were initially intended as a way to demonstrate Lucent's technologies and products to its Chinese customers. Around 2001, however, Lucent began outsourcing (including to China) most of its manufacturing operations and factories, which left its customers with few facilities in the United States to visit. Nevertheless, Lucent continued to provide its customers with "factory inspection" trips to the United States and other locations. These trips cost between \$25,000 and \$55,000 per trip. Similarly, the "training" visits were designed to offer some training, but often included extensive sightseeing, entertainment and leisure activities. Among other things, Lucent provided its visitors with per diems, paid for them to visit tourist attractions and paid for them to travel from training locations to leisure locations. As with the pre-sale trips, Lucent improperly recorded the expenses associated with these visits in its books and records as, among other things, costs for "other services."

The SEC complaint asserts that Lucent lacked the internal controls to detect and prevent trips that contained a disproportionate amount of sightseeing and leisure, rather than business purposes, and improperly recorded many of the trips in its books. The complaint states that these violations occurred because “Lucent failed, for years, to properly train its officers and employees to understand and appreciate the nature and status of its customers in China in the context of the FCPA.”

### *Akzo Nobel*

On December 20, 2007, Akzo Nobel N.V. (“Akzo Nobel”), a Netherlands-based pharmaceutical company, settled a civil complaint with the SEC for violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions in connection with improper After Service Sales Fee payments under the Oil-for-Food Programme. In the SEC action, Akzo Nobel agreed to disgorge over \$2.2 million in profits and pre-judgment interest, and pay a civil penalty of \$750,000.

In a related proceeding, Akzo Nobel entered into an unusual NPA with the DOJ contingent upon the resolution of a Dutch prosecution of Akzo Nobel’s subsidiary N.V. Organon (“Organon”). In the Dutch proceeding, Organon was expected to pay approximately €381,000. Under the NPA, if the Dutch proceeding was not successfully resolved, Akzo Nobel agreed to pay \$800,000 to the United States Treasury.

According to the SEC complaint, from 2000 to 2003, two of Akzo Nobel’s subsidiaries, Organon and Intervet International B.V. (“Intervet”), authorized and made \$279,491 in kickback payments in connection with pharmaceutical contracts entered into under the OFFP. During the OFFP, Intervet used two agents, Agent A and Agent B, who were paid jointly regardless of which agent secured the contract. Prior to August 2000, each agent received a 5% commission. After August 2000, their commissions were reduced to 2.5% due to pricing pressures.

In September 2000, Agent A informed Intervet that Iraqi officials were demanding an illegal surcharge in connection with an agreement that Agent A was negotiating, which Intervet refused to make. The agent indicated that he would “handle” the situation and was witnessed by an Intervet employee handing an envelope to an Iraqi representative at a contract signing. Thereafter, Agent A requested reimbursement for his payment of the ASSF on Intervet’s behalf. Intervet agreed to revert to the pre-August 2000 arrangement under which the two agents received 5% commissions, half of which would then be passed on to the Iraqi government. Similarly, Organon made improper surcharge payments in connection with three contracts, all of which also involved Agent A. These surcharge payments were made by increasing the commission owed to Organon’s agent. Akzo Nobel’s total profits from contracts in which illegal ASSF payments were made amounted to more than \$1.6 million.

The SEC determined that Akzo Nobel violated the internal controls provisions based, in part, on the “extent and duration of the improper illicit payments made by [the] two Akzo Nobel subsidiaries and their agents” as well as “the failure of Akzo Nobel’s management to detect these irregularities.” In addition, by improperly recording the payments as legitimate commission payments, Akzo Nobel violated the FCPA’s books and records provision.

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***Chevron Corporation***

On November 14, 2007, Chevron Corporation (“Chevron”) entered into an NPA with the DOJ and a separate agreement with the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“OFAC”) in connection with FCPA and related violations in connection with oil purchases the company made under the OFFP between April 2001 and May 2002. Chevron also settled civil charges with the SEC for violating the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions. In total, Chevron will pay \$30 million in fines and penalties, including a \$3 million civil penalty, \$25 million in disgorgement, and a \$2 million penalty to OFAC for violating sanctions against the former government of Iraq.

According to the SEC’s complaint, in Fall 2000, the U.N. received reports of the Iraqi oil surcharge demands, and advised oil traders that it was illegal to make such payments. Chevron was notified as early as December 2000 that it was illegal to make the surcharge payments. In January 2001, Chevron instituted a company-wide policy prohibiting the payment of surcharges in connection with purchases of Iraqi oil. In April 2001, Chevron began purchasing Iraqi oil through third parties, and continued doing so through May 2002. In total, Chevron purchased approximately 78 million barrels of Iraqi crude oil under 36 contracts with third parties.

According to the SEC, despite the company’s January 2001 policy, Chevron’s traders entered into the third-party contracts with actual or constructive knowledge that the third parties were making illegal surcharge payments to Iraq. Email traffic appeared to show that traders were aware that the surcharges were being used to cover the cost of kickbacks to the Iraqi government. An Italian third party, whose company on occasion sold oil to Chevron, stated that both the trader he dealt with at Chevron and the trader’s superiors knew about the illegal surcharge demands. Moreover, Chevron’s premiums to third parties shortly before the surcharge policy began typically ranged from \$0.25 to \$0.28 per barrel, whereas after the surcharge policy was put in place Chevron’s premiums rose as high as \$0.53 per barrel and typically ranged from \$0.36 to \$0.495.

In addition, Chevron’s policies required traders to obtain prior written approval for all proposed Iraqi oil purchases and charged management with reviewing each such proposed deal. Chevron’s traders did not follow the policy, and Chevron’s management failed to ensure compliance. Furthermore, Chevron’s management relied on its traders’ representations regarding third-party sellers instead of properly inquiring into and considering the identity, experience and reputation of each third-party seller. A credit check of one seller, whom Chevron used in two transactions, revealed that the seller was a “brass plate” company with no known assets, experience in the oil industry or actual operations.

Ultimately, Chevron, through its third-party contracts, made illegal surcharge payments of approximately \$20 million. In doing so, Chevron failed to implement a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to detect and prevent such payments. Chevron also improperly recorded the payments on its books and records, characterizing them simply as “premiums.

### *Ingersoll-Rand*

On October 31, 2007, Ingersoll-Rand Company Limited (“Ingersoll-Rand”), a global, diversified industrial company, resolved fraud and FCPA charges with the DOJ and SEC in connection with illegal ASSF payments made by its subsidiaries to Iraqi officials under the Oil-for-Food Programme. Ingersoll-Rand agreed to pay more than \$6.7 million in fines and penalties, including over \$2.2 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest, a \$1.95 million civil penalty and a \$2.5 million criminal fine.

The SEC Complaint details corrupt practices of five European Ingersoll-Rand subsidiaries, ABG Allgemeine Baumaschinen-Gesellschaft mbH (“ABG”), Ingersoll-Rand Italiana, SpA (“I-R Italiana”), Thermo-King Ireland Limited (“Thermo King”), Ingersoll-Rand Benelux, N.V. (“I-R Benelux”), and Ingersoll-Rand World Trade Ltd. (“IRWT”). The DOJ filed separate criminal informations against Thermo King and against I-R Italiana.

Four of the European subsidiaries — ABG, I-R Italiana, Thermo-King and I-R Benelux — entered into 12 OFFP contracts that contained ASSF kickbacks. Under these contracts, the Ingersoll-Rand subsidiaries, along with their distributors and one contract partner, made approximately \$963,148 in ASSF payments and authorized approximately \$544,697 in additional payments.

ABG entered into six AFFP contracts that included improper ASSFs. Two of these contracts were entered into in November 2000 with the Mayoralty of Baghdad for road construction equipment and were negotiated by an ABG sales manager. Ingersoll-Rand’s New Jersey office was notified of the kickback scheme by an anonymous fax on November 27, 2000, and immediately began an investigation. After discussing the matter internally and with outside counsel, however, Ingersoll Rand attempted to go forward with the contracts by submitting them to the U.N. for approval with a short note indicating the 10% markup. The U.N. advised that the ASSFs were not allowed and the Baghdad Mayoralty ultimately refused to go through with the contracts. Despite being put on notice of the potential kickback scheme, ABG’s sales manager subsequently negotiated four further contracts including AFFP payments on ABG’s behalf on an indirect basis through distributors who resold the goods. The distributors made a combined \$228,059 in ASSF payments and authorized a further \$198,000 payment that was not made.

I-R Italiana entered into four OFFP contracts for large air compressors between November 2000 and May 2002 that included improper ASSF payments of approximately \$473,302. Three of the contracts were entered into directly between I-R Italiana and the Iraqi Oil Ministry, while the fourth was made through a Jordanian distributor. Payments under the first three contracts, which were entered into in November 2000, were justified by adding a fictitious line item to I-R Italiana’s purchase orders, and were made by having I-R Italiana’s Jordanian distributor issue false invoices for work that was not performed. The fourth contract, entered into in October 2001 between the Jordanian distributor and the Iraqi Oil Ministry, provided for I-R Italiana’s distributor to resell goods purchased from I-R Italiana at a 119% markup, from which it made improper ASSF payments.

In October 2000, Thermo King authorized one ASSF payment of \$53,919 to General Automobile and Machinery Trading Company (“GAMCO”), an Iraqi government-owned company, relating to spare parts for refrigerated trucks. The ASSF payment was reflected in a side agreement negotiated and signed by Thermo-King’s Regional Director. For reasons unrelated to the ASSF, the contract was ultimately denied by the U.N.

In June 2002, I-R Benelux entered into an agreement with a Jordanian third party to sell 100 skid steer loaders and spare parts for resale to the Iraqi State Company for Agricultural Supplies. With I-R Benelux’s knowledge, the Jordanian company purchased and resold the equipment through the OFFP at a 70% markup, making ASSF payments totaling \$260,787 in connection with the sales. At the time it entered into the contract, officials at Ingersoll Rand headquarters were aware, through the anonymous fax sent to its New Jersey headquarters, that Iraqi authorities were demanding illicit payments on OFFP contracts. Despite this awareness, Ingersoll Rand failed to perform adequate due diligence on the Jordanian entity.

In addition, in February 2002, I-R Italiana sponsored eight officials from the Iraqi Oil Ministry to spend two days touring a manufacturing facility in Italy. The Iraqi officials spent two additional days touring Florence at the company’s expense and were provided \$8,000 in “pocket money.” I-R Italiana’s payment of holiday travel expenses and pocket money violated Ingersoll-Rand’s internal policies. Ingersoll-Rand also failed to properly account for these payments, recording the payments as “cost of sales deferred.”

The SEC and DOJ charged that Ingersoll-Rand failed to maintain an adequate system of internal controls to detect and prevent the payments and violated the books and records provisions of the FCPA by recording the payments as “sales deductions” and “other commissions.” After discovering and investigating the illegal payments, Ingersoll-Rand conducted an internal review and terminated implicated employees. Ingersoll-Rand self-reported the results of the review to the government.

### ***York International Corporation***

On October 1, 2007, York International Corporation (“York”), a global provider of heating, air conditioning and refrigeration products that is now a subsidiary of Johnson Controls, entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ and settled civil charges with the SEC related to improper payments under the OFFP and other foreign corruption allegations. The SEC charged York with violations of the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. The DOJ charged York with conspiracy to violate, and violations of, the wire fraud statute and books and records provision of the FCPA. York agreed to pay over \$22 million in fines and penalties, which includes a \$10 million criminal fine, a \$2 million civil penalty, and disgorgement and pre-judgment interest of over \$10 million.

Under the DPA, the DOJ can request documents and information from York, but the company can assert the attorney-client privilege and refuse to provide the requested materials. Such a refusal could come at cost to York as the agreement goes on to state that “[i]n the event that York withholds access to the information, documents, records, facilities and/or

employees of York, the Department may consider this fact in determining whether York has fully cooperated with the Department.”

- OFFP Payments

According to the charging documents, beginning in 1999, York’s wholly owned Dubai subsidiary, York Air Conditioning and Refrigeration FZE (“York FZE”), began participating in the OFFP. York FZE retained a Jordanian agent in connection with this activity and was able to obtain three contracts under the OFFP between March 1999 and April 2000 without making any illicit payments. In September 2000, the agent informed York FZE that it had been awarded a fourth contract, which was for the sale of air conditioner compressors (“Compressor Contract”) to the Iraqi Ministry of Trade. Shortly thereafter, however, the agent informed York FZE that the Iraqi government was requiring the payment of ASSFs in connection with humanitarian contracts. The agent recommended that York FZE increase its bid on the Compressor Contract it had just been awarded.

The Regional Sales Manager of York’s Delaware subsidiary, York Air Conditioning and Refrigeration, Inc. (“YACR”), responded that YACR would not enter into contracts that did not comply with U.N. rules. That manager, however, transferred out of the office for reasons unrelated to the OFFP, at which time a Dubai-based Area Manager assumed his duties. In November 2000, the Dubai-based Area Manager met with YACR’s Vice President and General Manager for the Middle East and the agent, and he agreed that the agent would be paid an inflated commission and pass such payments on to the Iraqi government to cover the ASSF for the Compressor Contract.

The agent subsequently made ASSF payments on York FZE’s behalf in connection with five additional OFFP contracts, typically by depositing funds in a Jordanian bank account designated by the Iraqi ministries. The inflated commission payments were recorded improperly in York’s books and records as “consultancy” payments. In total, the agent paid approximately \$647,110 in ASSF kickback payments on behalf of York FZE.

- Other International Bribery Schemes

According to the SEC and DOJ filings, from 2001 to 2006, various York foreign subsidiaries made over eight hundred improper payments totaling over \$7.5 million to secure orders on approximately 774 commercial and government projects in the Middle East, India, China, Nigeria and Europe. According to the SEC, 302 of these projects involved government end-users, and York generated net profits of nearly \$9 million on contracts involving illicit payments.

The improper payments, referred to internally as “consultancy fees,” were made in three ways. First, complicit customer personnel would supply York employees with false invoices that York employees then used to obtain cash and distribute to individuals to secure contracts. Second, York employees directly wired money or sent checks to entities designated by customer personnel based on false invoices for purported consulting services. Finally, York sales personnel arranged for direct payments to be made to consulting firms or contractors designated

by York's customer in return for changing design specifications so that they would be more favorable to York.

Specifically,

- In the United Arab Emirates ("UAE"), YACR made thirteen improper payments in 2003 and 2004 totaling approximately \$550,000 in bribes to UAE officials to secure contracts in connection with the construction of a luxury hotel and convention complex named the Conference Palace, built and owned by the Abu Dhabi government. The officials were members of the hotel Executive Committee. The committee was established by government decree and reported to the Ministry of Finance, and its members were appointed by the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi. Approximately \$522,500 in payments in connection with the project were made through an unspecified intermediary while knowing that the intermediary would pass most of it on to the UAE officials. The payments were approved by the same YACR Vice President who approved the kickbacks under the OFFP and YACR's Dubai-based director of finance. York generated sales revenue of approximately \$3.7 million in connection with the luxury hotel project.
- York entities also made illicit payments in connection with a number of non-governmental Middle East projects. For example, in connection with an Abu Dhabi residential complex project, a YACR sales manager made a cash payment to an engineering consultant working for the end user to have the engineer submit design specifications that favored York equipment. To make the payment, the YACR sales manager arranged for a local contractor to generate a false invoice for \$2,000. The contractor returned \$1,900 of the resulting payment to the YACR sales manager, who passed it on to the engineering consultant. In another example, York Middle East, a business unit within York, made approximately \$977,000 in payments between 2000 and 2005 to a senior executive of a publicly held UAE district cooling utility in order to secure future business with the cooling utility. The payments, which typically amounted to 7% of York's sales on cooling utility projects, were made to entities in Europe or the West Indies designated by the senior executive. The sales revenue associated with the district cooling utility payments was \$12.2 million.
- York's Indian subsidiary retained an agent to assist it in securing after-installation service contracts and to provide sales and marketing support in connection with equipment sold to the Indian Navy. An employee of the agent (who for a period of time was also employed by York India) admitted making routine payments to Indian Navy officials to secure business for York between 2000 and 2006. The payments were typically less than \$1,000, but over time amounted to approximately \$132,500 on 215 orders. The payments were made out of the nearly \$180,000 in commission payments made to the agent. York India generated revenue of \$2.4 million on contracts related to these payments.

- York's U.K. subsidiary, York United Kingdom ("York U.K."), retained a Nigerian agent to provide site supervision and accommodations in connection with 2002 and 2005 contracts the subsidiary had with the NNPC. For each contract, the agent received a commission of approximately 30% of the contract value. A September 2002 e-mail from a principal of the agent to the York U.K. manager that signed the 2002 NNPC contract indicated that the commission payment was being shared with an NNPC official. A separate York U.K. manager who signed the second NNPC contract admitted that the agent's approximately 30% commission was unusually high. York U.K. has since terminated the agency relationship and ceased bidding on future NNPC contracts.
- Finally, from 2004 through 2006, York Refrigeration Marine (China) Ltd. ("YRMC") made improper payments to agents and other individuals, including Chinese government personnel at government-owned shipyards, in connection with sales of refrigeration equipment to ship builders. The payments, which were described as commissions, sales and marketing expenses or gifts and entertainment expenses, lacked sufficient supporting documentation and were for nebulous and undocumented services. York's local Hong Kong office approved the payments and processed them through the Danish subsidiary. In addition, in one instance, YRMC provided Chinese shipyard employees with electronics and laptop computers.

### ***Syncor International Corp & Monty Fu***

On September 28, 2007, the SEC filed settled charges against Monty Fu, the founder and former chairman of Syncor International Corporation ("Syncor"), for failing to implement a sufficient system of internal accounting controls at Syncor and for aiding and abetting Syncor's violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA, arising from improper commission payments and referral fees by Syncor's wholly owned Taiwanese subsidiary, Syncor Taiwan, to doctors employed by state-owned and private hospitals in Taiwan. Without admitting or denying wrongdoing, Fu consented to an injunction from violating and aiding and abetting further such violations, and agreed to pay a civil monetary penalty of \$75,000.

According to the SEC's complaint, from 1985 through 1996, Syncor Taiwan's business consisted primarily of selling radiopharmaceutical products and medical equipment to Taiwanese hospitals. Beginning in 1985, Syncor Taiwan began making "commission" payments to doctors at private and public hospitals to influence their purchasing decisions. The commissions typically ranged between 10% and 20% of the sales price of the Syncor product and took the form of cash payments delivered by Syncor Taiwan personnel.

In 1996, Syncor Taiwan began establishing medical imaging centers in Taiwan in conjunction with private and public hospitals that generated management fees for Syncor Taiwan. Around 1997, Syncor Taiwan began providing "commission" payments to doctors to prescribe medicine for, or purchase products to be used in, Syncor's medical imaging centers.

These payments were also typically in cash and were based on a percentage of the sales price. Also around 1997, Syncor Taiwan began paying doctors “referral fees” to induce the doctors to refer patients to the Syncor medical imaging centers. The referral fees again were in cash and typically represented between 3% to 5% of the fees that patients paid to the imaging center.

The magnitude of the payments during the relevant seventeen-year period averaged over \$30,000 per year from 1989 through 1993 and over \$170,000 per year from 1997 through the first half of 2002. Syncor Taiwan recorded both the commission and referral fee payments improperly as “Advertising and Promotions” expenses, contrary to Syncor’s stated accounting policies and internal guidelines.

According to the SEC, at all relevant times, Fu was aware that Syncor was making the commission payments and referral fees. In 1994, an outside audit revealed the existence of certain of these practices, which prompted Syncor’s then-CEO to caution Fu on the propriety of making such payments. The SEC complaint asserts that the audit put Fu on actual or constructive notice that the payments were being improperly recorded in Syncor Taiwan’s books and records, which were then incorporated into Syncor’s books and records and filed with the SEC.

In light of the above conduct, the SEC determined that Syncor had insufficient internal controls to detect and prevent non-compliance with the FCPA by Syncor Taiwan. The SEC asserts that Fu, as a result of his various positions within Syncor, including founder of the company, creator of the Syncor Taiwan subsidiary and brother of the Taiwan country manager during the relevant period, had the authority to implement additional internal controls, but failed to do so. As a result, Fu was found to have knowingly failed to implement a system of internal accounting controls in violation of the Securities Exchange Act §13(b)(5) and Rule 13b2-1, and to have aided and abetted Syncor’s violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.

Previously, in 2002, Syncor agreed to settle civil and administrative proceedings with the SEC arising out of related conduct. Syncor agreed to a \$500,000 civil penalty in connection with that settlement and was enjoined from future violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA. At that time, Syncor also settled related DOJ criminal charges by agreeing to pay a \$2 million criminal fine. On January 1, 2003, Syncor became a wholly owned subsidiary of Cardinal Health, Inc.

### ***Immucor***

On September 27, 2007, Immucor, Inc. (“Immucor”) and Gioacchino De Chirico, its CEO, settled FCPA books and records and internal controls charges with the SEC. At that time, Immucor and de Chirico agreed to a cease and desist order enjoining them from committing future violations of those provisions of the FCPA. On October 2, 2007, de Chirico further consented to payment of a \$30,000 fine without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations.

Immucor Italia S.p.A., a wholly owned subsidiary of Immucor, sold blood-testing units to a hospital in Milan, Italy. In 2003, De Chirico allegedly arranged for the director of that hospital

to chair a medical conference in Italy. Although the amount of compensation was never established, the hospital director requested, and De Chirico agreed, that payment would be made so as to allow the director to avoid Italian income taxes. In 2004, De Chirico allegedly initiated, via Immucor Italia, a payment of 13,500 Euros to the hospital director. Immucor Italia categorized the 2004 payment as overdue compensation for the October 2003 conference, but the payment allegedly was made in exchange for preferential treatment from the hospital director, who selected companies to fulfill supplies and equipment contracts. De Chirico later approved an invoice that falsely described the payment as related to consulting services and Immucor recorded the payment as such.

As discussed above, immediately following Immucor's announcement of an SEC investigation into allegations of an improper payment under the FCPA, a shareholder class filed a complaint under §§ 10-b and 20(a) of the Exchange Act. In May 2007, Immucor agreed to settle the class action for \$2.5 million.

### ***Bristow Group***

On September 26, 2007, Bristow Group Inc. ("Bristow"), a Houston-based helicopter transportation and oil and gas production facilities operation company, settled FCPA anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions charges with the SEC relating to improper payments made by Bristow's Nigerian affiliate. Bristow, which self-reported the violations, consented to the entry of a cease-and-desist order, but the SEC imposed no fine or monetary penalty.

From at least 2003 through approximately the end of 2004, Bristow's subsidiary, AirLog International, Ltd. ("AirLog"), through its Nigerian affiliate, Pan African Airlines Nigeria Ltd. ("PAAN"), made at least \$423,000 in improper payments to tax officials in Delta and Lagos States, causing the officials to reduce the amount of PAAN's annual expatriate employment tax, known as the expatriate "Pay As You Earn" ("PAYE") tax. The payments were made with the knowledge and approval of senior employees of PAAN, and the release of funds for the payments was approved by at least one former senior officer of Bristow.

PAAN was responsible for paying an annual PAYE tax to the governments of the Nigerian states in which PAAN operated. At the end of each year, the state governments assessed the taxes based on the state government's predetermined, or "deemed," salaries and sent PAAN a demand letter. PAAN then negotiated with the tax officials to lower the amount assessed. In each instance, the PAYE tax demand was lowered and a separate cash payment for the tax officials was negotiated. Upon payment, the state governments provided PAAN with a receipt reflecting only the amount payable to the state government, not the payment to tax officials. Through the improper payments, Bristow avoided \$793,940 in taxes in Delta State and at least \$80,000 in taxes in Lagos State.

Bristow discovered the improper payments when its newly appointed Chief Executive Officer heard a comment at a company management meeting suggesting the possibility of improper payments to government officials. The CEO immediately brought the matter to the

attention of the audit committee, which retained outside counsel to investigate. Bristow “promptly brought this matter to the Commission’s staff’s attention.”

During its internal investigation, Bristow also discovered that PAAN and Bristow Helicopters (Nigeria), Ltd. (“Bristow Nigeria”) — the Nigerian affiliate of Bristow Helicopters (International), Ltd. (“Bristow Helicopters”) — underreported their payroll expenses to the Nigerian state governments. Neither Bristow Helicopters nor Bristow Nigeria is organized under the laws of the United States or is an issuer within the meaning of the securities laws, but their financials are consolidated into Bristow’s financials. As a result, Bristow’s periodic reports filed with the SEC did not accurately reflect certain of the company’s payroll-related expenses. Bristow ultimately restated its financial statements for the fiscal years 2000 through 2004 and the first three quarters of 2005 to correct this error. On January 31, 2011, the DOJ advised the Bristow group that it had closed its inquiry into the suspected misconduct.

### *Chandramowli Srinivasan*

On September 25, 2007, the SEC filed a settled civil action against Chandramowli Srinivasan, the founder and former president of management consulting firm A.T. Kearney Ltd. – India (“ATKI”), in connection with improper payments made to senior employees of partially state-owned enterprises in India between 2001 and 2003. At the time of the alleged offenses, ATKI was a unit of A.T. Kearney, Inc., a subsidiary of Texas-based information technology company Electronic Data Systems (“EDS”). Without admitting or denying the SEC’s allegations, Srinivasan agreed to entry of a final judgment ordering him to pay a \$70,000 civil penalty and enjoining him from future violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and from knowingly falsifying books and records.

According to the SEC, between 2001 and 2003, two partially government-owned Indian companies retained ATKI for management consulting services. In 2001, the companies became dissatisfied with ATKI and threatened to cancel the contracts. At the time, the two Indian clients accounted for over three quarters of ATKI’s revenue. To induce the companies not to cancel the contracts, Srinivasan agreed to, and ultimately did, make direct and indirect payments of cash, gifts and services to certain senior employees of the Indian companies. These payments totaled over \$720,000. As a result of the payments, the Indian companies did not cancel their contracts with ATKI, and one of the companies awarded ATKI two additional contracts in September 2002 and April 2003.

In order to fund the payments, Srinivasan and an ATKI contract accountant fabricated invoices that Srinivasan then signed and authorized, thus causing EDS to record the payments improperly in its books and records. EDS realized over \$7.5 million in revenue from the Indian companies after ATKI began paying the bribes.

Also on September 25, 2007, the SEC filed settled charges with EDS for violating the books and records provisions of the FCPA in connection with the improper payments made by Srinivasan. The SEC’s settlement with EDS also included several unrelated, non-FCPA books and records violations. EDS consented to an SEC order requiring it to pay approximately \$490,000 in disgorgement and prejudgment interest and cease and desist from committing future

books and records violations. In resolving the matter with EDS, the SEC noted that EDS discovered and reported Srinivasan's improper payments to the SEC in 2004.

### *Paradigm*

On September 21, 2007, the DOJ entered into an NPA with Paradigm B.V. ("Paradigm"), a Dutch software solutions company serving the oil and gas industry, in connection with improper payments in Kazakhstan, China, Mexico, Nigeria, and Indonesia between 2002 and 2007. Paradigm was, at the time of the agreement, a private limited liability company, which had maintained its principal place of business in Israel until July 2005 when it relocated to Houston, Texas (rendering Paradigm a "domestic concern" for purposes of the FCPA). Paradigm discovered the payments while conducting due diligence in preparation for listing on a U.S. stock exchange. Paradigm agreed to pay a \$1 million fine, implement new enhanced internal controls and retain outside counsel for eighteen months to review its compliance with the NPA.

According to the DOJ, in Kazakhstan, Paradigm was bidding on a contract for geological software in August 2005. An official of Kazakhstan's national oil company, KazMunaiGas ("KMG"), recommended that Paradigm use a particular agent, ostensibly to assist it in the tender process. Paradigm agreed to use the agent, Frontera Holding S.A. ("Frontera"), a British West Indies company, without conducting any due diligence and without entering into a written contract. Following Paradigm's award of the contract, it received an invoice from Frontera requesting payment of a "commission" of \$22,250, which Paradigm paid. The DOJ found that the documentary evidence indicating that Frontera prepared any tender documentation or performed any services to be "lacking."

Paradigm conducted its business in China largely through a representative office ("Paradigm China"), which was responsible for software sales and post-contract support. In July 2006, Paradigm China entered into an agreement with a local agent, Tangshan Haitai Oil Technology Co Ltd. ("Tangshan"), in connection with an unspecified transaction with Zhonghai Petroleum (China) Co., Ltd. ("Zhonghai"), a subsidiary of the China National Offshore Oil Company ("CNOOC"). The agent agreement provided that Tangshan was to receive a 5% commission and contemplated that commission payments would be passed on to representatives of Zhonghai, with Paradigm China and Tangshan splitting the costs of these commissions equally. Although documentation did not exist to determine how many of these payments were made, Paradigm China's country manager confirmed that at least once such payment was made.

Further, Paradigm China retained employees of state-owned oil companies as "internal consultants" and agreed to pay them in cash to evaluate Paradigm's software. The payments to the officials were intended to induce the internal consultants to encourage their companies to purchase Paradigm's products. Paradigm also paid these internal consultants "inspection" and "acceptance" fees of between \$100-200 at or around the time of business negotiations and after Paradigm's products were delivered and installed. Finally, Paradigm China paid for "training" trips for internal consultants and other employees of state-owned companies and provided them with airfare, hotel, meals, gifts, cash *per diems*, and entertainment (including sightseeing and

cash for shopping). Paradigm was unable to document the total amount of payments made to the internal consultants or for such training trips.

In 2004, Paradigm acquired a Mexican entity, AGI Mexicana S.A. de C.V. (“Paradigm Mexico”), and entered into a subcontract with the Mexican Bureau of Geophysical Contracting (“BGP”). Paradigm Mexico was to perform services in connection with BGP’s contract with Pemex, the Mexican national oil company. Paradigm Mexico used the services of an agent in connection with this contract without entering into a written agreement. The agent requested \$206,698 in commission payments to be paid through five different entities. Paradigm Mexico failed to conduct any due diligence on the agent or the entities through which payment was requested. Paradigm Mexico paid certain of the agent’s invoices. When new senior management learned of the payments, however, the payments were halted. The agent sued Paradigm Mexico in Mexican court, but Paradigm prevailed in the suit.

Further, Paradigm Mexico spent approximately \$22,000 on trips and entertainment for a Pemex decision maker in connection with the BGP contract and a second subcontract with a U.S. oil services company, including a \$12,000 trip to Napa Valley that coincided with the Pemex official’s birthday. Around the time of the second contract, Paradigm also acquiesced to a demand to hire the Pemex official’s brother as a driver (who did perform some driving duties after being retained). Finally, Paradigm Mexico leased a house from the wife of a separate tender official of a Pemex subsidiary in close proximity to the signing of a third contract between Paradigm Mexico and the Pemex subsidiary. The house was used by Paradigm Mexico’s staff, and the rental fee “appears to have been fair market value.” The Pemex decision maker on the first two contracts was also the “responsible official” for this third contract.

In 2003, Paradigm’s Nigerian subsidiary proposed entering into a joint venture with Integrated Data Services Limited (“IDSL”), the “services arm” subsidiary of the NNPC. Paradigm Nigeria hired an agent to assist in its Nigerian operations and, after submitting its bid for the joint venture, amended the agent’s contract to provide a commission in the event the joint venture bid was successful. A meeting between Paradigm officials and IDSL concerning the proposed joint venture took place in Houston in 2003. In May 2005, former Paradigm executives agreed to make between \$100,000 and \$200,000 of corrupt payments through its agent to unidentified Nigerian politicians in order to win the joint venture contract. When Paradigm learned it had not received the contract, it terminated the agency relationship.

Paradigm’s Indonesian subsidiary conducted business through an agent, exclusively so from April 2004 through January 2007. In 2003, employees of Pertamina, Indonesia’s national oil company, requested funds for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business. The agent was involved in making the payments. The frequency and amount of these payments could not be determined from available documentation, but Paradigm’s regional controller confirmed that at least one such improper payment had been made.

The DOJ emphasized that it agreed not to prosecute Paradigm or its subsidiaries and affiliates as a result of this wide-range of corrupt practices (assuming Paradigm’s compliance with its obligations under the NPA) because Paradigm “had conducted an investigation through

outside counsel, voluntarily disclosed its findings to the Justice Department, cooperated fully with the Department, and instituted extensive remedial compliance measures,” which the DOJ described as “significant mitigating factors.”

The compliance measures to which Paradigm agreed to address deficiencies in its internal controls, policies and procedures in preparation of its listing on a United States exchange as a public company, included: (i) promulgation of a compliance code designed to reduce the prospect of FCPA violations that would apply to all Paradigm directors, officers, employees and, where appropriate, third parties such as agents, consultants and joint venture partners operating on Paradigm’s behalf internationally; (ii) the assignment of responsibility to one or more senior corporate official(s) for implementation and oversight of compliance with these policies; (iii) periodic FCPA training for all directors, officers, employees, agents and business partners and annual certification by those parties of compliance with Paradigm’s compliance policies and procedures; and (iv) appropriate due diligence pertaining the retention and oversight of agents and business partners.

### ***Textron***

On August 21 and 23, 2007, Textron Inc. (“Textron”), a global, multi-industry company based in Providence, Rhode Island, entered into an NPA with the DOJ and settled FCPA books and records and internal control provisions charges with the SEC relating to improper payments made by two of Textron’s fifth-tier, French subsidiaries in connection with the OFFP and improper payments and failed due diligence by those and other Textron subsidiaries in the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”), Bangladesh, Indonesia, Egypt, and India.

In total, Textron will pay over \$4.5 million dollars to settle the charges. Specifically, according to the terms of the SEC settlement, Textron is required to disgorge \$2,284,579 in profits, plus approximately \$450,461 in pre-judgment interest, and to pay a civil penalty of \$800,000. Textron will also pay a \$1,150,000 fine pursuant to the NPA with the DOJ.

Further, Textron agreed to cooperate with the government in its ongoing investigation and to strengthen its FCPA compliance program, including: (i) extending the application of its FCPA policies to “all directors, officers, employees, and, where appropriate, business partners, including agents, consultants, representatives, distributors, teaming partners, joint venture partners and other parties acting on behalf of Textron in a foreign jurisdiction,” (ii) adopting and implementing “corporate procedures designed to ensure that Textron exercises due care to assure that substantial discretionary authority is not delegated to individuals whom Textron knows, or should know through the exercise of due diligence, have a propensity to engage in illegal or improper activities,” and (iii) ensuring that senior corporate officials retain responsibility for the implementation and oversight of the FCPA compliance program and report directly to the Audit Committee of the Textron Board of Directors.

From 2001 through 2003, two of Textron’s French subsidiaries, which Textron acquired in 1999, made approximately \$650,539 in kickback payments in connection with the sale of humanitarian goods to Iraq.

According to the SEC complaint and DOJ NPA, starting in the middle of 2000, the Textron subsidiaries, with the assistance of Lebanese and Jordanian consulting firms, inflated three OFFP contracts with the Iraqi Ministry of Oil and ten contracts with the Iraqi Ministry of Industry and Minerals to include the cost of secret ASSF payments. In violation of Textron's compliance policies, neither consulting firm was retained through a written contract. With the knowledge and approval of management officials of the Textron subsidiaries, the consultants made the ASSF payments to Iraqi accounts outside of the U.N. Oil-for-Food Escrow Account and were then reimbursed by the Textron subsidiaries. The payments were recorded as "consultation" or "commission" fees.

In addition, Textron's internal investigation of the Oil-for-Food payments revealed that between 2001 and 2005, various companies within Textron's industrial segment, known as its "David Brown" subsidiaries, made improper payments of \$114,995 to secure thirty-six contracts in the UAE, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Egypt, and India. For most of these payments, the government appears to have evidence that the funds were provided either directly or indirectly to foreign officials. However, the FCPA charge stemming from the Indonesia payments rests on the fact that Textron cannot show that the funds it provided a local representative were not funneled to a government official.

Specifically, the SEC complaint alleges that David Brown Union Pump engaged a local representative to sell spare parts to Pertamina, an Indonesian governmental entity. The total contract price for the transaction was \$321,171, with approximately \$149,000 allocated to after-sales services. "Thus, almost half of the contract value was for after-sales services, which was highly unusual." In January 2002, David Brown Union Pump paid the representative \$149,822, including a commission of \$17,250 and the remainder allocated to after-sales service fees. The representative paid approximately \$10,000 to a procurement official at Pertamina to help sponsor a golf tournament, with very little documentation to show what the representative did with the remainder of the funds allocated to after-sales services.

In describing the company's failure to maintain adequate internal controls sufficient to prevent or detect the above violations, the SEC complaint notes that despite the "endemic corruption problems in the Middle East," Textron failed to take "adequate confirming steps" to ensure that the managers and employees of its subsidiaries "were exercising their duties to manage and comply with compliance issues."

The SEC Litigation Release indicates that the "Commission considered the remedial acts promptly undertaken by Textron, which self-reported, and cooperation afforded the Commission staff in its continuing investigation."

### ***Delta & Pine Land Company***

On July 25 and 26, 2007, the SEC filed two settled enforcement proceedings charging Delta & Pine Land Company ("Delta & Pine"), a Mississippi-based company engaged in the production of cottonseed, and its subsidiary, Turk Deltapine, Inc. ("Turk Deltapine"), with violations of the FCPA. On July 25, 2007, the Commission filed a federal lawsuit charging the companies with violating the anti-bribery and books and records and internal controls provisions

of the FCPA. On July 26, 2007, the SEC issued an administrative order finding that Delta & Pine violated the books and records and internal controls provisions and that Turk Deltapine violated the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. In the lawsuit, the companies agreed to pay jointly and severally a \$300,000 penalty. In the administrative proceeding, the companies agreed to cease and desist from further FCPA violations and Delta & Pine agreed to retain an independent consultant to review and make recommendations concerning the company's FCPA compliance policies and procedures and submit such report to the SEC.

In both the federal court complaint and the administrative order, the SEC charged that, from 2001 to 2006, Turk Deltapine made payments of approximately \$43,000 to officials of the Turkish Ministry of Agricultural and Rural Affairs in order to obtain governmental reports and certifications that were necessary for Turk Deltapine to obtain, retain, and operate its business in Turkey. Specifically, Turk Deltapine regularly paid provincial government officials to issue inspection reports and quality control certifications without undertaking their required inspections and procedures. The payments included cash, travel expenses, air conditioners, computers, office furniture, and refrigerators.

The complaint and order note that upon learning of the payments in 2004, Delta & Pine failed to receive all the pertinent facts from Turk Deltapine employees and, rather than halting the payments, arranged for the payments to be made by a chemical company supplier that was reimbursed for its payments and granted a ten percent handling fee. An internal Delta & Pine document noted that there were "no effective controls put in place to monitor this process."

### ***Baker Hughes***

On April 26, 2007, Baker Hughes Inc. settled charges with the SEC and DOJ relating to improper payments to two agents associated with its business in Kazakhstan and for failed due diligence in connection with payments made in Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. Baker Hughes was also penalized for violating a 2001 SEC cease and desist order requiring the company to comply with the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA.

Combined, the SEC and DOJ settlements resulted in fines and penalties totaling \$44 million, the largest monetary sanction imposed in an FCPA case up to that time. The settlement is composed of over \$23 million in disgorgement and a \$10 million penalty to the SEC, along with an \$11 million criminal fine imposed by the DOJ. Under the terms of the SEC and DOJ resolutions, Baker Hughes is required to retain a monitor for three years to review and assess the company's compliance program and monitor its implementation of and compliance with new internal policies and procedures.

With regard to the Kazakhstan payments, Baker Hughes admitted that it hired an agent at the behest of a representative of Kazakhstan's former national oil company (Kazakhoil) in connection with Baker Hughes' efforts to secure subcontracting work on the Karachaganak oil field, although Baker Hughes had already been unofficially informed that it had won the contract and the agent had done nothing to assist Baker Hughes in preparing its bid. A Baker Hughes

official apparently believed that if Baker Hughes did not hire the agent it would lose the subcontracting work as well as future business in Kazakhstan.

The agency agreement called for Baker Hughes to pay a commission of 2% on revenues from the Karachaganak project. From May 2001 through November 2003, Baker Hughes made 27 commission payments totaling approximately \$4.1 million to the agent (approximately \$1.8 million was made by Baker Hughes on behalf of subcontractors). Baker Hughes was also charged with pressuring one of its subcontractors to make a \$20,000 payment to the same agent in connection with an unrelated contract.

Separately, from 1998 to 1999, a Baker Hughes subsidiary also made payments to another agent, FT Corp., at the direction of a high-ranking executive of KazTransOil (the national oil transportation operator in Kazakhstan). Despite already having an agent for the project in question, the Baker Hughes subsidiary hired FT Corp. after the contract award was delayed for fear that it would not be awarded the chemical contract with KazTransOil. In doing so, it failed to conduct sufficient due diligence and its agency agreement contained no FCPA representations. In December 1998, an employee of Baker Hughes' subsidiary learned that the FT Corp. representative was also a high-ranking KazTransOil executive. Nevertheless, payments were made until April 1999, with FT Corp. receiving commissions via a Swiss bank account of approximately \$1.05 million.

In addition to settling charges relating to the above improper payments, Baker Hughes also settled charges stemming from allegations that it improperly recorded items in its books and records, and failed to implement sufficient internal controls, relating to its business in several countries. In each instance, the government found Baker Hughes to have violated these requirements — even though there is no finding that illegal payments (which, in one instance, was only \$9,000) were in fact made — because Baker Hughes failed to conduct sufficient due diligence to determine whether the payments were provided to government officials. In other words, the SEC found violations not after proof was adduced that Baker Hughes made corrupt payments to foreign government officials, but rather from the company's inability to know that payments *were not* being passed on to government officials — effectively shifting the burden onto companies to prove that payments were not made to government officials when no or inadequate due diligence is conducted.

For example, between 1998 and 2004, a Baker Hughes subsidiary made payments to an agent (“N Corp.”) totaling nearly \$5.3 million in connection with N Corp.'s assistance in selling products to customers in Kazakhstan, Russia, and Uzbekistan. Prior to 2002, there was no written agreement with N Corp., and the agreement eventually entered into in 2002 did not contain the full FCPA provisions required by Baker Hughes' FCPA policies and procedures. In addition, N Corp. made it through Baker Hughes' revised due diligence procedures, including review by outside counsel hired to assist with agent re-certifications.

Baker Hughes self-reported its violations to the DOJ and the SEC. In its sentencing memorandum, the DOJ highlighted the company's “exceptional” cooperation. In addition to self-reporting, Baker Hughes terminated employees and agents it believed to be involved in the

corrupt payments and spent \$50 million on an internal investigation of its activities in twelve countries. The investigation included independent analysis of financial records by forensic accountants, review by outside counsel of tens of millions of pages of electronic data, hundreds of interviews and the formation of a blue ribbon panel to advise the company on its dealings with the government that included the late Alan Levenson, former director of the SEC's division of corporation finance, Stanley Sporkin, retired federal district judge and ex-director of the SEC's division of enforcement, and James Doty, former general counsel to the SEC. Baker Hughes met repeatedly with the DOJ in the course of its investigation, made its employees available for interviews, and provided a "full and lengthy report of all findings." These efforts led to a \$27 million reduction in fines under the sentencing guidelines and avoided a potential criminal trial and the prospect of Baker Hughes being disbarred from government contracts or losing export licenses.

### *Chiquita Prosecution*

On March 19, 2007, Chiquita Brands International Inc. ("Chiquita") pleaded guilty to one count of engaging in transactions with a specially designated global terrorist organization. Under the terms of the written plea agreement, Chiquita was required to pay a \$25 million criminal fine and implement and maintain an effective compliance and ethics program, and the company received five years of probation. This judgment was formally entered on September 24, 2007.

The plea agreement arises from payments that Chiquita made to the right-wing terrorist organization Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia ("AUC") from 1997 through February 2004. The factual proffer underlying the plea agreement indicates that from 1989 to 1997, Chiquita also made payments to left-wing terrorist organizations Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Columbia ("FARC") and Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional ("ELN"). In its self-disclosure, Chiquita represented that it made the payments under threat of violence and that refusal to make the payments would have forced Chiquita to withdraw from Colombia, where it has operated for more than a century. Chiquita is reported to have made over \$49 million in payments between 2001 and 2004 alone.

On April 24, 2003, Roderick Hills, then-head of Chiquita's Audit Committee and former Chairman of the SEC, approached Michael Chertoff, then Assistant Attorney General and later Secretary of Homeland Security, to self-report the payments and seek the government's advice on how to proceed. Chiquita officials claim that Chertoff and, subsequently, other DOJ officials recognized the difficult position in which the company found itself, noted larger ramifications for U.S. interests if the corporate giant pulled out of Colombia overnight and did not instruct Chiquita to halt the payments. Thus, although outside counsel advised Chiquita in writing on September 8, 2003 that "[DOJ] officials have been unwilling to give assurances or guarantees of non-prosecution; in fact, officials have repeatedly stated that they view the circumstances presented as a technical violation and cannot endorse current or future payments," Chiquita continued to pay the AUC throughout 2003 and early 2004.

According to press reports, a federal grand jury was convened to consider indictment against Hills and other high-level Chiquita officials for their approval of the payments. The

DOJ, however, announced in September 2007 that, as a matter of prosecutorial discretion, it would not pursue the charges against the Chiquita officials.

Although the Chiquita case does not directly implicate the FCPA, it raises difficult issues regarding when and under what circumstances a company should self-report and underscores the fact that, even in extreme circumstances such as those Chiquita faced, the government is unlikely to accept the argument that public policy or other broader circumstances might excuse or mitigate a company's illegal practices.

### ***Dow Chemical Company***

On February 13, 2007, the SEC filed a settled civil action against Dow Chemical Company ("Dow") for violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA related to payments made by DE-Nocil Crop Protection Ltd ("DE-Nocil"), a fifth-tier Dow subsidiary headquartered in Mumbai, India, to federal and state officials in connection with the company's agro-chemical products. Without admitting or denying wrongdoing, Dow consented to pay a civil monetary penalty of \$325,000 and to the entry of a cease-and-desist order.

The SEC's complaint alleged that from 1996 through 2001, DE-Nocil made a series of improper payments to Indian government officials totaling approximately \$200,000, none of which were properly recorded in DE-Nocil's books. Specifically, the complaint alleged that DE-Nocil, made approximately \$39,700 in improper payments to an official in India's Central Insecticides Board ("CIB") to expedite the registration of three of the company's products. Most of these payments were made to contractors, which added fictitious charges to their bills or issued false invoices to DE-Nocil. The contractors then disbursed the funds to the CIB official at DE-Nocil's direction.

In addition, DE-Nocil allegedly "routinely used money from petty cash to pay" various state officials, including state inspectors. The complaint states that these inspectors could prevent the sale of DE-Nocil's products by falsely claiming that a company's product samples were misbranded or mislabeled, which carried significant potential penalties. Rather than face the false accusations and suspension of sales, DE-Nocil made the payments from petty cash. The complaint recognized that other companies commonly made such payments as well and noted that, although the payments were small in amount — "well under \$100" — they "were numerous and frequent." Dow estimated that DE-Nocil made \$87,400 in such payments between 1996 and 2001.

Finally, DE-Nocil allegedly made estimated improper payments of \$37,600 in gifts, travel and entertainment to various officials, \$19,000 to government business officials, \$11,800 to sales tax officials, \$3,700 to excise tax officials, and \$1,500 to customs officials.

In reaching its settlement with Dow, the SEC took into account, among other things, (i) the fact that Dow had conducted an internal investigation of DE-Nocil and, upon completion, self-reported to the SEC; (ii) Dow's remedial efforts, including employee disciplinary actions; (iii) its retention of an independent auditor to conduct a forensic audit of DE-Nocil's books and

records; (iv) the company's improved FCPA compliance training and a restructuring of its global compliance program; (v) its decision to join a non-profit association specializing in anti-bribery due diligence; and (vi) its hiring of an independent consultant to review and assess its FCPA compliance program.

### ***El Paso Corporation***

On February 7, 2007, the SEC filed settled charges against The El Paso Corporation ("El Paso") for violations of the books and records and internal controls provisions of the FCPA arising from improper surcharge payments that El Paso and its predecessor-in-interest, The Coastal Corporation ("Coastal"), made in connection with the Iraqi OFFP. Without admitting or denying wrongdoing, El Paso consented to an injunction from violating the books and records and internal controls provisions, and to pay a civil monetary penalty of \$2.25 million. On the same date, El Paso settled charges of wire fraud and engaging in prohibited transactions with the government of Iraq, agreeing to forfeit approximately \$5.5 million to the U.S. government. (The SEC and DOJ inconsistently describe the fine as a disgorgement of profits and the value of the illegal surcharges, respectively.)

Coastal had longstanding ties with the Iraqi government. The company received the first Oil-for-Food contract in 1996. The complaint alleges that Coastal first received a demand for an improper payment in Fall 2000 from a SOMO official, who insisted that Coastal pay an additional \$.10 surcharge per barrel on all future oil purchases under an existing Coastal contract. A consultant and former Coastal official arranged to make the surcharge payment, which amounted to over \$200,000, in two installments to an Iraqi-controlled Jordanian bank account in 2001 and 2002. Coastal then refused to pay any additional demanded surcharges and did not enter into further direct contracts with SOMO.

However, Coastal, which in January 2001 merged with a wholly owned El Paso subsidiary, continued to purchase Iraqi crude oil indirectly through third parties. The complaint alleges that based on its past experience, trade press and communications with those third parties, El Paso knew or was reckless in not knowing that illegal surcharges were being paid in connection with that oil and that the third parties were passing the surcharges back to El Paso in premiums. The complaint further asserts that recorded conversations of the company's oil traders demonstrated the company's knowledge of the surcharge demand. For example, in one taped call, an El Paso official reminded an El Paso trader of past conversations with SOMO officials regarding the surcharges in which "they told us — blatantly — that we would have to pay."

In or around 2001, El Paso inserted a provision in some of its third-party Iraqi oil purchase contracts requiring its contract partners to represent that they had "made no surcharge or other payment to SOMO" outside the Oil-for-Food Escrow Account. The complaint asserts that the representations were false, that El Paso officials did not conduct sufficient due diligence to assure themselves that illegal surcharges were not being paid, and that recorded conversations demonstrated that El Paso knew that the contract provision was ineffectual. For example, in at

least one conversation, a third party indicated that he was willing to make the illegal surcharge payments and sign a false certification denying that any illegal surcharge was paid.

The complaint asserts that between June 2001 and 2002, surcharge payments of approximately \$5.5 million were paid in connection with these transactions and that El Paso generated approximately \$5.5 million in net profit off the transactions.

On October 1, 2007, Oscar Wyatt Jr., the former chairman of Coastal, pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud in connection with the OFFP. The U.S. government accused him of paying millions in illegal surcharges directly to Iraqi officials in return for oil allocations from 2000 to 2002. On November 28, 2007, a final judgment was entered sentencing Wyatt to one year and one day imprisonment and ordering him to forfeit over \$11 million.

### ***Vetco International Ltd.***

On February 6, 2007, the DOJ settled cases against three wholly owned subsidiaries of Vetco International Ltd. and entered into a NPA with a fourth subsidiary. The companies admitted that they violated, and conspired to violate, the FCPA in connection with over 350 indirect payments totaling approximately \$2.1 million made through an international freight forwarding company (since reported to be Panalpina World Transport Holding Ltd. (“Panalpina”)) to employees of the Nigerian Customs Service between September 2002 and April 2005.

The payments were designed to attain preferential treatment in the customs-clearing process for the companies’ deepwater oil drilling equipment in connection with the Bonga Project, Nigeria’s first deepwater oil drilling project. The Vetco companies made three types of improper payments through the freight forwarder — at least 338 “express courier” payments totaling over \$2 million designed to expedite the customs clearance of Vetco shipments, at least 19 “interventions” totaling almost \$60,000 to “resolve” problems or violations that arose in connection with Vetco shipments, and at least 21 “evacuations” totaling almost \$75,000 when shipments that were urgently needed were delayed in customs because of the failure to pay customs duties or other documentation irregularities. The complaints underlying the settled proceeding suggest that a payment designed to “secure an improper” advantage, whether or not it actually assisted in obtaining or retaining business, can serve as a basis for an FCPA anti-bribery violation, conflating the statutory elements identified above as (vi) and (vii).

The Vetco subsidiaries agreed to pay a total of \$26 million in fines, then the largest criminal fine in an FCPA prosecution to that date. This was the second time that one of the subsidiaries, Vetco Gray U.K., pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA. In 2004, Vetco Gray U.K. (under a different name) and an affiliated company pleaded guilty to paying more than \$1 million in bribes to officials of National Petroleum Investment Management Services (“NAPIMS”), a Nigerian government agency that approves potential bidders for contract work on oil exploration projects. Subsequently, Vetco Gray U.K. was renamed and acquired by a group of private equity-backed entities. In anticipation of that acquisition, the acquirers obtained an FCPA Advisory Opinion that indicated that the DOJ intended to take no action in connection

with the acquisition based, in part, on the acquirers' pledge to institute and implement a vigorous FCPA compliance system for the acquired company. (*See Opinion Procedure Release 04-02*). In calculating the fine against Vetco Gray U.K., which totaled \$12 million of the \$26 million in fines, the DOJ "took into account" Vetco Gray U.K.'s prior violation and the failure of the acquirers, in fact, to institute an effective FCPA compliance system.

In addition to the fines, Vetco International Ltd. agreed, among other things, (i) to a partial waiver of the attorney-client privilege by providing all memoranda of interviews by inside or outside counsel or any other consultant or agent in relation to its internal investigation of the improper payments; (ii) to the appointment of a monitor, mutually acceptable to Vetco International Ltd. and the DOJ, to review and evaluate over a period of three years its and the Vetco subsidiaries' internal accounting and compliance controls and recordkeeping procedures as they relate to the books and records and anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA; (iii) to institute and implement robust FCPA compliance systems, including regular FCPA training for, and annual certifications by, all directors, officers and employees, agents and business partners of the subsidiaries; and (iv) to conduct "compliance reviews" of thirty-one countries in which the Vetco companies do business, all existing or proposed joint ventures, and various acquisitions made since 2004.

The SEC has not instituted a related enforcement action. On February 23, 2007, GE purchased the Vetco entities and thus is bound by the Vetco plea agreements. As noted above, in November 2008, Aibel Group (successor to Vetco Limited) pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA and admitted that it was not in compliance with the 2007 DPA.

## **2006**

### ***Schnitzer Steel Industries***

On October 16, 2006, the SEC settled charges with Schnitzer Steel Industries Inc., ("SSI"), an Oregon-based steel company that sells scrap metal. The SEC charged SSI with approximately \$1.8 million in corrupt payments in violation of the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. According to the charges, from 1999 to 2004 SSI paid cash kickbacks or made gifts to managers of government-controlled steel mills in China to induce the purchase of scrap metal from SSI. During the same period, SSI also paid bribes to managers of private steel mills in China and South Korea, and improperly concealed these illicit payments in its books and records.

SSI buys and resells metal, including selling scrap metal to steel mills in Asia. In 1995, SSI began using two recently acquired subsidiaries, SSI International Far East Ltd. ("SSI Korea") and SSI International, Inc. ("SSI International"), to facilitate its Asian scrap metal sales. From 1999-2004, SSI Korea and SSI International employees made improper cash payments to managers of scrap metal customers owned, in whole or in part, by the Chinese government to induce the purchase of scrap metal from SSI. Specifically, SSI paid over \$205,000 in improper payments to managers of government-owned customers in China in connection with 30 sales transactions. According to SEC settlement documents, SSI's gross revenue for these transactions totaled approximately \$96 million, and SSI earned \$6.2 million in net profits on these sales.

The SEC settlement documents describe two types of kickbacks paid by SSI to the general managers of its Chinese scrap metal customers. First, SSI paid a “standard” kickback of between \$3,000 and \$6,000 per shipment from the revenue earned on the sale. The second type of kickback involved the Chinese general managers overpaying SSI for the steel purchase. SSI would then pay a “refund” or “rebate” directly to the general managers for the overpaid amount, usually ranging from \$3,000 to \$15,000. SSI made these payments possible by creating secret SSI Korea bank accounts, and at least one senior SSI official was aware of and authorized wire transfers to the secret bank accounts.

According to SEC documents, SSI Korea also acted as a commission-receiving broker for Japanese scrap metal sales in China. Japanese companies also provided SSI Korea with funds to make improper payments to managers of the government-owned Chinese steel mills. To conceal the improper payments, SSI falsely described those payments as “sales commissions,” “commission(s) to the customer,” “refunds,” or “rebates” in SSI’s books and records, resulting in further violations of the FCPA’s books and records provisions.

In addition to paying bribes to government-owned steel mills, SSI also paid bribes to managers of privately owned steel mills in China and South Korea to induce them to purchase scrap metal from SSI. Again, SSI falsely described the payments as “commissions” and “refunds” in its books and records. The SEC’s inclusion of these charges is significant as these payments involve private parties and not foreign officials or government-owned entities as is typical of most FCPA violations. These charges underscore that even illicit transactions not involving foreign officials might nonetheless result in FCPA violations, especially when coupled with false entries in a company’s books and records.

The illicit transactions described above also resulted in SEC charges against two SSI senior officials, the former SSI Chairman and CEO and the Executive Vice President of SSI International. As part of its settlement with the SEC, SSI undertook to retain an independent compliance consultant to review and evaluate SSI’s internal controls, record-keeping, and financial reporting policies. Further, SSI agreed to pay approximately \$15 million in combined fees and penalties.

- *Si Chan Wooh*

On Friday, June 29, 2007, Si Chan Wooh, former senior officer of SSI International pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA in connection with the improper payments made by SSI to government officials in China. As part of his guilty plea, Wooh agreed to cooperate with the DOJ’s ongoing investigation. Without admitting or denying wrongdoing, Wooh settled related charges with the SEC, consenting to an injunction prohibiting him from future violations of the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and from aiding and abetting violations of the books and records provisions. The settlement with the SEC required Wooh to pay approximately \$16,000 in disgorgement and interest and a \$25,000 civil penalty.

Wooh was Executive Vice President for SSI International from February 2000 through October 2004, and President from October 2004 through September 2006. Based on the

increased revenue that Schnitzer generated from sales involving improper payments, Wooh received a bonus of \$14,819.38.

- Robert W. Philip

On December 13, 2007, the SEC filed settled charges against Robert W. Philip, former Chairman and CEO of SSI for violating the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and for knowingly circumventing SSI's internal controls or knowingly falsifying SSI's books and records. Philip also was charged with aiding and abetting SSI's books and records and internal controls violations in connection with the above conduct. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Philip agreed to an order enjoining him from future violations of the FCPA and to disgorge approximately \$169,863 in bonuses, pay approximately \$16,536 in prejudgment interest, and pay a \$75,000 civil penalty.

The SEC alleged that, in addition to authorizing the payment of bribes and directing that the payments be misreported in SSI's books, Philip neglected to educate SSI staff about the requirements of the FCPA and failed to establish a program to monitor its employees, agents and subsidiaries for compliance with the Act. In so doing, Philip aided and abetted SSI's violations of the FCPA's internal controls provisions.

### ***ITXC***

On September 6, 2006, Yaw Osei Amoako, the former regional manager of ITXC Corporation, an internet telephone provider, pleaded guilty to criminal allegations of violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions in connection with his payment of approximately \$266,000 in bribes to employees of a foreign state-owned telecommunications carrier. On August 1, 2007 Amoako was sentenced to 18 months in prison for conspiring to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act. He was further required to pay \$7,500 in fines and serve two years of supervised release. Additionally, on July 25, 2007 Amoako was required to pay \$188,453 in disgorgement and pre-judgment interest in the settlement of the SEC's civil action under the FCPA. Amoako was accused of taking kickbacks for some of the bribes he paid to foreign officials.

On July 25, 2007, former ITXC Vice President Steven J. Ott and former ITXC Managing Director Roger Michael Young pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act in connection with corrupt payments to foreign telecommunications officials in Africa. On July 21, 2008, Ott was sentenced to five years probation, including six months at a community corrections center and six months of home confinement. He was also fined \$10,000. On September 2, 2008, Young was sentenced to five years probation, including three months at a community corrections center and three months of home confinement. He was also fined \$7,000.

In 2000, Amoako, at the direction of Ott and Young, traveled to Africa and hired a former senior official of the state-owned Nigerian telecommunication company ("Nitel") to represent ITXC in connection with ITXC's bid for a Nitel contract. The strategy failed,

however, in that the former Nitel official irritated the current Nitel decision-makers and failed to secure the contract for ITXC.

In 2002, in connection with another competitive bid, Amoako, with Ott's and Young's approval, entered into an agency agreement with the then-Nitel Deputy General Manager in exchange for his assistance in awarding the contract to ITXC. In return, they promised him a "retainer" in the form of a percentage of profits from any contract that ITXC secured. The contract was awarded to ITXC and Ott, Young and Amoako negotiated and/or approved over \$166,000 in payments to the agent. ITXC earned profits of \$1,136,618 million on the contract.

From August 2001 to May 2004, Ott, Young and Amoako entered into, or attempted to enter into, similar agency agreements with employees of state-owned telecommunications companies in Rwanda, Senegal, Ghana and Mali in order to induce these employees to misuse their positions to assist ITXC in securing contracts. For example, Amoako, at the direction of Ott and Young, arranged for ITXC to pay over \$26,000 to an employee of Rwandatel, the wholly owned government telephone company of Rwanda, in order to negotiate favorable terms for an ITXC contract. ITXC entered into an agreement that provided for the agent to receive \$0.01 for each minute of phone traffic that ITXC completed to Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda even though the agent was providing no legitimate services in connection with the contract. Ultimately, ITXC realized \$217,418 in profits on the Rwandatel contract.

In total, ITXC made over \$267,000 in wire transfers to officials of the Nigerian, Rwandan and Senegalese telecommunications companies and ITXC obtained contracts with these carriers that generated profits of over \$11.5 million. In addition to his participation in the above schemes, Amoako received a \$50,000 kickback from the scheme in Nigeria and embezzled \$100,411 from ITXC in connection with the bribery in Senegal.

In May 2004, ITXC merged with Teleglobe International Holdings Ltd. ("Teleglobe"), and in February 2006 Teleglobe was acquired by Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited ("VSNL").

### ***John Samson, John Munro, Ian Campbell and John Whelan***

On July 5, 2006, John Samson, John Munro, Ian Campbell and John Whelan all agreed to settle FCPA charges against them without admitting or denying SEC allegations that they bribed Nigerian officials to obtain oil contracts. Sampson, who allegedly profited personally, agreed to pay a \$50,000 civil penalty plus \$64,675 in disgorgement. Munro, Campbell and Whelan each agreed to pay \$40,000 in civil penalties.

All four men were employees of various Vetco companies, all of which were subsidiaries of ABB Ltd. A Swiss corporation traded on the New York Stock Exchange, ABB provides power and automation technologies to industrial clients. It has numerous subsidiaries and conducts business in 100 countries.

Sampson (former West Africa regional sales manager for Vetco Grey Nigeria), Munro (former senior vice president of operations for Vetco Grey U.K.), Campbell (former vice president of finance for Vetco Grey U.K.), and Whelan (former vice president of sales for Vetco

Grey U.S.) allegedly paid bribes to secure a \$180 million contract to provide equipment for an offshore drilling project in Nigeria's Bonga Oil Field.

The Nigerian agency responsible for overseeing oil exploration ("NAPIMS") had already selected ABB as one of several finalists for the contract. Sampson, Munro, Campbell and Whelan collaborated to pay approximately \$1 million to NAPIMS officials between 1999 and 2001 to obtain confidential information on competitors' bids, and to secure the deal for ABB. ABB was awarded the contract in 2001.

The men paid NAPIMS officials \$800,000 funneled through a Nigerian "consultant" disguised with invoices for fake consulting work. The money passed through several U.S. bank accounts. Sampson took \$50,000 of this money in kickbacks from one of the NAPIMS officials he was bribing. Munro and Campbell handled the logistics of wiring the bribe money as well as creating the counterfeit invoices for nonexistent consulting services.

Additional bribes were made in the form of gifts and cash to NAPIMS officials visiting the United States. Whelan used a corporate credit card to pay for meals, accommodations, and other perks exceeding \$176,000. Because the four men conspired to create fake business records to camouflage bribes as legitimate expenditures, they violated the books and records provisions of the FCPA in addition to its anti-bribery provisions.

ABB had already faced FCPA sanctions in July 2004 totaling \$5.9 million. In 2007 and 2008, it would later become the subject of additional DOJ and SEC investigations into possible FCPA violations in the Middle East, Asia, South America, Europe, and in the now-defunct UN Iraq Oil-for-Food Programme.

The Vetco companies are no longer subsidiaries of ABB; in February 2007, GE bought the Vetco entities and is now bound to the Vetco settlement agreements.

### *Statoil*

On October 11, 2006, Statoil, ASA ("Statoil"), Norway's largest oil and gas corporation, entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ relating to an agreement to pay \$15.2 million in bribes, of which \$5.2 million was actually paid, to an Iranian official to secure a deal on one of the largest oil and gas fields in the world, Iran's South Pars field. Statoil admitted to violating the anti-bribery and books and records provisions of the FCPA and agreed to pay a \$10.5 million penalty, to appoint an independent compliance consultant, and to cooperate fully with the DOJ and the SEC. In a separate agreement with the SEC, Statoil also agreed to pay \$10.5 million disgorgement. After their own investigation, Norwegian regulators assessed a corporate fine of approximately \$3.2 million that will be subtracted from the U.S. fines.

Statoil has American Depository Shares listed on the New York Stock Exchange, making it an issuer under the FCPA. In announcing the DPA, the head of the DOJ's Criminal Division emphasized that even though Statoil is a foreign issuer, the FCPA "applies to foreign and domestic public companies alike, where the company's stock trades on American exchanges."

CEO Olav Fjell, Executive Vice President Richard Hubbard, and Board Chairman Leif Terje Loeddesoel all resigned in the wake of the charges. Hubbard was also fined another \$30,000 by Norwegian regulators.

According to the Agreement, Statoil angled to position itself to develop oil and gas in Iran's South Pars Field, as well as to lay the groundwork for future deals in Iran. Statoil identified a key player as their gateway to Iranian business: an Iranian official who was not only the advisor to the Iranian Oil Minister, but also the son of a former President of Iran. Working through a London-owned third-party intermediary consulting company located in the Turks & Caicos Islands (Horton Investments, Ltd.), Statoil entered into a "consulting contract" with the Iranian official. Statoil agreed to pay an initial \$5.2 million bribe recorded as a "consulting fee" followed by ten annual \$1 million payments. The contract was executed, the \$5.2 million bribe was paid, and Statoil was awarded the South Pars Project. The bribes were made with the knowledge of Statoil's CEO.

The DOJ chastised Statoil's senior management for their handling of the issue once it became known. When an internal Statoil investigation brought the bribes to the attention of the Chairman of the Board, "instead of taking up the matter," he asked for further investigation and told the investigators to discuss the matter with the CEO. The CEO ordered that no further payments be made, but, against the investigators' recommendations, he refused to terminate the contract or otherwise address concerns raised by the investigators.

In September 2003, the Norwegian press reported on Statoil's Iranian bribes; the Chairman, CEO, and Executive VP all resigned, and the SEC promptly announced its own investigation.

The SEC and DOJ commended Statoil for its complete cooperation. Not only did the company promptly produce all requested documents and encourage employees to cooperate by paying travel expenses and attorneys fees, it also voluntarily produced documents protected by attorney-client privilege. The Board took substantial steps to ensure future compliance, including internal investigations into other transactions, implementation of a broad remedial plan with new procedures and training, new procedures to report corruption directly to the Board's Audit Committee, and an anonymous employee tip hotline.

### ***Faheem Mousa Abdel Salam***

On August 4, 2006, Faheem Mousa Abdel Salam, a naturalized U.S. citizen from Michigan living and working as a translator for a civilian contractor in Baghdad, pleaded guilty to one count of violating the FCPA. Salam was prosecuted for trying to bribe a senior Iraqi police official in order to induce the official to purchase a high-end map printer and 1,000 armored vests in a transaction unrelated to Salam's role as a translator. In February 2007, Salam was sentenced to three years in prison for his conduct.

According to charging documents, in mid-December 2005, a high-ranking Iraqi Ministry of Interior official introduced Salam to a senior official of the Iraqi police force and indicated that doing business with Salam could be "beneficial." During the discussion between Salam and

the police official, Salam apparently offered the official a “gift” of approximately \$60,000 to facilitate the sale of the printer and armored vests for over \$1 million. The sale was to be made through a multinational agency — the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (“CPATT”) — that oversaw, among other things, the procurement activities of the Iraqi police force. In a subsequent January 2, 2006 telephone call, Salam lowered the price of the printer and vests to \$800,000, and, as a result, lowered the proposed “gift” to the police official to \$50,000. Following this telephone call, the police official contacted U.S. authorities with the Office of Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (“SIGIR”), who began an investigation into Salam’s alleged conduct.

During their investigation, SIGIR officials monitored telephone calls and emails between Salam and the confidential police informant. In addition, a SIGIR agent posed as a CPATT procurement official, and met with Salam to discuss the proposed transaction. During these meetings, Salam offered the undercover “procurement officer” a bribe of between \$28,000 and \$35,000 for his efforts in finalizing the deal. In a February 2006 email, Salam abruptly, and without explanation, indicated that he would not be able to go forward with the transaction. He was arrested upon his return to the United States at Dulles International Airport on March 23, 2006.

### ***Oil States International***

On April 27, 2006, Oil States International, Inc. (“Oil States”) entered into a settlement with the SEC without admitting or denying any of the SEC’s FCPA books and records and internal controls allegations regarding business conducted in Venezuela through one of Oil States’ wholly owned subsidiaries. The SEC alleged that the subsidiary passed approximately \$348,000 in bribes to Venezuelan government employees. The settlement included a cease-and-desist order from future violations of the FCPA books and records and internal controls provisions, but did not include disgorgement or monetary fines.

Oil States is a Delaware corporation, traded on the NYSE, with corporate headquarters in Houston, Texas. Although it also caters to niche markets like top-secret noise-reduction technology for U.S. Navy submarines, Oil States primarily provides full spectrum products and services for the worldwide oil and gas industry, both onshore and offshore. One of its wholly owned subsidiaries is Hydraulic Well Control, LLC (“HWC”), which operates specially designed oil rigs and provides related services. Headquartered in Louisiana, HWC does business around the world, and has an office in Venezuela (“HWC Venezuela”). HWC’s Venezuelan operations provided approximately 1% of Oil States’ revenues during the relevant period.

In Venezuela, HWC operated in partnership with an energy company owned by the government of Venezuela, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (“PDVSA”). In 2000, HWC hired a local “consultant” to facilitate day-to-day operations between HWC and PDVSA. Oil States and HWC did not investigate the background of the consultant, nor did they provide FCPA training. In addition, although HWC did have FCPA policies in place, the written contract with the consultant failed to mention FCPA compliance.

The alleged violations occurred in two phases. In December 2003, employees of the government-owned PDVSA approached the consultant about a “kickback” scheme in which the consultant would over-bill HWC for his consulting services and “kickback” the extra money to the PDVSA employees. The plan also included HWC overcharging PDVSA for “lost rig time” on jobs. The PDVSA employees were capable of delaying or stopping HWC’s work if HWC did not acquiesce to the scheme. Indeed, after learning about it, three HWC employees went along with the kickback scheme: the consultant inflated the bills, the HWC employees incorporated the falsified information into the company’s books and records, and an undetermined amount of improper payments were made to the PDVSA employees. The consultant billed HWC approximately \$200,000 for his services, and HWC billed PDVSA approximately \$401,000 for rig time. Because lost rig time is difficult to assess even in the best of circumstances, and because of the difficulties inherent in retrospective investigation of falsified documentation, it was not possible for the SEC to determine exactly how much money flowed to the Venezuelan government employees.

The second phase of the fraud began in March 2004, when the PDVSA employees who had instigated the bribery decided to change tactics. Instead of exaggerating rig time, the PDVSA employees told the consultant to continue to over-bill HWC for “gel,” an important material used to manage viscosity and to protect cores by minimizing their contact with drilling fluid. The consultant and the HWC employees agreed to over-bill HWC for gel and to pass on the proceeds to the PDVSA employees as a bribe. During this phase, the consultant charged HWC and was paid over \$400,000 for his consulting services, some of which was passed on to the PDVSA employees as bribes. HWC also charged PDVSA nearly \$350,000 for gel. The true amount of gel used is unknown. As in the first phase of the fraud, it is impossible to determine the exact amount of money illicitly paid to the PDVSA employees.

The scheme was discovered in December 2004 by senior HWC managers in the United States as they were preparing the following year’s budget. Noticing an “unexplained narrowing” of HWC Venezuela’s profits, the managers immediately investigated and uncovered the payments. HWC managers promptly reported the illicit activity to Oil States management, which in turn immediately reported it to Oil States’ Audit Committee.

Oil States conducted an internal investigation and found no evidence that any U.S. employees of Oil States or HWC had knowledge of or were complicit in the Venezuelan kickback scheme. The Venezuelan consultant was dismissed, as were two complicit employees of HWC Venezuela. Oil States corrected its books and records, repaid PDVSA for improper charges, and reported the scheme in its next public filing. Oil States also strengthened its compliance program, provided the full results of its internal investigation to the SEC and DOJ, and cooperated fully with the investigation subsequently conducted by SEC staff. In the SEC administrative proceeding, which was limited to a cease-and-desist order and did not include a fine, the SEC “considered the remedial acts promptly undertaken by [Oil States] and cooperation afforded the [SEC] staff.” This case illustrates the breadth of the FCPA’s books and records provisions, as Oil States was held responsible for HWC’s improper recording of the payments as ordinary business expenses, even though HWC’s Venezuela operations consisted of only 1% of Oil States’ revenues and no U.S. employees were involved in the wrongful conduct.

*David M. Pillor & InVision*

On August 15, 2006, the SEC settled FCPA charges against David M. Pillor, former Senior Vice President for Sales and Marketing and Board member of InVision Technologies, Inc. (“InVision”) based on his conduct in connection with payments made by InVision’s third-party sales agents or distributors to government officials in China, Thailand, and the Philippines. The SEC alleged that Pillor, as head of the company’s sales department, failed to establish and maintain sufficient internal systems and controls to prevent FCPA violations and that he indirectly caused the falsification of InVision books and records. Without admitting or denying the allegations, Pillor agreed to pay \$65,000 in civil penalties.

Previously, in December 2004, InVision entered into a two-year NPA with the DOJ for violating the FCPA’s books and records provision in connection with the same conduct. In the NPA, InVision agreed to accept responsibility for the misconduct, pay an \$800,000 fine, adopt enhanced internal controls, and continue to cooperate with government investigators. Also in December 2004, InVision was acquired by General Electric, and now does business under the name GE InVision. On February 14, 2005, GE InVision settled SEC charges based on the same underlying facts, without admitting or denying the SEC’s claims. As part of the SEC settlement, GE InVision agreed to pay \$589,000 in disgorgement plus an additional \$500,000 civil fine. Although the conduct alleged in charging documents occurred prior to GE’s acquisition of InVision, GE was responsible for ensuring InVision’s compliance with the terms of its agreement.

InVision was, and GE InVision remains, a U.S. corporation that manufactures explosive detection equipment used in airports. In his position as Senior Vice President for Sales and Marketing, Pillor oversaw the company’s sales department and, according to the SEC, “had the authority to ensure that InVision’s sales staff complied with the FCPA.” In conducting its foreign sales, InVision relied both on internal regional sales managers who reported directly to Pillor and local sales agents and distributors, typically foreign nationals, familiar with sales practices in various regions. According to the SEC, Pillor failed to implement sufficient internal controls to ensure that its sales staff and third parties acting on its behalf complied with the FCPA. For example, the SEC notes that “InVision primarily relied on introductions by other American companies [when selecting agents and distributors], and conducted few, if any, background checks of its own.” InVision further failed to properly monitor or oversee the conduct of its staff and third-party representatives to ensure that they were not engaging in improper conduct on the company’s behalf. In particular, the charging documents highlight activities in China, the Philippines, and Thailand.

In November 2002, InVision agreed to sell (through its Chinese distributor) two explosive detection devices to China’s Guangzhou airport, which was owned and controlled by the Chinese government. Due to export license issues, InVision was late delivering the explosive detection equipment, and the distributor informed InVision that the Chinese government would exercise its right to impose financial penalties for late delivery. The distributor informed an InVision regional sales manager that it intended to offer free trips and other “unspecified compensation” to airport officials to avoid the late delivery penalties. The regional manager

alluded to such conduct in email messages to Pillor, but he did not respond or acknowledge receipt of such messages.

When InVision finally delivered its product to the distributor, the distributor sought \$200,000 in reimbursement for costs incurred in connection with the delay. Pillor discussed the request with other members of InVision's management and agreed to pay the distributor \$95,000. The distributor sent InVision a one-page invoice for various additional "costs." Pillor did not inquire further into these costs or seek additional documentation to support them and submitted the invoice to InVision's finance department for payment. Payment was made despite InVision being "aware of a high probability that the distributor intended to use part of the funds to pay for airport officials' travel expenses in order to avoid the imposition of the financial penalty for InVision's law delivery." It was further recorded improper as a legitimate cost of goods sold.

With respect to the Philippines, in November 2001, InVision agreed to sell two explosive detection devices to an airport. Despite having previously retained a third-party sales agent in the Philippines, InVision made the sale through a subcontractor. Afterwards, the sales agent sought a commission under the terms of its previous agreement, and suggested to a regional sales manager that it would use such commission to provide gifts or cash to Filipino government officials to assist with future InVision sales. The SEC's complaint alleges that some of the agent's messages were sent to Pillor, but he failed to respond. Pillor ultimately agreed to pay the agent a commission of \$108,000, which was less than the agreed upon percentage because the sale was made directly to the subcontractor. The payment was recorded as a legitimate sales commission despite the company's awareness of the high probability that at least part of it would be used to influence Filipino officials.

Beginning in 2002, InVision began competing for the right to sell explosive detection machines in Thailand and hired a distributor to "act as InVision's primary representative to the [Thai] airport corporation and the associated Thai government agencies." Between 2003 and 2004, the Thai distributor informed an InVision regional sales manager that it intended to make payments to Thai officials to influence their decisions. As in China and the Philippines, email messages to Pillor alluded to these intentions but were never acknowledged or responded to. In April 2004, InVision agreed to sell, through its distributor, 26 machines for over \$35.8 million. Although the transaction was later suspended, the company was aware, at the time it entered into the agreement, that its distributor intended to make improper payments out of its profits on the sale.

Above all, the InVision and Pillor settlements highlight the importance of exercising vigilance over third-party relationships, be they with sales agents, distributors or subcontractors. The SEC's February 2005 charging documents note, among other things, that although InVision's standard third-party agreements contained a clause prohibiting violations of the FCPA, "InVision provided no formal training or education to its employees . . . or its sales agents and distributors regarding the requirements of the FCPA." It also notes that it did not "have a regular practice of periodically updating background checks or other information

regarding foreign agents and distributors,” which could have assisted in detecting or deterring such violations.

### *Tyco*

On April 17, 2006, Tyco International, Ltd. (“Tyco”), a diversified manufacturing and service company headquartered in Bermuda, consented to a final judgment with the SEC on multiple counts of securities violations, including approximately \$1 billion in accounting fraud. Part of the SEC’s complaint alleged that, on at least one occasion, Tyco employees made unlawful payments to foreign officials to obtain business for Tyco in violation of the FCPA. Additionally, in an attempt to conceal the illicit payments, false entries were made to Tyco’s books and records in violation of the FCPA’s accounting provisions. Although providing few details on the specific nature of the illicit payments, the SEC complaint concluded that the payments were made possible by Tyco’s failure to implement procedures sufficient to prevent and detect FCPA misconduct. As part of the settlement for securities laws violations and FCPA violations by Tyco and its subsidiaries, Tyco agreed to pay a \$50 million civil penalty.

From 1996 to mid-2002, Tyco acquired over 700 companies worldwide in an effort to become a global, diversified manufacturing and service conglomerate. This aggressive acquisition campaign resulted in a widespread and decentralized corporate structure with over 1000 individual business units reporting to the Tyco corporate office. Until 2003, Tyco did not have an FCPA compliance program, FCPA employee training, or an internal control system to prevent or detect FCPA violations. The SEC complaint stressed that Tyco’s failure to implement FCPA control, education, and compliance programs enabled FCPA violations by Tyco subsidiaries in both Brazil and South Korea.

- *Earth Tech Brazil*

In 1998, despite its own due diligence investigation uncovering systemic bribery and corruption in the Brazilian construction industry, Tyco bought a Brazilian engineering firm and renamed it Earth Tech Brazil Ltda. (“Earth Tech”). As a newly acquired subsidiary reporting to Tyco’s corporate offices, Earth Tech constructed and operated water, sewage, and irrigation systems for Brazilian government entities.

According to the SEC complaint, between 1999 and 2002 Earth Tech employees in Brazil repeatedly paid money to various Brazilian officials for the purpose of obtaining business in the construction and operation of municipal water and wastewater systems. The illegal payments were widespread, and the SEC complaint estimates that over 60% of Tyco’s projects between 1999 and 2002 involved paying bribes to Brazilian officials. Specifically, Earth Tech made payments to Brazilian lobbyists with full knowledge that all or a portion of these payments would be given to Brazilian officials for the purposes of obtaining work for Earth Tech. The complaint asserts that Earth Tech executives based in California routinely participated in communications discussing bribes to Brazilian officials. In order to obtain the funds for the illicit payments and entertainment provided to Brazilian officials, various Earth Tech employees created false invoices from companies they owned. On other occasions, lobbyists submitted inflated invoices to procure the funds needed for the bribes.

- *Dong Bang*

In 1999, Tyco acquired a South Korean fire protection services company called Dong Bang Industrial Co. Ltd. (“Dong Bang”). Again, Tyco’s own due diligence investigation revealed a systemic culture of corruption and the prevalence of bribes to government officials in the South Korean contracting market.

The SEC complaint charged that from 1999 to 2002 Dong Bang executives paid cash bribes and provided entertainment to various South Korean government officials to help obtain contracting work on government-controlled projects. Specifically, the complaint reveals that Dong Bang’s former president spent \$32,000 entertaining several South Korean government officials in order to obtain business for Dong Bang. In addition, the complaint asserts that Dong Bang’s former president also regularly entertained the South Korean Minister of Construction and Finance as well as a South Korean military general for the purpose of obtaining business for Dong Bang. Another payment of \$7,500 was allegedly made to an employee of a government-owned and operated nuclear power plant to obtain contracting work at the facility.

Dong Bang further violated the FCPA’s accounting rules by creating fictitious payroll accounts. To finance some of the improper payments, Dong Bang disguised bribes as payments to fictitious employees, but then wired the cash directly to executives for their personal uses.

As discussed above, Tyco subsequently resolved parallel proceedings with the DOJ and SEC in September 2012 relating to conduct by numerous subsidiaries that had been discovered by outside counsel that Tyco had engaged in 2005 while in settlement discussions with the SEC. Tyco and its Dubai-headquartered subsidiary (which separately plead guilty to conspiring to violate the FCPA) together paid nearly \$29 million in criminal penalties, disgorgement, and prejudgment interest. (*See 2012 Tyco, above.*)

### ***Richard John Novak***

On March 22, 2006, Richard John Novak pleaded guilty to one count of violating the FCPA and another count of conspiring to violate the FCPA and commit wire and mail fraud. On October 2, 2008, Novak was placed on three years’ probation and ordered to perform 300 hours of community service.

From August 1999 until August 2005, Novak and seven others operated a “diploma mill” that sold (i) fraudulent academic products, including high school, college and graduate-level degrees; (ii) fabricated academic transcripts; and (iii) “Professorships.” They also sold counterfeit diplomas and academic products purporting to be from legitimate academic institutions, including the University of Maryland and George Washington University.

Beginning in 2002, Novak attempted to gain accreditation for several of the diploma mill universities in Liberia. In doing so, Novak was solicited for a bribe by the Liberian Consul at the Liberian Embassy in Washington, D.C. Acting at the direction of the diploma mill’s co-owner, Dixie Ellen Randock, Novak proceeded to pay bribes in excess of \$43,000, including travel expenses to Ghana, to several Liberian government officials in order to obtain accreditation for

Saint Regis University, Robertstown University, and James Monroe University, and to induce Liberian officials to issue letters and other documents to third parties falsely representing that Saint Regis University was properly accredited by Liberia. Between October 2002 and September 2004, approximately \$19,200 was wired from an account controlled by Dixie Ellen Randock and her husband Steven Karl Randock, Sr., to a bank account in Maryland in the name of the Liberian Consul. Dixie Ellen Randock and Steven Karl Randock, Sr. previously were each sentenced to 36 months in prison followed by three years of court supervision on non-FCPA charges.

## **2005**

### ***Micrus Corporation***

On February 28, 2005, the privately held California-based Micrus Corporation and its Swiss subsidiary Micrus S.A. (together, “Micrus”) entered into a two-year NPA with the DOJ to resolve potential FCPA violations. Under that agreement, the DOJ required Micrus to accept responsibility for its misconduct and that of its employees, cooperate with the DOJ’s investigation, adopt an FCPA compliance policy, retain an independent FCPA monitor for three years, and pay a monetary penalty of \$450,000.

Following the voluntary disclosure, the DOJ investigation revealed that the medical device manufacturer made more than \$105,000 in improper payments through its officers, employees, agents and salespeople to doctors employed at public hospitals in France, Germany, Spain, and Turkey. In return for these payments, the hospitals purchased the company’s embolic coils — medical devices that allow for minimally invasive treatments of brain aneurysms responsible for strokes. Micrus disguised these payments in its books and records as stock options, honorariums, and commissions. Micrus paid additional disbursements totaling \$250,000 to public hospital doctors in foreign countries, but failed to obtain the administrative and legal approvals required under the laws of those countries.

This case highlights the DOJ’s continuing pattern of construing the term “foreign official” broadly to include even relatively low-level employees of state agencies and state-owned institutions. As this agreement shows, the DOJ may consider doctors employed at publicly owned and operated hospitals in foreign countries as “foreign officials.”

The NPA imposed an independent monitor. The independent monitor filed the final report with the DOJ in May 2008. By July 2008, the DOJ confirmed that the monitorship had concluded.

### ***Titan Corporation***

On March 1, 2005, The Titan Corporation (“Titan”) agreed to pay combined civil and criminal penalties of over \$28 million, which at the time constituted the largest combined FCPA civil and criminal penalty ever imposed. The penalties included \$13 million in criminal fines resulting from a plea agreement with the DOJ and \$15.5 million in disgorgement and prejudgment interest as part of Titan’s settlement with the SEC. Under the agreements, Titan

was also required to retain an independent consultant and to adopt and implement the consultant's recommendations regarding the company's FCPA compliance and procedures.

In announcing the plea agreement and settlement, U.S. Attorney Carol C. Lam stressed that the size of the penalties evinced "the severity and scope of the misconduct." Along with other violations, Titan — a "Top 100 Defense Contractor" with annual sales to the Department of Defense topping \$1 billion — funneled over \$2 million to the electoral campaign of the then-incumbent Benin president through its in-country agent, falsely recorded such payments in its books and records, and failed to maintain any semblance of a formal company-wide FCPA policy, compliance program, or due diligence procedures.

In Benin, Titan partnered with the national postal and telecommunications agency to modernize the country's communications infrastructure by building, installing and testing a national satellite-linked phone network. To facilitate the project, Titan employed an agent whom the company referred to as "the business advisor" and "personal ambassador" to the President of Benin. From 1999 to 2001, Titan paid this agent \$3.5 million. Approximately \$2 million from these payments directly funded the then-incumbent President's re-election campaign, including reimbursing the agent for t-shirts featuring the President's face and voting instructions, which were handed out to the electorate prior to the elections. In return, the Benin agency increased Titan's management fee from five to twenty percent. From 1999 to 2001, Titan reported over \$98 million in revenues from this project.

Particularly troubling to the SEC was the manner in which Titan paid its Benin agent. First, Titan wired payment for the agent's initial invoice — which totaled \$400,000 to compensate for a litany of work purportedly completed within the first week of signing the consulting agreement — to a bank account held under the name of the agent's relative. Titan wired payments totaling \$1.5 million to the agent's offshore accounts in Monaco and Paris. And between 2000 and 2001, Titan made several payments to the agent in cash totaling approximately \$1.3 million, including payments made by checks addressed to Titan employees, which were cashed and passed along to the agent.

Second, both the SEC and DOJ placed particular emphasis on Titan's lack of FCPA controls. In particular, the agencies noted that Titan had failed to undertake any meaningful due diligence on its agent's "background, qualifications, other employment, or relationships with foreign government officials either before or after he was engaged," and that the company failed to implement FCPA compliance programs or procedures, other than requiring employees to sign an annual statement that they were familiar with and would adhere to the provisions of the FCPA. In summary, the SEC stated that "[d]espite utilizing over 120 agents and consultants in over 60 countries, Titan never had a formal company-wide FCPA policy, failed to implement an FCPA compliance program, disregarded or circumvented the limited FCPA policies and procedures in effect, failed to maintain sufficient due diligence files on its foreign agents, and failed to have meaningful oversight over its foreign agents."

Titan faced a host of other FCPA-related charges relating to misconduct such as: (i) making undocumented payments to three additional Benin consultants for a total of \$1.35

million; (ii) purchasing a \$1,900 pair of earrings as a gift for the president's wife; (iii) paying travel expenses for a government agency director; (iv) paying \$17,000 to an official at the World Bank in cash or by wire transfer to his wife's account to accommodate his request that Titan not document his payments; (v) systematically and grossly under reporting "commission" payments to its agents in Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka; and (vi) providing falsified documents to the governments of those countries, as well as to the United States.

In addition to the need for due diligence and FCPA controls, this case highlights the importance of responding adequately to red flags. In 2002, Titan's independent Benin auditor discussed in writing its inability to issue an opinion for the previous two years due to flaws in record keeping and \$1.8 million in "missing cash." Beginning in 2001, Titan's external auditor, Arthur Anderson, also warned of an internal policy and oversight vacuum and of the danger in continuing to operate with "no accounting system set up in the company." Additionally, senior Titan officers and executives were made aware of two written allegations that Titan employees in Benin were falsifying invoices and paying bribes. The SEC specifically noted Titan's failure to vet or investigate any of these issues and allegations.

In addition to Titan's criminal and civil fines, Steven Head, the former president and CEO of Titan-subsiary Titan Africa, was charged in the Southern District of California with one count of falsifying the books, records, and accounts of an issuer of securities. He pleaded guilty to the charge and was sentenced on September 28, 2007 to six months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and a \$5,000 fine.

On September 15, 2003, Titan entered into an agreement to be acquired by Lockheed Martin Corporation. On June 25, 2004, Lockheed terminated the agreement. As part of the merger agreement, Titan had affirmatively represented that, to its knowledge, it had not violated the FCPA. Although the merger agreement itself was not prepared as a disclosure document, the FCPA representation was later publicly disclosed and disseminated in Titan's proxy statement. On March 1, 2005, the same day that it announced the filing of the settled enforcement action, the SEC issued a Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Exchange Act to make clear that materially false or misleading representations in merger and other contractual agreements can be actionable under the Exchange Act when those representations are repeated in disclosures to investors.

### ***Robert E. Thomson & James C. Reilly***

On May 20, 2005, the DOJ suffered a then-rare FCPA loss after an Alabama jury acquitted two HealthSouth executives of falsifying the company's books, records and accounts. Robert Thomson (former COO of HealthSouth's In-Patient Division) and James Reilly (former vice president of legal services) had been indicted the previous year for violations of the Travel Act and the FCPA relating to the company's efforts to win a healthcare services contract in Saudi Arabia.

The DOJ alleged that the large healthcare services corporation had engaged in a fraudulent scheme to secure a contract with a Saudi Arabian foundation to provide staffing and management services for a 450-bed hospital in Saudi Arabia that the foundation operated. The

DOJ claimed in its indictment that HealthSouth allegedly agreed to pay the director of the Saudi Arabian foundation an annual \$500,000 fee for five years under a bogus consulting contract through an affiliate entity in Australia. The indictment charged Thomson and Reilly with falsifying HealthSouth's books, records and accounts to reflect the \$500,000 annual fee as a consulting contract, as well as with violations of the Travel Act.

Prior to that indictment, two former HealthSouth vice presidents had pleaded guilty to related charges. Former HealthSouth vice president Vincent Nico had pleaded guilty to wire fraud and had agreed to forfeit over \$1 million in ill-gotten gains, including direct personal kickbacks from the Saudi foundation director. Another former HealthSouth vice president, Thomas Carman, admitted to making a false statement to the FBI during the agency investigation of the scheme.

Thomson and Reilly, however, exercised their right to a jury trial. On May 20, 2005, a jury acquitted the two defendants of all charges.

#### ***DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd***

On May 20, 2005, the DOJ and SEC settled charges with the Los Angeles-based Diagnostic Products Corporation ("DPC") and its Chinese subsidiary, DPC (Tianjin) Co. Ltd. ("DPC Tianjin"). In the criminal case, the subsidiary, DPC Tianjin, pleaded guilty to violating the FCPA in connection with payments made in China and agreed to adopt internal compliance measures, cooperate with the government investigations, have an independent compliance expert for three years, and pay a criminal penalty of \$2 million. Simultaneously, the parent company, DPC, settled with the SEC, agreeing to disgorge \$2.8 million in profits and prejudgment interest.

DPC, a California-based worldwide manufacturer and provider of medical diagnostic test systems, established DPC Tianjin (originally named DePu Biotechnological & Medical Products Inc.) as a joint venture with a local Chinese government entity in 1991. While DPC initially owned 90% of the joint venture, it acquired complete ownership in 1997. Like many of DPC's foreign subsidiaries, DPC Tianjin sold its parent's diagnostic test systems and related test kits in-country. Its customers were primarily state-owned hospitals.

From 1991 to 2002, DPC Tianjin routinely made improper "commission" payments to laboratory workers and physicians who controlled purchasing decisions in the state-owned Chinese hospitals. These "commissions" were percentages (usually 3% to 10%) of sales to the hospitals and totaled approximately \$1.6 million. DPC Tianjin employees hand-delivered packets of cash or wired the money to the hospital personnel. DPC Tianjin earned approximately \$2 million in profits from sales that involved the improper payments.

In addition to the FCPA anti-bribery provisions, DPC Tianjin also violated the books and records provisions by recording the illicit payments as legitimate sales expenses. DPC Tianjin's general manager prepared and forwarded the company's financial records to DPC, accounting for the bribes as "selling expenses." It was not until DPC Tianjin's auditors raised Chinese tax issues regarding the illicit payments that the subsidiary discussed the payments with DPC.

Shortly after discovering the nature of the payments, DPC instructed DPC Tianjin to stop all such payments, took remedial measures, revised its code of ethics and compliance procedures, and established an FCPA compliance program. The SEC specifically noted its consideration of DPC's remedial efforts in determining to accept the settlement offer.

The DPC settlements illustrate the broad jurisdictional reach of the FCPA, particularly with respect to the conduct of non-U.S. subsidiaries. The DOJ charging documents describe DPC Tianjin as an "agent" of DPC, and the SEC specifically notes that "[p]ublic companies are responsible for ensuring that their foreign subsidiaries comply with Sections 13(b)(2)(A) and (B), and 30A of the Exchange Act." The DPC case also reinforces the need for swift remedial measures, highlights the FCPA risks that foreign subsidiaries pose to their U.S. parent corporations, and demonstrates how broadly the DOJ and SEC construe "foreign officials." Here, as with the Micrus Corporation case (above), the employees and doctors who received payments worked for foreign state-owned hospitals.

***Victor Kozeny, Frederic Bourke, Jr. and David Pinkerton***

In May 2005, the DOJ indicted Victor Kozeny, Frederic Bourke Jr. and David Pinkerton in connection with a scheme to bribe Azerbaijani government officials in an attempt to ensure that those officials would privatize the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan ("SOCAR") and that the defendants' investment consortium would gain a controlling interest in SOCAR. Kozeny controlled two investment companies, Oily Rock Ltd. and Minaret Ltd., which participated in a privatization program in Azerbaijan. The privatization program enabled Azerbaijani citizens to use free government-issued vouchers to bid for shares of state-owned companies that were being privatized. Foreigners were permitted to participate in the privatization program and own vouchers if they purchased a government-issued "option" for each voucher.

Kozeny, through Oily Rock and Minaret, sought to acquire large amounts of these vouchers in order to gain control of SOCAR upon its privatization and profit significantly by reselling the controlling interest in the private market. Bourke, a co-founder of handbag company Dooney & Bourke, invested approximately \$8 million in Oily Rock on behalf of himself and family members and friends. American International Group ("AIG") invested approximately \$15 million under a co-investment agreement with Oily Rock and Minaret. Pinkerton, who was in charge of AIG's private equity group, supervised AIG's investment.

The indictment alleged that, beginning in 1997, Kozeny, acting by himself and also as an agent for Bourke and Pinkerton, paid or caused to be paid more than \$11 million in bribes to Azerbaijani government officials to secure a controlling stake in SOCAR. The officials included a senior official of the Azerbaijani government, a senior official of SOCAR, and two senior officials at the Azerbaijani government organization that administered the voucher program. The alleged violations included a promise to transfer two-thirds of Oily Rock's and Minaret's vouchers to the government officials, a \$300 million stock transfer to the government officials, several million dollars in cash payments, and travel, shopping and luxury expenditures paid for by Oily Rock and Minaret. The 27-count indictment alleged 12 violations of the FCPA, 7

violations of the Travel Act, 4 money laundering violations, 1 false statement count for each individual (3 total), and 1 count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA and Travel Act.

On June 21, 2007, the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the FCPA criminal accounts against Bourke and Pinkerton (and almost all of the remaining counts as well) as time-barred by the five-year statute of limitations period in 18 U.S.C. § 3282. Judge Scheindlin explained that the “majority of the conduct” charged in the Indictment occurred between March and July 1998, and that the five-year statute of limitations therefore would have run before the Indictment was returned on May 12, 2005.

On July 16, 2007, Judge Scheindlin reversed her decision as to three of the dismissed counts, accepting the government’s position that those counts alleged conduct within the limitations period. On August 21, 2007, the DOJ filed an appeal of the dismissal of the remaining counts, but the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal.

The corresponding charges against Kozeny were not dismissed, as his extradition from the Bahamas was still pending at the time of the decision. On October 24, 2007, the Supreme Court of the Bahamas ruled that Kozeny could not be extradited as the grounds for extradition were insufficient and the United States had abused the court process in its handling of the extradition hearing. The prosecution appealed and, on January 26, 2010, the Bahamas Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of extradition. On February 3, 2011, the U.S. government informed the court in a related case that the Government of the Bahamas had appealed the case to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in London, the court of last resort for Bahamian law, and on December 17, 2010, the Privy Council granted discretionary review of the issue of extradition. On March 28, 2012, the Privy Council unanimously ruled that Kozeny could not be extradited from the Bahamas to the United States to face FCPA charges. The Council held that because Kozeny’s alleged bribery did not break any Bahamian laws, the courts there lacked jurisdiction to order his extradition.

The United States is not the only country that would like Kozeny to leave the Bahamas. The Czech Republic is also apparently seeking the extradition of Kozeny, who was once dubbed by Fortune Magazine as the “Pirate of Prague” for his alleged conduct in connection with the privatization of the Czech Republic’s formerly state-owned enterprises. According to Czech prosecutors, Kozeny embezzled \$1.1 billion from mutual funds that he established in the Czech Republic in the early 1990s. The Czech Republic tried and convicted Kozeny in absentia in 2010.

On July 2, 2008, the prosecution filed a *nolle prosequi* motion, an application to discontinue the criminal charges, as to Pinkerton because “further prosecution of David Pinkerton in this case would not be in the interest of justice.” Judge Scheindlin granted the government’s motion.

Meanwhile, the case against Bourke continued. On October 21, 2008, Judge Scheindlin rejected a proposed jury instruction from Bourke that would have allowed a local law defense that the payments were lawful under the laws of Azerbaijan. Under Azerbaijan law, the

payments ceased to be punishable once they were reported to the country's president. Judge Scheindlin determined that the fact that the payments were not punishable was insufficient to meet the local law defense provided under the FCPA, as the payments were still unlawful, even if no punishment was available. The judge held that "[i]t is inaccurate to suggest that the payment itself suddenly became 'lawful' — on the contrary, the *payment* was unlawful, though the *payer* is relieved of responsibility for it."

On July 10, 2009, a federal jury convicted Bourke of conspiring to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act, and of making false statements to the FBI. During the trial, the government presented testimony from Thomas Farrell and Hans Bodmer, individuals who had previously pleaded guilty to charges related to the underlying facts and who testified that they had discussed the illicit arrangements in detail with Bourke. The Assistant U.S. Attorney stressed in closing that Bourke "didn't ask any of his lawyers to do due diligence." On October 13, 2009, Judge Scheindlin rejected Bourke's motion for acquittal or a new trial. Among other arguments, Bourke had contended that the jury was improperly instructed as to the conscious avoidance doctrine. Bourke argued that the jury instructions suggested that Bourke could be convicted based on mere negligence in not uncovering the facts of the Kozeny's activities. But Judge Scheindlin rejected this argument, pointing out both that the jury instructions specifically instructed the jury that negligence was insufficient for a conviction and that a factual predicate existed for a finding that Bourke had actively avoided learning that the payments were illegal. In November 2009, Bourke was sentenced to one year and one day in prison and fined \$1 million.

On December 14, 2011, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals upheld Bourke's conviction of conspiring to violate the FCPA and the Travel Act and of making false statements. According to the brief filed in his appeal, Bourke's trial focused on two related issues: "whether Bourke knew that Kozeny was bribing the Azerbaijanis, and whether he willfully and corruptly joined the bribery conspiracy." Given the case's focus on his state of mind, Bourke argued that the government had not established a factual basis for the trial court's instruction to the jury that he could be guilty for consciously avoiding learning the truth about Kozeny's payments to Azerbaijani officials. He argued that such instruction prejudiced the jury towards conviction on the basis of negligence despite the absence of evidence that Bourke sought to avoid learning of bribery. Similarly, Bourke argued that testimony describing the due diligence of a company that decided not to invest in Kozeny's enterprise was irrelevant, further shifting the emphasis to "what [Bourke] should have known, rather than what he actually knew."

In upholding Bourke's conviction, the Second Circuit concluded that there had been a sufficient factual basis for instructing the jury on conscious avoidance of learning of Kozeny's improper payments, including: (i) his knowledge of the pervasive corruption in Azerbaijan and Kozeny's reputation for corrupt business practices, which was the same knowledge that led other similarly sophisticated investors to refuse to finance Kozeny's operations; (ii) his decision to join the board of American advisory companies rather than Kozeny's company, thus avoiding knowledge of its undertakings; (iii) tape recordings by his attorneys of conversations between Bourke and other investors in which Bourke speculated as to Kozeny's methods but deliberately eschewed actual knowledge thereof; and (iv) conversations between Bourke and his attorneys (over which Bourke had previously waived his attorney-client privilege as part of a proffer to

prosecutors) demonstrating that he failed to follow-up on concerns about possible FCPA liability that he voiced to his attorneys. In the Court's opinion, "a rational juror could conclude that Bourke deliberately avoided confirming his suspicions that Kozeny and his cohorts may be paying bribes."

On May 7, 2013, the Second Circuit denied Bourke's request for a rehearing. Bourke served his sentence at Englewood prison in Colorado and was later released on March 22, 2014.

In a related matter, Clayton Lewis, a former employee of the hedge fund Omega Advisors, Inc. ("Omega") which invested more than \$100 million with Kozeny in 1998, pleaded guilty on February 10, 2004, to violating and conspiring to violate the FCPA. Lewis, Omega's prime contact with Kozeny, admitted that he knew of Kozeny's scheme prior to investing Omega's funds. In July 2007, Omega settled with the government, entering into an NPA with the DOJ, agreeing to a civil forfeiture of \$500,000 and to continue cooperating with the DOJ's investigation. Lewis's sentencing has been repeatedly postponed during the government's pursuit of Kozeny's extradition. By delaying Lewis's sentencing, the government is able to continue to hold Lewis to his agreement to cooperate against Kozeny and Lewis's sentence will account for such cooperation.

### ***David Kay and Douglas Murphy***

In December 2001, David Kay and Douglas Murphy were indicted on 12 counts of violating the FCPA in connection with payments made to Haitian officials to lower the customs import charges and taxes owed by their employer, American Rice, Inc. ("ARI"). Specifically, among other measures to avoid the customs duties and taxes, Murphy and Kay underreported imports and paid customs officials to accept the underreporting. ARI discovered these practices, which were considered "business as usual" in Haiti, in preparing for a civil lawsuit and self-reported them to government regulators.

The district court dismissed the indictment, holding that the statutory language "to obtain or retain business" did not encompass payments to lower customs duties and taxes. In February 2004, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that improper payments geared towards securing an improper advantage over competitors, e.g., through lower customs duties and sales taxes, were at least potentially designed to obtain or retain business and therefore might fall within the statute's scope. The Court reasoned as follows:

Avoiding or lowering taxes reduces operating costs and thus increases profit margins, thereby freeing up funds that the business is otherwise legally obligated to expend. And this, in turn, enables it to take any number of actions to the disadvantage of competitors. Bribing foreign officials to lower taxes and customs duties certainly *can* provide an unfair advantage over competitors and thereby be of assistance to the payor in obtaining or retaining business.

The Fifth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to determine whether the government could adduce sufficient evidence to prove that the alleged bribes in question were intended to lower the company's cost of doing business in Haiti "enough to have a sufficient

nexus to garnering business there or to maintaining or increasing business operations” already there “so as to come within the scope of the business nexus element.”

In February 2005, a jury convicted Kay and Murphy on 12 FCPA bribery counts and a related conspiracy count, and the court sentenced Kay to 37 months imprisonment and Murphy to 63 months. Both defendants appealed their convictions and sentences. One of the critical questions on appeal was whether the district court properly instructed the jury on the *mens rea* element of an offense under the FCPA when it failed to inform them that the FCPA has both “willfulness” and “corruptly” elements. The government asserted that the jury charge’s invocation of the word “corruptly” was sufficient, while the defense argued that a distinct willfulness charge was necessary for the jury to make the required *mens rea* determination. The defendants further asserted that the Government had failed to prove that they had used the mails or instrumentalities of interstate commerce — specifically, shipping documents underreporting the amount of rice being shipped — “in furtherance” of the alleged bribes. Rather, they argued, the Government had showed only that the bribes they paid “cleared the way” for acceptance of the shipping documents, not the other way around.

On October 24, 2007, the Fifth Circuit issued its decision upholding the convictions and the disputed jury instructions. In doing so, the court discussed the *mens rea* requirement under the FCPA and determined that while a defendant “must have known that the act was in some way *wrong*” they are not required to know that their activity violates the FCPA in order to be found guilty. The court determined that the jury instruction encompassed this *mens rea* requirement by defining a “corrupt” act as one “done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a bad purpose or evil motive of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.” The court also rejected the defendants’ “in furtherance” argument, concluding that there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that the shipping documents had been used “in furtherance” of the bribes, as there was testimony to the effect that the amount of a bribe paid to a customs official was calculated by comparing the invoice listing the accurate amount of rice being shipped and the false shipping documents underreporting that amount.

In a January 10, 2008 decision, the Fifth Circuit denied defendants’ motion for a rehearing *en banc*. On October 6, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied the defendants’ writ of certiorari, effectively ending the litigation in this matter.

### ***Monsanto***

On January 6, 2005, Monsanto Company (“Monsanto”) settled actions with the SEC and DOJ in connection with illicit payments to Indonesian government officials. In the SEC actions, without admitting or denying the allegations, Monsanto consented to the entry of a final judgment in district court imposing a \$500,000 civil fine as well as an administrative order requiring it to cease and desist from future FCPA violations. Monsanto also entered into a three-year DPA with the DOJ under which the company agreed to accept responsibility for the conduct of its employees, pay a \$1 million fine, continue to cooperate with the DOJ and SEC

investigations, and adopt internal compliance measures, which would be monitored by a newly appointed independent compliance expert.

According to the SEC complaint and DOJ papers filed with the district court for the District of Columbia, Monsanto made and improperly recorded an illegal payment of \$50,000 to a senior Indonesian official in an attempt to receive more favorable treatment of the products that the company develops and markets. These products include genetically modified organisms (“GMO”), which are controversial in Indonesia and other countries.

To increase acceptance of its products, Monsanto hired a consultant to represent it in Indonesia. The consultant, which the SEC complaint notes also represented other U.S. companies working in Indonesia, worked closely with the former Government Affairs Director for Asia for Monsanto, Charles Martin, in lobbying the Indonesian government for legislation favorable to Monsanto and monitoring Indonesian legislation that could affect Monsanto’s interests. Martin and the consultant had some early success: in February 2001, they secured limited approval from the Indonesian government to allow farmers to grow genetically modified cotton.

Later that year, however, the Indonesian Ministry of Environment issued a decree requiring an environmental impact assessment for biotechnology products such as the genetically modified cotton. The decree presented a significant obstacle to Monsanto in its efforts to market the genetically modified cotton and other similar products.

Martin and the consultant unsuccessfully lobbied a senior environment official to remove the unfavorable language. In late 2001, Martin told the consultant to “incentivize” the senior official by making a \$50,000 payment. Martin directed the consultant to generate false invoices to cover the payment, which Martin approved and took steps to ensure that Monsanto paid. In February 2002, the consultant made the payment to the official. Despite the payment, however, the senior official failed to remove the unfavorable language from the decree. Martin settled separately with the SEC in March 2007.

The SEC complaint also states that Monsanto inaccurately recorded approximately \$700,000 of illegal or questionable payments made to at least 140 current and former Indonesian government officials and their family members over a five-year period beginning in 1997. According to the complaint, Monsanto affiliates in Indonesia established numerous nominee companies (without the knowledge of Monsanto), which it would over-invoice to inflate sales of its pesticide products in order to siphon payments to government officials.

Monsanto discovered the irregularities in March 2001, and following an internal investigation, notified the SEC of the illegal or questionable payments. The SEC noted its consideration of Monsanto’s cooperation in determining to accept the settlement offer.

In furtherance of Monsanto’s deferred prosecution with the DOJ, an independent counsel began a three-year review of the company’s internal compliance measures in March 2005. On March 5, 2008, following a DOJ motion to dismiss, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia entered an agreed order dismissing the charges with prejudice.

- Charles Martin

On March 6, 2007, the SEC filed a settled complaint against Martin. Martin consented, without admitting or denying wrongdoing, to an injunction prohibiting him from future violations of the FCPA's anti-bribery provisions and from aiding and abetting violations of the FCPA's books and records and internal controls provisions. The settlement required Martin to pay a civil monetary penalty of \$30,000.

## U.K. ANTI-BRIBERY DEVELOPMENTS

The U.K. Bribery Act 2010 is still causing ripples of uncertainty in the United Kingdom and abroad, despite the SFO's assurances that it will enforce the Act in such a way that "ethical companies have nothing to fear." Because the Bribery Act is not retroactive, it has taken some time for cases to emerge that could provide the global business community with guidance in complying with the law. In December 2014, the SFO obtained its first individual conviction under the act, as well as its first corporate conviction for bribery of foreign public officials (although under the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906, and not the Bribery Act).

### U.K. Bribery Act 2010

On April 8, 2010, the House of Commons passed legislation to consolidate, clarify and strengthen U.K. anti-bribery law. The previous U.K. anti-bribery legal regime was an antiquated mix of common law and statutes dating back to the 19th century, a legal framework that in 2009 then Justice Secretary Jack Straw conceded was "difficult to understand . . . and difficult to apply for prosecutors and the courts."

The Bribery Act creates four categories of offenses: (i) offenses of bribing another person; (ii) offenses related to being bribed; (iii) bribery of foreign public officials; and (iv) failure of a commercial organization to prevent bribery. The first category of offenses prohibits a person (including a company as a juridical person) from offering, promising, or giving a financial or other advantage: (a) in order to induce a person to improperly perform a relevant function or duty; (b) to reward a person for such improper activity; or (c) where the person knows or believes that the acceptance of the advantage is itself an improper performance of a function or duty. The second category of offenses prohibits requesting, agreeing to receive, or accepting such an advantage in exchange for performing a relevant function or activity improperly.

The third category of offenses, bribery of foreign public officials, is the most similar to the FCPA. According to the Bribery Act's Explanatory Notes, Parliament intended for the prohibitions on foreign bribery to closely follow the requirements of the OECD Convention, to which the United Kingdom is a signatory. Under the Bribery Act, a person (again, including a company) who offers, promises, or gives any financial or other advantage to a foreign public official, either directly or through a third-party intermediary, commits an offense when the person's intent is to influence the official in his capacity as a foreign public official and the person intends to obtain or retain either business or an advantage in the conduct of business. In certain circumstances, offenses in this category overlap with offenses in the first category (which generally prohibits both foreign and domestic bribery). The MOJ Guidance, however, highlights that the offense of bribery of a foreign public official does not require proof that the bribe was related to the official's improper performance of a relevant function or duty. The overlap between the general bribery offenses and the offenses relating to bribery of foreign officials also allows prosecutors to be flexible, enabling them to bring general charges when a person's status as a foreign official is contested or to seek foreign official bribery charges when an official's duties are unclear.

Finally, and most significantly for large multinational corporations, the Bribery Act creates a separate strict liability corporate offense for failure to prevent bribery, applicable to any corporate body or partnership that conducts part of its business in the United Kingdom. Under this provision, a company is guilty of an offense where an “associated person” commits an offense under either the “offenses of bribing another person” or “bribery of foreign public officials” provisions in order to obtain or retain business or a business advantage for the company. An “associated person” includes any person who performs any services for or on behalf of the company, and may include employees, agents, subsidiaries, and even subcontractors and suppliers to the extent they perform service on behalf of the organization. While failure to prevent bribery is a strict liability offense, an affirmative defense exists where the company can show it had in place “adequate procedures” to prevent bribery.

The offense of failure to prevent bribery stands in contrast to the FCPA’s standard for establishing liability for the actions of third parties, such as commercial agents. Whereas the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions require knowledge or a firm belief of the agent’s conduct in order for liability to attach, the U.K. Act provides for strict liability for commercial organizations for the acts of a third party, with an express defense where the company has preexisting adequate procedures to prevent bribery. This strict liability criminal offense creates significant new hazards for corporations when they utilize commercial agents or other third parties. In effect, the actions of the third party will be attributable to the corporation, regardless of whether any corporate officer or employee had knowledge of the third party’s actions. The affirmative defense places a great premium on having an effective compliance program, including, but not limited to, due diligence procedures. In the United States, the existence of an effective compliance program is not a defense to an FCPA charge, though the DOJ and SEC do treat it as one of many factors to consider in determining whether to bring charges against the company, and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines include it as a mitigating factor at sentencing.

The Bribery Act has several other notable differences from the FCPA, and in many ways the U.K. law appears broader. Portions of the Act are applicable to any entity that carries on a business, or part of a business, in the United Kingdom, whether or not the underlying conduct has any substantive connection to the United Kingdom. As SFO Director Richard Alderman explained in a June 23, 2010 speech:

I shall have jurisdiction in respect of corruption committed by those corporates anywhere in the world even if the corruption is not taking place through the business presence of the corporate in this jurisdiction. What this means is this. Assume a foreign corporate with a number of outlets here. Assume that quite separately that foreign corporate is involved in corruption in a third country. We have jurisdiction over that corruption.

Furthermore, the Bribery Act criminalizes bribery of private persons and companies in addition to bribery of foreign public officials. The Act also provides no exception for facilitation or “grease” payments, nor does it provide any exception for legitimate promotional expenses,

although it is arguable that properly structured promotional expenses would not be considered as intended to induce a person to act improperly and therefore would not violate the Act.

Not surprisingly given its sweeping scope, the Bribery Act has received a fair bit of criticism from business circles, and the Ministry of Justice delayed its implementation until July 1, 2011, seven months later than initially promised, to give the business community time to adjust compliance policies to the MOJ Guidance.

### **The MOJ Guidance**

On March 30, 2011, the MOJ Guidance, officially titled “Guidance About Procedures Which Relevant Commercial Organizations Can Put Into Place To Prevent Persons Associated With Them From Bribing (Section 9 of the Bribery Act 2010),” was released. Although the MOJ Guidance is “non-prescriptive” and does not change the legal standards contained within the Bribery Act, the Guidance focuses on a specific set of core principles to explain what the Ministry would consider to be “adequate procedures” sufficient to invoke the affirmative defense. Even though this Guidance is non-prescriptive, it is a useful showing of how the current MOJ interprets the language of the Act and what U.K. authorities and prosecutors will consider when assessing a company’s internal policies and procedures. The true value of the MOJ Guidance will hinge on whether U.K. courts follow its interpretations of the Act.

The MOJ Guidance describes six principles it urges commercial organizations to consider when implementing procedures designed to prevent bribery. These principles — which are consistent with U.S. and international best practices — are not meant to propose any particular procedures but are instead to be “flexible and outcome focused, allowing for the huge variety of circumstances that commercial organizations find themselves in.” This reflects the MOJ’s stance that there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution to preventing bribery. The MOJ Guidance also contains an Appendix A (which it specifically states is not part of the actual Guidance) that illustrates how the principles may be applied to various hypothetical problem scenarios. Although these scenarios may not be part of the formal Guidance, they nonetheless provide a starting point for the dialogue or negotiations with U.K. prosecutors regarding whether a company’s procedures are “adequate.”

Organizations accused of violating the Bribery Act through associated persons bear the burden of proving the adequate procedures defense through a “balance of probabilities” test largely by demonstrating their commitment to the following six principles:

#### **Principle 1 — Proportionate Procedures**

Commercial organizations should have clear, practical, and accessible policies and procedures that are proportional both to the bribery risks they face and to the nature, scale, and complexity of their commercial activities. Organizations should tailor their policies and procedures — as well as the manner by which they implement and enforce those policies and procedures — to address the results of periodic and case-by-case risk assessments. Effective bribery prevention policies are those that both mitigate known risks and prevent deliberate, unethical conduct by associated persons.

Effective preventative policies and procedures are particularly important when dealing with third parties that negotiate with foreign public officials, which the MOJ flags as a category of “associated persons” that presents a significant amount of risk. The Guidance recognizes the challenges of enforcing policies on third-parties, as well as retrospectively introducing new policies into existing business relationships, and encourages companies to approach these situations “with due allowance for what is practicable” based on their “level of control over existing arrangements.”

*Principle 2 — Top-Level Commitment*

The MOJ Guidance makes clear that a key concern of U.K. authorities will be the tone of the culture fostered by an organization. Top-level management — including the board of directors — must be committed to preventing bribery and establishing a culture within the company in which bribery is not condoned. In doing so, they should take an active role in communicating anti-bribery policies to all levels of management, employees, and relevant external actors. The manifestation of this commitment will vary based on the size and industry of the organization, but should communicate both internally and externally the management’s zero-tolerance of bribery.

The Guidance further suggests that companies adopt a statement of commitment to counter bribery in all parts of the organization’s operation that could be made public and communicated to business partners and third parties. It also suggests personal involvement by top-level management in developing a code of conduct, overseeing the development and implementation of an anti-bribery program, and conducting regular reviews of the effectiveness of those policies.

*Principle 3 — Risk Assessment*

Commercial organizations are expected to regularly and comprehensively assess the nature and extent of the bribery-related risks to which they are exposed. The MOJ Guidance acknowledges that what constitutes adequate risk procedures will vary from company to company and notes that companies should adopt risk assessment procedures that are proportionate to their size, their structure, and the nature, scale, and location of their activities. Effective risk assessment should include oversight by top-level management and appropriate resourcing proportional to the scale of an organization’s business and the need to identify all relevant risks, identify internal and external sources of information related to risk, contain appropriate due diligence inquiries, and ensure the accurate and appropriate documentation of both the risk assessment and its conclusions.

The Guidance also states that companies should, as part of their risk assessments, consider both internal and external bribery risks. Internally, the MOJ Guidance suggests evaluating such areas as the company’s remuneration structure, training program, and anti-bribery policies. Externally, it identifies five categories of risk — country risk, sector risk, transaction risk, business opportunity risk, and partnership risk — that should be evaluated for each business venture. Above all, risk identification must be periodic, informed, and documented.

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Principle 4 — Due Diligence

Companies are expected to have proportionate and risk-based due diligence procedures that cover *all parties to a business relationship*, including the organization’s supply chain, agents and intermediaries, all forms of joint venture and similar relationships, and all markets in which the company does business.

The MOJ Guidance notes that due diligence is a “firmly established” element of good corporate governance that both assesses and mitigates risk. Due diligence is particularly important when committing to relationships with local entities and in mergers/acquisitions. The Guidance urges commercial organizations to expand their due diligence programs beyond initial screenings — which are expected for all associated persons, including employees — to include continued monitoring of all recruited or engaged associated persons. The Guidance also recommends that organizations take a risk-based approach to their immediate suppliers and ask that suppliers both agree to anti-corruption representations and agree to seek such representations from their own suppliers.

Principle 5 — Communication and Training

The MOJ Guidance indicates authorities will evaluate not only whether a company has adopted anti-bribery policies and procedures, but whether they have been implemented in such a fashion that they are “embedded and understood throughout the organization through internal and external communication, including training, that is proportionate to the risks [the company] faces.” This involves more than just proper tone from top-level management; the Guidance notes that effective communication is a two-way channel and requires organizations to establish secure and confidential means for internal and external parties to report potential bribery. Internal communications should focus on the implementation of compliance policies and emphasize the implication of those policies. External communication of bribery prevention policies, such as a code of conduct, can also reassure existing and prospective associated persons and deter those who intend to bribe on the company’s behalf. Effective training is required for all employees and should be continuous as well as regularly monitored and evaluated.

Principle 6 — Monitoring and Review

Companies should institute continual monitoring and review mechanisms to ensure compliance, identify issues as they arise, and adjust policies and procedures as needed. The MOJ Guidance suggests that companies may want to go beyond regular monitoring and examine the processes that occur in response to specific incidents, such as governmental changes in countries where they operate, incidents of bribery, or negative press reports. The MOJ Guidance encourages companies to consider using both internal and external review mechanisms to conduct formal, periodic reviews and reports for top-level management. In addition, the Guidance notes that organizations “might wish to consider seeking some form of external verification or assurance of the effectiveness of anti-bribery procedures,” but cautions that “certified compliance” within the industrial sector “may not necessarily mean that a commercial organization’s bribery prevention procedures are ‘adequate’ for all purposes.” Consequently,

companies should continually monitor and review mechanisms to ensure compliance, identify issues as they arise, and adjust policies and procedures as needed.

In addition to the Six Principles, the MOJ Guidance also discusses six specific issues pertaining to the failure to prevent bribery offense: (i) the impact of local law; (ii) hospitality and promotional expenditures; (iii) when a company is “doing business” in the United Kingdom; (iv) the definition of “associated persons” whose bribery corporations attempt to prevent through adequate procedures; (v) facilitation payments; and (vi) prosecutorial discretion.

- Local Law

U.K. prosecutors will be required to prove that, in cases of bribery of foreign public officials, the payment or advantage given to the official was neither permitted nor required by the written laws applicable to that official, including potentially the laws of the foreign country. The MOJ Guidance clarifies that “offset” arrangements, whereby additional investment is offered as part of a tender, will generally not violate the Bribery Act where the additional investment is subject to legislative or regulatory provisions. This would appear to cover what are often referred to as “social payments” and “local content” requirements where those payments are legitimate and made in compliance with written local law. Where local law is silent, however, authorities will have the discretion to prosecute such payments where it is in the public interest.

- Hospitality and Promotional Expenditures

The MOJ Guidance reassures companies that reasonable and proportionate hospitality or promotional expenses which seek to improve the company’s image, better present products, or simply establish cordial relations are not prohibited by the Act, and such expenses will only trigger liability if they are made or intended to induce improper activity or influence an individual in their official role to secure business for the company. The inquiry as to whether an expenditure is a bribe will necessarily depend on the surrounding circumstances, and the greater and more lavish the expenditure, the greater the inference will be that it is intended to influence the official. The MOJ Guidance also indicates that, for a violation to occur, the hospitality or promotional expenditure must be one the official would not otherwise receive from his employer. A company may, for example, pay travel expenses for a foreign official if the foreign government would otherwise have covered the same costs itself. The Guidance also suggests that entertainment expenses — even relatively lavish ones, such as tickets to Wimbledon, the Six Nations rugby tournament, or the Grand Prix — are permitted when linked to a legitimate promotional goal.

- Doing Business in the United Kingdom

One of the more controversial aspects of the Bribery Act is the application of the failure-to-prevent-bribery offense to non-U.K. companies that “carry on a business, or any part of a business, in any part” of the United Kingdom. The MOJ Guidance appears to narrow the scope of non-U.K. companies that would fall within the offense’s reach by asserting that having a U.K. subsidiary is not, “in itself,” sufficient to establish that the parent company is carrying on part of a business in the United Kingdom, nor is raising capital on the London Stock Exchange, “in

itself,” sufficient to establish that a company is carrying on part of a business in the United Kingdom.

Companies should be wary, however, of concluding that their U.K. subsidiary or U.K. stock listing will not require them to enact adequate procedures to prevent bribery. The Guidance asserts that the government will take a holistic, “common sense approach” to each case and warns that “the final arbiter, in any particular case, will be the courts . . . .” This latter caveat should be cold comfort to non-U.K. corporations, as a “wait-and-see” approach to compliance is never sensible when criminal convictions and penalties are at stake.

- Associated Persons

The MOJ Guidance expands upon the definition of “associated persons” contained within the Bribery Act. As discussed above, the Bribery Act uses a broad definition of associated persons that includes all employees, agents, subsidiaries, subcontractors, and even suppliers that “perform services” for or on behalf of a company. The Guidance, however, suggests that a factor in determining whether a corporation is liable for the acts of an associated person is the degree of control the corporation exercises over the associated person. This factor could significantly limit a parent corporation’s liability in the United Kingdom for the actions of subcontractors and agents hired by foreign subsidiaries that operate with sufficient autonomy, particularly in the case of suppliers not directly dealing with the corporation and joint venture partners in the context of a joint venture that exists as a separate entity from its members (unlike a contractual joint venture arrangement).

- Facilitation Payments

The Bribery Act contains no exemption for facilitation payments, and the MOJ Guidance cautions that such payments will trigger liability under the Act, as “exemptions in this context create artificial distinctions that are difficult to enforce, undermine corporate anti-bribery procedures, confuse anti-bribery communication with employees and other associated persons, perpetuate an existing ‘culture’ of bribery and have the potential to be abused.” The MOJ Guidance specifically distinguishes the Act’s treatment of facilitation payments from the FCPA, which provides an exception for facilitation payments. The Guidance recognizes that this zero-tolerance policy on facilitation payments will present challenges in many countries and industrial sectors, and notes that the “eradication of facilitation payments is recognized as a long-term objective.” As noted below, this stance is consistent with recent guidance from the OECD that urged countries and companies to prohibit such payments due to their corrosive nature. (Interestingly, however, the Ministry of Justice’s “The Bribery Act 2010: Quick Start Guide,” which it issued in conjunction with its official MOJ Guidance, notes that companies can continue to pay for legally required administrative fees or “fast-track services,” as payments in these categories are not considered facilitation payments.)

Richard Alderman, the Director of the SFO, provided the SFO’s policy on facilitation payments in light of the MOJ Guidance. During a speech on April 7, 2011, he stated:

I do not expect facilitation payments to end the moment the Bribery Act comes into force. What I do expect though is for corporates who do not yet have a zero tolerance approach to these payments, to commit themselves to such an approach and to work on how to eliminate these payments over a period of time. I have also said that these corporates should come and talk to the SFO about these issues so that we can understand that their commitment is real. This also gives the corporate the opportunity to talk to us about the problems that they face in carrying on business in the areas in which they trade. It is important for us to know this in order to discuss with the corporate what is a sensible process.

The type of case where we are likely to want to consider prosecution will be one where corporations have no intention of ceasing to use facilitation payments. Instead they want to continue. Indeed, they look at this as a way of obtaining an advantage over those corporations that have banned them.

This policy suggests a path forward for corporations operating in environments where the choice is between making facilitation payments and not doing business at all.

- *Prosecutorial Discretion*

The MOJ Guidance explicitly identifies hospitality, promotional expenses, and facilitation payments as areas where prosecutorial discretion provides a degree of flexibility. The Guidance outlines a two-stage test prosecutors must apply in determining whether to prosecute an offense under the Bribery Act: (i) whether there is sufficient evidence to provide a realistic prospect of a conviction; and (ii) if so, whether a prosecution is in the public interest. The more serious the offense, the more likely a prosecution will meet the second prong.

### **Other Developments**

More recently, there have been further developments relating to the Bribery Act. Specifically, (i) the Director of Public Prosecutions and the Director of the Serious Fraud Office published a Code of Practice for DPAs on February 14, 2014 to provide guidance to SFO prosecutors; and (ii) the U.K. Sentencing Council issued a consultation on sentencing for bribery and other related offenses in June 2013.

#### ***Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice***

On February 14, 2014, the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) and the Director of the Serious Fraud Office (“DSFO”) published a final version of the Deferred Prosecution Agreements Code of Practice (“DPA Code” or “Code”). The DPA Code provides guidance to prosecutors for negotiating DPAs, seeking court approval of DPAs, and overseeing approved DPAs. Following the release of the Code, prosecutors were authorized to begin using DPAs starting February 24, 2014.

- The DPA Code

In drafting the final version of the DPA Code, the DPP and DSFO incorporated and responded to comments gathered from 32 individuals and organizations as part of a public consultation on the draft Code of Practice for DPAs (“Draft DPA Code”) released in 2013. The public consultation lasted from June 2013 through September 2013. In response to the comments, the DPP and DSFO clarified and amended several sections of the Draft DPA Code including: (i) the two-step process for determining whether to enter into a DPA, (ii) the factors prosecutors may properly take into account when deciding between negotiating a DPA or seeking criminal charges, (iii) the prosecutor’s disclosure obligations during and after the negotiation of a DPA, (iv) the potential DPA terms to be listed in the DPA Code, and (v) the scope and costs of imposed monitorships.

The DPA Code outlines a two-step process for determining whether to pursue a resolution through a DPA. The first stage addresses the adequacy of available evidence. The Code instructs that a DPA will be appropriate if there is either (i) a realistic prospect of conviction or (ii) “at least a reasonable suspicion based upon some admissible evidence” that the organization has committed the offense and “reasonable grounds” to believe that an investigation would produce “further admissible evidence within a reasonable time period” to create a realistic prospect of conviction. The Code adds that a reasonable time period will depend on the facts of the case, including its size, type, and complexity.

After the evidentiary evaluation, the DPA Code instructs the prosecutor to determine whether the public interest would best be served by a DPA or a prosecution. With respect to the public interest, the Code states that the “more serious the offense, the more likely it is that prosecution will be required in the public interest,” and that a prosecution will usually take place unless public interest factors against prosecution “clearly outweigh those tending in favor of prosecution.” Public interest factors to be considered include whether the company had an effective compliance program, undertook a “genuinely proactive” approach to self-reporting and remedial measures, and has not committed similar violations previously. While the presence of such factors support the negotiation of a DPA, their absence favors prosecution. The DPA Code also instructs prosecutors to consider other factors that weigh in the favor of prosecution, including whether the misconduct (i) was an established business practice at the company, (ii) was known but not reported within a reasonable time, (iii) caused severe economic harm, or (iv) otherwise presents substantial adverse impact to the “integrity or confidence of markets, local or national governments.” Finally, the code asks prosecutors to consider whether a conviction would have “disproportionate consequences” for the company under the domestic laws of the United Kingdom or any other jurisdiction, including but not limited to the EU.

The DPA Code incentivizes thorough and prompt self-reporting and cooperation by calling on prosecutors to emphasize the effectiveness of a company’s compliance and internal investigation mechanisms in determining whether a DPA is an appropriate tool for the resolution of a given matter. The Code instructs prosecutors to give “considerable weight” to a company’s efforts to identify witnesses, make witnesses available, and provide reports of “any internal investigation including source documents.” Conversely, efforts by a company to withhold

material that would jeopardize further investigation of individuals implicated by the misconduct would be a “strong factor in favor of prosecution.” Furthermore, prosecutors are instructed under the DPA Code to consider the timing of the self-report and whether any actions taken by the company prior to self-reporting may have prejudiced the investigation, including whether the company’s conduct “could have led to material being destroyed or the gathering of first accounts from suspects being delayed to the extent that the opportunity for fabrication [had] been afforded.”

At present, the DPA Code provides limited protection for materials disclosed during unsuccessful DPA negotiations. Aside from limitations on certain evidence directly related to the negotiation, the DPA Code explains that there is “no limitation on the use to which other information obtained by a prosecutor during the DPA negotiation period may subsequently be put during criminal proceedings,” so long as the evidence is admissible under the rules of evidence.

- *The Crime and Courts Act 2013*

The Bribery Act itself does not explicitly provide a process for the SFO to enter into settlement agreements with corporate offenders. Although the SFO appeared to believe that it possessed the necessary authority to enter into such agreements under the Act itself, that belief was quickly dispelled by the Crown Court. In April 2010, only days before the House of Commons passed the Bribery Act, Lord Justice John Thomas (who was appointed as Lord Chief Justice of England and Wales on July 16, 2013) criticized the SFO for entering into a civil recovery order with Innospec in connection with that company’s activities in Indonesia.

Specifically, then-Lord Justice Thomas stated:

It is clear, therefore, that the SFO cannot enter into an agreement under the laws of England and Wales with an offender as to the penalty in respect of the offense charged. . . . [S]ave in minor matters such as motoring offences, the imposition of a sentence is a matter for the judiciary. Principles of transparent and open justice require a court sitting in public itself first to determine by a hearing in open court the extent of the criminal conduct on which the offender has entered the plea and then, on the basis of its determination as to the conduct, the appropriate sentence. . . . This has always been the position under the law of England and Wales. Agreements and submissions of the type put forward in this case can have no effect. . . .

I have concluded that the Director of the SFO had no power to enter into the arrangements made and no such arrangement should be made again . . . unless any change is made to the rules of procedure or to the practice direction . . . .

Because of the SFO's inability to enter into further negotiated agreements, companies facing likely prosecution in the United Kingdom had little incentive to self-report or cooperate with ongoing investigations. That, in turn, would likely prevent the SFO from handling corporate bribery cases with the same efficiency and effectiveness as the DOJ and SEC do. Consequently, U.K. authorities sought to devise an effective means to facilitate resolutions of bribery-related offenses and other crimes.

The Crime and Courts Act 2013, which received Royal Assent on April 25, 2013, addressed these shortcomings by authorizing enforcement authorities in the United Kingdom to resolve certain economic crimes, such as violations of the Bribery Act, through DPAs. Under the act, however, only corporate bodies, partnerships, and unincorporated associations may enter into DPAs. Unlike such arrangements in the United States, the DPAs are explicitly not available to individuals.

Schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013 provides that DPAs must contain a statement of facts and a date of expiry. Schedule 17 also provides a non-exhaustive list of requirements that may be imposed on the organization pursuant to a DPA, including enhanced compliance measures, cooperation, as well as financial obligations such as penalties, victim compensation, disgorgement, or even donations. When a DPA includes a financial penalty, the Crime and Courts Act 2013 request that the penalty must be "broadly comparable to the fine that a court would have imposed" following a guilty plea.

Under the act, and perhaps influenced by Lord Justice Thomas's comments, the judiciary plays a more robust role in approving the DPAs than U.S. courts do. When the prosecutor and the organization have agreed to a statement of facts, they must apply to the Crown Court for a declaration that entering into the DPA is "in the interests of justice" and that the proposed terms are "fair, reasonable, and proportionate." A hearing on this request must be held in private, and any reasons the court gives for granting or denying the request must also be given in private. Once a final agreement has been reached, the prosecutor and organization must again apply to the Crown Court and attend a final hearing to obtain a declaration that the DPA is in the interests of justice and fair, reasonable, and proportionate. Once a DPA is approved, the prosecutor must publish the DPA, the Crown Court's initial declaration (or reason for denying the initial request), and the courts final declaration and reasons for granting the final declaration.

### ***Sentencing Council Guidelines***

In June 2013 the U.K. Sentencing Council issued a consultation and draft guidelines on sentencing for fraud, bribery, and money laundering offenses, including for offenses under the Bribery Act. The draft sentencing guidelines set out a series of steps that courts should follow to calculate a criminal fine that should be "substantial enough to have a real economic impact which will bring home to both management and shareholders the need to operate within the law." Of particular note, the guidelines provide that courts should consider whether the size of a fine might put the offending company out of business, but adds that "in some bad cases this may be an acceptable consequence."

Under the guidelines, courts should first determine the amount of compensation required to address any resulting loss or damage resulting from the offense. Next, the court should determine whether, depending upon the culpability and level of harm, the offense should be classified as High Culpability, Medium Culpability, or Lower Culpability. The guidelines state that a corporation should be found to have High Culpability if it had a “leading role in organized, planned unlawful activity” or a corporate culture of “willful disregard of commission of offences by employees or agents with no effort to put effective systems in place.” If the corruption involved is “of local or national government officials or ministers” or “officials performing a law enforcement role,” a company might also be found to have High Culpability.

To determine the “starting point” of the fine, the draft guidelines instruct the courts to multiply the level of harm (in the case of bribery, the greater of either the gross profit obtained as a result or the “cost avoided by failing to put in place an effective anti-money laundering programme”) by the level of culpability (300% for High Culpability, 200% for Medium Culpability, and 100% for Lower Culpability).

Once the starting point is determined, the guidelines suggest increasing or decreasing the amount of the fine based on various aggravating and mitigating factors. Aggravating factors include conduct such as setting up a corporation or subsidiary to commit fraudulent activity, attempting to conceal misconduct, and causing substantial harm to the integrity of local or national governments. Potential mitigating factors include co-operation with the investigation, making early admissions, and voluntarily reporting offending conduct.

Finally, the Draft Sentencing Guidelines ask the court to “step back” and consider whether the amount of the fine meets the objectives of punishment, deterrence, and removal of ill-gotten gains. The guidelines list a number of factors to consider when potentially adjusting the level of the fine, but expressly note that the impact of the fine on shareholders is not to be considered.

For individuals found guilty under the Bribery Act 2010, the Sentencing Guidelines use similar factors to determine the amount of prison time that is appropriate. The Guidelines give an example of the head of the U.K. division of an IT company who, over a two-year period, oversaw corrupt payments totaling £1.5 million to a government official with control over two state-owned entities in a third-world country. The payments were used to secure contracts worth approximately £25 million and the executive received a £500,000 bonus. In this hypothetical, the Guidelines state the executive would likely merit High Culpability and a Harm category of 1, with a corresponding sentence of 5-8 years before a potential reduction for a guilty plea.

### ***October 2012 Guidance***

In October 2012, the SFO updated its website and provided additional information regarding its views on facilitation payments and hospitality & promotional expenses. First, the SFO re-emphasized the absolute prohibition on facilitation payments, but acknowledged that public interest factors may limit the likelihood of prosecution in certain cases. Specifically, the SFO confirmed that it would apply the Full Code Test, which requires a realistic prospect of conviction and evaluation of public interests, when determining whether to bring a prosecution

based on facilitation payments. The SFO explained that large or repeated payments reflecting a standard way of conducting business would warrant prosecution while a single small payment would likely result “in only a small penalty.” The recent update is thus consistent with the March 2011 Guidance, which recognized that a zero-tolerance policy on facilitation payments would present challenges in many countries and industrial sectors, and noted that the “eradication of facilitation payments is recognized as a long term objective.”

Second, the SFO addressed hospitality and promotional expenses, reiterating prior statements that the degree of lavishness, the lack of connection with legitimate business, or any suppression of the payment contributes to the appropriateness of the payment. Like the additional guidance provided on facilitation payments, the SFO referenced the relevance of public interest considerations in determining whether to bring a prosecution based on hospitality or promotional expenditure. However, the guidance failed to identify any factors particularly relevant to hospitality and promotional expenses.

The SFO’s guidance on hospitality expenses follows continuing pressure from the business community and the OECD Working Group for the SFO to provide clarification regarding the scope of permissible hospitality and promotional expenses. In September 2012, the Daily Mail quoted SFO chief David Green in noting that companies would not be prosecuted for entertaining clients at events like the London Olympics. According to the article, Green said:

We are not interested in that sort of case. We are interested in hearing that a large company has mysteriously come second in bidding for a big contract. The sort of bribery we would be investigating would not be tickets to Wimbledon or bottles of champagne. We are not the “serious champagne office.”

### **Enforcement Actions and Investigations**

In addition to the developments discussed above, further clarity on the Bribery Act and general anti-corruption efforts in the United Kingdom can be gleaned from the following recent enforcement actions and investigations of note.

#### ***Smith & Ouzman Ltd***

On December 22, 2014, U.K.-based printing company Smith & Ouzman Ltd. (“Smith & Ouzman”) was convicted at Southwark Crown Court of violating the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1906. Two employees — Chairman Christopher John Smith and Sales and Marketing Director Nicholas Charles Smith — were also convicted. Two other individual defendants were acquitted.

Following a trial, Smith & Ouzman (which specializes in printing security documents such as ballot papers, currency, payment vouchers and checks) and the two above-mentioned employees were found guilty of paying a total of £395,074 in bribes to public officials in Kenya and Mauritania to win lucrative ballot paper supply contracts.

Many bribes were concealed using inflated contracts, while others were provided directly to officials and their family members. The SFO alleged that Christopher John Smith had provided government officials in Kenya with various gifts, including a Samsung Mini Notebook, a PlayStation and an iPod. In one instance, he received a wish list from the son of a Kenyan official. Emails produced by the SFO included numerous discussions between Smith & Ouzman, its agent, and Kenyan officials discussing “chicken,” which they used as a code word for the improper payments.

SFO Director David Green noted that the case marked the SFO’s first corporate conviction for bribery of foreign public officials (although not under the Bribery Act). Sentencing in the case has been scheduled for February 12, 2015.

### ***Former Sustainable AgroEnergy PLC Executives***

On December 5, 2014, the SFO announced that its investigation into Sustainable Growth Group (“SGG”) and its subsidiary Sustainable AgroEnergy plc (“AgroEnergy” or “SAE”), already the source of the SFO’s first charges brought under the Bribery Act, had resulted in its first convictions under the Act.

Former SAE executive Gary West and independent consultant Stuart Stone were convicted under Section 1 (Offences of bribing another person) and Section 2 (Offences relating to being bribed) of the Bribery Act, making them the first to be convicted under the Act by an SFO-led prosecution. West is also the first to be convicted under Section 2 of the Act. Stone and West, along with former SGG CEO and Chairman James Whale, were also convicted for fraudulent trading activities and furnishing false information under the Criminal Act of 1977.

On December 8, 2014, West, Stone, and Whale were sentenced, respectively, to 13, 6 and 9 years in prison. West and Whale were disqualified from being directors for 15 years and Stone was disqualified for 10 years. Former SAE Financial Controller Fung Wong was also charged with violating the Bribery Act but was acquitted of all charges by a jury.

The SFO’s investigation into the Sustainable Growth Group began as early February 23, 2012, when the SFO obtained an order from the Southwark Crown Court to freeze related corporate and personal bank accounts. In March 2012, the company entered administration, a UK procedure to rescue insolvent companies and protect the interests of creditors. SGG’s founder, Gregg Fryett, was not charged by the SFO but was arrested in Cambodia in March 2013 by local anti-corruption police on charges of forgery. West, Stone, Whale and Wong were charged by the SFO on August 14, 2013.

The charges stemmed from a plot to deliberately mislead investors into believing that AgroEnergy owned a Jatropha tree plantation in Cambodia destined to be harvested for biofuel production. Between April 2011 and February 2012, AgroEnergy sold approximately £23 million of investment products related to these Jatropha plantations, primarily to UK investors via self-invested pension plans. However, reports indicate that although SAE purchased land to farm Jatropha trees, allegedly from the wife of a prominent politician and a Cambodian military officer, the crops failed and no biofuel was ever produced. Instead, the SFO alleged, AgroEnergy

used the investments it received to fund a pyramid scheme, using new investors' money to pay previous investors' returns. As part of the scheme, Stone knowingly sold the fraudulent investments and West approved invoices from Stone's consulting company, which paid commission rates of up to 65% on the funds invested. In return, West received approximately £126,000 in bribes from Stone.

### ***Rolls-Royce Group PLC***

The SFO's investigation of Rolls-Royce Group PLC ("Rolls-Royce") continued throughout 2014, with the enforcement agency making a number of arrests and requesting additional funding from Parliament. The company had first announced that it was cooperating with the SFO in an investigation into alleged bribery and corruption at several overseas operations in December 2012. Earlier that year, the SFO contacted Rolls-Royce regarding allegations of potential illegal activities occurring in Indonesia and China. This prompted Rolls-Royce to conduct an internal investigation, the results of which were provided to the SFO. In a statement, Rolls-Royce indicated that its investigation had uncovered "matters of concern" involving intermediaries in both Indonesia and China, as well as other unspecified overseas markets.

In Indonesia, Rolls-Royce scrutinized allegations made by former employee Dick Taylor. Taylor alleged that Tommy Suharto — the youngest son of the former President of Indonesia — had received \$20 million (£12.5m) and a blue Rolls-Royce car in exchange for his assistance in persuading the national airline, Garuda, to order Rolls-Royce's Trent 700 engines. Taylor's allegations had been widely circulated online since 2006, when he began posting the allegations in comment sections below articles about Rolls-Royce. The bribes were alleged to have taken place in the early 1990s, and Suharto's lawyer has questioned the SFO's authority to investigate a twenty-two year old claim.

In China, Rolls-Royce investigated allegations of illegal payments made to an executive involved in ordering engines for Air China and China Eastern Airlines. Rolls-Royce supplied a combined \$2 billion (£1.2bn) in engines to Air China in 2005 and China Eastern Airlines in 2010. In April 2011, Chen Xin, an executive who worked for both airlines, was reportedly arrested by Chinese authorities investigating allegations that he received bribes from intermediaries working for western companies. The two airlines have refused to comment on the bribery claims.

Even the most recent allegations appear to predate the Bribery Act, and some of the older allegations are so dated that records may no longer exist to prove any case to a criminal certainty. In the December 6, 2012 statement announcing the investigation, Rolls-Royce Chief Executive John Rishton stated: "The consequences of these disclosures will be decided by the regulatory authorities. It is too early to predict the outcomes, but these could include the prosecution of individuals and of the company. We will co-operate fully."

Since 2012, the company has strengthened its compliance program, including instituting a new code of ethics and a policy concerning intermediaries. On January 10, 2013, Rolls-Royce announced the appointment of an independent attorney — noted solicitor Lord Gold — to review

its current compliance procedures and report the findings to the Ethics Committee of the Board of Directors. Rolls-Royce has also informed the DOJ about the allegations and has held discussions with DOJ regarding the investigations.

On May 2, 2013, Rolls-Royce announced the sudden resignation of Mark King, the chief of Rolls-Royce's aerospace business and a 27-year veteran of the company. The resignation came barely four months after King had been appointed to run the division and was a surprise to analysts, aerospace industry executives, and the media. Previously, King had served as head of Rolls-Royce's civil aerospace unit, which is reportedly at the center of the corruption investigation, although both Rolls-Royce and the SFO declined to comment on whether King's resignation was connected to the inquiry. A spokesperson for Rolls-Royce stated that King's departure was for "personal" reasons.

In the meantime, the SFO has continued to gather information from a number of sources and continues to consider further investigatory steps. On February 12, 2014, the SFO arrested two men, Sudhir Choudhrie and his son Bhanu, although both were ultimately released. Choudhrie and his son have denied all wrongdoing and stated their cooperation with the SFO's investigation, and both were released from bail restrictions in July 2014. Reports state that they are expected to play no further role in the investigation. Choudhrie, a major donor to the U.K.'s Liberal Democrats political party, had been expected as recently as 2013 to be appointed to the House of Lords.

Although earlier media reports suggested that Rolls-Royce and the SFO were discussing a multimillion-pound civil settlement that would allow the company to avoid any criminal charges, no settlement was announced in 2014. Rolls-Royce and the SFO have declined to comment on reports of a civil recovery order, but the SFO requested an additional £26.5 million in funding from Parliament in October 2014 in order to continue its investigation of Rolls-Royce and other entities.

### ***JLT Specialty Limited***

On December 19, 2013, the Financial Conduct Authority ("FCA"), the UK's regulator for the financial services industry, imposed a £1.88 million (approximately USD 3.06 million) fine on JLT Specialty Limited ("JLT") for breaching its duty to establish adequate risk management systems for countering the risks of bribery and corruption. JLT is a London based subsidiary of the Jardine Lloyd Thompson Group that provides insurance broking, risk management and claims consulting services to a wide range of national and international corporate clients.

According to the FCA's Final Notice, JLT made payments to overseas third parties, referred to as "Overseas Introducers," to help it win and retain business from clients in foreign countries. The Final Notice stated that JLT failed to conduct adequate due diligence before entering into a relationship with these Overseas Introducers, even though in many cases there was a significant risk that the third party would commit acts of bribery. Notably, the FCA found no evidence that JLT permitted or intended to permit any illicit payment or inducement to any Overseas Introducers. Instead, JLT was fined by virtue of the fact that it breached Principle 3 of

the FCA's Principles for Businesses by failing to take reasonable care to counter the risks of bribery and corruption.

The FCA noted in particular that JLT had failed to adequately implement its own anti-bribery policies or to carry out checks, which would have enabled it to identify that its policies were not being implemented correctly. JLT introduced an Employee Handbook and a Group Anti-Bribery and Corruption Policy, which both prohibited its employees from engaging in any form of bribery, and it later introduced an Operation Procedure Manual. While the new manual contained a procedure that employees had to follow in order to establish relationships with Overseas Introducers, it did not require employees to take specific proactive steps to identify whether, for instance, an Overseas Introducer had a 'special relationship' with a public official.

JLT had introduced a "7 Alarm Bells" mechanism in June 2011. Under this system, alarm bells should start to ring if certain risk factors, such as the nature of the role of the third party agent, or the countries involved in the transaction, required further attention, and the number of ringing bells determined the level of sign-off required to authorize the relationship with that third party agent. According to FCA's review, however, JLT had not properly utilized its Alarm Bell system. The FCA reviewed 17 total cases involving Overseas Introducers and found that the 7 Alarm Bells mechanism had not been implemented correctly (or at all) in any of those cases.

In assessing the amount of the imposed penalty, the FCA emphasized that JLT's breaches had been set against a backdrop of heightened awareness in the insurance broking industry of the FCA's requirements. The FCA pointed specifically to the fines imposed on Aon Limited in 2009 and Willis Limited in 2011, suggesting that those actions within the same industry should have put JLT on notice of the need for effective compliance systems.

### ***News Corporation***

In June 2014, the sensational trial of former *News of the World* executives, editors, and reporters concluded with a high-profile conviction, guilty pleas, noteworthy acquittals, and a hung jury. The trial — which followed a long-standing investigation into allegations that News Corporation's now-defunct tabloid had not only hacked into the mobile phones of politicians, celebrities, and families of murder victims, but had also bribed police officers and other government officials to obtain news "scoops" and other information — captured the public's attention.

The personal stories of defendants Rebekah Brooks and David Coulson added to the *cause célèbre*. Brooks had rocketed from an early position as a secretary at Rupert Murdoch's tabloid to become the youngest editor of a nationwide paper and ultimately the head of all Murdoch's British newspapers. She was known to be a neighbor and close friend of Prime Minister David Cameron. Coulson, the former editor of *News of the World*, had become Prime Minister Cameron's Director of Communications. In another salacious twist, details emerged about Brooks and Coulson's secret six-year love affair.

The story was too much for Hollywood to resist. In late 2014, George Clooney announced that he would begin shooting and directing a movie about the scandal in 2015. Sony Pictures Entertainment, the rival to Murdoch's 21st Century Fox, will produce the film.

In addition to the continuing bad publicity, however, various other U.K. journalists await trial on charges of bribery and illicit hacking. Also, as discussed below, the case has caught the attention of U.S. regulators, who have reportedly been investigating potential FCPA violations.

- *Background of the Scandal*

The scandal began simply enough, with a November 2005 article in *News of the World* reporting that Prince William had suffered a knee injury while playing soccer. The story, however, appeared to quote directly from information recorded on a private voicemail message, raising suspicions that journalists had hacked into the mobile phones owned by the royal family.

In August 2006, police arrested Editor Clive Goodman and private investigator Glenn Mulcaire. The two eventually admitted to hacking the phones and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to intercept communications. In January 2007, Goodman and Mulcaire were sentenced to four months and six months in prison, respectively. Coulson, then-editor of *News of the World*, took "ultimate responsibility" for the incident and resigned.

News International Limited ("News International"), which owned *News of the World* on behalf of News Corporation, conducted an internal review and found "no evidence" that Coulson or other executives were aware of Goodman or Mulcaire's misconduct. By June 2009, however, reports had emerged that other senior staff were aware that *News of the World* reporters had illegally accessed the mobile phones of celebrities and politicians from 2003 through 2007.

- *Investigations Begin in Earnest*

Scotland Yard, which had been criticized for failing to fully investigate *News of the World* initially because of its "close relationship" with the tabloid, opened a second formal investigation in early 2011 following allegations that the tabloid's staff was continuing to hack phones. As the investigation continued, the list of alleged hacking victims grew to include numerous public officials and celebrities, including two former British Prime Ministers, members of the royal family, Brad Pitt, Angelina Jolie, Sean Connery, Paul McCartney, and David and Victoria Beckham. Private individuals have also allegedly been targeted, including the families of two 10-year old murder victims, families of 9/11 victims, families of victims of the 2005 London "7/7" bombings, and families of British soldiers killed in Iraq and Afghanistan.

By April 5, 2011, Ian Edmondson, Neville Thurlbeck, and James Weatherup (the former editor, chief reporter, and journalist, respectively, at *News of the World*) were arrested on suspicion of conspiring to intercept mobile phone messages. Three days later, News International issued "an unreserved apology and an admission of liability" for illegally accessing people's cell phones. The statement came as News International agreed to resolve some of the 24 civil cases then filed against it, which it hoped to settle for less than £20 million. News

International also acknowledged that its “previous inquiries failed to uncover important evidence” and “were not sufficiently robust.”

*News of the World* could not withstand the public backlash. After 168 years in business, the tabloid printed its last edition on July 10, 2011. It was subsequently replaced by a Sunday edition of another News Corporation tabloid, *The Sun*.

Brooks and Coulson were both arrested in July 2011. In addition to phone hacking, Brooks was charged with conspiring to pay \$160,000 in bribes to a U.K. Defense Ministry official in exchange for information used in a series of news stories. Coulson was also charged with conspiring to bribe public officials to obtain a confidential royal telephone directory.

By June 2012, Scotland Yard had arrested 32 people in relation to the phone hacking scandal, including an employee at the British Ministry of Defense, a member of the British military, current and former U.K. police officers, a former prison officer arrested on suspicion of money laundering, and over a dozen journalists from News Corporation’s U.K. papers.

- *The Trial of the Century*

The trial against Brooks, Coulson and others spanned from October 2013 to June 2014 — one of the longest and most expensive in English history. Brooks alone testified for a marathon thirteen days on the witness stand. During the proceedings against the eight defendants who had pleaded not guilty, prosecutors argued that telephone hacking was condoned and conducted on a “systemic” scale, and that over 5,500 victims were hacked over a period of many years.

The trial ended in June 2014 with one conviction, five acquittals, and a hung jury. Brooks was acquitted of all charges, including those related to hacking, conspiracy to conceal evidence, and bribery of public officials — despite the fact that she testified that, in return for information, she had authorized the payment of bribes to public officials a “half a dozen” times while serving as a newspaper editor. She defended her actions as having been rare, carefully considered, and serving “an overwhelming public interest.” Brooks’ husband and three other defendants were also acquitted.

The sole conviction in the trial was Coulson, who was found guilty of conspiring to intercept phone messages. Controversially, after Coulson’s conviction but before his sentence, Prime Minister Cameron made a televised statement apologizing for having hired Coulson and claiming that Coulson had misled him about his involvement in the phone hacking. Amidst calls for a mistrial, the presiding judge took the rare step of condemning the sitting Prime Minister from the bench for having potentially prejudiced the jury. Coulson was subsequently sentenced to 18 months in prison.

The jury was dismissed after it could not reach a decision against Coulson and Goodman on the other charges, including bribery. British prosecutors have indicated that they will seek a retrial of Coulson on some of the charges. Meanwhile, he also faces perjury charges that he previously testified under oath that he did not know of the phone hacking.

Four defendants had pleaded guilty to a variety of charges at the outset of the trial. Former Chief Reporter Neville Thurlbeck and former News Editor Greg Miskiw were each sentenced to six months in prison. Former reporter James Weatherup was given a suspended four-month sentence. Private investigator Glenn Mulcaire, who as noted above had already been imprisoned for six months at the outset of the scandal, was given a suspended sentence of six months.

Edmondson, who did not participate in the proceedings for health reasons, was convicted separately in a later trial and sentenced to eight months in prison.

- *Other Alleged Bribery Offenses*

Since 2011, information and media reports have emerged suggesting that other members of the News Corporation organization may have bribed U.K. police officers and members of the U.K. military to obtain “scoops” on news stories. By August 2014, a sprawling investigations had resulted in the arrest of 63 journalists (including 50 from *The Sun* or *News of the World*).

A three-month trial began in October 2014 against six former staffers of *The Sun* and ended with a mix of acquittals and a hung jury. Prosecutors sought to prove that the journalists had bribed police officers, prison guards, and soldiers for newsworthy tips on “a grand scale” between 2002 and 2011. In the midst of the trial, the six defendants were acquitted of an umbrella conspiracy to bribe public officials, and the trial focused instead on various conspiracies involving subsets of the defendants. Prosecutors have stated that they will seek a retrial on the charges that were not decided.

Various other journalists are awaiting trial. Former *Daily Mirror* journalist Greig Box-Turnbull faces charges that he bribed officials at two different prisons. Prison officer Marc Alexander was charged as a co-conspirator for allegedly receiving £2,500, and prison officer Grant Pizzey and his wife were charged as co-conspirators for allegedly receiving £20,000.

Former *News UK* tabloid reporter Vince Soodin faces charges of paying £500 in bribes to police officer Darren Jennings in exchange for information about witnesses involved in ongoing investigations. Jennings was also charged with allegedly seeking £10,000 from *The Sun* in September 2010 in exchange for information about a fellow officer facing criminal charges as well as other individuals in police custody.

- *FCPA Liability*

The DOJ and the SEC have reportedly begun investigating News Corporation for potential FCPA violations as well. The investigation follows requests from U.S. Senators Jay Rockefeller, Barbara Boxer, and Frank Lautenberg to Attorney General Eric Holder and then-SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro to investigate the allegations. Rockefeller in particular had described News Corporation’s behavior as an “offensive and a serious breach of journalistic ethics” that “raise[d] serious questions about whether [News Corp] has broken U.S. law.”

In its November 6, 2014 quarterly report, News Corporation stated that “U.K. and U.S. regulators and governmental authorities continue to conduct investigations initiated in 2011 with respect to the U.K. Newspaper Matters. The investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (the “DOJ”) is directed at conduct that occurred within 21st Century Fox prior to the creation of [News Corporation]. Accordingly, 21st Century Fox has been and continues to be responsible for responding to the DOJ investigation. The Company, together with 21st Century Fox, is cooperating with these investigations.”

Thus far, the DOJ and the SEC have not pressed charges against News Corporation or its employees, although June 2013 news reports indicated that the company was in settlement discussions with the DOJ, with one supposedly “knowledgeable source” stating that the settlement could be as high as \$850 million.

### ***Mawia Mushtaq and Yang Li***

In December 2012 and April 2013, two individuals were convicted under the U.K. Bribery Act. The cases involve instances of minor domestic bribery and not the types of commercial activity typically seen in anti-corruption enforcement actions. First, Mawia Mushtaq was sentenced to two months imprisonment (suspended for twelve months with curfew) after he offered a licensing officer payments of £200 and £300 to change his score on a driving test for a private-hire taxicab license so that he would pass. The Oldham Council conducted the prosecution, with the consent of the Director of Public Prosecution, the first instance of a local jurisdiction bringing charges under the Bribery Act.

Second, Yang Li, a student at the University of Bath, was convicted of violating the Bribery Act by trying to bribe his tutor to obtain a passing grade. Li was enrolled at the University of Bath and studying for a Masters degree in innovation and technology management when he received a score of 37% on his final dissertation, below the 40% score required to pass.

Li’s professor told him was told he had three options: resubmit the essay, appeal the grade, or accept it and withdraw from the course. Li reportedly placed £5,000 in cash on the table and said “I am a businessman. There is a fourth option, you can keep the money if you give me a pass mark and I won’t bother you again.” When the professor refused, Li put the money back in his pocket. During this process, a loaded air pistol fell out of the same pocket. Li subsequently admitted to the charges of bribery and possession of an imitation firearm; he was sentenced to 12 months in prison and ordered to pay a fine of £4,880.

### ***Munir Patel***

On October 14, 2011, Munir Yakub Patel, a former court clerk at the Redbridge Magistrates’ Court in London, became the first individual to be convicted under the U.K. Bribery Act of 2010. The U.K. Bribery Act entered into force on July 1, 2011 — the conduct that led to Patel’s indictment occurred shortly afterwards in August 2011.

The Patel case was brought by the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”), which has the authority to bring cases under the Bribery Act and which investigates, charges, and presents

criminal cases investigated by the police in England and Wales. Because of the simplicity of the case and the small value, it was not prosecuted by the Serious Fraud Office (“SFO”), which focuses on cases that exceed £1M in value or that are significantly complex.

Jayraj Singh, a U.K. motorist, received a speeding ticket and called the Magistrates’ Court with questions regarding his summons. It is reported that, shortly after Singh contacted the court, Patel phoned Singh and told him that he (Singh) could pay £500 to make the situation “go away” or that he should expect to have penalty points added to his driving record and to pay a hefty fine. Patel allegedly sent text messages to Singh to warn him that his insurance would go up if he were convicted of a moving violation. In August 2011, Patel promised to use his access to the Magistrates’ Court system to tamper with the official databases on behalf of Singh, in exchange for a payment of £500.

Instead of paying the solicited bribe, Singh contacted *The Sun*, a popular British tabloid, which developed the idea to catch Patel’s solicitation and acceptance of a bribe on film. According to *The Sun*’s exclusive article on its sting operation, Patel met with an undercover investigator who posed as Singh. *The Sun* arranged for the exchange between Patel and the investigator to be recorded by a hidden video camera within the vehicle where the two arranged to meet. *The Sun* also managed to take photographs of Patel leaving the rendezvous with the bribe money in his hand. Ironically, *The Sun* acknowledged that, technically, it had itself violated the Bribery Act by setting up and following through on the sting operation. The Justice Secretary indicated that prosecutors would dismiss such technical breaches as not being within the public interest to prosecute.

Patel pled guilty to two counts of the indictment brought against him. Under Count 1, Patel pled guilty to the violation of Section 2 of the Bribery Act, which declares that a person is guilty of an offense if that person “requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function or activity should be performed improperly.”

Under Count 2, Patel pled guilty to the charges for misconduct in a public office, a common law offense. A charge for misconduct in public office applies where a public officer, acting in an official capacity, willfully neglects to perform that officer’s duty and/or willfully misconducts themselves, such that it rises to the level of an abuse of the public’s trust in that officer, without reasonable excuse or justification.

Though Patel admitted to and was convicted of only one count of bribery, CPS alleged that he earned approximately £20,000 and “helped” approximately 53 offenders. During the trial, the court reportedly heard evidence that £53,814 in cash deposits and £42,383 in wire transfers had been made to Patel’s account. Patel’s salary from the courts was just £17,978 per year, and no suitable explanation was provided for the large sums of money in his account.

Regarding Patel’s guilty plea, Gaon Hart, Senior Crown Advocate for the CPS Special Crime and Counter Terrorism Division, stated,

This prosecution is the first of its kind under the Bribery Act 2010 which has provided a significant weapon in the armoury of prosecutors that enables us to focus on the bribery element rather than general misconduct behaviour. We will continue to target those who act corruptly purely for personal gain and tailor the charge to reflect their wrong-doing.

On November 18, 2011, Patel was sentenced to three years in prison for the Count 1 bribery offense and six years in prison for the Count 2 misconduct in a public office charges. The two prison sentences are to be served concurrently. Additionally, Patel was also ordered to pay back £7,500, an amount that police believe is a mere fraction of the bribes that he received. Patel's sentence was reduced based on several factors, including that he plead guilty "at the earliest reasonable opportunity", that he was young (22 years old at the time of sentencing) and that he was even younger when he began his criminal conduct; and finally, that he had previously had a good character. Judge Alistair McCreath weighed these factors with the nature and seriousness of Patel's offenses and the length and incidence rate of Patel's activities to determine the sentence.

Just before announcing Patel's sentence, Judge McCreath stated,

It is important that those who are tempted to behave in this way understand that there will be serious consequences. Sentences for this sort of offence must act to deter offending of this kind. They must also reflect the determination of the courts to protect the process from corrupt practices and to maintain public confidence in the justice system.

### ***Julian Messent***

On October 22, 2010, Julian Messent pleaded guilty in Crown Court in London to making or authorizing corrupt payments of almost \$2 million to officials of the Costa Rican state insurance company, Instituto Nacional de Seguros ("INS"), and the national electricity and telecommunications provider, Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad ("ICE"). Four days later, Messent was sentenced to 21 months in prison, ordered to pay £100,000 compensation to the Republic of Costa Rica, and barred from acting as a company director for five years by Judge Geoffrey Rivlin QC of the Southwark Crown Court.

At the time the payments were made, Messent was head of the Property (Americas) Division at PWS International Ltd. ("PWS"), a London-based insurance company. In that capacity, he was responsible for securing and maintaining contracts for reinsurance in the Central and South America regions. One of those contracts was to act as the broker of a lucrative reinsurance policy for INS, which in turn served as the insurer for ICE. This policy was known as the "U-500" contract. According to the SFO, between 1999 and 2002, Messent authorized 41 corrupt payments totaling nearly \$2 million to at least three Costa Rican officials, their wives, and associated companies as inducements or rewards for assisting in the retention of PWS as the broker of that policy. The covert payments were routed through bank accounts in the names of

the wives of two of the Costa Rican officials and through accounts in Panama and the United States, and a travel agency in Florida.

The corrupt payments were first discovered by Costa Rican authorities. The 2002 elections resulted in the replacement of a number of officials at INS and ICE. Though it is not clear whether the recipients of the PWS payments were among those officials ousted, it is clear that shortly after this turnover, the authorities began making inquiries into the contract with PWS and payments made in connection with it. According to news reports, Costa Rican authorities attempted to contact the company about the payments in September 2005, and when PWS failed to respond, Costa Rica complained to the British embassy and hired U.K. counsel to threaten PWS with a lawsuit. The British embassy quickly referred the case to the SFO.

In August 2006, the SFO initiated an investigation (conducted jointly with the City of London Police) in response to Costa Rica's allegations. Messent, who had been promoted to the chief executive post at PWS in 2003, resigned shortly thereafter. PWS was placed in administration by early 2008 and a substantial portion of its assets sold to another UK insurer, the THB group. An attorney for the SFO told Judge Rivlin that the exposure of the illicit payments was "one of the factors" in PWS going into administration.

Under an agreement with the SFO, Messent pled guilty to two counts of making corrupt payments contrary to §1(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906. Specifically, Messent admitted to paying \$25,832 to the wife of Alvaro Acuna, an agent of INS, in February 1999 and \$250,000 to a company associated with Cristobal Zawadski, another agent of INS, in June 2002.

Judge Rivlin sentenced Messent to 21 months incarceration for each count, with the terms to be served concurrently. Rivlin reportedly reduced Messent's sentence from what would have otherwise been four-to-five years on account of his cooperation with the SFO's investigation and the plea agreement.

At sentencing, Messent's attorney emphasized that his client had not acted alone in making the corrupt payments. He claimed that Messent had "inherited" the arrangements when he became head of the firm's Latin America department in 1996, that he had not concealed the payments from other employees, and that the details were known to the heads of the finance department and the compliance unit. According to observers, Judge Rivlin said he "accepted" that Messent did not act alone in making the payments and "did not attempt to hide or disguise these payments" within the company or in accounting records. Yet Judge Rivlin thought it plain — and sufficient — that Messent had been "deeply involved in the decision making" and "authorized" the corrupt payments, which "represent[ed] a loss to the Republic of Costa Rica."

The SFO apparently chose to forgo pursuing prosecutions of any other individuals or PWS in connection with the illicit payments. According to the SFO, it declined to prosecute the company because any fine levied against it would likely have been enforced against its pension funds, which already faced a "substantial deficit," and so the punishment would have been disproportionately felt by the company's employees.

Messent's case is notable to observers of the U.K. justice system for several reasons. First, it makes clear that even where circumstances are present that justify not prosecuting an organization, the SFO will hold individuals accountable for corrupt activity. In this case, because PWS was in administration, and any fines levied would have been paid out by the company's employee pension funds, the U.K. authorities decided not to pursue a case against the entity. This practice may be especially relevant in prosecutions under the Bribery Act, as an organization might avail itself of the defense of "adequate procedures" as currently written in that legislation, while an individual could not.

Second, it affirms the unremarkable proposition that the fact that bribery is a standard industry practice constitutes neither a defense nor a mitigating factor in U.K. courts. Here the former-CEO and Chairman of PWS, Lord Malcolm Person, was quoted in *The Guardian* as stating, "It is very regrettable that something like this should happen. But in 1997 when this started, it was regarded as perfectly normal. Under that regime, all the other insurance brokers were doing exactly the same thing." Judge Rivlin directly rejected this line of argument at sentencing.

Third, it clarifies the status of plea agreements entered into with the SFO. The viability of plea agreements had been thrown into some doubt in early 2010 when two U.K. judges expressed concern that the SFO had exceeded its authority by agreeing to sentences with defendants in overseas corruption cases and warned the SFO against plea deals that purported to bind the courts in sentencing decisions. Some commentators questioned whether those warnings threatened the SFO's whistleblower program and its partnership with the U.S. Justice Department in resolving international bribery cases. Here, however, Messent entered into a plea agreement with the SFO that appears to have been largely respected. According to observers of the sentencing, Judge Rivlin made clear that he was applying a substantial reduction to the sentence he otherwise would have handed down precisely because of the plea agreement reached between Messent and the SFO, which reflected Messent's cooperation with the SFO's investigation. And then-SFO director Richard Alderman was quoted as saying, "This case is also a good example of how an early plea agreement can bring a swift resolution."

### ***Victor Dahdaleh and Bruce Allan Hall***

On April 6, 2010, the Wall Street Journal reported that U.S. and U.K. authorities were investigating the activities of Victor Dahdaleh, a Canadian citizen, suspected of bribing officials at Aluminium B.S.C. ("Alba"), a Bahraini state-owned smelting company formed in 1968, on behalf of Alcoa (formerly "Aluminum Company of America"). The Alba board of directors included a number of government ministers with Sheikh Isa Bin Ali Al Khalifa ("Sheikh Isa"), the brother-in-law of Bahrain's Prime Minister, as Chairman of the Board during the material time between 2002 and 2005.

On October 24, 2011, Dahdaleh voluntarily traveled to a U.K. police station to be arrested by the SFO. Dahdaleh's voluntary surrender caused speculation that he may have "chosen" to face charges in the United Kingdom rather than the United States in order to leverage his strong presence in the U.K. business community and British high society. The SFO

alleged that Dahdaleh made these payments to guarantee shipments of alumina from Bahrain to Australia and as part of a scheme to overcharge Alba by hundreds of millions of dollars for the purchase of alumina. Additionally, the SFO accused Dahdaleh of making payments in connection with contracts to supply goods and services to Alba. The SFO charged Dahdaleh with violations of corruption under the Prevention of Corruption Act, conspiracy to corrupt contrary to the Criminal Law Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act, and acquiring and transferring criminal property contrary to the Proceeds of Crime Act. Dahdaleh was charged in criminal court on April 16, 2012.

On 25 June, 2012, in connection with the same scheme, former Alba CEO Bruce Allan Hall pleaded guilty in the U.K. to conspiring to violate and violating the Prevention of Corruption Act and of committing money laundering in violation of the Proceeds of Crime Act. Hall admitted that he had entered into a pre-existing conspiracy with Sheikh Isa and Dahdaleh to receive corrupt payments in exchange for securing shipment of alumina from Bahrain to Australia. Hall admitted that he received payments as part of a deal to allow the existing corrupt scheme between Dahdaleh and Sheikh Isa to continue. Hall admitted to having received twenty of corrupt payments as part of this scheme totaling about £2.88 million including 10,000 Bahraini dinars in cash from Sheikh Isa. On July 22, 2014, Hall was sentenced to 16 months in prison and required to pay £3.67 million in disgorgement, compensation and contribution to prosecution costs.

Despite the cooperation of Hall, on December 10, 2013, the SFO announced it would be dropping its case against Dahdaleh, noting that there was no longer a realistic prospect of conviction. The SFO provided two main reasons for this decision. First, according to the SFO, Hall's statement as part of his plea deal differed materially from that he had previously provided to the SFO. Second, the SFO was unable to secure the cooperation of two key-witnesses, both partners at the American law firm Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP ("Akin Gump"). According to U.K. press reports, the SFO had delegated much of its investigation in Bahrain to Akin Gump. However, Akin Gump had been retained as counsel for Alba in a civil lawsuit against Dahdaleh, calling into question the objectiveness of that investigation.

### ***Mabey & Johnson***

On July 10, 2009, Mabey & Johnson, a privately owned U.K. company that specializes in bridge building, pleaded guilty in Westminster Magistrates Court to charges of conspiracy to corrupt in relation to its activities in Ghana and Jamaica and charges of paying kickbacks in connection with the United Nations Oil-For-Food Programme in Iraq. The guilty plea came after an internal investigation led to a voluntary disclosure by Mabey & Johnson regarding corrupt activities in Jamaica and Ghana. Mabey & Johnson also disclosed information regarding corruption in Angola, Bangladesh, Mozambique, and Madagascar, but the SFO decided not to pursue charges related to those activities. The prosecution is significant because it marked the United Kingdom's first successful prosecution of a company for corrupt practices in overseas contracts and for breaching a United Nations embargo on trade with Iraq. It also set the stage for many of the principles that would be incorporated into the Bribery Act and related guidance.

Mabey & Johnson was sentenced on September 25, 2009 and received a £6.6 million fine. The fine included £4.6 million in criminal penalties comprised of £750,000 each for bribes paid in Ghana and Jamaica, £2 million for breach of the U.N. sanctions relating to the Oil-For-Food Programme, and a confiscation order for £1.1 million. Additionally, Mabey & Johnson was ordered to pay £2 million in reparations and costs, including £658,000 to be paid to Ghana, £139,000 to be paid to Jamaica, and £618,000 to be paid to Iraq. Further, the company replaced five of the eight members of its board of directors and implemented a comprehensive compliance program. Mabey & Johnson is required to submit its compliance program to the review of a SFO-approved independent monitor. On February 10, 2011, David Mabey, the Sales Director of Mabey & Johnson, and Charles Forsyth, the Managing Director of Mabey & Johnson, were found guilty of making illegal payments in violation of United Nations sanctions by a jury in Southwark Crown Court. A third defendant, Richard Gledhill, Mabey & Johnson's Sales Manager for Iraq, had pleaded guilty to sanctions offenses at an earlier hearing and gave evidence for the prosecution. On February 23, 2011, Judge Geoffrey Rivlin of the Southwark Crown Court sentenced Forsyth to 21 months' imprisonment, ordered him to pay prosecution costs of £75,000, and disqualified Forsyth from acting as a company director for five years. Judge Rivlin also sentenced Mabey to eight months' imprisonment, ordered him to pay prosecution costs of £125,000, and disqualified Mabey from acting as a company director for two years. In issuing the sentences, Judge Rivlin noted that Forsyth's sentence reflected that he "bears the most culpability" and that, in regards to Mabey, "[w]hen a director of a major company plays even a small part, he can expect to receive a custodial sentence." Gledhill, on the other hand, received a suspended sentence of eight months in recognition of his cooperation with prosecutors.

The Prosecution Opening Note in the Mabey & Johnson proceeding referencing the allegations in Jamaica and Ghana stated that, "it is . . . beyond reasonable argument that unless properly monitored and controlled, the employment of local agents and payment of commissions is a corruption 'red flag' exposing the company to risk. What it may provide is a convenient smokescreen to deny corporate or individual knowledge of arrangements conducted overseas."

The Prosecution Opening Note also contains an Appendix including a "non-exhaustive list of the factors which the Director of the SFO takes into account when considering whether to investigate and prosecute allegations of overseas corruption by United Kingdom-based companies and individuals." This list includes the imposition of a "monitoring system to ensure absolute compliance with U.K. law . . . ." In this regard, the SFO noted that in appropriate circumstances it will "seek to follow the model provided by the United States of America's [FCPA]."

On January 12, 2012, the SFO took action against Mabey Engineering (Holdings) Ltd. ("Mabey Engineering"), the parent company of Mabey & Johnson. The U.K. High Court issued an Order that Mabey Engineering pay £131,201 under Part 5 of the U.K. Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 in recognition of sums it received through share dividends derived from contracts won through unlawful conduct by Mabey & Johnson and former officers Mabey, Forsyth, and Gledhill. The Director of the SFO noted that the SFO initiated the civil action to recover the proceeds of the Mabey & Johnson-related crimes even though "[i]n this particular case...[Mabey

Engineering] was totally unaware of any inappropriate behavior.” The Director stated that this reinforced the SFO’s position that investors are obligated to satisfy themselves with the business practices of the companies they invest in.

The Director acknowledged the Mabey Group’s cooperation throughout the SFO’s enforcement action and stated that the SFO had been “very impressed by [the Mabey Group’s] attitude and the clear commitment of [its] new management to ethical trading.” The SFO Director added that “it appears that in many ways the Mabey Group is now leading the way in implementing controls and procedures to ensure that it is able to trade ethically in high-risk jurisdictions.” According to the SFO, the January 2012 civil action represents the “final piece in an exemplary model of corporate self-reporting and cooperative resolution.”

- Iraq

Mabey & Johnson was allegedly involved in providing funds to the Iraqi government in order to obtain a contract for the supply of bridges valued in excess of €4.2 million as part of the United Nations Oil-Food-Food Programme discussed in Part II. The kickbacks, 10% of the total contract value, were paid in two separate installments to Jordanian bank accounts and exactly reflected the kickback sum that was required by the Iraqi government. The payments were made through Upper Gulf Agencies, Mabey & Johnson’s agent in Iraq. The three individual defendants noted above participated in the Iraq scheme.

- Jamaica

According to the Prosecution Opening Note, Mabey & Johnson paid bribes to Jamaican officials, through agents, in order to secure contracts for the building of bridges. The SFO contends that Mabey & Johnson knew that the appointed agents were hired to facilitate corruption. Although Mabey & Johnson denied this contention, it acknowledged that there was a risk that payments might be passed on as bribes.

The SFO alleged that bribes were paid by Deryck A. Gibson, an agent of Mabey & Johnson, to Joseph Uriah Hibbert with the authorization of Mabey & Johnson directors to secure projects and increase project costs. Hibbert served as the Jamaican Chief Technical Director of the Ministry of Transport and Works from November 1993 until October 2000 and had a longstanding relationship with Mabey & Johnson dating back to 1993. While in this position, Hibbert held delegated powers to act on behalf of the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry, which included the ability to enter into financial commitments when there was a vacancy in the Secretary of the Ministry position. During this period, Hibbert received payments of £100,134.62 from Mabey & Johnson. Payments from Mabey & Johnson to Gibson were originally paid into accounts under Gibson’s own name, but later were made to an offshore vehicle.

The primary project at issue was the Priority Flyover Program, known as the “Jamaica 1” contract. In February 1999, Mabey & Johnson entered into a joint venture with Kier International Ltd. for implementation of the Jamaica 1 contract after a presentation was made to the Jamaican Ministry of Transport. Hibbert approached Gibson to make a bid that Hibbert later

approved. The contract was valued at £13.9 million but later increased in value to £14.9 million, seemingly as a result of bribes paid to Hibbert. The alleged bribes were paid to Hibbert through commissions paid to Mabey & Johnson agent, Gibson, which were set at an inflated 12.5% rate. In addition to payments made directly to Hibbert, payments were also made to Hibbert's niece and funeral expenses were covered for Hibbert's mother.

- Ghana

According to the Prosecution Opening Note, Mabey & Johnson paid commissions to agents in relation to business it won through the Ghana Development Fund ("GDF"). This fund was to be used for the development of business in Ghana but in actuality was used as a slush fund for Mabey & Johnson to pay bribes. A number of individuals were involved in making and receiving corrupt payments out of the GDF. Consequently, bribes made during the relevant period totaled £470,792.60, which resulted in Mabey & Johnson receiving the award of three principal contracts. These contracts were Priority Bridge Programme Number 1, worth £14.5 million, Priority Bridge Programme Number 2, worth around £8 million, and the Feeder Roads Project, worth £3.5 million. Many of the illicit payments were distributed to members of the Ghanaian government, including Dr. Ato Quarshie, the Minister of Roads and Highways. Mabey & Johnson accepted that in creating and making payments from the GDF, its executives facilitated corruption on behalf of the company and that its executives were in corrupt relationships with public officials in order to affect Mabey & Johnson's affairs.

## OTHER INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

There have been a number of significant international anti-corruption developments, including bribery-related enforcement actions by the World Bank and other agencies abroad, as well as significant proposed legislation and amendments in various countries to better address bribery concerns. Certain of these developments are discussed herein.

### International Organizations

#### *World Bank Group Anti-Corruption Enforcement*

Since former World Bank Group President James D. Wolfensohn delivered the “cancer of corruption” speech in October 1996, the World Bank has dramatically expanded its anti-corruption capabilities and has been a leader of similar efforts among the other Multilateral Development Banks (“MDBs”).

Under the World Bank’s sanctions regime — which is encapsulated in the World Bank’s “Sanctions Procedures” — the World Bank has the ability to investigate and sanction firms and individuals for so-called “sanctionable practices” (fraud, corruption, collusion, obstruction and/or coercion) committed during the procurement or implementation of a World Bank-financed project. The World Bank’s jurisdiction is contract-based, *i.e.* the Sanctions Procedures apply whenever a contract between a borrower and the World Bank is governed by the Anti-Corruption, Procurement or the Consultant Guidelines. The World Bank’s sanctions regime mainly focuses on contractors, subcontractors and consultants and does not cover public officials of governments or World Bank staff members who have engaged in misconduct, as these cases are dealt with under separate administrative proceedings.

Depending on the gravity of the misconduct, the imposed sanctions range from letters of reprimand (generally reserved for minor misconduct) to indefinite debarment from participating in any future World Bank-financed project. As described in more detail below, debarments greater than one year in length trigger cross-debarments by other MDBs. In each case, the identity of the sanctioned party and the sanctions imposed are publicly disclosed, causing significant reputational harm which could prove ruinous for the party involved.

The World Bank has dramatically increased its sanctioning activity over the past couple of years and, today, is by far the most active MDB in this regard. According to its official figures, the World Bank found sanctionable practices in 112 contracts worth approximately \$998 million in fiscal year 2013, up from 84 contracts worth \$178 million in 2012. The increase in cases as well as the potential severity of the sanctions imposed underscores the growing need for companies operating in the development sector to familiarize themselves with the World Bank sanctions regime and educate their staff in anti-corruption compliance matters.

- Main Actors and Procedures of the World Bank Sanctions Regime

The World Bank's current sanctions regime is built around three main actors: the Integrity Vice Presidency, the Suspension & Debarment Officer and the Sanctions Board, which respectively represent the Bank's investigatory branch and two adjudicatory bodies.

- Integrity Vice Presidency

In 2001, the World Bank's Department of Institutional Integrity was established as an independent investigative unit reporting directly to the World Bank's president; today this unit operates as a full Integrity Vice Presidency ("INT") within the World Bank. INT's core responsibility is investigating allegations of sanctionable practices on World Bank-funded projects. Such allegations are mostly reported to INT by government officials of the borrowing country (*e.g.* members of the implementation agency or the bid evaluation committee), World Bank staff participating in the project or other types of whistleblowers (*e.g.* competitors). Once INT has concluded its investigation and finds that there is sufficient evidence supporting the allegations of sanctionable practices, INT refers the case to the Suspension & Debarment Officer for first-level adjudication (described below.)

Not all allegations come to and are handled by INT in the same manner. First, INT does not exclusively base its investigations on third party reports; in some cases companies self-disclose their misconduct by participating in the World Bank's Voluntary Disclosure Program ("VDP"). Created in 2006, the VDP permits companies who have engaged in sanctionable practices to continue to compete for World Bank-financed contracts if they disclose the conduct to the World Bank before they are under investigation. In return, the companies have to comply with the VDP's terms and conditions, which — among other things — include the commitment to provide INT with valuable information about misconduct on World Bank-financed projects and adopt a compliance program to be monitored for three years by an external compliance monitor. The World Bank will generally not publicize the identity of the company participating in the VDP, unless certain limited exceptions apply.

Second, not all cases are resolved by adjudication. In 2009, INT began to resolve some of its investigations through negotiated resolution agreements ("NRAs"). INT and the company alleged to have engaged in the misconduct can enter into settlement discussions any time during the investigation phase and even once the proceedings have begun. Depending on the terms of the NRA, the case can be closed or proceedings merely deferred.

- Office of Suspension & Debarment

The Office of Suspension & Debarment ("OSD") acts as the initial and impartial adjudicator of any cases brought to it by INT. The OSD determines if the evidence supports a finding of a sanctionable practice under the applicable World Bank guidelines and, if so, may recommend the imposition of sanctions by issuing a "Notice of Sanctions Proceedings" to respondents. The position of the OSD was established in 2006 following formal recommendations by former UN Undersecretary and US Attorney General, Mr. Dick

Thornburgh, who was retained by the World Bank in connection with its efforts to adapt its debarment standards and proceedings to international best practices.

In most instances where the OSD initiates sanctions proceedings, the OSD simultaneously imposes a temporary suspension on the respondent which will remain in effect while proceedings are underway. Like debarments, temporary suspensions render the respondent ineligible for World Bank contracts; however, they are not announced publicly. Instead, they are shared only with the limited number of persons specified in the Sanctions Procedures.

Since 2009, the OSD also has, and increasingly uses, the power to issue so-called “early temporary suspensions” before INT has concluded its investigation. INT can only request an early temporary suspension if it believes that it is highly likely that its investigation will be concluded within one year from the request. The OSD, in turn, will grant INT’s request if (i) the evidence presented by INT is sufficient to support a finding that the potential respondent has engaged in a sanctionable practice and (ii) the sanctionable practice as presented in the evidence would warrant a two-year period of debarment at a minimum.

If the respondent does not contest the OSD’s recommended sanctions, the sanctions are imposed as recommended. The decisions of the OSD are published on the World Bank’s website; however, they mainly provide the legal reasoning and do not give the full factual background of each case. If the respondent contests the recommended sanctions, the case is referred to the Bank’s Sanctions Board.

- Sanctions Board

The Sanctions Board is the second and final adjudicator of the cases initiated by INT. The Sanctions Board is composed of seven members, four of which are external (*i.e.*, have never held a World Bank position) and three of which are selected among the World Bank’s senior staff by the World Bank president. The Sanctions Board reviews any allegations *de novo* on the basis of the evidence presented by INT and the respondent in written submissions and, if requested, during oral argument. As per the Sanctions Procedures, decisions of the Sanctions Board are non-appealable and the Sanctions Board has recently confirmed that it will only reconsider its decisions in narrowly defined and exceptional circumstances, such as the discovery of new and potentially decisive facts, fraud in the proceedings and/or a clerical mistake in the original decision (Decision No. 62 ¶ 6 (January 2014).)

Although the World Bank has sanctioned more than 650 firms and individuals since the inception of the sanctions regime, the decisions, and therefore the bases for the determination of sanctions in contested World Bank proceedings, were not disclosed until December 2011, with full decisions not available until May 2012. As of the end of December 2014, 30 decisions have been published in full text.

- Sanctions Board Decisions: Main Take-Aways for Companies

While the decisions published by the Sanctions Board are still limited in number, they serve as guidance to respondents and their defense counsel in ongoing World Bank proceedings.

The published decisions provide insight into the Sanctions Board's decision-making process and emphasize the Sanctions Board's willingness to take an independent view of the submissions presented to them. The decisions also demonstrate Sanctions Board's awareness of and appreciation for broader global compliance trends, particularly with respect to the activities that it expects companies to undertake and the mitigating credit or aggravating treatment warranted by various conduct.

○ Internal Investigations

The Sanctions Board expects internal investigations to be undertaken by persons with sufficient independence, expertise, and experience. The Sanctions Board refused to give mitigating credit in a case where the persons conducting the investigation were not sufficiently independent from the misconduct at issue and where such persons lacked the necessary expertise and experience to conduct a competent and thorough investigation. (Decision No. 50 ¶ 67 (May 2012).) The Sanctions Board also clarified that the burden to prove the independence of internal investigators lies with the respondents: in Decision No. 68, the Board refused to apply mitigation where respondents had claimed that its "Board of Management" had conducted an internal investigation without specifying the composition of the Board nor speaking to the independence of its members (Decision No. 68, ¶ 43 (June 2014), see also Decision No. 61. ¶¶ 45-46 (November 2013).) Lastly, the Sanctions Board refused to apply mitigation for an internal investigation conducted by respondent's legal department, which failed to adequately document the investigation's processes and credibly establish its findings (Decision No. 71, ¶¶ 98-100 (July 2014).)

By contrast, the Board applied mitigation in Decision No. 63, where it found that the respondent had (i) conducted an adequate internal investigation "first by a designated officer reporting directly to the President and CEO, and then by external counsel" and (ii) "shared detailed findings with INT as well as national authorities." (Decision No. 63 ¶ 112 (January 2014).)

These findings are consistent with decisions of regulatory agencies inside and outside the United States that have insisted on similar criteria for crediting corporate investigations of potential misconduct.

○ Compliance Programs

The Sanctions Board recognizes an effective compliance program defense to vicarious corporate liability. Amidst the ongoing debate over whether there should be an "effective compliance program" defense in the context of U.S. FCPA violations, the Sanctions Board's decisions emphasize the Board's recognition of such a defense to the imposition of corporate liability for the acts of employees. If an employer can demonstrate to the Sanctions Board's satisfaction that it had implemented, prior to the conduct at issue, controls reasonably sufficient to prevent or detect the conduct, the employer would appear to have a defense against liability for its employees' actions. For companies that have or may seek World Bank Group-financed contracts, these decisions create a substantial incentive to review and, as necessary, recalibrate

existing compliance programs to both anticipate likely compliance risks and generally meet the World Bank's expectations for compliance programs.

The Sanctions Board gives credit for compliance program modifications implemented in response to alleged misconduct. Even if a pre-existing compliance program had not been reasonably designed to prevent or detect the conduct at issue, the Sanctions Board has indicated that it will also provide mitigation credit for post-conduct compliance modifications designed to prevent or detect recurrence of the alleged misconduct. (Decision No. 51 ¶¶ 51-52 (May 2012); No. 53 ¶¶ 60-61 (September 2012), No. 60 ¶¶ 129-30 (September 2013).) In such cases, the Sanctions Board positively notes where the modifications have been made prior to the issuance of the Notice of Sanctions Proceedings to respondents. (Decision No. 63, ¶ 107 (January 2014), Decision No. 71, ¶ 94 (July 2014).)

In applying mitigation credit for the respondent's compliance program, the Board will likely examine the program's individual components, such as the company's tone at the top, the existence of a code of ethics and/or written policies on the firm's tendering guidelines, mandatory staff training and the establishment of a comprehensive company risk assessment (Decisions No. 63 ¶ 107 (January 2014), No. 68 ¶ 40 (June 2014).) Limited compliance enhancements could garner limited credit. In one decision, for example, the Sanctions Board agreed to provide "some mitigating credit, limited by the lack of more evidence" for the adoption of a company-wide prohibition against misconduct with approval and support of senior management. (Decision No. 56 ¶¶ 68-69 (June 2013).) Unit-or department-level improvements can also result in some mitigation credit. (Decision No. 55 ¶ 78 (March 2013).)

○ *Disciplining Responsible Employees*

The Sanctions Board places emphasis on disciplining responsible employees, but will only provide mitigating credit when the scope of punitive employment actions are timely and proportionate to the conduct at issue. Accordingly, the Sanctions Board has declined to provide mitigation credit to companies that (i) disciplined a responsible employee without thoroughly investigating the underlying conduct to allow the company to "assess and address its own responsibility or that of other employees" (Decision No. 55 ¶ 77 (March 2013)) or (ii) did not provide any "proof of a demonstrable nexus" between the relevant employee's departure and the sanctionable conduct at issue (Decision No. 56 ¶ 67 (June 2013)).

Similarly, in two recent decisions arising out of the same World Bank-funded project, the Sanctions Board denied mitigating credit for voluntary corrective actions taken by respondents on the basis that the claimed corrective actions did not adequately target the staff actually involved in the misconduct. In one of the decisions, respondent claimed mitigating credit for having filed a police report and terminating its relationship with the agent who had issued allegedly forged bid securities; neither of which — the Sanctions Board found — addressed misconduct arising "within the Respondent's own staff or operations." (Decision No. 67, ¶ 39 (June 2014).) In the other decision, respondent claimed mitigating credit for having issued a warning letter against its finance and deputy finance director. The Sanctions Board again denied mitigating credit for the lack of disciplinary measures taken against the marketing staff, which

had allegedly processed the tender as well as (lower-echelon) finance staff, which had processed the bid securities. (Decision No. 68 ¶ 39 (June 2014).)

○ Cooperation with INT

The Sanctions Board expects respondent companies to cooperate with INT during the investigation, and may scrutinize the type and extent of assistance provided. For example, in Decision No. 69, the Board found that the record revealed “a certain degree of responsiveness on the part of the Respondent at its interviews” but noted that it was “not clear whether the documents that the Respondent provided to INT relate to these sanctions proceedings.” On this basis, the Board found that the “record does not show sufficient cooperation to warrant mitigation.” (Decision No. 69 ¶ 41 (June 2014).)

The Sanctions Board will also warrant aggravation for particularly uncooperative actions by respondents. In Decision No. 56, for example, the Board criticized an infrastructure project management consultant for “interference in the Bank’s investigation” that allegedly included attempts to destroy evidence of improper gifts and expenditures involving government officials, misrepresent the date that the company entered into a “marketing fee” arrangement with sub-consultant, and deny INT access to relevant financial information regarding that marketing fee. (Decision No. 56, ¶¶ 57-62 (June 2013).) Furthermore, the Sanctions Board conditioned the release of the sanctioned company from one-year debarment on not only adopting and implementing an effective integrity compliance program, but also on demonstrating that the respondent consultant “cooperated with INT by providing the results of all internal investigations relating to the sanctionable practices in this case.” (Decision No. 56 ¶ 89 (June 2013).)

It is of note that respondents may obtain mitigating credit for their eventual cooperation with INT’s investigation even if they initially impeded INT’s investigation efforts. In Decision No. 60, the Sanctions Board found the respondent director and respondent commercial manager (and the associated respondent entity via the theory of *respondeat superior*) culpable of obstruction for having ordered the deletion of emails before INT’s audit. Ultimately, however, these respondents were awarded “significant” mitigating credit for having (i) met with INT and admitted misconduct; (ii) provided inculpatory evidence and (iii) made efforts to retrieve previously deleted emails. (Decision No. 60, ¶ 133 (September 2013).) Similarly, in Case No. 63, the Sanctions Board found that attempts by a respondent entity’s employees to interfere with INT’s investigation warranted aggravation, while also applying mitigation for subsequent efforts by respondent entity’s management to correct the employees actions. (Decision No. 63, ¶¶ 102 and 110 (January 2014).)

○ Effect of Mitigating and Aggravating Factors

Finally, the published decisions demonstrate that mitigation credit can indeed be meaningful. Even though the World Bank’s sanctioning guidelines set a three-year debarment with conditional release as a “baseline” sanction, one decision imposed as sanction a conditional one-year debarment that would only take effect if the company did not provide financial restitution and implement an effective integrity compliance program. (Decision No. 53 (September 2012).) In that case, the Sanctions Board provided mitigating credit for the

implementation of an enhanced compliance program, a voluntary offer of financial restitution, and a change in the company's management, as well as a significant passage of time since the improper conduct had occurred.

More poignantly, the sanction in Decision No. 63 was reduced from a three-year debarment with conditional release to a six months retroactive, non-conditional debarment in large part due to a multitude of mitigating factors, including internal action taken against the responsible individual, the establishment of an effective compliance program, assistance with INT's investigation, ongoing cooperation and the conducting of an adequate internal investigation. (Decision No. 63 ¶¶ 106-107, ¶¶ 109-110, ¶ 112 (January 2014).)

The significance of mitigation credit is also evident from the increased sanctions levied when such factors are absent. In Decision No. 50, for example, the Sanctions Board found that a corporate member of a consulting consortium engaged in corrupt practices by offering and soliciting an improper payment to public officials to influence the selection of a contract for a Thailand-based project. In reaching its decision, the Board noted applicable aggravating factors such as did not provide any mitigating credit in connection with common voluntary corrective actions, such as a sufficient and independent internal investigation, the implementation of an enhanced corporate compliance program, cessation of misconduct, disciplinary actions against responsible employees, and assistance and cooperation with the INT investigation. The lack of applicable mitigating credit, coupled with the application of several aggravating factors (such as the harm caused to the project) was reflected in the more severe sanction: a debarment of five years with conditional release (or two years more than the baseline.) (Decision No. 50 ¶¶ 57-71 (May 2012).)

More recently, in Decision No. 69, the Sanctions Board found that respondent had engaged in a fraudulent practice by submitting forged bid documents and imposed a five-and-a-half-year debarment with conditional release, up from the three-year period of ineligibility recommended by the OSD. In imposing this sanction, the Sanctions Board noted, among other things, (i) the lack of evidence pointing to an internal compliance program and (ii) the limited assistance provided to INT by respondent. (Decision No. 69 ¶¶ 39, 41 (June 2014).) What's more, the respondent in this case failed "to acknowledge any responsibility for or knowledge of the fraudulent practice, despite credible evidence indicating that [respondent submitted forged bid documents]" which the Board concluded "demonstrates a lack of candor ... that warrants aggravation." (Decision No. 69 ¶ 45 (June 2014).)

- *Recent World Bank Developments and Ongoing Reforms*

The World Bank continues to actively seek ways to improve its sanctions regime as illustrated by the developments described below.

- *Creation of Good Governance Group within the Bank*

In a speech held on December 19, 2013, World Bank president Jim Yong Kim boldly declared corruption to be "public enemy number one" in developing countries and, as a sign of the World Bank's increased anti-corruption enforcement efforts, announced the establishment of

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a global “good governance” group. The group, intended to play a key role within the World Bank, will regroup “a single pool of technical experts in rule of law, public sector, financial and state management, and public procurement.” Further details on the start of the group’s operations, as well as the specific responsibilities of the group, are yet to be disclosed.

- *Cooperation with other MDBs and International and National Anti-Corruption Authorities*

The Sanctions Procedures specify that the World Bank may, at any time and under certain conditions, make materials obtained in the course of an investigation and/or sanctions proceedings available to “another multilateral development bank or other international or multinational organization, or to national development agencies or prosecuting authorities of its member countries.” In line with this concept of cooperation, which is part of the very framework of the sanctions regime, the World Bank has continuously strengthened and developed its network of external alliances in the fight against corruption and other types of misconduct.

The World Bank has spearheaded anti-corruption reforms across other MDBs and continues to do so. On September 17, 2006, the World Bank Group, the African Development Bank Group (“AfDB”), the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”), the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”), the European Investment Bank Group (“EIB”), the Inter-American Development Bank Group (“IDB”), and the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) entered into a landmark agreement that, among other things, harmonized their definitions of fraudulent and corrupt practices and their investigative processes, as well as promoted the exchange of information relating to investigations of such practices.

The resulting cooperation among several of these institutions was enhanced by the April 2010 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions between the AfDB Group, ADB, EBRD, the IDB, and the World Bank. Under this agreement, each participating institution agreed to enforce debarment decisions by other participating institutions when the period of debarment is more than one year.

Far from limiting cooperation to other MDBs, the World Bank is also the driving force behind many cooperation efforts involving national and international anti-corruption authorities and actors. In particular, the World Bank— mostly through Leonard McCarthy, the Vice President of INT — has signed over 40 cooperation agreements in support of parallel investigations, information sharing and asset recovery with anti-corruption authorities including the UK Serious Fraud Office, the City of London Police, the European Anti-Fraud Office (“OLAF”), Interpol, the Korean Supreme Prosecutor’s Office, the Ethiopian Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission, the Philippine Ombudsman and the Liberian Anti-Corruption Commission. Most recently, in June 2014, INT and the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague signed a Memorandum of Understanding that further strengthens the general cooperation and information sharing between the respective offices.

The collaboration between the World Bank and national and international authorities has very real consequences for companies and individuals under investigation, as illustrated by Sanctions Board Decision No. 72. The case underlying this decision arose in connection with

two World Bank-funded projects in Iraq, for which respondents submitted successful bids with the assistance of a local agent. Among other things, INT alleged that respondents engaged in corrupt practices by offering and/or paying the agent a commission with the expectation that these funds would be used to influence procurement officials working on the projects. The Sanctions Board sided with INT, relying on email correspondence in which the agent stated that part of the commission would be used to make payments to a project manager. The email correspondence, which proved to be a crucial piece of evidence, had been referred to INT by national authorities shortly before the scheduled hearing and accepted by the Sanctions Board as additional evidence.

Conversely, World Bank investigations and/or proceedings can also have a “spill over” effect and trigger criminal proceedings in the cooperating countries. In fiscal year 2012 alone, the Bank made 46 referrals of findings to national authorities and agencies in over 30 countries, ten of which triggered investigations by the concerned authorities. The case of SNC-Lavalin Group (“SNC-Lavalin”) — which INT’s Vice President Leonard McCarthy called “a testimony to collective action against global corruption” — serves as a good case in point to understand the potentially wide-reaching ripple effects caused by referrals to national authorities.

On April 17, 2013, the Bank entered into an NRA with SNC-Lavalin, a Canadian engineering firm, to settle allegations that a subsidiary, SNC-Lavalin Inc. (“SLI”) had bribed officials in Bangladesh and Cambodia. As part of the agreement, the subsidiary was barred from bidding on Bank-financed projects for ten years, the longest debarment ever imposed by the World Bank in a negotiated settlement. Once the World Bank had sufficient evidence of SLI’s misconduct, the matter was referred to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police while INT was finalizing its investigation. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police not only helped INT in its investigation (*e.g.* by reportedly raiding SLI’s office in Oakville, Ontario in September 2011 at the request of the World Bank) but also brought domestic criminal charges against a number of the company’s executives. Specifically, on January 31, 2014, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police filed bribery and fraud charges against two former senior SLI executives (former vice-president, Stephane Roy, and former executive vice-president, Sami Abdallah Bebawi.) This followed the arrest of former CEO Pierre Duhaime and the charging of two other executives in 2012, and the extradition, ordered by a Swiss court, of former SLI executive Riadh Ben Aissa in August 2013.

○ *Increasing Transparency*

The World Bank has also taken steps to increase the accountability and the transparency of the sanctions regime. INT has published annual reports and updates on its investigatory activities reaching back to fiscal year 2004. On June 25, 2014, the World Bank’s Office of Suspension and Debarment released its first public report on its suspension and debarment activities from 2007 through June 30, 2013. The report describes the “lessons learned” and contains valuable statistics on the cases reviewed by the OSD. For example, the report provides a detailed breakdown of (i) the number of firms/individuals temporarily suspended by the OSD since 2008 (239 firms and individuals in total, including five early temporary suspensions issued in the past two fiscal years), (ii) the cases/settlements received by typology of sanctionable

practice (fraud 86%, corruption 14%, collusion 9%, obstruction 2%, coercion 1%) and (iii) the duration of cases from the date of the earliest investigative activity reflected in the case exhibits until the date of the final decision by the OSD (uncontested cases) or the Sanctions Board (contested cases.)

- ***Ongoing Review of the Sanctions Regime (2011-2014)***

Perhaps the most important ongoing reform effort undertaken by the World Bank consists of the formal, two-phase review of the Bank's sanctions regime (the "Review"). The first phase of the Review, concluded on October 31, 2013, included a stock-taking exercise of the Bank's sanctions regime, which sought feedback from stakeholders both internal (*e.g.* INT, the OSD and the Sanction Board Secretariat) and external (*e.g.* contractors and consultants regularly participating in World Bank projects, country officials involved in the implementation of such projects, academics, defense counsel *etc.*)

The World Bank collected and organized the feedback obtained in a "feedback summary" table, which is publicly available on the World Bank's website. According to the feedback summary, recurring comments by participants centered on the importance of respondents' due process rights. Specifically, participants stressed the need for "a high standard of safeguards and due process in order to protect less experienced businesses from mistakes or from pressure from investigation and debarment proceedings."

- *Evidentiary Issues*

Many of the due process concerns noted by the consultation participants relate to INT's disclosure of evidence. Under the Sanctions Procedures, INT is required to present all evidence in its position "that would reasonably tend to exculpate the Respondent or mitigate the Respondent's culpability." Moreover, the Sanctions Procedures' default presumption is that all parties to the proceedings will receive copies of all evidence presented. Only limited exceptions are provided which allow INT to withhold or redact sensitive materials from respondents or request that such evidence be reviewed by respondents *in camera*.

Participants consulted as part of the Review identified INT's "disclosure of exculpatory and/or mitigating evidence" as an area of improvement and emphasized that "companies should get the full record of the investigation." This feedback echoes developments in recent sanctions proceedings, where respondents have increasingly (albeit not always successfully) challenged the notion that INT has submitted all exculpatory evidence available to it (Decision No. 63 ¶¶ 40-41 (January 2014)) and/or that the withholding or redaction of sensitive materials by INT prevented respondents from mounting a meaningful defense (Decision No. 60 ¶¶ 49-53 (September 2013), No. 63 ¶¶ 42-47 (January 2014), No. 64 ¶ 32 (March 2014).)

The consultation participants also noted INT's method of conducting witness interviews and the accuracy of interview recordings as a potential area of improvement. Again, this feedback is mirrored by recent Sanctions Board decisions. For instance, in Sanctions Board Decision 64, the Sanctions Board dismissed INT's allegations that respondent had engaged in corrupt practices based on evidentiary grounds. Specifically, the Board held that INT had failed

to carry its burden of proof by relying heavily on incomplete and “extremely condensed” records of interviews with witnesses, which stood in stark contrast to the “detailed assertions” respondent made in the proceedings. (Decision No. 64 ¶¶ 35 and 38 (March 2014).)

○ Notification of Sanctions Proceedings and Early Temporary Suspensions

Another important due process concern voiced by the consultation participants in their feedback relates to the notice of sanctions proceedings. In particular, the consultation participants suggested that “INT should routinely notify potential respondents about its plans to initiate a sanctions proceeding and give that party an opportunity to be heard. As a model, the Bank could look at the approach of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) whereby the commission sends respondents a letter (a ‘Wells Notice’) giving them the opportunity to provide information as to why the enforcement action should not be brought against them.” The World Bank has since communicated its intention to make greater use of “show cause” letters to notify respondents of imminent procedures against them.

In the same vein, consultation participants cautioned against the trend to mainstream early temporary suspensions, issued before INT has concluded its investigation. Emphasizing the “potentially damaging and irreversible consequences” to the companies involved, the participants noted that the Bank should “ensure more proportionality” when issuing early temporary suspensions. Among other things, participants suggested that “where misconduct is limited to a business unit, the whole corporate group should not be impacted” by the early temporary suspension.

According to the Review’s consultation plan, the second phase of the Review will use the findings of the stock-taking exercise undertaken in the first phase to address “the larger, first-principle issues of the overall efficiency and effectiveness of the system.”

• AfDB Anti-Corruption Enforcement

While the World Bank is undoubtedly the MDB most actively engaged in anti-corruption enforcements, other MDBs, such as the AfDB, are also stepping up their efforts. Indeed, as mentioned above, the AfDB has not only cross-debarred 391 firms and individuals by virtue of being a signatory to the April 2010 Agreement for Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions, recent developments illustrate that the AfDB is successfully starting to put its own sanctions system into practice.

○ Overview

The AfDB’s sanctions system is currently laid out in the April 2013 version of the AfDB sanctions procedures. With a few exceptions, the AfDB’s sanctions procedures largely mirror the World Bank’s procedures, in part due to the MDBs’ efforts to harmonize their respective anti-corruption enforcement frameworks. Like the World Bank, the AfDB has jurisdiction to investigate and sanction five types of sanctionable practices, *i.e.* fraud, corruption, collusion, obstruction and/or coercion committed during the procurement or implementation of a project financed by the AfDB. Similarly, the AfDB proceedings are centered around one

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investigative/prosecutorial body and a two-tiered adjudicatory system with two distinct adjudicators.

The Integrity and Anti-Corruption Department (“IACD”) is the investigative body of the AfDB in charge of receiving and assessing allegations of sanctionable conduct. If the allegations are deemed sufficiently credible, material and verifiable, and the IACD, after its investigation, concludes that at least one sanctionable practice was committed, the IACD will present its findings to the Sanctions Commissioner, the AfDB’s first-level adjudicator.

Upon receiving the IACD’s findings, the Sanctions Commissioner will make a *prima facie* assessment and either reject the case on the basis of insufficient evidence or accept the case and issue a Notice of Sanctions Proceedings to the respondents. The Sanctions Commissioner may also “make an independent determination of [an additional] Sanctionable Practice based on the evidence provided by IACD.” Moreover, unlike under World Bank proceedings, the Sanctions Commissioner will not recommend any sanctions in the Notice but simply refer the respondents to the range of possible sanctions (from letters of reprimand to debarments, with debarments with conditional release being the baseline sanction).

If the respondents chose not to contest the allegations brought by the IACD, the Sanctions Commissioner will decide the case on the basis of IACD’s evidence only; if the respondents submit a response to IACD’s allegations, the Sanctions Commissioner will take into consideration both respondents and IACD’s submissions to determine whether or not respondents committed a sanctionable practice. In both cases, the preponderance of the evidence (*i.e.* more likely than not) serves as the standard of proof. The procedures specify that the Sanctions Commissioner may make requests for clarifications to the IACD and/or the respondents before issuing its final decision.

The respondents may appeal any decision rendered by the Sanctions Commissioner against them to the AfDB’s Appeals Board, which will review the case *de novo*. The Appeals Board is composed of three members, of which one is internal to the AfDB (appointed by the AfDB’s President among senior staff members of the AfDB) and two are external (nominated by the President and appointed by the AfDB’s Board). As a default rule, the Appeals Board will render a final and binding decision on the basis of the IACD’s and the respondents’ written submissions only. Specifically, the AfDB procedures indicate that the parties “have no right to an oral hearing,” and any request to hold a hearing by the parties shall be granted by the Appeals Board on a discretionary basis. At least in theory, this differentiates AfDB’s sanctions procedures from the World Bank procedures, where requested hearings are granted as a matter of course.

After final determination by the Sanctions Commissioner or the Appeals Board, as the case may be, AfDB will publicly disclose the identities of the sanctioned parties, the sanctionable practices in question and the sanctions imposed (except letters of reprimand). The AfDB procedures do not provide for the publication of the full decisions by the Sanctions Commissioner or the Appeals Board; instead summaries of the said decisions are disclosed.

○ Temporary Suspensions and Settlement Negotiations in the AfDB system

Like the prosecutorial arms of other MDBs as well as national enforcement authorities, IACD is equipped with several legal tools and mechanisms designed to facilitate the AfDB's anti-corruption enforcement mission.

First, IACD has the ability to request a temporary suspension of respondents at the time it presents its findings to the Sanctions Commissioner or before the conclusion of an investigation; similar to the temporary and early temporary suspension mechanisms afforded to INT at the World Bank. Importantly, the AfDB procedures specify that IACD may request a suspension of the entity prior to the conclusion of an investigation if it "believes that continuous eligibility of the subject of the investigations would cause *imminent financial or reputational harm*" to the AfDB (emphasis added). This requirement of urgency and imminent threat is a common *sine qua none* condition of temporary restraining order-type mechanisms across common or civil, private or administrative systems of law. Note, however, that it marks another point of distinction between the AfDB's system and the World Bank procedures, where the decision to grant an early temporary suspension appears to depend mainly on the gravity of the underlying conduct, not on the urgency of the situation.

Negotiated settlements are another mechanism forming part of the legal toolkit available to IACD under the AfDB's sanctions procedures. Specifically, the AfDB procedures grant IACD authority to resolve cases of alleged sanctionable practices by entering into a negotiated settlement agreement with the accused parties. Again, the procedure is similar to the procedure set out under the World Bank sanctions system, in that settlements negotiated between IACD and the respondents are subject to the review of the Sanctions Commissioner and the AfDB's General Counsel, who will ensure that the terms of the payment are fair and proportionate. While the terms of each settlement may vary (imposition or not of a debarment period, potential cooperation with the IACD in future investigations, implementation or improvement of an anti-corruption compliance program), all settlements must include the respondent's full admission of guilt and the facts underlying the offence.

***OECD Reports***

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ("OECD") has recently taken several steps aimed at increasing the anti-corruption enforcement efforts of member countries and signatories to the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention").

The Working Group's Annual Report 2014, released in September 2014, showed that 117 individuals and 21 companies had been criminally sanctioned under provisions prohibiting foreign bribery during 2013. The Report noted that there were an estimated 390 investigations underway in 24 countries, and that 142 additional individuals and companies were facing criminal charges in 11 countries for charges under the convention.

The data provided with the Report, however, indicates that only 17 of the 40 signatory parties had actually issued sanctions, and less than half of all parties to the convention had begun

any investigations. This data appears to weigh heavily on the OECD. As the Phase 3 reports discussed below show, the Working Group has criticized those countries who have failed to launch sufficient anti-corruption enforcement actions to date.

Additionally, the OECD released its first Foreign Bribery Report on December 2, 2014, summarizing and analyzing trends from all foreign bribery enforcement actions that have been concluded since the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“OECD Convention”) entered into force. The Report was prepared with the goal of assisting the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Transactions and the G20 Working Group in efforts to combat bribery.

Details are provided below regarding this report and the country-specific working group reports that the OECD has issued in 2013 and 2014.

- *OECD Foreign Bribery Report*

The OECD’s Foreign Bribery Report analyzed sanctions for foreign bribery and related preparatory or participatory offenses against 427 individuals and corporate defendants between February 15, 1999, and June 1, 2014, to provide a fact-based illustration of the crime of foreign bribery. The Report provided key findings and detailed enforcement trends in enforcement, together with its recommendations for the OECD. Although the findings are instructive, it is important to remember that they reflect statistics of successfully prosecuted cases, and therefore do not include instances of bribery that were not prosecuted or which went undiscovered.

- *Key Findings*

The Report found that a majority of sanctions took place in specific industries rather than specific countries. For example, 59% of the cases examined occurred in the extractive (19%), construction (15%), transportation and storage (15%) and information and communication (10%) industries. Additionally, challenging the notion that the vast majority of bribery occurs in developing nations, the Report found that 43% of cases involved public officials from countries with either high (22%) or very high (21%) levels of human development based on the UN Human Development Index.

The Report also listed categories of public officials that had been more likely to receive bribes. In a majority of the cases reviewed, the public officials involved were employees of state-owned enterprises (27%), customs officials (11%), health officials (7%), or defense officials (6%). Employees of state-owned enterprises received 80% of the total amount paid as bribes. Heads of state and ministers received bribes less frequently, but the bribes that they did accept tended to be much larger in value — although they received only 5% of the number of bribes paid, these together accounted for 11% of the total value of bribes paid. By contrast, customs officials received 11% of the total number of bribes paid, these only accounted for 1.14% of the total value of bribes paid.

The parties that had paid the bribes also fit a certain profile. The Report found that 60% of the sanctioned companies had more than 250 employees and that in 53% of the cases

examined a corporate-management level employee or the CEO was either involved or knew of the bribes being paid. The Report cited these statistics to disprove the theory that bribery is usually the result of a rogue employee's actions, and to demonstrate the need for top-level management to set a clear tone to prevent bribery.

Another key finding of the Report confirmed what many already suspected: bribes were usually paid through an intermediary. In 41% of cases reviewed, bribes were paid through local sales, marketing, or distribution agents, and in another 35% of cases, bribes were paid through corporate vehicles such as subsidiaries, local consulting firms, and offshore companies.

More often than not, the reviewed cases involved improper payments to obtain public procurement contracts (57%). Other popular motivations including passing customs regulations (12%) or receiving favorable tax treatment (6%) or a special license or authorization (6%).

- Enforcement Trends

The Report also identified certain current trends in enforcement. According to the Report, a third of all investigations were initiated by self-reporting. Among these cases, more than half were discovered through internal audits or through due diligence related to mergers and acquisitions, and nearly one-sixth started with internal whistleblowers. Approximately 13% of the cases had been initiated directly by enforcement agencies, and only 2% stemmed from whistleblower reports to government authorities. The Report also found that most cases (69%) ended in settlement rather than a conviction (31%).

The Report showed that investigations and prosecutions typically took several years to conclude, and the time necessary has only increased over the years. Whereas it took an average of 2 years to progress from a criminal act to a sanction in 1999, it took over 7 years for cases concluded in 2013.

- Recommendations

The Report makes a number of preliminary conclusions based on its review of the data, including with respect to the need for (i) increased availability of information, (ii) increased whistleblower mechanisms, (iii) due diligence, and (iv) integrity in public procurement. First, the Report noted that there were significant gaps in the data set due to the lack of publicly available information related to many concluded foreign bribery cases, and it recommended that enforcement agencies provide more detailed and transparent information regarding the individuals involved and the relevant conduct. Second, the Report recommended that companies should seek to introduce and implement whistleblowing mechanisms, noting that while 17% of all self-reporting cases originated from an internal whistleblower, only one of those cases involved a company had an established whistleblower hotline or procedure at the time. Third, the Report stressed the importance of an effective due diligence process to any compliance program giving the large percentage of improper payments that had been made through intermediaries. Fourth, in referencing the high number of cases in which bribes were paid in public procurement, the Report noted a need for greater awareness on both sides of the procurement process of the apparent risks and temptations involved.

- Phase 1 Working Group Reports

**Latvia:** On May 30, 2014, Latvia became the 41st Party to the OECD Convention, joining Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Russia and South Africa as non-OECD member countries that are nonetheless Parties to the Convention. Latvia's domestic implementing legislation came into force on March 21, 2014, and the OECD Working Group on Bribery conducted a Phase 1 review to evaluate its implementation of the Convention.

The Working Group found that "Latvia's legislation largely conforms to the standards of the Convention," subject to a number of issues to be analyzed further during the Phase 2 review. Those issues include whether Latvian law adequately distinguishes between an "offer" and a "promise" of a bribe; the extent to which a "foreign country's administrative unit" includes "all levels and subdivisions of government [...]" for the purposes of the definition of "foreign public official;" and the difference in penalty when the bribe is made through an intermediary, which carries a shorter maximum incarceration period than the penalty for a bribe paid directly. The report also recommended that Latvia amend its legislation to calibrate the scope of Latvia's territorial jurisdiction so that foreign bribery can effectively be prosecuted. Regarding enforcement mechanisms, the report noted that Latvian law provides "no legal obligation to record a detailed decision not to initiate proceedings because an investigator will decide not to initiate proceedings only when it is clear that a criminal offence has not been committed." The report pointed out that "Latvia cannot commence criminal proceedings based on anonymous information or unsourced information [...]." These issues will be monitored during Phase 2.

- Phase 2 Working Group Reports

**Russia:** In October 2013, the OECD Working Group released its Phase 2 Report on Russia's implementation of the OECD Convention. At the outset, the report noted that "[w]hile Russia has undertaken efforts to implement the Convention, the Working Group remains concerned that Russia has not responded to key Phase 1 recommendations." The report noted that "[t]he Working Group is particularly concerned by the deficiencies in Russian law on the foreign bribery offence and urges Russia to adopt appropriate legislation as a matter of high priority." Notably, the report called on Russia to eliminate the defense of "effective regret." The report also recommended that Russia take measures to ensure that the "false accounting offences cover all of the activities described in the Convention and are subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive sanctions."

According to the Working Group, as of October 2013, no cases of foreign bribery had been "detected, investigated or prosecuted." The report found that this "inadequacy could be addressed if Russia devoted sufficient resources specifically to the enforcement of foreign bribery and adopted a more proactive approach to its detection and investigation." Finally, the report noted a number of positive developments, including (i) a new obligation for diplomatic personnel stationed abroad to report suspected foreign bribery; (ii) a statutory obligation for companies operating in Russia to implement anti-corruption programs; and (iii) Russia's assistance to other parties of the Convention in their investigations of foreign bribery allegations.

- Phase 3 and Follow-Up Reports

In 2013 and 2014, the OECD Working Group on Bribery completed a number of Phase 3 monitoring reports, which focus on a country's enforcement of the OECD Convention, the 2009 Anti-Bribery Recommendations, and any outstanding recommendations from the Phase 2 reviews. In a number of instances, the Working Group identified "serious concerns" with the ongoing implementation of the Convention — mostly in connection with the failure of member states to sufficiently investigate or prosecute violations of their anti-corruption laws.

**Argentina:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Argentina in December 2014. As with many other countries under review, the Working Group stated that it was "gravely concerned about Argentina's commitment to fight foreign bribery" in light of its failure to implement previous recommendations issued in 2001. The Working Group criticized the country not only for failing to make substantial progress with open investigations, but for also not seeking the cooperation of foreign authorities in connection with those investigations. While acknowledging some limited efforts made by the country (such as a court-established panel of experts to support corruption cases), the Working Group also expressed concerns about judicial independence, the country's ability to detect foreign bribery, and a lack of whistleblower protections.

**Belgium:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Belgium in October 2013, following a Phase 2 evaluation that had been conducted in 2005. Generally, the Working Group noted that it was "disappointed by the lack of priority Belgium gives to the fight against bribery of foreign public officials by Belgian individuals and companies." Stressing that "not a single Belgian national or company has ever been prosecuted in a foreign bribery case," the Working Group stated that it was "seriously concerned by the flagrant lack of resources" devoted to investigations and prosecutions of foreign bribery cases, which "leads to investigations not being opened, cases being closed and the expiry of the statute of limitations."

The Working Group stated that it was "concerned that the Belgian authorities take into account factors such as exceeding a 'reasonable time limit,' which is shorter than the statutory limitation period, in decisions to open investigations or at sentencing stage in foreign bribery cases." The Working Group expressed its disappointment that Belgium had not acted to correct a number of problems with its national implementing legislation identified in the Phase 2 Report. The Working Group also noted that recently-adopted whistleblower protections do not extend to public and private sector employees who report "suspected acts of foreign bribery to the competent authorities."

**Brazil:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Brazil on October 16, 2014. The report commended Brazil on the enactment of its new anti-corruption law and for the recent indictments of individuals for corruption-related offenses as part of *Operation Car Wash* (see Focus Issues, above). Nevertheless, the report noted that the Working Group remained concerned about the relatively low enforcement levels, as well as the country's "proactivity in detecting, investigating, and prosecuting foreign bribery." As noted in the Focus Issue section

above, the Working Group recommended that Brazil issue its announced Presidential Decree to implement the new anti-corruption law and allow for proper enforcement.

**Chile:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Chile in March 2013. The report stated that the Working Group was “concerned that Chile has not sufficiently investigated several foreign bribery allegations.” Additionally, the Working Group suggested that Chile “raise awareness of Article 5 of the Convention [which states that foreign bribery investigations must not be influenced by economic interest, international relations, or personal identity] among Chilean judges, prosecutors, investigators and relevant government officials.” The report also recommended that Chile clarify existing law and provide “provide additional guidance on what constitutes an effective model for preventing foreign bribery, particularly in light of “the pace at which companies in Chile are seeking certifications.”

**Czech Republic:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on the Czech Republic in March 2013. While the Working Group praised the Czech Republic’s adoption of “a comprehensive corporate liability regime,” it also stated that “effective enforcement could be much enhanced” by raising awareness of foreign bribery risks with key actors including private companies, auditors, and accountants. In this respect, the report found a “serious deficiency in the engagement between the Czech government and the Czech private sector.” The Working Group recommended that more should be done to increase awareness of reporting obligations and the importance of developing and administering compliance programs.

**Denmark:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Denmark in March 2013. The report noted positively that efforts that Denmark has recently undertaken to implement the Convention, and praised Denmark’s mechanisms for obtaining tax and bank information, noting an increase in suspicious money laundering transaction reports and sanctions for failure to report. The Working Group nonetheless expressed concern regarding the lack of enforcement and the lack of implementation of certain Phase 2 recommendations. It noted that “foreign bribery cases should be investigated and prosecuted even in the absence of parallel investigations in foreign jurisdictions.” The Working Group recommended, among of other things, that Denmark “enhance the usage of, and train law enforcement authorities on, corporate liability provisions in foreign bribery cases.”

**Estonia:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Estonia in June 2014. The Working Group commended certain Estonian efforts to implement the Convention, including multiple amendments to its Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure and the passage of the Anti-Corruption Act of 2012, which included whistleblower protections for public sector employees.

At the same time, however, the Working Group stressed its concern that a general “lack of awareness of foreign bribery risks prevails among Estonian public officials and the private sector alike,” which in part explained why, “since becoming a Party to the Convention in 2005, Estonia has not investigated or prosecuted any foreign bribery cases, despite available information of allegations of bribery of foreign public officials committed by Estonian individuals or companies.” The Working Group added that some of its concerns regarding

insufficient enforcement would be alleviated if the “amendments in the law currently still before Parliament are adopted and the offense streamlined.” The report also recommended that the corporate liability regime be improved and that enforcement officers be trained.

**France:** The OECD Working Group issued a Follow-Up to its Phase 3 Report on December 19, 2014. The Working Group commended France on making significant reforms to its anti-corruption legislative framework (see the Focus Issue of this Alert above), noting in particular that private anti-corruption organizations could now file civil party claims. At the same time, however, the Working Group found that France’s enforcement efforts “still falls far short.” Additionally, the Working Group criticized the current legal framework that only permitted the Public Prosecutor’s Office to launch an enforcement action with respect to offenses committed outside France if the victim filed a complaint or the foreign authority made an official accusation. The OECD also criticized France for failing to enact any amendments to ensure that the country’s “blocking statute” does not raise obstacles to investigations conducted by other regulators.

**Hungary:** The OECD Working Group issued a Follow-Up to its Phase 3 Report on July 31, 2014. The Working Group noted that the Magyar Telekom case was ongoing, but added that Hungarian enforcement authorities have not opened any new bribery investigations in the previous two years. The Working Group also expressed concerns about the potentially broad immunities from investigations and prosecutions permitted under Hungarian law. The Working Group also noted several positive developments, including (i) increased resources for the public prosecution service, (ii) the provision of training to police with respect to violations of the anti-corruption laws, (iii) legislative enhancements to Hungary’s anti-corruption laws, and (iv) new whistleblower protections.

**Ireland:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Ireland in December 2013. As with other countries discussed above, the report noted that the Working Group had “serious concerns that Ireland has not prosecuted a foreign bribery case in the twelve years since its foreign bribery offence came into force.” The Working Group recommended that Ireland “urgently reorganize law enforcement resources in a manner that credible allegations of foreign bribery will be investigated and prosecuted in a timely and effective manner.” The report noted that Irish rules on corporate liability remain inadequate. It highlighted that Irish law maintains two foreign bribery offences in separate and inconsistent statutes, including disparate levels of sanctions, and stated that these two statutes “still not been consolidated and harmonized” in accordance with Article 1 of the Convention. The report notes that general awareness of bribery issues and reporting mechanisms in both the public and the private sectors should be strengthened.

**Japan:** The Follow-Up to Japan’s Phase 3 Report was issued on February 5, 2014. Echoing its common theme, the Working Group stated that it had “significant concerns about the low level of foreign bribery enforcement in Japan,” particularly in light of numerous published allegations involving Japanese companies. At the same time, the Working Group noted several areas of encouragement, including steps taken to share information other enforcement agencies

on foreign bribery cases, the provision of targeted training to Japan's overseas missions with respect to bribery, and various efforts to raise awareness in the private sector.

**New Zealand:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on New Zealand in October 2013. The report praised certain positive developments in New Zealand, including the adoption of a whistleblower protection law, a new anti-money laundering regime, and certain legislative steps to address weaknesses in its foreign bribery offence legislation.

The Working Group also stressed, however, that it had "serious concerns about the lack of enforcement of the foreign bribery offence," noting that "[s]ince 2001, New Zealand has not prosecuted any foreign bribery case," and that New Zealand opened its first foreign bribery investigation only in July 2013. The report cited the low number of foreign bribery allegations involving New Zealand as an indication of a lack of awareness of the problem combined with inaccurate and "outdated perceptions that New Zealand individuals and companies do not engage in bribery," which in turn "undermine detection efforts." The Working Group called on New Zealand to train law enforcement officials and take measures to increase enforcement while developing awareness campaigns to ensure that "suspicions of foreign bribery are reported to competent authorities, including by auditors and tax examiners."

**Poland:** The Working Group conducted its Phase 3 review of Poland in 2013, following its Phase 2 evaluation in 2007. The report highlighted the Working Group's regrets that "Poland has not successfully prosecuted a foreign bribery case in the twelve and a half years since its foreign bribery offence came into force." The report noted that "due to increasing international business activities by Polish companies, the risk of foreign bribery could increase in the medium to long term."

Among the Phase 2 recommendations that Poland still has not implemented include recommendations on (i) the "impunity provision in the foreign bribery offence, which "allows perpetrators of bribery to automatically escape punishment by notifying the law enforcement authorities of the offence before the authorities learn about it from other sources"; (ii) the effectiveness of the liability of legal persons; and (iii) the tax treatment of bribe payments.

The report recommended that Poland set forth an "investigation and prosecution strategy for foreign bribery cases to address concerns about whether adequate resources and expertise are available to effectively investigate and prosecute highly complex cases, and the extraordinary length of proceedings for corruption cases in Poland." Additionally, the report called upon Poland to take measures to increase the general awareness of foreign bribery risks, including within the accounting and auditing professions. The report recommended that Poland revise its whistleblower law, and that public procurement and export credit agencies should check whether applicants have been listed on international financial institutions' debarment lists to decide whether to conduct enhanced due diligence. The Working Group also recommended that the Polish tax law contain a clear statement that bribes to foreign officials are not tax-deductible.

**Portugal:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Portugal in June 2013. Once again, the report noted that the Working Group was "seriously concerned that Portugal's enforcement of the foreign bribery offence has been extremely low." The Working

Group highlighted that “[d]espite Portugal’s strong economic links to countries plagued by severe corruption, only 15 foreign bribery allegations have surfaced since 2001, [which] have not resulted in a single prosecution to date.”

The Working Group recommended that Portugal “review its overall approach to enforcing its foreign bribery laws,” including by investigating more pro-actively and by seeking assistance from foreign authorities where appropriate. The report noted that factors prohibited under Article 5 of the Convention may influence the risk that foreign bribery exacerbated concerns about low enforcement. The Group also suggested that Portugal should further raise awareness and promote corporate compliance programs to prevent foreign bribery; make efforts to detect, prevent and prosecute money laundering by politically exposed persons, strengthen whistleblower protection in the private and private sector; and that “corporate liability for foreign bribery should be extended to state-owned or controlled enterprises.”

**Slovak Republic:** The OECD Working Group released a Follow-Up to its Phase 3 Report on November 28, 2014, noting that the country had “implemented the majority of [its] Phase 3 recommendations.” The Working Group added, however, that certain key recommendations had not been implemented, including with respect to establishing an offense of corporate liability (covered in a draft law that had not yet been adopted) and amending the law to ensure that the offense of foreign bribery covers the bribery of officials from public international organizations. The Follow-Up Report also noted that the country “has still not prosecuted a case of the bribery of foreign public officials.”

**Slovenia:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on Slovenia in June 2014. The Working Group expressed “serious concerns about the lack of enforcement of, and priority given to, the foreign bribery offence.” In a similar vein, the report noted that “prosecutions of this offence may be obstructed by political and economic considerations.” The report highlighted a number of areas for improvement; it recommended, for instance, that Slovenia ensure that the penalties imposed are commensurate with the standards contained in the Convention. In addition to stressing the need for reform of the legal framework controlling anti-corruption enforcement, the report emphasized the importance of developing a better awareness of foreign bribery issues.

**South Africa:** The OECD Working Group released its Phase 3 report on South Africa in June 2014. The report noted serious concerns “with the lack of foreign bribery enforcement actions,” explaining that ten foreign bribery allegations have surfaced since South Africa became a Party to the Convention in 2007, of which four have progressed to ongoing investigations, while none have resulted in prosecutions.

The Working Group expressed concerned that political and economic factors could influence the investigation and prosecution of foreign bribery cases, and indicated that the “lack of corporate liability for foreign bribery is especially troubling in an economic environment where there has been a major growth in corporate activity, and where state-owned enterprises operating in sensitive sectors are allegedly involved in foreign bribery cases.” To mitigate that problem, the Working Group recommended that South Africa “increase the financial resources

available to prosecutors and ensure enhanced cooperation and coordination between the police and prosecutors from the outset of foreign bribery investigations.” The report also emphasized the need to strengthen and improve awareness of whistleblower protections.

**Sweden:** The Working Group issued a Follow-Up to its Phase 3 Report on Sweden on August 8, 2014. The findings were largely positive, noting that Sweden had “made significant progress on enforcing its offence of bribing a foreign public official.” In particular, the Working Group praised Sweden’s investigation of potential territorial links with respect to allegations of bribery of Swedish subsidiaries and intermediaries outside the country.

**Turkey:** Turkey’s Phase 3 Report was issued on October 17, 2014. As with its report on France, the Working Group commended Turkey on its “efforts to enhance its foreign bribery legislation,” but noted that it remained “seriously concerned about Turkey’s low level of enforcement” — including specifically the absence of any foreign bribery convictions in the eleven years since Turkey ratified the treaty. The Working Group specifically criticized the country for claiming to be unaware of certain bribery allegations even though “these were publicized in both Turkish and foreign news.”

### ***OECD, World Bank, and UNDOC Anti-Corruption Handbook***

On November 26, 2013, the World Bank, the OECD, and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (“UNDOC”) released their Anti-Corruption Ethics and Compliance Handbook for Business (“the handbook”). Although facilitated by the World Bank, OECD, and UNDOC, the handbook was “written by private companies, for private companies,” with the goal of consolidating major business guidance instruments into a useful and practical “tool for companies seeking compliance advice in one, easy-to-reference publication.” While the handbook is designed to help businesses and G20 member governments implement the 2010 G20 Anti-Corruption Action plan, it does not set forth new legal standards or requirements. Instead, it offers guidance on how to build more effective compliance programs.

The Handbook is structured in three main parts. First, the handbook presents the international legal framework for combating corruption. Part two focuses on designing and using adequate risk assessment methods. Part three sets forth practical advice on how to structure an effective compliance program, with a focus on twelve interwoven elements: (i) support and commitment from senior management for the prevention of corruption; (ii) developing an anti-corruption program; (iii) oversight of the anti-corruption program; (iv) clear, visible, and accessible policy prohibiting corruption; (v) detailed policies for particular risk areas; (vi) application of the anti-corruption program to business partners; (vii) internal controls and record keeping; (viii) communication and training; (ix) promoting and incentivizing ethics and compliance; (x) seeking guidance — detecting and reporting violations; (xi) addressing violations; and (xii) periodic reviews and evaluations of the anti-corruption program). In the annex, the handbook provides a quick-reference table that cross-references the twelve business principles with the major sources of business guidance.

### *OECD Good Practice Guidance*

The OECD previously released the Recommendation of the Council for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“Recommendation”). Perhaps the most notable aspect of the Recommendation is Annex II, Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance (the “Good Practice Guidance”) released on February 18, 2010.

The Good Practice Guidance sets forth a list of suggested actions to ensure effective internal controls for the prevention and detection of bribery. The OECD recognized that there could be no one-size-fits-all approach to compliance programs, and that small and medium sized enterprises in particular would need to adjust the guidance to fit their particular circumstances. The Good Practice Guidance is significant, however, in that it signals the endorsement of a risk-based approach to compliance. As the guidance states, “[e]ffective internal controls, ethics, and compliance programmes or measures for preventing and detecting foreign bribery should be developed on the basis of a risk assessment addressing the individual circumstances of a company, in particular the foreign bribery risks facing the company (such as geographical and industrial sector of operation).” The twelve themes that the OECD recommends be incorporated into a compliance program are the following:

- Strong, explicit and visible support and commitment from senior management to the company’s internal controls, ethics, and compliance programs or measures for preventing and detecting bribery;
- A clearly articulated and visible corporate policy prohibiting foreign bribery;
- Individual responsibility for compliance at all levels of the company;
- Senior corporate officers with adequate levels of autonomy from management, resources, and authority have oversight responsibility over ethics and compliance programs, including the authority to report to independent monitoring bodies;
- Ethics and compliance programs designed to prevent and detect foreign bribery, applicable to all entities over which the company has effective control that address gifts, hospitality and entertainment, customer travel, political contributions, charitable donations and sponsorships, facilitation payments, and solicitation and extortion;
- Ethics and compliance programs designed to prevent and detect foreign bribery, applicable to third parties and including three essential elements: (i) properly documented risk-based due diligence and oversight; (ii) informing third-parties of the company’s commitment to legal prohibitions on bribery as well as the company’s code of ethics and compliance program; and (iii) a reciprocal commitment from the third party;
- A system of financial and accounting procedures, including internal controls, reasonably designed to ensure accurate books, records and accounts so as to ensure that they cannot be used for bribery or to hide bribery;

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- Measures designed to ensure periodic communication and documented training on the company's ethics and compliance program;
  - Measures to encourage and provide positive support for the observance of ethics and compliance programs at all levels of the company;
  - Disciplinary procedures to address violations of anti-bribery prohibitions;
  - Effective measures for: (i) providing guidance to directors, officers, employees, and, where appropriate, business partners on complying with the company's ethics and compliance program, including in urgent situations in foreign jurisdictions; (ii) internal and, where possible, confidential reporting by, and protection of, directors, officers, employees and, where appropriate, business partners, who are either unwilling to violate ethics rules under instructions or pressure from superiors or are willing to report breaches of the law or ethics rules in good faith and on reasonable grounds; and (iii) undertaking appropriate action in response to such reports;
  - Periodic reviews of the ethics and compliance programs designed to evaluate and improve their effectiveness in preventing and detecting bribery.

The Recommendation itself, applicable to OECD member countries and other countries that are party to the OECD Convention, recommends that member countries "take concrete and meaningful steps" in several areas to deter, prevent and combat foreign bribery. Among the steps recommended are the following:

- *Facilitation Payments*: The Recommendation urges member countries to undertake periodic reviews of policies regarding facilitation payments and encourages companies to prohibit or discourage the use of such payments. Member countries should also remind companies that when facilitation payments are made, they must be accurately accounted for in books and financial records. The Recommendation also urges member countries to raise awareness of public officials regarding domestic bribery laws and regulations in order to reduce facilitation payments.
- *Tax Measures*: The Recommendation urges member countries to implement the 2009 Council Recommendation on Tax Measures for Further Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions, which recommends that member countries disallow tax deductibility of bribes. The Recommendation also suggests that independent monitoring be carried out by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs.
- *Reporting Foreign Bribery*: Member countries are encouraged to ensure that accessible channels and appropriate measures are in place for reporting suspected acts of bribery of foreign officials to law enforcement authorities, including reporting by government officials posted abroad. The member countries are further encouraged to take steps to protect public and private sector employees who report suspected acts of bribery in good faith.

- *Accounting Requirements:* Member countries are encouraged to prohibit the establishment of off-the-books accounts and the making of inadequately identified transactions, recording of non-existent expenditures, entry of liabilities with incorrect identification of their object, and the use of false documents for the purpose of bribing foreign officials or hiding such bribery and provide criminal penalties for such activities. They are also urged to require companies to disclose contingent liabilities and to consider requiring companies to submit to an external audit and maintain standards to ensure independence of those audits. More notably, the Recommendation contemplates member countries requiring auditors who find indications of bribery to report their findings to a monitoring body and potentially to law enforcement authorities.
- *Internal Controls:* Member countries are encouraged to develop and adopt internal controls, ethics and compliance programs and to encourage government agencies to consider compliance programs as factors in decisions to grant public funds or contracts. They are also asked to encourage company management to make statements disclosing their internal controls, including those that contribute to the prevention and detection of bribery and provide channels for the reporting of suspected breaches of the law. Additionally, member countries are to encourage companies to create independent monitoring bodies such as audit committees.
- *Public Advantages:* The Recommendation suggests that member countries allow authorities to suspend from public contracts or other public advantages companies that have been found to have bribed foreign public officials. It also asks that member countries require anti-corruption provisions in bilateral aid-funded procurement, promote proper implementation of anti-corruption provisions in international development institutions, and work with development partners to combat corruption in all development efforts.
- *International Cooperation:* The Recommendation encourages member countries to cooperate with authorities in other countries in investigations and legal proceedings, including by sharing information, providing evidence, extradition, and the identification, freezing, seizure, confiscation, and recovery of the proceeds of bribery. It also encourages countries to investigate credible allegations of bribery referred by other countries and consider ways of facilitating mutual legal assistance between member and non-member countries and international organizations and financial institutions that are active in the fight against bribery.

Also released in conjunction with the Recommendation was Annex I, Good Practice Guidance on Implementing Specific Articles of the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions (“Annex I”). Annex I sets forth in more detail some of the general suggestions presented in the main Recommendation. Among other things, Annex I: (i) suggests that member countries should not provide a defense or exception for situations where the public official solicits a bribe; (ii) suggests that member countries provide training to officials posted abroad so they can provide information to their country’s corporations when such companies are confronted with bribe solicitations; (iii)

encourages countries not to restrict the liability of legal persons (*i.e.*, corporations) to instances where natural persons are prosecuted or convicted; (iv) recommends that countries ensure that legal persons cannot avoid responsibility for conduct by using intermediaries to offer, promise or pay a bribe; and (v) encourages countries to be vigilant in investigating and prosecuting violations. In this respect, Annex I states that countries should seriously investigate complaints and credible allegations and not be influenced by external factors such as economic interest, foreign relations or the identity of persons or companies involved.

The Recommendation comes as the OECD continues its Phase 3 review process of Convention signatories, which examines, among other things, the enforcement efforts and results of such countries. In releasing the guidance, the OECD is likely drawing attention to those areas on which it will particularly focus, such as the liability of legal persons, the use of intermediaries, and increased international cooperation. The release of the Good Practice Guidance is also significant because it provides helpful guidance to companies looking to better structure their internal compliance efforts to address their industry and company specific risks.

### ***European Court of Justice — In-House Counsel Legal Privilege***

In a landmark ruling issued September 14, 2010 in *Akzo Nobel Chemicals Ltd. and Akros Chemicals Ltd. v. Commission*, the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) rejected calls to broaden the scope of the attorney-client privilege in European Union (“EU”) competition law investigations carried out by the European Commission (“EC”). In such investigations, the attorney-client privilege is subject to two cumulative conditions, as originally established in a 1982 ECJ ruling in *AM & S Europe v. Commission*: (i) the exchange with the lawyer must be connected to “the client’s rights of defense” and (ii) the exchange must emanate from “independent lawyers,” *i.e.*, “lawyers who are not bound to the client by a relationship of employment.” The ECJ confirmed that the attorney-client privilege in EU competition law matters extends only to communications between the client and an external lawyer admitted to the Bar of a Member State of the European Economic Area (“EEA”). Crucially, the attorney-client privilege *does not* protect from discovery and disclosure in an EU competition law case internal communications between company management and an in-house lawyer, even if that lawyer is admitted to and a member of the Bar, nor does it protect communications between the company and external lawyers who are not admitted to the Bar of an EEA Member State.

- **Case Background**

On February 12 and 13, 2003, EC officials, assisted by representatives of the U.K. Office of Fair Trading (“OFT”), carried out a surprise investigation on the premises of Akros Chemicals Ltd. (“Akros”) in Manchester, England, and seized copies of a number of documents. Akros representatives informed the EC officials that certain seized documents were covered by the attorney-client privilege. The EC officials and Akros representatives disagreed on the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to several documents, in particular two emails between the managing director of Akros and the in-house coordinator for competition law at Akros’ then-parent, Akzo Nobel (“Akzo”). The in-house lawyer, who was also an Advocaat of the Netherlands Bar, had signed an agreement with Akros that specifically acknowledged his

independence and professional obligations to the Netherlands Bar, which would have permitted the company to assert privilege under Dutch law. The EC rejected the claim of privilege in a 2003 decision. Akzo and Akcros challenged the EC's decision before the Court of First Instance (now the General Court), which dismissed the challenge in 2007. Akzo and Akcros appealed that dismissal to the ECJ. The United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Ireland, and a number of professional associations intervened in support of extending the attorney-client privilege to in-house counsel.

- *The ECJ's Decision*

Akzo, Akcros, and a number of the interveners argued that the criterion that the lawyer must be "independent" should not be interpreted to exclude in-house lawyers. They argued that in-house lawyers enrolled in a bar or law society are as independent as external lawyers due to their obligations of professional conduct and discipline. The ECJ reiterated that the requirement that the lawyer be independent was based on "a conception of the lawyer's role as collaborating in the administration of justice and as being required to provide, in full independence and in the overriding interests of that cause, such legal assistance as the client needs." The ECJ held that "the requirement of independence means the absence of any employment relationship between the lawyer and his client, so that attorney-client privilege does not cover exchanges within a company or group with in-house lawyers." It stated that, due to their economic dependence and close ties with their employers, in-house lawyers do not have the same degree of independence from their employers as lawyers working in external law firms with respect to their clients, despite their professional ethical obligations and any membership in a bar or law society. In-house lawyers may also be required to carry out tasks that have an effect on the commercial policy of the company. The ECJ held that an in-house lawyer cannot be treated in the same manner as an external lawyer because he is an employee, "which, by its very nature, does not allow him to ignore the commercial strategies pursued by his employer, and thereby affects his ability to exercise professional independence."

The ECJ further held that, although recognition of the attorney-client privilege for communications with in-house lawyers has become more common at the national level than at the time of the original *AM & S Europe* case, it was not possible to identify tendencies in the national laws of EU Member States that were uniform or had clear majority support. Many Member States do not extend the attorney-client privilege to communications with in-house lawyers and a number of Member States do not allow in-house lawyers to be admitted to a Bar or Law Society. The ECJ held that the legal situation of EU Member States and EU law had not evolved to such an extent as to justify recognition of attorney-client privilege for in-house lawyers.

Akzo and Akcros similarly argued that attorney-client privilege should be extended to in-house lawyers in the interest of legal certainty. They argued that, because EU competition law is often applied in parallel with corresponding national laws and many EU Member States recognize attorney-client privilege for in-house lawyers, the application of attorney-client privilege should not depend on which authority carries out the investigation. The ECJ, however, determined that limiting the scope of attorney-client privilege in EU competition law

investigations carried out by the EC did not create any legal uncertainty as companies can determine their rights, obligations, and position based on which authority conducts the investigation.

The ECJ rejected the argument that the need for confidential in-house legal advice to prevent infringements of competition law had increased due to the modernization of procedural rules and the desirability of the establishment of compliance programs. It also rejected the argument that the principle of national procedural autonomy, which allows EU Member States to designate procedural rules for their domestic legal systems governing actions based on rights derived from EU law, meant that Member States could define the limits of attorney-client privilege. The ECJ held that the principle of national procedural autonomy did not affect the scope of the attorney-client privilege in EC investigations under EU law. Rather, the ECJ held that the interpretation and application of EU law cannot depend on the national law relevant to the inspected company.

- *Impact*

In *Akzo*, the ECJ reaffirmed that the attorney-client privilege in EU competition law investigations before the EC does not apply to in-house attorneys. Companies with operations in the EU therefore must be cautious with respect to communications containing legal advice from in-house counsel. This rule extends only to EU competition law investigations before the EC; national law covering privilege will govern in other situations, likely covering most investigations. However, materials produced in EU/EC investigations may become accessible to plaintiffs or regulators in other countries, including non-EU countries, even if those materials would have been privileged originally in those countries. Similarly, as occurred in *Akzo*, the EC may ask officials of a national competition authority to assist in an investigation, and in such a situation, the *Akzo* rule would apply and privilege would not be available for communications with in-house attorneys. Companies should be aware of the different privilege rules potentially applicable to them depending on jurisdiction and select appropriate counsel accordingly.

### ***International Chamber of Commerce Guidelines***

On November 19, 2010, the Anti-Corruption Commission of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) released guidelines on the vetting of agents, intermediaries and other third parties (the “ICC Guidelines”). The ICC, founded in 1909, today has hundreds of thousands of member enterprises in over 120 countries. The ICC Guidelines, intended for voluntary self-application, describe the use of third parties as “the weak link in the chain” of an entity’s anti-corruption practices. The ICC recommends that due diligence be applied to third parties acting on behalf of principles in both the private and public sectors.

Under Article 2 of the ICC Rules, member enterprises must implement an anti-corruption policy that ensures that (i) payment amounts to third parties are appropriate and for legitimate services, (ii) no payments are inappropriately passed on by third parties as bribes, (iii) agents explicitly agree not to pay bribes and can have their contracts terminated if they do so, and (iv) the enterprise maintains appropriate records pertaining to all third parties engaged for transactions with state, private, or public bodies. Importantly, the ICC Guidelines note that

corruption risks are not limited to third parties who deal with the public sector, as a growing list of countries criminalize commercial bribery. The ICC Guidelines therefore suggest conducting appropriate due diligence on intermediaries operating in both the private and public sector. The ICC Guidelines are notable for the level of detail they provide on the potential content of an FCPA due diligence process, and are worthy of review by any company seeking to create or update its due diligence procedures.

The ICC makes clear that the objective of the due diligence process should be to confirm that the proposed transaction with the third party is legal under applicable law and to “provide a reasonable record supporting the presumption that the third party will not use its influence with the government, public entities or the private sector in order to corruptly obtain or retain business, other authorizations or permits or other improper advantage in the conduct of business.” Consistent with other due diligence guidance, the ICC recommends that a business should select a due diligence process “that is appropriate to its unique circumstances, including its size, resources, and risk profile.” The ICC Guidelines suggest that companies may find tiered due diligence procedures — where certain categories of intermediaries undergo more significant review — a more efficient and effective use of resources.

The ICC Guidance stresses the importance of a “collaborative” due diligence process involving various parts of the organization. The ICC contemplates the use of outside due diligence service providers, however it cautions that “the final decision to retain or not the candidate [t]hird party should be taken by the enterprise and not outsourced.”

The ICC Guidance contemplates four main sources of information as part of such a process: (i) the sponsoring department of the enterprise; (ii) the third-party candidate; (iii) non-sponsoring departments or business units; and (iv) outside sources.

- *Sponsoring Department*

The ICC Guidance proposes requiring the Sponsoring Department to complete an application form. Because the employee proposing the engagement may have an interest in the hiring of the candidate or the success of the deal, that employee alone should not be allowed to make the final decision on the engagement of the third-party candidate. The entity can independently assess the candidate by requiring a form that sets forth such information as the business need for employing a third party, the business justification for the proposed compensation, an evaluation of the commercial and technical competence of the candidate, specific information regarding the candidate’s reputation for integrity, details on how the candidate was identified, whether any other third parties were considered, and why the candidate was proposed.

- *The Candidate*

The ICC recommends that an entity may also obtain information from the candidate directly by requiring the candidate to complete a questionnaire and provide supporting documentation. The topics covered by such questionnaires could include the candidate’s basic information and qualifications; ownership and other business interest; status as a public official

(including whether any of the candidate's owners, directors or employees are or previously were public officials, or have any relationship with public officials); financial data; information about current and previous litigation; information about current and previous criminal investigations, sanctions, debarment and convictions; and references. The ICC points out that, in doing so, an entity must be aware of possible legal restrictions on the process such as data privacy protections for the candidate's employees.

The ICC also suggests interviewing the candidate in person if feasible. "Although not practical for all retentions, interviews conducted in person are generally more effective in assessing the responses to these inquiries, and provide a better setting to ask the often delicate questions necessary." The ICC also notes that interviews can also be used to train the candidate regarding enterprise policies and procedures, and to communicate a commitment to complying with applicable anti-bribery laws and policies. The ICC suggests memorializing the interview in a memorandum to be kept with the due diligence file.

- *Non-Sponsoring Departments or Business Units*

As a third source of information, the ICC suggests gathering information regarding the candidate from internal sources *other* than the person who has proposed to engage the candidate. Internal sources can provide information on the candidate's past dealings with the enterprise, including the candidate's background and reputation. The ICC also suggests comparing the proposed compensation to internally prepared compensation guidelines and external benchmarks.

- *Outside Sources*

Finally, the ICC guidelines suggest numerous outside sources that can be used to obtain information regarding the candidate, including (i) commercial and bank references; (ii) news sources; (iii) reports from independent enterprises that compile financial and other information about commercial entities; (iv) government databases of parties subject to sanctions; (v) embassy staff or other government sources; and (vi) due diligence service providers. The ICC also recommends seeking a local law opinion where there is an issue of whether the arrangement is permissible under local law.

Once a candidate has been approved, the ICC recommends that detailed contractual clauses describe the third party's compliance with anti-corruption policies. After the initial approval, the guidelines suggest ongoing monitoring of transactions with the third party, along with periodic auditing and reevaluation of the party's risk. Businesses should consider requiring employees of the third party to undergo anti-corruption training. Each payment to the third party should be independently reviewed and checked for red flags. The ICC recommends extra attention be given to third parties whose compensation is linked to their success. When such compensation is determined to be appropriate, "careful documentation of the legitimate business case for the engagement" is a recommended practice.

### ***Global Witness Report - British Banks and Nigerian Corruption***

On October 11, 2010, the prominent U.K. NGO Global Witness released a report titled “International Thief - How British Banks Are Complicit In Nigerian Corruption,” identifying four British banks (Barclays, HSBC, RBS, NatWest) and the U.K. branch of a fifth (UBS) that held accounts for two Nigerian state governors accused of funneling corruptly acquired money through the banks to sustain their luxurious lifestyles. The report was based on documents related to civil asset recovery cases brought by the Nigerian government at the High Court in London against the governors to recover the illicit assets. It focuses on the histories of two Nigerian Governors, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha and Joshua Dariye.

By British law, banks are required to carry out due diligence on their customers, which consists of two stages. First, the banks must know the identity of their customer and assess the money laundering risk posed by the customer. Senior foreign politicians, known as “politically exposed persons,” are deemed to be higher risk because their control over state revenues and contracts gives them greater opportunity for corruption. Current regulations require banks to be aware when their customers become politically exposed persons and carry out enhanced due diligence on such customers. Although no regulation requires banks to know whether a foreign country bans its senior politicians from holding international accounts, industry guidance published by the U.K. Joint Money Laundering Steering Group required banks to know which countries were placed on the Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (“NCCT”) list by the Financial Action Task Force, an inter-governmental group that sets global anti-money laundering standards, and to carry out extra due diligence on transactions from those countries. Nigeria was on the NCCT list from 2001 to 2006. This industry guidance has quasi-legal status in the United Kingdom.

Second, banks must monitor their customers’ accounts for suspicious activity. If the bank suspects a customer is engaged in money laundering, it must file a “suspicious activity report” (“SAR”) with the Serious Organised Crime Agency and wait a set period for consent to proceed with the transaction. SARs are confidential, so it is usually not possible to confirm whether one has been filed. The Steering Group’s guidance suggested that banks take “reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth (including the economic activity that created the wealth) as well as the source of funds to be used in the relationship.” Since 2007, the regulations have required banks to “take adequate measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds” of politically exposed persons. The guidance suggested that “ongoing scrutiny should be applied to any unexplained sources of wealth, *e.g.* value of property owned by the client that does not match the income or initial wealth profile.” It also states that “a suspicious transaction will often be one that is inconsistent with a customer’s known, legitimate activities.” The guidance recommends that banks ask the following questions: (i) is the size of the transaction consistent with the normal activities of the customer; and (ii) is the transaction rational in the context of the customer’s business or personal activities?

The guidance also recommends that banks develop benchmarks of normal activity for different types of customers. It warned banks that large volumes of cash deposits, especially from non-U.K. customers, posed a high risk of money laundering. At the time of the activities

discussed in the Global Witness report, the guidance suggested that banks also subject close associates of politically exposed persons to additional scrutiny. This additional scrutiny is now required by regulation in the United Kingdom. As part of their ongoing monitoring of their customers, banks must check for patterns that indicate a customer is an associate of a politically exposed person or is receiving significant and unusual payments from a politically exposed person.

- Alamieyeseigha

According to Global Witness, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, governor of Bayelsa State in Nigeria's oil-rich Delta region, was arrested in September 2005 in London on money laundering charges following investigations by the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes Commission ("EFCC") and the U.K. Metropolitan Police's Proceeds of Corruption Unit. In December 2005, he was impeached by the Bayelsa State Assembly and stripped of immunity from prosecution. In July 2007, he was convicted by a Nigerian Court of 33 counts of money laundering, corruption, and false declaration of assets. Alamieyeseigha amassed a personal fortune by soliciting bribes and receiving payments from government contractors. He controlled accounts with RBS, HSBC, Barclays and NatWest, despite statements in asset disclosures to the Nigerian government that he held no foreign bank accounts. Both the receipt of payments from contractors and the maintenance of foreign bank accounts by a public official violated the Nigerian Constitution.

RBS, HSBC, and UBS allowed him to receive payments and property from contractors working for Bayelsa State. The High Court ruled that a number of the RBS and HSBC transactions were bribes and ordered that all of Alamieyeseigha's assets at the banks be returned to Nigeria. His UBS assets were returned to Nigeria following an out-of-court settlement between Nigeria and UBS. In 2003, the Nigerian Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission began investigating Alamieyeseigha for corruption, which was prominently reported and easily could have been discovered by a bank conducting due diligence. At least one of the banks, UBS, was aware of the allegations in 2003 and continued to do business with Alamieyeseigha. Additionally, the amount of money moving through his accounts with the banks significantly exceeded the assets and income claimed on the disclosures he filed with the Nigerian government.

Despite the constitutional prohibition on foreign bank accounts, Alamieyeseigha had opened an account with UBS in England just three months after taking office as Governor in 1999. Shortly after opening the account, he told UBS staff that he anticipated a sharp increase in deposits from \$35,000 to \$1.5 million. UBS filled out an "Approval Form" for "Public Functionaries" in late 1999 indicating that the bank knew Alamieyeseigha was an elected official and stating that his wealth was unrelated to his political activities. Although it carried out at least a cursory investigation into Alamieyeseigha's source of wealth, Global Witness concluded that UBS never saw any of his asset declarations to the Nigerian government or knew that he was required to submit such declarations. A thorough investigation of the financial requirements for a Nigerian governor likely would have revealed both the requirement to submit asset declarations and the ban on accounts outside of Nigeria. A review of his asset declarations would have

revealed a discrepancy between his reported income and assets and the \$1.5 million planned for deposit into the UBS account.

In late April 2001, a Bayelsa State contractor deposited \$1 million into the UBS account and, a week later, made an additional \$500,000 deposit to the same account. By this time, UBS was a signatory to the Wolfsberg Principles, which state that banks should accept only clients whose wealth could reasonably be established as legitimate and would subject politicians and other individuals with positions of public trust to heightened scrutiny. A UBS employee “politely” inquired as to the source of these funds and was told by Alamiyeseigha that the money came from the sale of a palace to the contractor. No such property or other properties of such value were listed on his asset declarations. The UBS employee apparently accepted Alamiyeseigha’s statements and, rather than investigate further, convinced Alamiyeseigha to invest the money in a trust account with UBS.

As noted above, UBS was aware of the 2003 corruption investigation of Alamiyeseigha by May of that year. That same month, Alamiyeseigha attempted to use the trust account to buy a luxury apartment in London. This time, UBS categorically insisted on specific documentation regarding the source of the funds in the account. Alamiyeseigha never provided an explanation but found a different way to buy the apartment. Despite his failure to respond to inquiries regarding the funds in the account, UBS kept the trust account open. By December 2005, Alamiyeseigha’s personal account with UBS contained over \$500,000 and the trust account contained \$1.8 million, considerably above his declared assets.

Around the same time the UBS account was opened in 2001, the same contractor who opened that account paid £1.4 million through HSBC for a London residence on behalf of Alamiyeseigha with the assistance of an HSBC banker. Documents indicate that the HSBC banker was aware that the contractor planned to purchase the house for Alamiyeseigha through a British Virgin Islands shell company. It is unclear whether the HSBC banker knew the shell company was wholly owned by Alamiyeseigha. The contractor also referred to Alamiyeseigha as “Chief” in communications with the banker, which likely should have prompted HSBC to investigate whether Alamiyeseigha was a public official. While it is unclear whether HSBC raised any concerns about this transaction or conducted any due diligence, the High Court later described it as a bribe.

Later in 2001, the same contractor opened an account at HSBC for Alamiyeseigha with a £420,000 deposit. Both the contractor and the contractor’s lawyer already banked at HSBC and served as Alamiyeseigha’s “referees” for the bank. Alamiyeseigha and the contractor later gave conflicting accounts as to whether the money in this account was related to the contractor’s business with Bayelsa State. HSBC informed Global Witness that it was aware that the Nigerian Constitution prohibited governors from holding bank accounts outside of Nigeria and from receiving gifts from government contractors, but did not confirm whether it was aware of these prohibitions at the time of these transactions. HSBC refused to comment on the case in particular, but stated that it has had policies relating to anti-money laundering controls since 1994 and specific policies related to “politically exposed persons” since 2000.

In 2004, Alamieyeseigha opened an account at RBS using a second offshore shell company based in the Seychelles. Although he claimed that he expected the annual turnover for the account to be £250,000, approximately £2.7 million was deposited in 26 separate deposits in the fourteen months after he opened the account. Of those deposits, about £1.6 million came through a Nigeria-based bank from a company that contracted with Bayelsa State. Although Alamieyeseigha claimed the deposits were unspent campaign funds, the High Court stated that the evidence showed that the deposits were bribes. It is unclear whether RBS identified Alamieyeseigha as a senior foreign official with a higher risk of money laundering activities and whether RBS investigated the source of his funds. Even if RBS did not know Alamieyeseigha's status as a governor (easily obtainable from an Internet search) or that the funds came from a contractor in the state he governed, the transaction should have undergone heightened scrutiny because the funds came through a bank based in Nigeria, which was on the NCCT list at the time. Additionally, RBS should have scrutinized this shell company account because, other than one property purchase, money was only deposited into the account and never withdrawn, which a judge later observed was not characteristic of a functioning business. RBS cooperated with authorities investigating Alamieyeseigha, but declined to answer specific questions from Global Witness.

- Dariye

Joshua Dariye, governor of Plateau State from 1999 to 2007, was arrested in London in September 2004 on money laundering and corruption charges but subsequently fled to Nigeria. The U.K. Metropolitan Police began their investigation of Dariye in July 2003. According to documents obtained by Global Witness, Dariye transferred approximately £2.85 million into the United Kingdom through multiple accounts with Barclays and NatWest. Following successful civil asset recovery proceedings by Nigeria, the assets in these banks were returned to Nigeria. Although he was immune from prosecution in Nigeria during his governorship, at the time of the report Dariye was awaiting trial on fourteen money laundering and corruption charges.

Between July 2003 and March 2004, about £1.17 million of the funds was routed through the NatWest account of a Dariye associate. That associate, a housing tenancy manager in a London suburb, was later jailed for three years for money laundering in connection with those deposits. The associate, who was made the guardian of Dariye's children, claimed the money was used to pay the costs of educating the children at a private school in England. It is unknown whether NatWest knew of the association with Dariye or conducted due diligence on these transfers. However, such large deposits were likely inconsistent with the normal banking activity and salary of a housing tenancy manager, which under the Steering Group guidance should have led to additional scrutiny of the transactions.

Between September 1999 and January 2004, £1.69 million was transferred through Barclays and NatWest accounts held by either Dariye or his wife. A large portion of these transfers was deposits of tens of thousands of pounds of cash. Under the Steering Group's guidance, such large cash transfers should have triggered additional scrutiny. Like Alamieyeseigha, Dariye claimed to have no accounts outside Nigeria on his asset declarations to the Nigerian government.

- Responses

Four of the five banks (Barclays, HSBC, NatWest, and UBS) also reportedly took money from former Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha during the 1990s. As a result of the revelation of this activity in 2001, the banks purportedly tightened their internal procedures to prevent corruption. Although some of the banks replied to inquiries by Global Witness with general statements about their approaches to fighting financial crimes, none of the banks answered specific questions about their role in Alamieyeseigha's or Dariye's activities.

As of the date of the Global Witness report, the U.K. regulator, the Financial Services Authority ("FSA"), had never publicly fined or named any British bank for handling corrupt funds, either willingly or negligently, although it claims to have demanded changes to the banks' procedures following the Abacha allegations. In the past two years, the FSA has imposed fines on banks on several occasions for inadequate anti-money-laundering procedures, unrelated to corruption. In addition, the FSA fined RBS £5.6 million in 2010 for failing to properly implement U.K. financial sanctions. The FSA refused to confirm or deny that enforcement action was taken against the banks discussed in the Global Witness report and has made no public statement on whether it investigated the allegations concerning Alamieyeseigha, Dariye, and the five banks. The British coalition government promised to break up the FSA, moving its functions to the Bank of England and two new entities, a Consumer Protection and Markets Authority and an Economic Crime Agency. The entity to be tasked with responsibility for enforcing anti-money laundering laws has not been identified.

- Recommendations

The Global Witness report makes a number of recommendations stemming from the above-described cases, certain of which may be more likely to be implemented than others:

- Banks should keep lists of countries that ban specific politically exposed persons from holding accounts abroad and should not accept such persons as customers. Regulators should ensure that this happens and provide information on which countries impose such bans.
- Regulations should require that banks only accept funds from politically exposed persons, or their family members and associates, if the bank has strong evidence that the source of funds is not corrupt.
- To address the lack of transparency regarding shell companies, every country should publish an open list of the beneficial owner/controller of all companies and trusts, and subject institutions that register them to due diligence requirements.
- The international community and national regulators must provide more information to banks on corruption-related money laundering to educate their staff on identifying potentially corrupt funds.

- Using proactive techniques, regulators should ensure that banks carry out meaningful customer due diligence, especially for politically exposed persons. Regulators should identify banks that fail to implement their own policies and name and shame banks that take corrupt funds or have inadequate systems in place.
- Countries should deny visas to foreign officials where there is credible evidence they are involved in corruption.

### **Non-U.S. Investigations and Settlements of Note**

#### ***VimpelCom Ltd and TeliaSonera AB***

In March 2014, Dutch authorities raided the offices of VimpelCom Ltd. (“VimpelCom”) and TeliaSonera AB (“TeliaSonera”) — two rival telecommunication services companies that face bribery and money laundering allegations in connection with their business operations in Uzbekistan. Enforcement agencies in Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States have launched related investigations. Norwegian authorities may join the fray.

VimpelCom, which is headquartered in Amsterdam and trades on NASDAQ, is controlled by the Russian Alfa Group and partly owned by the Norwegian telecommunications company Telenor (33% economic rights / 43% voting rights), whose majority owner is the Government of Norway. The Swedish and Finnish governments both have ownership interests in Swedish-headquartered TeliaSonera (37.3% and 10.1% respectively). The two companies compete for market share not only in Scandinavia, but also in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe and the Russian Commonwealth.

The investigations of both companies have focused on their involvement with a Gibraltar-based company called Takilant Ltd. (“Takilant”), which was closely connected to Gulnara Karimova, the eldest daughter of Uzbek President Islam Karimov.

- ***Initial Allegations Regarding TeliaSonera***

In September 19, 2012, the Swedish television show Uppdrag Granskning (translation: “Mission: Investigate”) alleged that TeliaSonera had paid \$300 million to Takilant to purchase its 3G operating license in Uzbekistan in 2007. Uppdrag Granskning revealed, however, that the \$300 million payment was not recorded in Takilant’s financial records. Takilant was owned by a 24-year-old Armenian who worked for Karimova as an assistant at her fashion company House of Style.

In a press release also issued on September 19, 2012, TeliaSonera stated that it had purchased its 3G license from Takilant in exchange for payment of \$30 million and a 26% interest in TeliaSonera’s Uzbek subsidiary (valued at more than \$280 million), which it claimed was a prerequisite for establishing its operations in the country. TeliaSonera stated that it

conducted a background check on the company to ensure that it had the necessary permits, but noted it “has no insights into how Takilant has used the proceeds, or whether there are any connections to other persons in Uzbekistan.” TeliaSonera paid Talikant an additional \$217 million in February 2010 to purchase back 20% of the shares that it had previously given the company.

- *Parallel Investigations in Sweden and Switzerland*

Following the TV broadcast and press report, Sweden’s National Anti-Corruption Unit launched an investigation of TeliaSonera to review the allegations, removed documents from the company’s offices, and froze several accounts connected to Takilant. In December 2012, TeliaSonera disclosed that two of its employees had been served with indictments, but maintained that the “corruption allegations directed at TeliaSonera are unfounded.”

The account holder of the frozen Takilant bank account in Sweden was listed as Uzbek national Alisher Ergashev, who also served as the director of French property firms owned by Karimova. According to a detailed report by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, Ergashev and his associate had been arrested in Switzerland in July 2012 while trying to access Takilant accounts there that held hundreds of millions of dollars that “may have been TeliaSonera funds routed by Takilant to Hong Kong and then back to Switzerland.”

Swiss prosecutors launched their own investigation and arrested Ergashev and his associate. In March 2014, the Swiss Attorney General’s Office announced that it was targeting Karimova as part of the widening money laundering investigation. The Attorney General’s Office stated that it had also frozen more than \$817 million of cash and asset as part of the investigation.

- *Internal Review and Change of Management at TeliaSonera*

TeliaSonera hired external counsel to undertake its own internal investigation of the allegations. On February 1, 2013, the company reported that although the internal review “has not found any substance to the allegations that TeliaSonera committed bribery or participated in money laundering in connection with its investments in Uzbekistan,” it nevertheless noted serious shortcomings in the due diligence process that “was not sufficient to pick up warning signs that there were ethical risks.” The company announced that it needed “a new start in many respects” and replaced six of its eight board members, including CEO Lars Nyberg.

The new board has taken a more aggressive approach. TeliaSonera dismissed four senior executives in October and November 2013, including CFO Per-Arne Blomquist. By December 9, 2014, the new board stated that it was “leav[ing] open the possibility of suing for damages against earlier officials based on what may be detected in ongoing investigations.”

- *Dutch and U.S. Authorities Target TeliaSonera and VimpelCom*

As noted above, Dutch authorities raided the offices of VimpelCom and two of TeliaSonera’s Dutch subsidiaries in March 2014. Like TeliaSonera, VimpelCom had entered

into business transactions with Takilant in 2007 in Uzbekistan. According to the company's May 15, 2014 Form 20-F filing, VimpelCom had paid Takilant a net total of \$94.5 million for its 3G operating license and the repurchase of shares of its Uzbek subsidiary. On November 14, 2014, Swedish prosecutors presented evidence in a court in Stockholm that purportedly show that \$55 million of this amount constituted a bribe.

Both companies revealed that they were under investigation by the DOJ and SEC as well. VimpelCom has conducted various internal reviews of its partnership in Uzbekistan since 2012. In addition to the allegations regarding VimpelCom's business conduct in Uzbekistan, the Dutch and U.S. enforcement agencies are also reviewing VimpelCom's operations in other countries.

- *Reverberations in Norway*

The investigation of VimpelCom — in which the Norwegian government holds a sizeable interest through Telenor — has caused shockwaves in Norway, particularly on the heels of settlements and investigations of Yara and Kongsberg Gruppen, both of whom are also partly owned by the state. To date, the Norwegians have not yet officially opened an investigation into the matter, but they have assisted other enforcement agencies through the provision of documents and testimony by witnesses in Norway.

Initially defiant regarding the allegations, Telenor has consistently claimed that as a minority shareholder it only has access to publicly available information regarding VimpelCom's investments in Uzbekistan, and that it has not been provided with the findings of VimpelCom's internal reviews. Referring to the strict confidentiality obligations imposed on the members of VimpelCom's Supervisory Board, Telenor has also refused to disclose information provided to its three representatives in their capacity as Supervisory Board members. However, in December 2014, following significant public criticism, Telenor CEO Jon Fredrik Baksaas stepped down from the Supervisory Board, citing the corruption allegations and the need "to solely focus on protecting Telenor's position" as a minority shareholder.

Following the recent revelations from the Swedish prosecution, Telenor informed the Norwegian Minister of Trade, Monica Mæland, that "if the [Swedish] Prosecution's presentation of the facts before the Swedish courts are proven, this raises further concern, and Telenor will have to assess whether to adopt further measures in its capacity as minority shareholder without control of VimpelCom." Baksaas, Mæland and her predecessor Trond Giske, have been summoned to appear before the Norwegian Parliament's Standing Committee on Scrutiny and Constitutional Affairs, which will issue a report with its own findings and a recommendation to the Norwegian Parliament.

- *Fallout in Uzbekistan*

Gulnara Karimova, alleged to have been the ultimate beneficiary of the TeliaSonera and VimpelCom payments, was once viewed as one of Uzbekistan's untouchable elite with high aspirations. A wikileaks cable from 2005, for example, noted that local press articles had focused "on her selfless giving, charity work, and business acumen" as part of a media campaign in preparation for a potential presidential run. She had previously served as a diplomat to the

United Nations and worked as a professor. As a pop music star using the name “Googoosha,” she had recorded duets with Julio Iglesias and Gérard Depardieu.

Since then, she has had a “spectacular fall from grace.” According to Radio Free Europe, five Uzbek dissidents broke into Karimova’s \$20-million Swiss mansion in December 2013 and “uncovered a treasure trove of 20th-century paintings pilfered from Uzbekistan’s state art museums.” By August 2014, Karimova had been placed under house arrest in Uzbekistan, and her House of Style fashion business had been shuttered. The following month, the Uzbek Prosecutor’s Office stated that “Karimova G.” was a suspect in a corruption case.

***Robert Barra, Dario Bernini, Shailesh Govindia, and Nazir Karigar***

On June 4, 2014, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police charged three individuals with violations under Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (“CFPOA”): U.S. citizens Robert Barra and Dario Bernini and U.K. citizen Shailesh Govindia. All three individuals were connected to Cryptometrics Canada (“Cryptometrics”) — Barra and Bernini previously served as the company’s CEO and COO, respectively, and Govindia worked at the London-based Emerging Markets Group, serving as an agent for Cryptometrics in connection with its operations in India.

A month earlier, on May 23, 2014, former Cryptometrics India Executive Director Nazir Karigar was sentenced to a three-year prison term for violations of Section 3(1)(b) of the CFPOA. Karigar had been convicted in August 2013 of offering over \$450,000 in bribes to Indian public officials in the form of cash and shares of stock. Karigar had been the first individual prosecuted under the CFPOA.

According to the opinion of Judge Charles Hackland the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, the alleged misconduct began in June 2005 when Karigar contacted Robert Bell, the Vice President for Business Development at Cryptometrics. Karigar indicated that he had contacts at Air India and was aware that the airline was seeking biometrics technology to improve security at the airline. In September 2005, Karigar arranged meetings for Bell in India with prominent Air India officials. Karigar later provided Cryptometrics with information regarding the expected requirements of Air India and confidential information regarding competitors and proposed tender terms.

In January 2006, Cryptometrics appointed Karigar as Executive Director of the newly established Cryptometrics India. Shortly thereafter, Air India issued an RFP for a biometric facial recognition system and Cryptometrics Canada began to prepare a response. Bell testified in court that Karigar first proposed paying bribes to Indian public officials at a meeting in an Indian hotel to discuss the RFP submission. Karigar then sent Bell spreadsheets listing the Air India official who should receive bribes, as well as the amount of money and Cryptometrics stock that each should receive. One listing, for example, provided that the Air India Deputy Director of Security — who co-chaired the selection committee for the facial recognition project and who was referred to internally as “the Captain” — should receive company stock and up-front cash.

In June 2006, Karigar sent several emails to Cryptometrics employees, stating that he needed to obtain \$200,000 to pay “the Captain” and that “the Captain” and another individual identified as MMD “need to see the money.” Cryptometrics subsequently transferred \$200,000 to Karigar’s Mumbai bank account, which was intended to ensure that only two companies were technically qualified for the project.

Karigar, however, also developed the second bid, which he presented under the name of his other company IPCON. In IPCON’s bid, Karigar bid the same technology at a higher price in order to create the illusion of a competitive bidding process. In August 2006, IPCON and Cryptometrics were short-listed as the only two qualified bidders. Karigar subsequently explained that Cryptometrics would win the project because its bid price was lower than IPCON’s, so long as it could pay the Minister of Civil Aviation, Praful Patel, an additional \$250,000 to “bless” the system. In March 2007, Cryptometrics entered into a Letter of Agreement with Karigar to provide him with the needed \$250,000.

At some point thereafter, however, it appears that Karigar had a falling out with Barra and Berini, as well as Karigar’s principal points of contact in connection with the scheme. Beginning in August 2007, Karigar sent multiple anonymous emails to the DOJ’s Fraud Section under the username “Buddy,” stating that he had information about U.S. citizens paying bribes to foreign officials and seeking immunity. The DOJ, however, shared Karigar’s information with its Canadian counterparts, and the evidence that Karigar himself provided, together with the testimony provided by Bell (who was granted immunity), was used to convict him.

Importantly, Judge Hackland conceded that there was no evidence that Karigar actually paid or offered bribes to Indian public officials. Nevertheless, he ruled that the liability for conspiracy under the CFPOA did not require “proof of the offer of or receipt of a bribe . . . [which] would require evidence from a foreign jurisdiction, possibly putting foreign nationals at risk and would make the legislation difficult if not impossible to enforce and possibly offend international comity.” Rather, Judge Hackland stated that it was sufficient that Karigar believed “that bribes needed to be paid as a cost of doing business in India and he agreed with Berini and others to pay such bribes.” The Judge also noted that Karigar had told U.S. authorities that he believed that bribes had in fact been paid.

The opinion also states that Barra and Berini continued to seek means to finalize the Air India contract after their dispute with Karigar, and that the two executives subsequently hired Govindia of Emerging Markets Group, to pay an initial \$2 million to Minister Patel. According to press reports, Patel has claimed that the allegations are baseless and preposterous.

## ***ENI***

According to news sources, ENI and several of its current and former executives are under investigation in connection with ENI and Shell’s \$1.1 billion purchase of Nigerian offshore block OPL 245. On July 24, 2013, Reuters reported that the U.K. Crown Prosecution Service’s Proceeds of Crime Unit was investigating the transaction. ENI also confirmed on September 11, 2014 that Italian Prosecutors in Milan had opened a separate “preliminary investigation” targeting its current CEO Claudi Descalzi and Chief Development, Operations,

and Technology Officer Roberto Casula in connection with their role in the transaction. ENI's former CEO Paolo Scaroni is also under investigation by the Italian authorities in connection with his role.

ENI could face allegations of bribery and money laundering charges in connection with the transaction because most of the proceeds that the companies paid for the block were subsequently transferred to Malabu Oil and Gas ("Malabu"), a company registered five days before the sale and connected to former Nigerian Oil Minister Chief Dausia Loyal "Dan" Etete. According to Reuters, the Italian prosecutors have claimed that \$533 million of the purchase price was used to bribe local politicians and intermediaries, who used the money to purchase aircraft and armored cars.

ENI and Shell have both denied any wrongdoing. ENI denied knowledge of "any possible agreements" between Malabu and the government at the time of the sale, and it added in September 2014 that the entire payment "was made uniquely to the Nigerian government" and continued to deny any illegal contact. Shell — which according to press reports is not a target of either the U.K. or Italian investigations — issued a press statement that it had purchased the oil block directly from the Nigerian government, made no improper payments to Malabu, and "acted at all times in accordance with" Nigerian law.

The on-going investigation is important in that it demonstrates how companies could be investigated and potentially held liable for payments made directly to a foreign government (rather than to a government official), particularly in instances where the government itself allegedly served as a type of "third-party intermediary" in passing a potentially improper payment on to another entity.

- *Background*

OPL 245 is an off-shore block that industry analysts estimate may contain as much as 9.2 billion barrels of crude oil. According to various filings and orders in two civil litigation cases in the New York Supreme Court and the Commercial Court of the Queen's Bench Division, the Nigerian Government initially sold the block in 1998 for \$2 million to Malabu, a company registered five days before the sale and initially owned by then-Nigerian Oil Minister Chief Dausia Loyal "Dan" Etete and the son of then-Military Dictator Sani Abacha. Four months after the sale of OPL 245, Abacha died.

Malabu and Shell Nigeria Ultra Deep Limited ("Shell Nigeria") entered into agreements relating to the oil block in March 2001, but the subsequent Nigerian government revoked the block several months later. Following a competitive bid, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation then entered into a production sharing contract with Shell Nigeria, awarding the international oil company with the exclusive right to operate OPL 245 as a contractor for a term of thirty years.

The revocations and transfers set off a string of litigation between Shell Nigeria, Malabu, and the Nigerian government. In November 2006, the Nigerian government agreed to re-allocate OPL 245 to Malabu in exchange for payment of \$208 million within twelve months. The court

filings state that Malabu subsequently sought to find an investor to help break the deadlock with Shell Nigeria and pay the necessary \$208 payment to the Nigerian government, and it sought the assistance of Ednan Agaev, a Russian consultant who owned a company named International Legal Consulting Limited (“ILC”), and Zubelum Chukwuemeka “Emeka” Obi, a Nigerian national who owned another company named Energy Venture Partners Limited (“EVP”), for this purpose. (As discussed below, both ILC and EVP later pursued civil claims against Malabu, which first brought information regarding the April 2011 sale to light.) The Queen’s Bench Division order states that Obi was involved in some capacity in negotiations with ENI and its subsidiary, Nigerian Agip Exploration Limited (“Nigerian Agip”), between December 2009 and March 2011. In particular, Obi testified that he had approached ENI on behalf of Malabu and introduced Etete to ENI representatives initially to discuss the deal. Other documents filed in the case included an e-mail from a Shell employee stating that he met with Etete over “lots of iced champagne.”

In April 2011, Shell Nigeria and ENI agreed to purchase OPL 245 from the Nigerian government for \$1.09 billion. In a separate contract, the companies agreed to pay the government an additional \$208 million as a “signature bonus” — the same amount that Malabu previously agreed to pay for the transfer of the assets. The Nigerian government then executed an agreement with Malabu on April 29, 2011 — the day before the new Nigerian minister of finance assumed office — pursuant to which the Nigerian government agreed to pay Malabu the \$1.09 billion in sale proceeds. The Government subsequently made the transfer and retained only the amount of the “signature bonus.” In an order entered in the New York Supreme Court, Justice Bernard Fried stated that “it does appear that the [Nigerian Government] was indeed the proverbial ‘straw man’ holding \$1.1 billion for ultimate payment to Malabu.”

The allegations first came to light following the court filings by ILC and EVP. ILC filed a motion to freeze assets in connection with its arbitration claim against Malabu for “failure to pay ILC a ‘Success Fee’ in the approximate amount of \$65.5 million as a result of ILC’s services for the transfer of Malabu’s rights to an oil prospecting license over oil block OPL 245.” Separately, EVP brought suit in the United Kingdom against Malabu for \$200 million in unpaid fees for brokering the 2011 sale of OPL 245 to Shell and ENI. On July 17, 2013 the High Court ruled that EVP was entitled to \$110.5 million for its role in brokering the sale, and the funds were subsequently transferred to bank accounts in Switzerland.

At the request of Italian prosecutors, the Swiss authorities froze those funds. Later, the U.K. authorities also agreed to freeze an additional \$80 million of Malabu funds that remained in the United Kingdom.

Etete was convicted in 2007 in France in absentia on charges of money-laundering related to bribes that he had allegedly taken while an Oil Minister. Etete was sentenced to three years in prison and a criminal fine of €300,000. A French appellate court initially denied Etete’s appeal of the conviction in March 2009, but his prison sentence was changed to a fine of €8 million. Ultimately, however, the French government pardoned Etete of all charges in March 2014.

*Giuseppe Orsi and Bruno Spagnolini*

Over recent years, multinational defense and aerospace contractor Finmeccanica SpA has been implicated in a series of corruption allegations and probes that culminated in the resignation of two consecutive CEOs, Pier Francesco Guarguaglini and Giuseppe Orsi, respectively in 2011 and 2013. For the most part, these investigations have focused on alleged improper connections between the company and the Italian government (which owns 30.2% of its shares) or allegations of domestic misconduct, such as a 2003 bribery case involving state-controlled energy company Enelpower.

Additionally, however, Italian authorities have also scrutinized Finmeccanica's operations abroad, and accused the company of having engaged in corruption in the scope of multiple projects in Latin America and Asia. For instance, in 2011, former sales manager Paolo Pozzessere was arrested over allegations of bribery in connection with contracts for the supply of helicopters and other technology in Panama and Brazil.

Another scandal gained international attention in February 2013, when then-CEO Giuseppe Orsi was arrested in Italy under suspicion of having orchestrated a vast corruption scheme to secure a €560 million contract in 2010 with the Indian government for the supply of twelve luxury "VVIP" helicopters typically used for heads of state. The Italian authorities also placed Bruno Spagnolini, then-CEO of Finmeccanica's helicopter division AgustaWestland, and two other AgustaWestland executives under house arrest on charges relating to the same underlying conduct. Orsi and Spagnolini resigned from their positions at Finmeccanica shortly after their arrests, although the former has explicitly denied any wrongdoing and stated that the tender had been carried out regularly under the law.

According to the allegations, Orsi and Spagnolini "presid[ed] over a system of bribery and corruption that was part of the company philosophy." Specifically, the two individuals allegedly conspired with a former Indian Air Force Chief, S.P. Tyagi, to alter the terms of the tender for the sale of the helicopters in favor of Finmeccanica, and to increase the number of helicopters purchased by the Indian government from eight to twelve. AgustaWestland allegedly paid over €51 million to third-party consultants connected to Christian Michel, Guido Haschke, and Carlos Gerosa, who (i) funneled €15 million to Indian officials through companies they owned in Tunisia (Gordian Services Sarl and IDS Tunisia) and India (Aeromatrix and IDS India), routing the money through Tunisia and Mauritius, (ii) paid €100,000 was paid in cash to three of Tyagi's cousins (Julie Tyagi, Docsa Tyagi, and Sandeep Tyagi), and (iii) redirected at least €10 million to Italian politicians who supported Orsi's appointment as Finmeccanica CEO in 2011.

Haschke was arrested in October 2012. In April 2014, he entered into a plea agreement to provide testimony against Orsi and Spagnolini. Under the terms of the agreement, Haschke was sentenced to 22 months in prison.

Despite Haschke's testimony, Orsi and Spagnolini were acquitted of all corruption-related charges on October 9, 2014. Both men were sentenced, however, to two years imprisonment for false bookkeeping. Orsi has stated that he will seek to reverse the conviction

on appeal, and press articles have noted that the short sentences are likely to be suspended under Italian law.

### ***Griffiths Energy***

On January 22, 2013, Griffiths Energy International Inc. (“Griffiths Energy”), a Canadian oil and gas company now known as Caracal Energy, pleaded guilty to making an illegal payment of \$2 million to the wife of Chadian ambassador to Canada in violation of Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act (“CFPOA”). On January 25, 2013, the Court of Queens’ Bench in Calgary accepted a settlement in which Griffiths Energy agreed to pay a fine of CAD \$10.35 million.

According to the Agreed Statement of Facts, Griffiths Energy is a privately held Canadian company that Brad Griffiths, Naeem Tyab, and Tyab’s brother founded in August 2009 in order to purchase various oil blocks in the Republic of Chad. Shortly after the company was founded, Griffiths Energy entered into a consultancy agreement with the Maryland-based Ambassade du Tchad LLC, a company that was wholly owned by Mahamoud Adam Bechir, then-Chadian ambassador to Canada as well as the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Cuba. The consultancy agreement stated that Ambassade du Tchad would provide various consulting services in connection with Griffiths Energy’s oil and gas projects, and that it would receive a fee of USD \$2 million if Griffiths Energy were awarded the certain oil blocks by December 31, 2009.

In early September 2009, however, Griffiths Energy’s external legal counsel advised Tyab that Griffiths Energy could not offer to make a payment to Ambassade du Tchad because it was owned by Ambassador Bechir, a government official. Griffiths Energy terminated that consultancy agreement, but several weeks later executed an identical agreement with Chad Oil Consulting LLC, which was wholly owned by Ambassador Bechir’s wife and had been incorporated in Nevada only days prior. Separately, Bechir’s wife and her associates were permitted to purchase 4 million founders shares of Griffiths Energy for a total of CAD \$4,000.

Following a string of MOUs, negotiations, and intensive study of the oil blocks in question between September 2009 and December 2010, Griffiths Energy and the Chadian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy entered into a production sharing agreement on January 19, 2011. On February 8, 2011, Griffiths Energy transferred payment of \$2 million to Chad Oil Consulting’s Washington, DC bank account through an escrow agreement with Griffiths Energy’s external law firm.

Griffiths Energy hired an entirely new management team and appointed six new independent directors to its board by September 2011. The new board and management discovered the consultancy agreements while conducting due diligence in anticipation of its Initial Public Offering (which it subsequently withdrew), and it promptly conducted an internal investigation. In November 2011, Griffiths Energy informed Canadian enforcement authorities of the ongoing investigation and also self-disclosed the underlying conduct to U.S. enforcement authorities. Crown prosecutor Robert Sigurdson reportedly told journalists that he expected that the DOJ would not pursue charges given the Canadian prosecution.

The Accepted Statement of Facts praised Griffith Energy's investigation as being "full and extensive." Pursuant to the settlement agreement, the company committed to continue to cooperate with the Canadian government, pay a fine of CAD \$10,350,000, and adopt a robust anti-corruption compliance program and strengthen its internal controls.

- *Forfeiture Actions Against Bechir and Wife*

According Canadian newspaper *The Globe and Mail*, Bechir left his post as ambassador to Canada at the end of 2012 and became the Chadian ambassador to South Africa, but he was subsequently dismissed as a result of the bribery scandal. In various interviews with and a letter to the newspaper, Bechir asserted that his Maryland-based wife — from whom Canadian authorities are seeking to recover the USD \$2 million payment she received as well as her founders shares (now valued at over \$20 million) — had not done anything wrong. To the contrary, Bechir stated that she "deserves her millions" because she legitimately "opened the doors" and convinced the Chadian government to sign the production sharing agreement with Griffiths Energy. Bechir further argued that it was possible that the payment to his wife would not benefit him, noting: "It depends. Not necessarily. I might benefit because she is my wife, but I might not. Maybe she'll get richer and she'll be on her own."

The DOJ filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia on July 8, 2014 to seek the civil forfeiture of nearly \$1.5 million in funds under the U.S. Kleptocracy Recovery Initiative. As of December 31, 2014, the case was still pending.

### *Sandals / Turks and Caicos Islands Investigations*

In January 2013, a Special Investigation and Prosecution Team ("SIPT") established by the U.K. government reached a settlement agreement with Sandals Resorts International in connection with its Beaches resort in the Turks and Caicos Islands ("TCI"). Although the details of the settlement with Sandals were not disclosed, press reports indicate that the investigation centered around several transactions that former Sandals executive Jeffrey Pyne allegedly made in 2005 and 2006, transferring approximately \$1.65 million from Sandals to then-TCI Chief Minister Michael Misick and his Progressive National Party through various third-party firms controlled by his brothers, including Misick and Stanbrook (a law firm headed by Ariel Misick), Chalmers and Company (a law firm headed by Chalmers Misick), and Prestigious Properties (a real estate company headed by Washington Misick).

Sandals agreed to pay \$12 million to the Turks and Caicos Islands Government, but did not admit liability by the company, its directors, or its officers. In 2011, however, Sandals had brought a lawsuit in Jamaica alleging that Pyne breached his fiduciary duties by transmitting the funds without permission. Moreover, according to a statement issued by Neil Smith, the Governor's Spokesman for TCI, the agreement "does not prevent the prosecution of any other persons" regarding any of the underlying facts.

The SIPT noted that the agreement was in part a result of the internal investigation that Sandals had launched in January 2011 into "various unauthorized transactions" related to the investigation by U.K. and U.S. authorities into general corruption in TCI. The SIPT remarked

that Sandals' cooperation with the U.S. authorities had been "both extraordinary and unique and included the early and voluntary release of valuable evidence." Following the announcement of the settlement Sandals stated that they were "pleased at the outcome" and "satisfied in the manner in which it has been resolved."

Other private developers also settled with the SIPT. Mario Hoffman and the Salt Cay Development Companies announced a settlement with the SIPT in July 2012. Under the terms of that agreement, the companies paid \$7 million and transferred 1,506 acres of land to the TCI government. Separately, the government recovered 806 acres of land through a judgment against Star Platinum, a company owned by Turkish national Cem Kinay — regarding whom Interpol issued an international arrest warrant on July 13, 2012 in connection with these matters. Varet Jak Civre, one of the thirteen defendants discussed above, settled charges with the SIPT following a payment of \$5 million.

The investigations trace back to a June 2008 report the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons in the United Kingdom published on Overseas Territories. The report described widespread corruption within the government of TCI and noted, among other things, that "[o]ver 50 individuals from TCI wrote to us, many alleging corruption, for instance in regard to the sale of Crown land, the distribution of contracts and development agreements, the granting of Belongerships (a status which indicates freedom from any immigration restrictions and also confers rights normally associated with citizenship, including the right to vote) and the misuse of public funds."

The Report detailed specifically several "allegations of corrupt practices in relation to distribution of contracts" for international development, and that there had been widespread departures from competitive tendering. Specifically, the TCI Leader of the Opposition alleged to the Foreign Affairs Committee that "[i]t appears that any and every investment in the country is gotten as a result of kickback to a government minister or his/her immediate family."

The Report concluded with a recommendation for a Commission of Inquiry to investigate these allegations, and the outgoing governor of TCI established such a commission in July 2008. The investigation by the Commission provided further evidence that Misick had acquired public lands and sold them to developers improperly, unjustly enriching himself and amassing a multi-million dollar fortune. Witnesses before the Commission testified to Misick's mansions, private jets, and a \$200,000 per month clothing allowance for his American ex-wife, LisaRaye McCoy, an actress and fashion designer.

Following the publication of an initial report by the Commission of Inquiry in March 2009, Misick abruptly resigned and fled the country. Several months later, in August 2009, the U.K. government suspended parts of the TCI constitution and imposed direct rule on the islands. At that time, the United Kingdom established the SIPT to work with the DOJ in connection with the ongoing investigation of fraud and corruption by Misick's regime. In total, the SIPT and DOJ reviewed over 100,000 pages of evidence.

The ongoing investigation has ensnared government officials as well as the international developers that allegedly paid them bribes. Misick himself was arrested in Brazil in December

2012 on an Interpol red notice and a warrant from the Brazilian supreme court. Among other things, Misick allegedly used \$1 million in improper payments from Sandals to pay personal debts (including payments to the mother of his children).

According to press reports, Misick is extradited to TCI in January 2014, and he has been released on bail pending a future trial that was scheduled to begin on December 1, 2014 but which has been delayed in light of various legal challenges as well as the difficulty of finding an impartial jury.

### *Safran Group*

On September 5, 2012, the Paris Criminal Court fined the French Safran Group €500,000 for allegedly bribing public officials in Nigeria. The Paris-headquartered Safran Group, which also trades ADRs on the U.S. OTC, is a multinational corporation that provides services in the aeronautics, defense, and securities industries. The current company, in which the French government holds a 30% stake, was formed in 2005 through the merger of two other French companies: Société d'Applications Générales de l'Électricité et de la Mécanique ("SAGEM") (a security and telecommunications company) and Snecma S.A. (an aerospace and defense company). Today, the company has over 60,000 global employees and €11.5 billion in annual revenue.

The French found that, between 2001 and 2003, SAGEM had endorsed payments of bribes ranging from €22,000 and €36,000 to Nigerian public officials through local agents to win a \$214 million contract to produce national identity cards. The initial allegations appear to have arisen following the merger of SAGEM and Snecma in 2005, when then-Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo alleged at a public conference that SAGEM had made improper payments to government officials. President Obasanjo alleged that SAGEM had made over €380,000 in illicit payments, together with gifts of Rolex watches, to win the National ID Card project. President Obasanjo also alleged that SAGEM had made other gifts and bribes through local intermediaries to various high-ranking Nigerian officials, including former Minister of Internal Affairs Sunday Afolabi, that together exceeded \$4 million. Based on these allegations, and at the subsequent urging of Nigeria, the United Kingdom, and the United States, France opened its investigation into Safran in January 2006.

As noted by the French press, the conviction and fine represents a rare bribery-based prosecution in France, which has been criticized in the past by the OECD for its lack of enforcement actions. Indeed, the Safran case marks the first-ever French conviction of a company for bribery, although individuals have been convicted in previous occasions. Safran has stated that it will appeal.

Two former Sagem employees were prosecuted in parallel with the company. Prosecutors sought a suspended sentence of up to 18 months and a €15,000 fine for both Jean-Pierre Delarue, a sales manager in Nigeria at the relevant time, and François Perrachon, the company's director for identification systems. The investigating judge, however, acquitted both former employees on the basis that the evidence only proved that their superiors, but not the defendants themselves, had personal knowledge of the corrupt acts.

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## OTHER FCPA DEVELOPMENTS

In addition to the numerous settlements and criminal matters discussed earlier in this Alert, there have been a number of significant developments related to the FCPA, including important civil litigation, and regulatory guidance, among other things. Certain of these developments are discussed herein.

### FCPA-Related Civil Litigation

The FCPA does not provide for a private cause of action. Nevertheless, enterprising shareholders, employees, competitors, and even foreign governments have sought alternative means to use allegations of bribery as a basis to bring derivative actions, securities class-action suits, and whistleblower complaints, among other legal actions.

#### *Derivative Actions*

When a publicly traded company resolves an FCPA investigation brought by the DOJ or the SEC, or discloses that such an investigation is underway, the company's shareholders can file derivative suits. These suits typically attempt to prove that the company's board of directors breached its fiduciary duty by failing to implement or adequately monitor internal anti-bribery controls.

Courts have required that a plaintiff "must show with particularized facts that the directors *knew* they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations or that the directors demonstrated a *conscious* disregard for their responsibilities such as failing to act in the face of a known duty to act" to establish liability for inadequate oversight. *Freuler v. Parker*, 803 F. Supp. 2d 630, 638 (S.D. Tex. 2011) (applying Delaware law and quoting *In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig.*, 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 1996) (emphasis in original)). Moreover, plaintiffs must further show that "(a) the directors utterly failed to implement any reporting or information system or controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls, [they] consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems requiring their attention." *Midwestern Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Baker Hughes, Inc.*, Civil Action No. H-08-1809, 2009 WL 6799492, \*4 (S.D. Tex. May 7, 2009) (quoting *Stone v. Ritter*, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006)). The mere fact of a violation is not sufficient to prove bad faith on the part of the directors. *Id.*

- *Dismissed Cases*

Plaintiffs have a heavy burden to shoulder in order to survive a motion to dismiss, and to pursue their claims successfully. Indeed, courts have regularly noted that a breach of the directors' "duty of attention or care in connection with the on-going operation of the corporation's business . . . is possibly the most difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win a judgment." *Freuler*, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 639 (citing *Caremark*, 698 A.2d at 969).

Numerous shareholder derivative actions based on the claim of a director's breach of his fiduciary duties have been dismissed. On July 25, 2012, for example, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts dismissed a lawsuit filed by shareholders against officers and directors of Nevada-based Smith & Wesson Holding Corporation ("Smith & Wesson"). The suit followed an indictment of the company's former international sales director based on FCPA allegations (*see Smith & Wesson*), and was dismissed based in part on the difficult threshold to prove director liability. *Holt v. Golden*, No. 11-CV-30200-MAP, slip op. at 8-12 (D. Mass. July 25, 2012) (granting defendant Smith & Wesson's motion to dismiss). Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana dismissed a shareholder derivative suit with prejudice on March 5, 2013 after the plaintiffs' motion to stay was denied. The suit was filed against officers and directors of Delaware-incorporated Tidewater Inc. in connection with alleged bribes paid to Azerbaijani and Nigerian government officials (*see Tidewater*).

Other previous FCPA-related shareholder derivative actions that have been dismissed over the past five years include (i) a shareholder derivative suit brought against Hewlett Packard Company on October 19, 2010 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California (dismissed in March 2012) (*see Hewlett Packard*); (ii) suits against the officers and directors of Parker Drilling Company by shareholders, filed in Texas state and federal court, alleging that the plaintiff shareholders had not been sufficiently informed that the company was under investigation by the DOJ and the SEC for its use of "customs and freight forwarding agents" in Kazakhstan and Nigeria (with the federal case being dismissed on March 14, 2012, and the state case on July 23, 2012); (iii) a derivative suit by the Rohm and Haas Company, which sought specific performance against the Dow Chemical Company regarding an aborted acquisition (dismissed by a Delaware Chancery court in January 2010) (*see Dow Chemical*); (iv) a lawsuit filed by a Teamsters' pension trust fund in the Southern District of Texas against current and former officers and directors of Baker Hughes (magistrate judge's memorandum and recommendation of dismissal adopted in May 2010) (*see Baker Hughes*); (v) a derivative claim against current and former directors of BAES by the City of Harper Woods (Michigan) Employees' Retirement System in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (dismissal affirmed in December 2009) (*see BAES*); and (vi) an ironworkers' pension fund's claim in the Western District of Pennsylvania against current and former Alcoa officers and directors based on the alleged bribes to Bahraini government officials (dismissed in July 2008) (*see Dahdaleh*).

- Settlements

A few derivative suits, however, have resulted in settlements in which the defendant companies adopted enhanced anti-corruption programs and paid the attorney fees of the plaintiff shareholders, including *NCR Corporation*, *Johnson & Johnson*, *Halliburton*, *SciClone Pharmaceuticals*, and *Maxwell Technology*.

In January 2014, Georgia-based ATM manufacturer NCR Corporation reached a settlement with a shareholder over allegations that company executives and board members knowingly allowed NCR to violate the FCPA in China and the Middle East, and to violate U.S. sanctions imposed on Syria. The litigation began in 2012 following a story in *The Wall Street Journal* in which a tipster accused the company of violating U.S.-imposed economic sanctions

on Syria by continuing to do business in the country. An NCR shareholder subsequently filed a derivative lawsuit in Georgia state court which was then removed to federal court in April 2013. Following several months of negotiations, the parties reached a settlement which provided, in part, that NCR would increase compliance training for its employees and implement a process for tracking company gifts given to government officials, with a special focus on NCR's policies in China. The settlement was approved by Judge Steven C. Jones in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia on April 8, 2014. In October 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey approved a settlement in a shareholder derivative case filed against Johnson & Johnson that alleged corrupt practices by Johnson & Johnson in Greece, Poland, and Romania, as well as under the U.N. Oil for Food Program in Iraq. Under the settlement, Johnson & Johnson agreed to (i) adopt and reinforce governance and compliance procedures, (ii) evaluate and compensate its employees on their adherence to those procedures, (iii) fund the governance and compliance reforms for the five-year term of the agreement, and (iv) reimburse plaintiffs' legal fees and expenses up to a cap. An appeal challenging the settlement was dismissed on January 15, 2014.

In June 2012, Halliburton entered into a proposed settlement agreement to resolve shareholder actions brought against it based in part on its alleged involvement in a Nigerian bribery scheme. Litigation began in May 2009 when two pension funds filed separate shareholder derivative suits in Texas state court against current and former Halliburton directors. In January 2011, a Halliburton shareholder submitted a separate demand to the board, alleging essentially the same conduct in violation of the FCPA, which gave rise to the consolidated complaint. Without admitting liability, Halliburton entered into a settlement agreement with plaintiffs, later approved by the Harris County District Court, under which Halliburton agreed to pay the plaintiffs' legal fees and implement changes to its corporate governance policies, which included a revision of its code of business conduct and the introduction of FCPA training.

In February 2012, Maxwell Technology entered into a proposed settlement to resolve consolidated derivative actions filed by shareholders in connection with allegations that the company bribed officials of a Chinese state-owned electric utility company (*see Maxwell*). Maxwell Technology agreed to pay \$3 million in attorneys' fees and to adopt enhanced compliance measures. Although the settlement did not require a Mandarin-fluent compliance coordinator, the company did agree to establish a new FCPA and Anti-Corruption Compliance department, which would be spearheaded by a Chief Compliance Officer. In addition to other enhanced governance measures, including due diligence procedures, training, and audit control testing, the settlement agreement also provided for changes to the company's executive compensation policy.

In December 2011, a California state court approved a settlement agreement to resolve consolidated derivative lawsuits against SciClone Pharmaceuticals, which had disclosed previously that it was under investigation by the SEC and the DOJ in connection with its interactions with government-owned entities in China. In addition to agreeing to pay \$2.5 million in plaintiffs' attorneys' fees, SciClone agreed to adopt enhanced corporate governance measures, including: (i) the engagement of a compliance coordinator, fluent in English and Mandarin, who would conduct annual compliance reviews, report directly to the company's audit

committee, and file quarterly reports with SciClone's legal counsel, CEO, CFO, and internal and external auditors; (ii) an enhanced "Global Anti-Bribery & Anti-Corruption Policy" designed to prevent and detect violations of the FCPA and other applicable laws; (iii) maintaining the company's internal audit and control function; (iv) due diligence reviews in connection with the hiring of all "foreign agents and distributors;" (v) mandatory employee compliance training; and (vi) modifications to the company's whistleblower program.

- Pending cases

The high legal burden and historical lack of success in eliciting large monetary settlements or judgments have not precluded plaintiff shareholders from attempting to bring similar lawsuits, and a number of shareholder derivative actions are pending.

The most publicized pending shareholder lawsuits have been filed against Wal-Mart in connection with allegations that it bribed Mexican government officials and later sought to conceal the evidence (*see Wal-Mart*). Following the publication of these allegations in the *New York Times*, Wal-Mart has been mired in litigation, having spent hundreds of millions of dollars on compliance and FCPA-related matters. Consolidated proceedings are currently pending in the Delaware Court of Chancery, and proceedings elsewhere have been stayed and administratively terminated pending the resolution of those actions. The Delaware cases, consolidated in September 3, 2012, also specified that the plaintiffs comply with the pending "Verified Complaint To Compel Inspection Of Books And Records" that one of the lead plaintiffs had filed earlier. On May 20, 2013, the chancery judge heard oral arguments and ruled that Wal-Mart must provide plaintiffs with substantial additional internal files, including all documents in the custody of eleven custodians, certain director-level documents, as well as documents protected by the attorney-client privilege and the attorney work-product doctrine. Wal-Mart appealed, but in a sweeping July 23, 2014 opinion, the Supreme Court of Delaware upheld the Chancery Court's ruling, finding that all of the categories of documents were "necessary and essential" to the shareholders because they addressed the "crux of the shareholder's purpose" and were unavailable by other means. The suit is still pending.

Nevada-based gambling company Wynn Resorts Limited Corporation ("Wynn") faces a lawsuit by shareholders for alleged FCPA violations related to casino resort projects in the Chinese gambling enclave of Macau. The shareholder derivative suits were filed in federal and state courts following an inquiry by the SEC regarding the company's \$135 million donation made to the University of Macau's Development Foundation. The federal and state suits allege that Wynn made the donation to the Macau University in an improper attempt to influence the Macau government, and to expedite its approval of a land concession agreement needed by Wynn to build a new casino resort. The federal plaintiffs filed a consolidated claim on August 6, 2012 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. On February 1, 2013, the district court granted Wynn's motion to dismiss for failure to meet the requirements of the heightened pleading standard of 23.1, but permitted the plaintiffs to file an amended complaint. Plaintiffs subsequently filed an amended complaint on April 8, 2013. Wynn's motion to dismiss on the same grounds was granted on March 13, 2014, and an appeal is pending with the Ninth Circuit.

Global food processor Archer Daniels Midland Company (“ADM”) faces a derivative shareholder suit in Illinois state court in connection with an alleged bribery scheme in Ukraine. ADM agreed to a \$54.2 million settlement with the SEC and DOJ in December of 2013, after an investigation by regulators concluded that the company’s German and Ukrainian subsidiaries paid \$21 million in bribes to obtain the release of more than \$100 million in tax refunds from Ukrainian officials. The derivative suit was filed on January 16, 2014 in the Cook County Chancery Division of Illinois Circuit Court, and alleges that many of ADM’s officers and board members knowingly or recklessly allowed the bribery scheme to continue. The case remains pending.

Several current and former board members of tech giant Hewlett Packard Co. (“HP”) are facing a derivative suit by shareholders over allegations that they covered up FCPA violations, failed to cooperate with an investigation by U.S. regulators, and wasted corporate resources through these actions as well as through a series of allegedly reckless multi-billion dollar acquisitions. The suit comes after recent investigations by US, German, and Polish anti-corruption authorities into allegations that the company violated the FCPA in public sector transactions in Poland, Russia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Mexico, and other unnamed countries (*see Hewlett-Packard*). The complaint was filed on February 10, 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, and states in part that HP’s Board, “as a de facto matter of policy, manifested over and over again in the various bribery schemes alleged herein, consistently elevated revenues and profits over compliance with laws and regulations designed to protect the Company and its shareholders.”

Other pending shareholder derivative actions of note include six new actions filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California between March 13, 2013 and May 7, 2013 against Maxwell Technologies, which allege that Maxwell paid bribes to Chinese state officials in order to obtain and retain sales contracts. In January 2011, Maxwell Technologies agreed to pay a total of \$14 million to resolve enforcement actions with the DOJ and SEC with respect to corruption in China and in late 2013, the DOJ charged a former Maxwell Technologies executive and Swiss citizen Alain Riedo with conspiracy and substantive FCPA violations related to the same underlying conduct. Four of the March 2013 shareholder derivative cases were consolidated on October 2013 and then dismissed in May 2014. An amended complaint was filed on July 10, 2014.

### ***Class Action Securities Suits***

Plaintiffs have had more success with class action security lawsuits brought by current or former shareholders pursuant to Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5, which states that:

It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, (a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material

fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

- Pleading Requirements

To state a claim under Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5, a shareholder plaintiff must plead that the defendant company or directors “made a false statement or omitted a material fact, with scienter, and that plaintiff’s reliance on defendant’s action caused plaintiff injury.” *Johnson v. Siemens AG*, Case No. 09-CV-5310, 2011 WL 1304267, \*12 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2011) (quoting *San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Cos.*, 75 F.3d 801, 808 (2d Cir.1996)).

Moreover, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”) established more stringent pleading standards, requiring that the complaint must (i) “specify each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed,” and (ii) “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.” *Johnson*, 2011 WL 1304267 at \*12. (quoting 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-4(b)(1) and (2)).

Providing detailed factual allegations that the defendants acted with the necessary scienter has proved the most difficult element for plaintiffs to plead sufficiently. To meet the “strong inference” requirement, the United States Supreme Court has required that the pleaded facts be cogent and create an inference “at least as compelling as any opposing inference of nonfraudulent intent” that the defendant sought to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. *Tellabs v. Makor Issues & Rights*, 551 U.S. 308, 314 (2007).

- Dismissed Cases

A number of plaintiffs have failed to meet this stringing standard, including, (i) a capital management fund that filed a suit following GE’s acquisition of InVision (dismissal by the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in November 2008) (see *InVision*); (ii) shareholders who filed a suit against Siemens, claiming that that the company had misrepresented the scope and magnitude of the corruption discovered by multiple ongoing investigations (dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in March 2011) (see *Siemens*); (iii) class action plaintiffs who alleged that the stock of SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“SciClone”) had dropped 40 percent the day it was announced that the SEC and the DOJ were investigating possible FCPA violations related to the company’s business in China (voluntarily dismissed by plaintiffs in the U.S. District Court Northern District of California on December 1, 2010); and (iv) class action plaintiffs who filed suit against Avon and two of its former executives claiming that the executives had attributed Avon’s success in China to direct sales in several financial disclosure

statements over the years when, in fact, they knew that the direct sales were made possible only by widespread bribery (dismissed by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York on September 29, 2014, with leave to amend; Second Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiffs on October 24, 2014) (*see Avon*).

Moreover, in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court made it even more difficult for plaintiffs who acquired shares extraterritorially to file claims in federal courts. In *Morrison v. National Australia Bank*, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010), the Court reversed previous federal jurisprudence, holding that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not apply extraterritorially. The Court specified that plaintiffs could only bring such cases if “the purchase or sale is made in the United States, or involves a security listed on a domestic exchange.”

- Settlement Agreements

Despite the increasing burdens and limitations, some plaintiffs have still been able to obtain substantial court-approved settlements reaching as high as \$61.5 million. Such cases include: (i) a securities fraud suit in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California against UTStarcom, Inc., which included allegations of FCPA violations involving the company’s activities in China, India, and Mongolia (\$30 million settlement in August 2010) (*see UTStarcom*); (ii) an action filed in the U.S. District Court District of Utah against Nature’s Sunshine Products in connection with false statements made by the company’s CEO, who allegedly had made illegal payments under the FCPA (\$6 million settlement in September 2009) (*see Nature’s Sunshine*); (iii) a class action lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida alleging that Faro Technologies had overstated sales, understated the cost of goods sold, and concealed its overstatement of profit margins through violations of the FCPA (\$6.875 million settlement in October 2008) (*see Faro Technologies*); (iv) a securities fraud suit brought in the U.S. District Court for the District of Texas that claimed violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act by Willbros Group, whose inflated stock price enabled the company to complete a \$70 million offering of Convertible Senior Notes and enter into a \$150 million credit agreement (\$10.5 million settlement in February 2007) (*see Willbros*); (v) a securities action filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia against Immucor, Inc., wherein the plaintiffs claimed that the company made false or misleading statements about the scope and gravity of investigations in Italy (\$2.5 million in May 2007) (*see Immucor*); and (vi) a class action lawsuit brought in the Superior Court for the State of California, County of San Diego, against Titan Corporation, in which plaintiff shareholders argued that the company’s FCPA violations prevented it from entering into a definitive merger agreement with Lockheed Martin (\$61.5 million settlement in December 2005) (*see Titan*).

- Class-Action Suit Against Petrobras

Following the revelations and allegations that arose in late 2014 in connection with the Brazilian federal police investigation *Operation Car Wash* (discussed in detail in our Focus Issues, above), investors filed a class-action lawsuit against Petrobras (whose ADSs are listed on the NYSE) on December 8, 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York. An initial pre-trial conference has been set for January 8, 2015.

In the complaint, lead plaintiff Peter Kaltman alleges that Petrobras “made false and misleading statements by misrepresenting facts and failing to disclose a multi-year, multi-billion dollar money-laundering and bribery scheme.” Kaltman alleges that former Petrobras senior executives, including among other Paulo Roberto Costa and Renato Duque, received kickbacks from companies such as Odebrecht and SBM Offshore in exchange for inflated contracts. The plaintiffs attempt to meet the scienter requirements by arguing that Costa and Duque’s “knowledge of the fraud is attributable to [Petrobras] for the purposes of assessing [its] scienter.”

- Wal-Mart

On May 7, 2012, shareholders filed a class-action lawsuit in the Middle District of Tennessee, alleging “unlawful and unethical conduct” in connection with allegations of a bribery scheme at Wal-Mart’s largest subsidiary, Wal-Mart de Mexico. The plaintiffs sought to establish Wal-Mart’s liability under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act on the grounds that, during the class period, Wal-Mart knew but concealed that Wal-Mart de Mexico was making bribery payments in Mexico, violating both the FCPA and Mexican law. On July 25, 2012, Judge Todd Campbell of the Middle District of Tennessee granted Wal-Mart’s motion to transfer venue to the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Arkansas. On March 4, 2013, Wal-Mart filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ amended complaint for failure to allege sufficient false statements, or facts that allege that Wal-Mart acted with the required scienter.

On September 26, 2014, the U.S. District Court of the Western District of Arkansas denied Wal-Mart’s motion to dismiss. Judge Hickey, fully adopting the report of Magistrate Judge Setser, held that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficiently plausible claims that (i) Wal-Mart’s failure to disclose its 2005 knowledge of the Mexican bribes was actionably false or misleading because a reasonable investor would have viewed the omission as significantly altering the total mix or information available and (ii) Wal-Mart had possessed the requisite scienter because it knew that omitting its 2005 knowledge of the Mexican bribes from its December 2011 Form 10-Q would be materially misleading. On December 18, 2014, shareholders asked the Delaware Chancery Court to impose sanctions against Wal-Mart for ignoring a previous order to turn over documents related to its internal investigation. As of December 2014, the case was on track to proceed to trial.

### ***Civil Actions Brought by Partners or Competitors***

In addition to shareholders, competitors have brought claims under federal and state statutes, alleging harm related to lost contracts stemming from FCPA-related violations. Most notably, competitors have brought claims under the Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organization (“RICO”) Act in addition to other federal and state laws that prohibit anticompetitive practices.

On July 23, 2010, NewMarket Corporation (“NewMarket”) filed a lawsuit against Innospec in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia (*see Innospec*). Bringing claims under the Sherman Act, the Robinson-Patman Act, the Virginia Antitrust Act, and the Virginia Business Conspiracy Act, NewMarket alleged that Innospec paid bribes and kickbacks to foreign officials to ensure that NewMarket’s fuel additive, which competed with Innospec’s,

would be at a competitive disadvantage in Iraq and Indonesia. On September 13, 2011, Innospec agreed to pay NewMarket a total of \$45 million through a combination of cash payments, promissory notes, and common stock.

In a second case, the Dubai-based Supreme Fuels filed suit on October 21, 2008 in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida against International Oil Trading Company (“IOTC”), and its co-owners, Harry Sargeant, the then-Finance Chairman of the Republican Party of Florida, and Mustafa Abu-Naba’a, a Jordanian resident of the Dominican Republic, asserting multiple claims under the RICO Act, the Clayton Act, and various Florida state laws. The suit alleged a conspiracy to bribe key Jordanian government officials — beginning in 2004 — that would ensure that IOTC would be the sole recipients of more than \$1 billion in U.S. government contracts for the supply of fuels to the U.S. military in Iraq. On May 6, 2011, the court found that the parties had entered into a binding settlement, and ordered the defendants to pay \$5 million, plus post-judgment interest.

A Florida jury also found Harry Sargeant and Mustafa Abu-Naba’a liable for a separate breach of contract and fraud action filed by their former business partner in IOTC Jordan, Mohammad Al-Saleh. Sargeant and Abu-Naba’a contracted with Al-Saleh — a member of the Jordanian royal family by virtue of his marriage to Princess Alia Al Hussein, the half-sister of King Abdullah II — to curry favor with the royal family, but later sought to replace Al-Saleh with a former CIA agent after the lucrative contracts had been secured. Following the two-and-a-half week trial in Palm Beach Florida Circuit Court in July 2011, the jury awarded Al-Saleh over \$28 million in damages. On August 7, 2013, the District Court of Appeal of the State of Florida, Fourth District, denied the defendants’ direct appeal of the judgment, but remanded the case to the circuit court to determine the proper amount of pre-judgment interest due to the plaintiff. Although the circuit court eventually determined Al-Saleh was owed over \$3 million in prejudgment interest, the case has continued and involved appeals back to the Fourth District as well as applications to the Florida Supreme Court. As of December 2014, the case in the Palm Beach Florida Circuit Court was still active.

Recently, defendants have sought to dismiss such lawsuits by challenging the extraterritoriality of federal securities fraud statutes following the Supreme Court’s April 2010 decision in *Morrison v. National Australia Bank*. The *Morrison* Court found that because the plain language of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 referred only to the purchases or sales of securities listed on an American stock exchange or in the United States, the law did not reach securities purchased on foreign exchanges, despite the fact that the underlying fraud upon which the suit was based occurred in Florida.

In *TJGEM v. Republic of Ghana*, a case in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in March 2013 against various Ghanaian officials — including the Mayor of Accra — and the New Jersey-based Conti Construction Co. Inc. (“Conti Construction”), the plaintiff alleged that the defendants engaged in various racketeering, fraud, and other corrupt practices to induce and coerce TJGEM to pay bribes and kickbacks in connection with a sewer redevelopment project, which occurred primarily in Ghana. The defendants moved to dismiss all of the claims in TJGEM’s complaint on multiple grounds, including sovereign immunity, the

doctrine of *forum non conveniens*, and lack of personal jurisdiction. The defendants, however, have taken aim most directly at the RICO claims, both on the merits and on the grounds that the claims are barred under the holding of *Morrison*. After defendants filed their motion to dismiss, plaintiffs amended their complaint, significantly expanding the factual matrix showing the defendants' actions in the United States.

On September 11, 2013, the Ghanaian defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint, which was granted on December 31, 2013. The District Court dismissed the complaint against the Ghanaian defendants for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because they were undisputedly foreign sovereigns under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA") and TJGEM had not pleaded facts sufficient to show that one of the enumerated exceptions to the FSIA applied. TJGEM's claims against Defendant Conti were also dismissed by the court as required by the rules of comity and Supreme Court precedent in *Republic of the Philippines et al. vs. Pimentel*, which provides that a case must be dismissed if an un-joined foreign sovereign is a required party to the suit under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.

TJGEM appealed the decision of the District Court on March 20, 2014. As of December 2014, TJGEM's appeal was still pending.

### ***Lawsuits by Foreign Governments and State-Owned Entities***

Companies that have resolved charges with the DOJ and SEC occasionally face additional U.S.-based lawsuits from the countries or state-owned entities implicated in the action. The mere fact that those government entities may themselves have solicited or received the bribes in question has not prevented them from bringing suit. Courts, however, have appeared reluctant to allow such entities to bring such claims when the foreign entities could themselves be considered co-conspirators in the matter. Moreover, these types of plaintiffs face the same challenges as the more typical shareholders in meeting the stringent pleading standards, and the limitation of the application of the securities laws extraterritorially under *Morrison*. But if the foreign government or state-owned entity can survive a motion to dismiss, a substantial settlement can be attained.

- ***Alcatel-Lucent***

On December 27, 2010, Alcatel-Lucent agreed to pay substantial criminal and civil penalties to the DOJ and the SEC, and agreed to a three-year deferred prosecution agreement to resolve investigations of FCPA violations in Costa Rica, Taiwan, Honduras, Malaysia, and Kenya, among others. (*See Alcatel-Lucent.*) In Costa Rica, for example, Alcatel-Lucent paid \$18 million in bribes through consultants to officials at the Instituto Costarricense de Electricidad ("ICE"), the state-owned telecommunications company, and earned over \$23 million in profits on the substantial contracts it secured with ICE.

In April 2010, shortly after Alcatel-Lucent disclosed the tentative agreements in February 2010, ICE sued Alcatel-Lucent and three of its subsidiaries in Florida state court, seeking over \$200 million in damages, arguing that Alcatel-Lucent had operated a racketeering enterprise. The state court dismissed that suit under the doctrine of *forum non conveniens*, and noted that

ICE could not transform the criminal prosecution into a civil RICO claim “because civil RICO claims do not apply extraterritorially to foreign plaintiff’s foreign injury for bribes made to foreign officials.”

ICE then sought to have the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida reject the plea agreements between Alcatel-Lucent and the Department of Justice, and to be recognized as a “crime victim” under the Crime Victims Rights’ Act, which affords a qualifying victim the right to seek restitution. *See* 18 U.S.C § 3771.

In its petition for relief, ICE argued that as soon as it learned of the corruption it immediately terminated the directors and employees who were involved in taking the bribes, and that ICE itself did not profit from the bribes, and the corrupt activities of Alcatel-Lucent and the corrupt employees caused ICE significant losses. ICE further claimed that DOJ’s decision not to provide the Costa Rican company with the monetary fines it obtained was “the product of the same imperialist view of Latin America, the Caribbean and lesser-developed nations that spawned Alcatel’s fraudulent scheme.”

At a subsequent status conference, the DOJ made clear, however, that it was not mere ICE “employees,” but “nearly half of ICE’s board of directors [that] were soliciting and taking hundreds of thousands of dollars in bribes.” The district court agreed, rejecting ICE’s petition for victim status and restitution, in part because the company’s was a “co-conspirator” in the scheme:

I think you have, even though not a charged conspirator co-conspirator relationship, that’s essentially what went on here; that given the high-placed nature of the criminal conduct within [ICE’s] organization, the number of people involved, that basically it was ‘Bribery Is Us,’ meaning that everybody was involved in it. Even though you didn’t know specifically, it’s enough to say that the principals were involved here.

On June 14, 2011, the court approved guilty pleas of the subsidiaries and the deferred prosecution agreement between Alcatel-Lucent and the United States, which did not include an award of restitution. On the same day, ICE filed its notice of appeal of the court’s order.

On June 15, 2011, ICE petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, requesting that the circuit court issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to recognize ICE as a “crime victim,” allow for restitution, and direct the district court to vacate Alcatel-Lucent’s guilty pleas and the deferred prosecution agreement. On June 17, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit denied ICE’s petitions.

On August 3, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit denied ICE’s appeal of the district court’s approval of the guilty pleas and the deferred prosecution agreement for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the district court had not entered a final judgment, but had simply approved a deferred prosecution agreement. Moreover, the court relied on the well-established default rule in the Eleventh Circuit, that “crime victims have no standing to appeal a defendant’s sentence in

a criminal proceeding.” Following the Eleventh Circuit’s denial, ICE petitioned for a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court, which was denied on December 10, 2012.

- *Aluminium Bahrain*

Bahrain’s state-owned steel company, Aluminium Bahrain (“Alba”), filed a suit in U.S. Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania against Alcoa on February 27, 2008 (and again on November 28, 2011 after the end of a DOJ-requested stay). Alba claimed that the Pennsylvania-based company had engaged in misconduct including overcharging, fraud, and bribery of Bahraini officials over a 15-year period, and had violated the RICO statute. On January 27, 2012, Alcoa filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the “enterprise” identified by Alba in connection with the racketeering activities under RICO was “essentially foreign.” As a result, Alcoa urged the district court to treat Alba’s RICO-based claims as extraterritorial applications of the statute, and unreachable under *Morrison*.

The district court, however, rejected Alcoa’s argument. Finding that Alba had adequately established that Alcoa, its affiliated entities, and senior executives were domestic, the court denied Alcoa’s motion to dismiss on June 11, 2012. The district court pointed to the 60-percent ownership of Alcoa in its Australian subsidiary, which had supplied the aluminum involved in the alleged bribery scheme. The court also criticized case law relied upon by the defendants, which judged the applicability of RICO by testing whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States, stating that the so-called “conduct test” had been rejected by the Supreme Court in *Morrison*.

On October 9, 2012, Alba and Alcoa entered into a settlement agreement to permanently resolve the pending lawsuit. Pursuant to the agreement, Alcoa, without admitting liability, agreed to pay Alba \$85 million in two equal installments — one-half at the time of settlement, and the balance after one year — in exchange for a dismissal of all claims against Alcoa.

Alba filed a second, similar suit on December 18, 2009, in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas against the Sojitz Corporation (“Sojitz”) and its American subsidiary. Alba described a 12-year scheme in which Sojitz’s two predecessor entities paid over \$14 million in bribes to two Alba employees in exchange for unauthorized discounted prices. In May 2010, the DOJ intervened and sought a stay of discovery. The enforcement agency noted that it had been investigating FCPA violations committed by Alcoa and stated that, although it did “not mean to overstate the relationship between the government’s investigation into Sojitz and its investigation into Alcoa, the [Department of Justice’s] Fraud Section believes that some individuals may have been involved in both alleged bribery schemes.” On January 16, 2013, the parties settled the case out of court, and jointly stipulated to the dismissal of the action.

- *The Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG et al.*

On June 27, 2008, the Iraqi government filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York based on allegations of bribery in connection with the U.N. Oil-for-Food Programme (“OFFP”) (*see ABB Ltd, above*). The Iraqi Government brought the suit against over 90 corporations — almost 50 parent companies and over 40 of their affiliates —

including the companies discussed in this Alert in connection with the OFFP settlements. Many of the other companies named in the lawsuit are under investigation by the DOJ or the SEC. The lawsuit seeks damages in connection with RICO and common law claims, including fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, which the Iraqi government asserts both directly and as *parens patriae* on behalf of the Iraqi people.

On January 15, 2010, defendants filed a consolidated motion to dismiss the claims on the basis of multiple grounds. The defendants argued that Iraq lacked standing because (i) it was the mastermind behind the alleged conspiracy, (ii) any injury that Iraq suffered was the result of its own conduct, and (iii) only U.S. states — not foreign nations — may seek redress for injuries under the doctrine of *parens patriae*. The defendants also argued that Iraq's own misconduct bars the claims, because "a primary wrongdoer may not recover from secondary participants in the alleged scheme."

Much of the jockeying between the parties centered on the issue of attribution, as well as whether the current Iraqi government and the government under the "Hussein Regime" are one and the same. The defendants cited *Trans-Orient Marine Corp. v. Star Trading & Marine, Inc.*, arguing that a change in government, regime or ideology has no effect on that state's international rights and obligations because the state continues to exist despite that change. The Iraqi government countered that although the nation has continued to exist, the "Hussein Regime was not the nation, but the nation's self-proclaimed ruler (that is, its self-appointed agent)."

On February 6, 2013, the district court granted defendants' consolidated claim and dismissed Iraq's complaint with prejudice. Although the court agreed with the defendants' argument that Iraq's status as a foreign nation bars it from making a *parens patriae* claim, it found that Iraq had standing to recover for the injury of its proprietary interest, which was caused by the wrongful depletion of the U.N. escrow account holding the proceeds of the OFFP. But although Iraq had standing in terms of an injury in fact, the court found that the RICO claims could not be brought because the actions took place extraterritorially, as in *Morrison*, and there is no private right of action under the FCPA. And with respect to the issue of attribution, the court sided with the defendants concluding that the "[Hussein] government, however deplorable it may have been, represented Iraq and its acts, however allegedly depraved, are attributable to the sovereign." The court noted that its finding comports with the International Law Commission's Articles which state that when "a person acts in an apparently official capacity, or under the color of authority, the actions in question will be attributable to the State."

Iraq appealed the district court's decision and, on September 18, 2014, the Second Circuit upheld the order of the district court. Writing for the Second Circuit, Judge KeARSE applied the doctrine of *in pari delicto*, which stands for the principal that a plaintiff "who has participated in wrongdoing equally with another person may not recover from that other person damages resulting from the wrongdoing," to dismiss Iraq's RICO claims. Although primarily applied by courts to antitrust claims, Judge KeARSE held here that, as a common law defense, *in pari delicto* also applied to RICO claims. Accordingly, Iraq could not bring claims against the defendants for wrongs committed by the Hussein Regime, because the legal position of a foreign state survives changes in its government. The court dismissed Iraq's FCPA claims because it did not find any

evidence that Congress had intended to create a private right of action in the FCPA, and, lastly, the court affirmed that the district court had properly declined to exercise supplement jurisdiction over Iraq's common law claims because they were essentially state law claims.

On October 2, 2014, Iraq filed for rehearing by the Second Circuit *en banc*; its petition for rehearing was denied on December 2, 2014.

- *Petróleos Mexicanos & Pemex-Refinación v. SK Engineering & Siemens*

On July 30, 2013, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed the complaint of *Petróleos Mexicanos*, Mexico's national oil exploration corporation, and its subsidiary *Pemex-Refinación* (collectively "Pemex"). Pemex sought \$160 million in damages from SK Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd., a Korean conglomerate, and Siemens Aktiengesellschaft stemming from bribes the latter allegedly paid to Pemex officials to retain an oil refinery rehabilitation contract suffering from significant overruns. The complaint alleged that the defendants violated the RICO Act.

Relying on *Morrison*, Judge Stanton granted defendant's motion to dismiss, stating that Pemex's "RICO claims are extraterritorial: they allege a foreign conspiracy against a foreign victim conducted by foreign defendants participating in foreign enterprises." Pemex's original complaint, which had been dismissed, had sought as much as \$1.5 billion in damages and alleged that the contract itself was a product of bribery. Judge Stanton was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a summary opinion issued on September 3, 2014.

### ***Whistleblower Complaints***

The Dodd-Frank Act enacted the SEC's whistleblower protection program. In the 2012 fiscal year, the SEC received over 3,000 whistleblower tips, and 115 tips related to FCPA violations. However, since the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Act, courts have wrestled with the appropriate scope of protections for employee whistleblowers. Recent cases indicate that there may be some tension between the SEC and courts regarding the interpretation of the Dodd-Frank whistleblower provisions.

- *Asadi v. GE Energy*

In 2013, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit handed down a much-discussed decision on this issue in *Asadi v. GE Energy*. A former GE Energy executive, Khaled Asadi, filed a complaint against his former employer. Asadi alleged that GE Energy wrongfully terminated him shortly after he notified his supervisors and the GE's ombudsman of potential FCPA violations, including an allegation that GE Energy may have been "pimping its way" to winning a contract by hiring a female employee specifically requested by a senior Iraqi official as its "point of contact."

In his complaint, Asadi conceded that because he had reported the FCPA violations internally, he did not fall under the statutory definition of the term "whistleblower," which the Dodd-Frank Act defined as:

any individual who provides . . . information relating to a violation of the securities laws to the [Securities and Exchange] Commission, in a manner established, by rule or regulation, by the Commission.

Asadi argued that his claim was nevertheless covered by Dodd-Frank’s Anti-Retaliation Provision, which prohibits employers from retaliating against:

a whistleblower in terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act done by the whistleblower [in] making disclosures that are required or protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act . . . , the Securities Exchange Act . . . , and any other law, rule, or regulation subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission.”

Citing to existing precedent, Asadi argued that the Anti-Retaliation Provision protected individuals — regardless of whether they reported the conduct to the SEC — so long as they had undertaken the protected activity listed in the provision.

On June 28, 2012, the U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Texas granted GE Energy’s motion to dismiss Asadi’s complaint on jurisdictional grounds. The district court declined to decide whether Asadi qualified as a Dodd-Frank “whistleblower,” and instead, it dismissed Asadi’s claims on the basis of the presumption against extraterritoriality, established in *Morrison*, noting that “like the language of Section 10(b) [of the Securities Exchange Act referred to in *Morrison*] the language of the Dodd-Frank Anti-Retaliation Provision is silent regarding whether it applies extraterritorially.” The court concluded that the provision “does not extend to or protect Asadi’s extraterritorial whistleblowing activity.”

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, however, held that because the statutory definition of a “whistleblower” includes only those individuals who report a potential violation to the SEC, he was ineligible for protection from retaliation. In its decision, the court observed that Congress had deliberately used the already-defined term “whistleblower” in the Anti-Retaliation Provision, rejecting Asadi’s view that a reading of the provision gives an additional, broader definition of whistleblowers under Dodd-Frank.

The *Asadi* Court rejected the conclusion reached by other courts that had previously considered the issue. For instance, in *Egan v. Tradingscreen*, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York noted that “a literal reading of the definition of the term ‘whistleblower’ in [the Act’s statutory definition], requiring reporting to the SEC, would effectively invalidate [the Anti-Retaliation Provision’s] protection of whistleblower disclosures that do not require reporting to the SEC.” *Egan v. TradingScreen, Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47713, at \*4 (S.D.N.Y. May 4, 2011).

- *Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G.*

*Meng-Lin Liu v. Siemens A.G.*, decided by the Second Circuit on August 14, 2014, rejected a complaint similar to *Asadi* and held that the whistleblower anti-retaliation provisions

do not apply extraterritoriality. In that case, Liu was a Taiwanese compliance officer working for the Chinese subsidiary of Siemens, a German company listed on the New York Stock Exchange, when he reported corrupt payments taking place in China and North Korea to his superiors. Liu was terminated shortly thereafter and subsequently reported the suspected FCPA violations to the SEC. He then brought a claim against Siemens A.G. under the anti-retaliation provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, but his claim was dismissed by the Southern District of New York and affirmed by the Second Circuit on the grounds that he had alleged “essentially no contact with the United States regarding either the wrongdoing or the protected activity.”

Most notably, however, the SEC filed an *amicus curiae* brief to the Second Circuit in *Meng-Lin Liu*, arguing that Liu should have been protected as a whistleblower under Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions. In its brief, the SEC argued against the Fifth Circuit’s stance in *Asadi*, reasoning that it was Congress’ express intent in crafting Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower provisions not to reduce the effectiveness of existing compliance departments and that denying the Act’s protections to internal reporters defeated that intent. Furthermore, the SEC argued that the statute’s text was ambiguous and, therefore, its interpretation of the whistleblower provisions deserved judicial deference under *Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.* However, the Second Circuit declined to address the SEC’s arguments, finding that it had sufficient grounds to dismiss the claim for other reasons and “assum[ing] without deciding that internal reporting is sufficient to qualify for the statute’s protection.”

- *Other Actions*

Several whistleblower actions remain pending, including a case filed with the District Court of Clark County, Nevada by Steven Jacobs, former President of the Macau Operations of Las Vegas Sands Corporation, owned by billionaire Sheldon Adelson. Jacobs alleges that he was fired for, among other things, his repeated refusal to (i) withhold business from Chinese banks that refused to exercise influence with government officials, (ii) investigate senior government officials in order to blackmail them, and (iii) continue to retain a Macau attorney despite concerns that he “posed serious risks under the criminal provisions” of the FCPA. In what has devolved into a battle over discovery, Jacobs alleges that documents being withheld by the casino magnate will show its connections to the Chinese mob. Although the case has been pending for over four years, discovery disputes have stalled the case. No trial date had been set as of December 2014.

### ***Suits Against Former Employees***

On the other side of the coin, corporations that face FCPA investigations or charges can find themselves in the position of bringing suit against the employees who allegedly caused the violations. Most prominently, in late 2009, Siemens agreed to settle potential claims against two former CEOs and nine other former executives for alleged breaches of organizational and supervisory duties relating to the massive bribery scandal (*see Siemens*). The two former CEOs, Heinrich von Pierer, who ran the company from 1992-2005, and his successor, Klaus Kleinfeld, denied any wrongdoing, but agreed to settle the matters for €5 million and €2 million, respectively. Other former board members who have reached a settlement with Siemens include

Uriel Sharef, who agreed to pay €4 million, Juergen Radomski and Johannes Feldmayer, who each agreed to pay €3 million, former Chairman Karl Hermann, who agreed to pay €1 million, and Klaus Wucherer, Rudi Lamprecht, and Edward Krubasik, who each settled for €500,000. On November 28, 2012, Siemens reached a settlement with former management board member Thomas Ganswindt, terminating litigation proceedings between Siemens and Ganswindt in Munich, Germany.

On February 19, 2012, the casino resort developer Wynn filed a complaint in the District Court of Clark County Nevada against its then-director Kazuo Okada, Okada's Tokyo-based company Universal Entertainment Corp ("Universal"), and its wholly-owned U.S. subsidiary Aruze USA Inc. ("Aruze") (collectively the "Okada Parties"), alleging a breach of fiduciary duty and related claims. The complaint was prompted by allegations of FCPA violations committed by the Okada Parties in a resort development project in the Philippines. Okada then filed a petition in Nevada state court to compel Wynn to disclose its books and records relating to a \$135 million donation made by the company in Macau, China.

According to Wynn's February complaint, Okada attempted to convince Wynn's board to pursue business opportunities in the Philippine gaming market throughout the 2000s. When Okada's suggestions were ignored, Okada pursued the opportunities through his own business, Universal. Wynn also contends that Okada sought to obtain those business opportunities by falsely implying to the local clients that Wynn would also be involved in the projects.

Questioning Okada's actions, Wynn commissioned several internal risk assessments on the regulatory and compliance climate in the Philippines in early 2011. Okada claims that he continued to press Wynn's board to participate in a project — planned by Okada and Universal — for a casino resort in Manila Bay. Wynn's internal assessments concluded that there was wide-spread corruption in the Philippine gaming industry and, with respect to Okada specifically, found certain anomalies regarding Universal's and Okada's dealings in the Philippines. Wynn retained a former FBI director to conduct an independent investigation into Okada's activities in the Philippines, the findings of which were summarized and issued in February 2012 in the so-called "Freeh Report." The Freeh Report uncovered illicit payments made by Okada to officials of the Philippine gaming regulator, including luxury lodging, dinners, and cash advancements for shopping sprees for the regulators and their families. These findings prompted Wynn to (i) redeem and cancel Aruze's shares in Wynn, which represented a 20% stake of Wynn's common stock, (ii) commence its efforts to remove Okada from the boards of Wynn and Wynn's affiliates (Okada was eventually removed from all such boards one year later, in February 2013), and (iii) on February 19, 2011, file the above-mentioned complaint with the Nevada state court.

On March 12, 2012, Okada filed an answer denying the claims, and alleging counterclaims against Wynn. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada, but was ultimately remanded. On April 8, 2013, the DOJ filed a motion to intervene and seeking partial stay of discovery. The DOJ stated that it had been conducting a criminal investigation of the Okada Parties based on the same allegations of FCPA violations. On May 2, 2013, the state court granted the DOJ's motion to intervene, and ordered a six-month stay of discovery to allow the DOJ to conduct its investigation. On October 31, 2013, in response to

personal safety issues disclosed in a sealed DOJ declaration, the court ordered an additional six-month stay of discovery, barring new discovery requests but allowing the parties to compel responses to certain discovery requests that had already been served. On May 2, 2014, the court denied the DOJ's request for a second extension of the temporary stay but did grant its request to have the names of anyone cooperating with the DOJ investigation redacted from the file. A jury trial has been scheduled for February 6, 2017.

### **United States Developments and Regulatory Guidance**

#### ***The Meaning of "Instrumentality" – the Esquenazi Decision***

The FCPA prohibits bribes to "foreign officials," a category includes officers and employees of a "foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof." What exactly constitutes an "instrumentality" of the state, however, has been a source of significant confusion and headaches for companies, particularly those working in places such as China or Russia, where the state has extensive involvement throughout the economy.

The DOJ's own interpretation of the term has been quite expansive. In the *Resource Guide*, for example, the DOJ and SEC had specifically stated that "the term 'instrumentality' is broad" and that the determination of whether an entity qualified as such required a fact-specific analysis of an entity's ownership, control, status, and function.

Joel Esquenazi and Carlos Rodriguez sought to challenge this broad definition in an appeal to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals of their 2011 convictions. The Circuit Court recently provided a decision that purports to offer some clarity on the question, and its importance as the first federal court appellate decision to directly and substantially address the question of what makes an entity an "instrumentality" under the FCPA is significant.

At the same time, however, because the definition of "instrumentality" the Court lays out includes a complex weighing of factual considerations, it fails to provide bright-line definitions that would be most useful to companies operating abroad. In many cases where the facts are not as clear as those in the *Esquenazi* case, the court's guidance may be of limited utility.

- **Initial Convictions**

The U.S. government charged Esquenazi, Rodriguez, and others with making corrupt payments on behalf of their company, Terra Telecommunications Corp., to officials at Telecommunications D'Haiti ("Haiti Teleco") through several intermediary shell companies. In return for the payments, which totaled over \$800,000, Teleco officials granted Terra preferred telecommunication rates, reduced the number of minutes for which payments were owed, and provided credits to reduce debts owed to Teleco. (See "Terra Telecommunications," below, for a more detailed discussion of the matter.)

Teleco is the only provider of landline telephone service to and from Haiti, and accordingly, all international telecommunications companies must contract with it to provide their customers with non-cellular telephone access to Haiti. During the trial, the government

presented evidence that Haiti Teleco is an instrumentality of the Haitian government, including testimony of multiple fact and expert witnesses as well as internal emails from Terra Telecommunications' General Counsel that referred to Haiti Telecom as an "instrumentality" of the government of Haiti.

Both men were found guilty. For their roles in the scheme, the Court sentenced Esquenazi to 15 years' imprisonment, a record for an FCPA-related conviction, and Rodriguez to 7 years' imprisonment.

- *The Eleventh Circuit Decision*

Esquenazi and Rodriguez appealed their convictions, arguing that Teleco was not an instrumentality of the Haitian government, and therefore, its employees were not "foreign officials" under the FCPA. They argued, in essence, that only those entities that perform "traditional, core government functions" are "instrumentalities" of the state under the FCPA.

The Eleventh Circuit sided with the Government both in rejecting this narrow reading and in holding that Teleco was a government "instrumentality" — which meant that the Teleco officials were "foreign officials" under the FCPA.

While the Court stated that Teleco would be considered an instrumentality "under almost any definition we could craft," the Court was "mindful of the need of both corporations and the government for ex ante direction about what an instrumentality is." Accordingly, the Court adopted a two-part "fact-bound" test to determine whether an entity (i) was controlled by the government, and (ii) performed a function that the government treated as its own.

According to the decision, to decide if the government "controls" an entity, courts and juries should look to, among other factors: (i) the foreign government's formal designation of the entity; (ii) whether the government have a majority interest in the entity; (iii) the government's ability to hire and fire the entity's principals; (iv) the extent to which the entity's profits go directly to the government fisc; (v) the extent to which the government funds the entity; and (vi) the length of time these indicia have existed.

To determine if the entity performs a government function, courts and juries should consider whether: (i) the entity has a monopoly over the function it carries out; (ii) the government subsidizes the costs associated with providing services; (iii) the entity provides services to the public at large; and (iv) the public and the government of the country generally perceive the entity to be performing a government function.

### ***The Resource Guide to the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act***

The DOJ and SEC jointly released the FCPA Resource Guide on November 14, 2012. The purpose of the initiative is to provide businesses of all sizes, as well as individuals, with information to help them comply with the FCPA, detect and prevent violations, and implement effective control systems.

While the Resource Guide is non-binding and does not set forth any enforceable rules or regulations, it does open a rare window into the minds of U.S. enforcement agencies, helpfully gathering into one comprehensive, current document an overview of the agencies' positions on several difficult issues that compliance professionals must address daily. However, as the DOJ and the SEC expressly warn, it does "not substitute for the advice of legal counsel on specific issues related to the FCPA" under the facts and circumstances of any particular conduct, and accordingly it should not be relied on as an ultimate legal opinion for any particular factual scenario.

The Resource Guide reaffirms the agencies' previously demonstrated enforcement principles and practices, but also features a detailed analysis of the law and summaries of key enforcements actions, numerous hypothetical scenarios, and actual agency enforcement declinations with the aim of clarifying multiple areas of concern. Among other things, the Resource Guide clearly emphasizes the importance of conducting anti-corruption due diligence on third parties and, in connection with M&A transactions, provides a detailed outline of the ten "hallmarks" of an effective compliance program, and summarizes the various documents that inform the agencies' enforcement principles. The Resource Guide also provides greater clarity into various enforcement issues, such as parent-subsidary liability and the agencies' views on gifts, travel and entertainment, charitable contributions, and facilitating payments.

- *Risk-Based Due Diligence of Third-Party Business Partners*

The Resource Guide stresses that companies must conduct due diligence to minimize the risks of FCPA liability associated with third parties. The Resource Guide endorses what has become common refrain — that the deployment of compliance resources and efforts should be "risk-based," undoubtedly a welcome endorsement for compliance professionals with finite budgets. The agencies stress that "[o]ne-size-fits-all compliance programs are generally ill-conceived and ineffective because resources inevitably are spread too thin, with too much focus on low-risk markets and transactions to the detriment of high-risk areas." While the most compliance resources and attention should be paid to the greatest risks, the agencies acknowledge that lesser compliance risks warrant fewer resources and attention — and state that they will not deny "meaningful credit" to a company whose compliance program failed to prevent an unexpected violation in a low-risk areas.

Although it is common practice and often a business necessity to retain local agents, consultants, or representatives, such engagements carry significant and well-documented risks of liability. As enforcement actions over the years have consistently demonstrated, a company must conduct appropriate, good-faith due diligence of such third parties to ensure the appropriateness of such relationships and reduce their risk of liability. The Resource Guide confirms that a company's "degree of scrutiny should increase as red flags surface," and it identifies the following, non-exhaustive examples of such red flags:

- Excessive commissions to third-party agents or consultants;
- Unreasonably large discounts to third-party distributors;

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- Vaguely defined services in third-party “consulting agreements”;
  - The third-party consultant is in a different line of business than that for which it has been engaged;
  - The third party is related to or closely associated with a foreign official;
  - The third party became part of the transaction at the express request or insistence of a foreign official;
  - The third party is a shell company incorporated in an offshore jurisdiction; and
  - The third party requests payment to offshore bank accounts.

The DOJ and the SEC expect that companies will implement an effective compliance program, a critical component of which is risk-based due diligence of any prospective third parties. As guiding principles for such due diligence procedures, they advise that companies ensure they understand the following with respect to third-party relationships:

- **Qualifications and Reputation.** The Resource Guide confirms that companies should seek to understand the qualifications and associations of its third-party partners, including in connection with their business reputation and potential relationships with government officials.
- **Business Justification.** Companies should be able to demonstrate a clear business rationale for including the third party in the transaction, which includes understanding the role of and need for the third party, describing specifically in the contract the services to be performed, and considering the timing of the third party’s introduction to the business.
- **Reasonable Payment Terms.** The Resource Guide states that companies should pay particular attention to the payment terms included in their agreements with third parties, and they should ensure that such terms fall within typical market rates for the industry and country.
- **Commitment to Compliance.** A company should inform its third parties of its compliance program and seek assurances, through certifications and otherwise, that the third party commits to complying with the law and company policies.
- **Ongoing Monitoring Efforts.** Efforts to ensure that third-party relationships are compliant with the FCPA should continue after the initial due diligence review. Specifically, the DOJ and SEC advise that companies confirm and document that third parties are actually performing the work for which they are being paid and that the compensation is reasonable and proportionate to the work undertaken. Additionally, the enforcement agencies advise that companies also continue to monitor their third-party relationships through additional efforts, which may include

updating due diligence periodically, exercising audit rights, providing periodic training, or requesting annual compliance certifications.

- *Due Diligence in M&A Transactions*

Risk-based due diligence is also the touchstone of the Resource Guide's advice regarding compliance-risk mitigation in the merger and acquisition context. Generally, when a company merges with or acquires another, the successor company assumes all of the predecessor company's liabilities, which include FCPA violations. Every transaction does not, however, necessarily trigger successor liability; whether successor liability exists is a fact-specific inquiry and also depends on the range of laws applicable to the circumstances. For example, if an issuer acquires a foreign company that was not subject to the FCPA's jurisdiction pre-acquisition, the fact of the acquisition does not retroactively create FCPA liability for the acquiring issuer for the target company's pre-acquisition conduct.

In this context, the DOJ and the SEC expect that companies (i) conduct as much pre-acquisition FCPA due diligence as is possible under the circumstances (including applicable local law), (ii) conduct post-acquisition due diligence immediately to address what the pre-acquisition due diligence could not reach, and (iii) promptly implement their compliance programs and internal controls at the acquired operations. Such measures are essential to the termination of any conduct that would violate the FCPA post-acquisition and help to recalibrate a company's compliance program and internal controls going forward to account for the acquired operations' impact on the resulting company's overall anti-corruption risk profile.

Moreover, due diligence demonstrates to U.S. authorities a genuine commitment to uncovering and preventing FCPA violations, potentially leading to more favorable treatment by the enforcement agencies even in the event of post-acquisition violations. The DOJ and the SEC emphasize that "[i]n a significant number of instances, [they] have declined to take action against companies that voluntarily disclosed and remediated conduct and cooperated with DOJ and SEC in the merger and acquisition context." The Resource Guide states that the enforcement agencies typically take action against a successor company only in limited situations that involve "egregious and sustained violations or where the successor company directly participated in the violations or failed to stop the misconduct from continuing after the acquisition." For example, the Resource Guide cites one example where no action was taken against a successor company that uncovered prior instances of bribery by the predecessor during post-acquisition due diligence, because the successor disclosed the FCPA violations to the DOJ, conducted an internal investigation, cooperated fully with the authorities, and took appropriate remedial actions (which included terminating senior management at the predecessor).

As a general recommendation in this context, the DOJ and the SEC set forth a number of "practical tips to reduce FCPA risks in mergers and acquisitions." In particular, the Resource Guide notes that companies can seek an opinion from the DOJ in anticipation of a potential acquisition (such as occurred with Opinion Procedure Release 08-02, discussed in greater detail *below*), although it notes that such opinions would "likely contain more stringent requirements than may be necessary in all circumstances." More practicably, the Resource Guide

recommends that a company engaging in a merger or acquisition (i) conduct thorough risk-based due diligence, (ii) ensure that the company's code of conduct and anti-corruption policies and procedures apply to the acquired or merged entity as quickly as possible, (iii) provide appropriate training to the directors, officers, and employees (as well as agents and business partners when appropriate) of the acquired or merged entity; and (iv) conduct an anti-corruption audit of the new entity. The Resource Guide also recommends that companies disclose any corrupt payments discovered as part of its due diligence or anti-corruption audit, noting that "DOJ and SEC will give meaningful credit to companies who undertake these actions, and, in appropriate circumstances, DOJ and SEC may consequently decline to bring enforcement actions."

- *The Ten Hallmarks of an Effective Corporate Compliance Program*

The DOJ and the SEC reinforce the requirement that an effective compliance program must be tailored to the company's specific business and its associated risks, and must be constantly improved and adapted to corporate changes. Although companies are not expected to prevent all criminal activity and FCPA violations, having a program that is well-designed and implemented in good faith may not only affect the outcome of an investigation (the authorities take it into account when deciding whether or not to take action, to sign a deferred prosecution agreement or non-prosecution agreement, or to impose corporate probation), but also influence the penalty amount and the imposition of a monitor or self-reporting obligations.

With the caveat that compliance needs and challenges vary for every individual company and that there is no "one-size-fits-all" formula, the DOJ and the SEC identified the following ten "Hallmarks of Effective Compliance Programs" that they consider (among other things) in determining whether a compliance program is "effective":

1. ***Tone at the Top.*** There should be a "culture of compliance," adopted and adhered to by high-level executives, that is implemented by middle managers and clearly communicated and reinforced to all employees. The Resource Guide states that the agencies will "evaluate whether senior management has clearly articulated company standards, communicated them in unambiguous terms, adhered to them scrupulously, and disseminated them throughout the organization."
2. ***Code of Conduct and Compliance Policies and Procedures.*** Effective codes of conduct are "clear, concise, and accessible to all employees and to those conducting business on the company's behalf." They should be available in the local language for subsidiaries and third parties, and should also be reviewed periodically to remain current. With respect to their content, the DOJ and the SEC value policies that "outline responsibilities for compliance within the company, detail proper internal controls, auditing practices, and documentation policies, and set forth disciplinary procedures."
3. ***Oversight, Autonomy, and Resources.*** Companies should assign responsibility for overseeing and implementing their compliance programs to one or more specific senior executives. Such executives must have appropriate authority within the company, as well as adequate autonomy from management, and sufficient resources

to ensure effective implementation. In addition, companies should apply staffing and resources to the program in proportion to the size and risks of the business.

4. ***Risk Assessment.*** It is recommended that companies develop a comprehensive and risk-based compliance program. Due diligence procedures should be fact-specific and vary according to the risks presented by “the country and industry sector, the business opportunity, potential business partners, level of involvement with governments, amount of government regulation and oversight, and exposure to customs and immigration in conducting business affairs.”
5. ***Training and Continuing Advice.*** Companies should provide periodic training for all directors, officers, relevant employees, and, where appropriate, agents and business partners. The training should be adapted to each audience, which includes conducting it in local languages. Additionally, where appropriate and feasible, companies should provide continued guidance and advice on compliance, including establishing a means for the provision of advice in urgent situations.
6. ***Incentives and Disciplinary Measures.*** To be effective, a compliance program must be enforced, and “should apply from the board room to the supply room.” The DOJ and SEC assess whether a company has clear disciplinary procedures and whether those are consistently and promptly applied. The DOJ and the SEC suggest publicizing disciplinary measures where possible, and remind companies that providing incentives for compliant behavior (as opposed to only punishing non-compliant behavior), such as promotions and rewards can also be effective. The agencies stress that “[n]o executive should be above compliance, no employee below compliance, and no person within an organization deemed too valuable to be disciplined, if warranted.”
7. ***Third-Party Due Diligence and Payments.*** As discussed above, the DOJ and the SEC strongly encourage the implementation of risk-based due diligence, particularly with respect to third-party relationships.
8. ***Confidential Reporting and Internal Investigation.*** Companies should provide a mechanism for employees and others to report misconduct or violations of the company’s policies on a confidential basis and without fear of retaliation, such as anonymous hotlines (where permitted under local law) or ombudsmen. In addition, they should implement an efficient, reliable, and properly funded process for investigating alleged violations and documenting the company’s response, including any improvements or revisions to their internal controls or compliance programs.
9. ***Continuous Improvement.*** Companies should review and improve their compliance programs regularly in order to keep them current and effective, especially considering changes in operations, compliance weaknesses revealed through the company’s experience, and enforcement actions brought against other companies.

10. ***Pre-Acquisition Due Diligence and Post-Acquisition Integration.*** As discussed above, the DOJ and SEC emphasized the importance of effective anti-corruption due diligence in the merger and acquisition context, and identifies this as another element typically present in an effective compliance program.

- *An Overview of DOJ and SEC Enforcement Principles*

The Resource Guide provides insight into the factors that the DOJ and SEC take into account when determining whether to open an investigation, bring charges, or negotiate plea agreements. As discussed above, one such factor is the nature and effectiveness of a company's compliance program. Following significant public discussion in the United States of the merits of self-reporting, the Resource Guide re-emphasizes the importance of other factors, including cooperation and remediation, to their enforcement decisions.

Beyond these issues, the Resource Guide also collects and summarizes the various pre-existing, public guidance regarding the factors that the DOJ and SEC consider in making enforcement decisions, including, for the DOJ, policy and public guidance, the Principles of Federal Prosecution (for individuals and business organizations), and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, and for the SEC, the Enforcement Manual, the Seaboard Report, and cooperation programs.

The DOJ's policy is to prosecute individuals whenever they are accused of a federal offense and there is admissible evidence that the DOJ believes will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction, unless (i) there is no substantial federal interest in doing so (determined generally based on considerations of the nature and seriousness of the offense, the deterrent effect of prosecution, and the individual's culpability, criminal history, and willingness to cooperate); (ii) the person may be effectively prosecuted in another jurisdiction; or (iii) there is an adequate non-criminal alternative to prosecution. These principles are not legally binding, and an individual could not rely on the DOJ's guidance to block a U.S. enforcement action for conduct that has already been prosecuted in another country.

With respect to companies, under the DOJ's "Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations" and U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the agency takes into account similar factors as discussed above in deciding whether to bring an enforcement action against a company, such as the nature and seriousness of the offense, the corporation's previous history of wrongdoing, and willingness to cooperate with the investigation (which could also be evidenced through self-disclosure). Additionally, the DOJ also considers (i) the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation and by corporate management, (ii) appropriate remedial actions, including disciplinary measures and targeted enhancements to the corporate compliance program, (iii) collateral consequences to innocent shareholders, pension holders, and employees, and (iv) the adequacy of the prosecution of responsible individuals or other alternatives to criminal enforcements, such as civil or administrative enforcement actions. Additionally, as discussed above, the DOJ considers the nature and effectiveness of a company's compliance program.

The SEC considers a number of similar factors to those discussed above when determining whether to open an investigation and to bring civil charges against individuals or corporations. In particular, the SEC's Enforcement Manual provides that the SEC analyzes the egregiousness and magnitude of the violation as well as whether the case involves a recidivist. The SEC also considers whether:

- The potentially harmed group is particularly vulnerable or at risk;
- The conduct is ongoing;
- The conduct can be investigated efficiently and within the statute of limitations period;
- Other authorities, including federal or state agencies or regulators, might be better suited to investigate the conduct;
- The case involves a possibly widespread industry practice that should be addressed; and
- The matter gives SEC an opportunity to be visible in a community that might not otherwise be familiar with SEC or the protections afforded by the securities laws.

In addition, the SEC identified four broad measures of corporate cooperation in its "Seaboard Report" (discussed further *below*) that could result in leniency ranging from reduced sentences to declinations. These measures include: (i) appropriate self-policing through effective compliance procedures and tone at the top, (ii) self-disclosure to the public, regulatory agencies, and self-regulatory organizations, (iii) appropriate remediation, and (iv) cooperation with law enforcement activities.

With respect to individuals, the SEC considers a number of similar factors in determining whether to give credit to cooperation and pursue reduced sentences or decline to bring an action. These factors include the level and value of the assistance provided, the importance of the matter in question, the societal interest in holding the individual accountable for his or her misconduct, and the appropriateness of granting such cooperation credit.

- *Parent-Subsidiary Liability*

The Resource Guide seeks to clarify the DOJ's and SEC's views on parent-subsubsidiary liability. Under the FCPA, a parent company may be liable directly for bribes paid by its subsidiary when it directed or otherwise participated sufficiently in the activity of the subsidiary to be directly liable. Otherwise, a parent company may still be liable if the DOJ and SEC determine that it had sufficient control over the subsidiary's operations to establish an agency relationship. To determine the existence of such a relationship, the DOJ and SEC will look not only to the formal structure of the companies, but also to the reality of their interactions, including parent company knowledge and direction, reporting lines, the existence of shared

management, and the involvement of the parent's legal department or corporate management in approving any relevant engagements or payments.

In the context of books and records and internal controls violations, however, the Resource Guide specifies that an issuer's responsibility "extends to ensuring that subsidiaries or affiliates under its control [and whose financial statements are consolidated into its books and records], including foreign subsidiaries and joint venture partners, comply with the accounting provisions" of the FCPA. In some circumstances, therefore, the DOJ and SEC may take the view that an issuer parent company is not liable for bribes paid by its subsidiary but nonetheless liable for violations of the books and records or internal controls provision of the FCPA.

Additionally, the Resource Guide recognizes the difficulty that companies may face in connection with minority-owned subsidiaries or affiliates, and it notes that in such circumstances "the parent is only required to use its best efforts to cause the minority-owned subsidiary or affiliate to devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls consistent with the issuer's own obligations under the FCPA."

- *Gifts, Travel, and Entertainment*

The Resource Guide reaffirms that the FCPA does not prohibit gifts, travel, and entertainment, so long as the expenses are not given corruptly to obtain or retain business. Consistent with the fact that there is no bright-line value threshold under the FCPA for when a gift becomes a bribe, the Resource Guide provides helpful insight into what the DOJ and SEC consider as relevant factors. For example, gifts are less likely to be considered bribes if they are given openly and transparently, accurately recorded in the gift-giver's books and records, provided only to reflect esteem or gratitude in accordance with local business culture, and permitted under local law. Similarly, corporate-sponsored travel and entertainment that is reasonable and undertaken in connection with a bona fide business justification is unlikely to run afoul of the law.

The Resource Guide does not provide a threshold amount for gifts or expenses, but notes that single instances of large or extravagant gifts (such as sports cars, fur coats, or luxury items) or travel (such as multiple trips unrelated to business purposes) are more likely to suggest an improper purpose. Conversely, the Resource Guide notes that small items of nominal value (such as cab fare, reasonable meals and entertainment expenses, or company promotional items) are unlikely to improperly influence the recipient, but nevertheless added that "widespread gifts of small items [could be viewed] as part of a pattern of bribes" — a point reinforced recently by the Eli Lilly settlement in December 2012 (*see Eli Lilly, below*).

The Resource Guide notes that, "[a]s part of an effective compliance program, a company should have clear and easily accessible guidelines and processes in place for gift-giving by the company's directors, officers, employees, and agents."

- Facilitating Payments

The Resource Guide notes that the FCPA “contains a narrow exception for ‘facilitating or expediting payments’ made in furtherance of routine governmental action.” The Resource Guide provides various examples of “routine governmental action” for which the facilitating payment exception could apply, including processing visas or work orders, or providing police protection, mail pickup and delivery, phone service, or power and water supply. In a hypothetical example, the Resource Guide specifically states that a company would not violate the FCPA by using an agent “to make a one-time small cash payment to a clerk in the relevant government office to ensure that the clerk files and stamps the permit applications expeditiously, as the agent has experienced delays of three months when he has not made this ‘grease’ payment.”

At the same time, however, the Resource Guide recognizes that the U.K. Bribery Act and other local laws do not contain such an exception, and that such payments could subject a company or individual to sanctions under those laws. Additionally, facilitating payments may still violate the FCPA if they are not properly recorded in an issuer’s books and records.

### ***Rulings on the Statute of Limitations in Civil Penalty Actions***

In February 2013, the Supreme Court and the Southern District for the District of New York issued rulings that provide additional clarity on when the SEC may file complaints to seek civil penalties. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2462, the SEC may only commence civil penalty actions under the FCPA “within five years from the date when the claim first accrued if, within the same period, the offender . . . is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.” The two court rulings confirm that this statute of limitations begins to run when the violation occurred (not when the SEC discovers it), unless the offenders were not present in the United States at any point during the five-year time period.

First, on February 27, 2013, Supreme Court held in *Gabelli v. SEC* that the statute of limitations clock begins to tick for civil penalty actions when a violation of securities law is completed, not when the violation is discovered. Although the Court did not specifically address the FCPA in its ruling, its interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2462 applies with equal force to violations of that law.

The case arose from an enforcement action that the SEC filed against two executives of Gabelli Funds, LLC, an investment adviser to a mutual fund. The SEC alleged that the two executives had aided and abetted violations of securities laws by allowing one of its clients to fraudulently engage in certain trading transactions prior to August 2002. The SEC filed a complaint seeking civil penalties in April 2008, more than five years after the alleged fraud had been completed. A district court dismissed the case as untimely, but the Second Circuit reversed on the basis that, under “the discovery rule, the statute of limitations for a particular claim does not accrue until that claim is discovered, or could have been discovered with reasonable diligence, by the plaintiff.”

In a unanimous decision delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision. In short, the Court argued that the discovery rule was only

available to plaintiffs that had been wronged and sought recompense, not to an enforcement agency that sought to impose penalties. The Court noted that plaintiffs wronged by fraud required additional protections, because otherwise the fraud itself could work to conceal the injury until after the statute of limitations had expired:

Most of us do not live in a state of constant investigation; absent any reason to think we have been injured, we do not typically spend our days looking for evidence that we were lied to or defrauded. . . . [Accordingly,] courts have developed the discovery rule, providing that the statute of limitations in fraud cases should typically begin to run only when the injury is or reasonably could have been discovered.

But the Court explained that “[u]nlike the private party who has no reason to suspect fraud, the SEC’s very purpose is to root is out.” Moreover, the Court noted that the enforcement action in question involved civil penalties that “are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers.” Accordingly, because the SEC was tasked with investigating fraud, had adequate tools and resources to do so, and sought more than mere recompense, and because Congress had not specified otherwise, the Court held that the discovery rule does not apply to civil penalty actions and that the SEC must file such complaints within five years of when the violations occurred.

One exception to that rule, however, was explored in a separate decision by the Southern District for the District of New York on February 8, 2013. In *SEC v. Straub*, the district court considered the applicability of the latter half of 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which provides that the five-year statute of limitations runs “if, within the same period, the offender or the property is found within the United States in order that proper service may be made thereon.”

As with *Gabelli*, the *Straub* case involved an civil penalty enforcement action that was filed five years after the alleged securities violation occurred. The SEC filed a complaint on December 29, 2011 alleging that three executives of Hungarian telecommunications company Magyar Telekom, Plc. (“Magyar”) had bribed government officials in Hungary through an intermediary in 2005 in order to soften the impact of new legislation that would have increased Magyar’s fees and regulatory burdens.

Unlike in *Gabelli*, however, the court ruled that the SEC’s complaint was timely. Because the three Magyar defendants had not been present in the United States during the relevant period, they had never been “found within the United States” and thus the statute of limitations had not run. The district court explained that it did not matter that service outside of the United States was now possible through the Hague Service Convention — which, incidentally, was the process through which the defendants were served — because “Congress has maintained the statutory carve-out for defendants not found within the United States.”

Thus, although the Supreme Court quoted Chief Justice Marshall in its *Gabelli* decision for the tenet that “it ‘would be utterly repugnant to the genius of our laws’ if actions for penalties could ‘be brought at any distance of time,’” the *Straub* decision appears to allow for precisely

that in certain circumstances. The defendants sought to file an interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit on the statute of limitations issue, but their motion was denied in an order filed on August 5, 2013.

Importantly, however, the five-year statute of limitations discussed in both *Gabelli* and *Straub* applies only to civil penalty actions brought by the SEC, and enforcement agencies possess other tools to address older violations. The SEC would not be barred by 28 U.S.C. § 2462, for example, from seeking to obtain injunctive relief or disgorgement from a company or individual that had violated the FCPA. Similarly, although criminal violations of the FCPA are also subject to a five-year statute of limitations pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (which was not at issue in the two decisions discussed above), the DOJ can toll the statute for an additional three years in some circumstances to obtain evidence from outside the United States. Additionally, the DOJ may also bring charges of conspiracy to violate the FCPA, and the five-year statute of limitations in connection with such charges would begin to run on the date of the last overt act of the conspiracy.

### ***Resource Extraction Disclosure Rules***

On July 2, 2013, the District Court for the District of Columbia vacated a final SEC rule that would have required issuers engaged in “resource extraction” activities to publicly disclose certain payments made to foreign governments. As discussed below, the court vacated the rule because it found that the SEC’s rationale for requiring public disclosures of reports and not allowing exemptions to comply with foreign local law was flawed, but the court left open the possibility that a similar rule might be valid if based on the SEC’s independent analysis and judgment. Accordingly, the SEC might adopt a new rule in the near future that includes the same requirements, particularly in light of comments received by U.S. senators that it do so and the existence of similar requirements in EU directives.

- ***Background of the SEC Rule***

Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act mandates that the SEC adopt rules to require certain issuers (namely those who are required to file annual reports with the SEC and who engage in commercial development of oil, natural gas, or minerals) to produce annual reports regarding payments to the U.S. or foreign governments in connection with the commercial development of those natural resources.

On August 22, 2012, the SEC adopted a final rule that required issuers engaged in the exploration, extraction, processing, or export of oil, natural gas, or minerals to disclose payments that it makes to the U.S. or foreign governments (including departments, agencies, and instrumentalities thereof) to further the commercial development of those resources.

Importantly, the SEC rule provided that it issues make the disclosures through a public filing. The SEC included this requirement on the basis of its belief that Congress required public disclosure through its additions to the Exchange Act, which “is fundamentally a public disclosure statute,” because the newly added Section 13(q) requires the SEC to make public a “compilation of the information required to be submitted.” The SEC explicitly rejected the approach of

commentators who suggested that the statute only required the SEC to compile a summary of the disclosed information to make available to the public, instead insisting that the law required it to “pull[] together in one place the actual issuer-by-issuer project-level and government-level information” for public consumption.

The SEC also rejected requests from commentators to provide exemptions for countries that prohibit payment disclosures, such as Angola, Cameroon, China, and Qatar. The SEC agreed “that the impact of such host country laws could add billions of dollars of costs to affected issuers, and hence have a significant impact on their profitability and competitive position,” but reasoned that an exemption would nevertheless be inconsistent with the requirements of the Act.

- *District Court Vacates and Remands*

The District Court vacated the final rule because of “two substantial errors” — namely, that the SEC “misread the statute to mandate public disclosure of the reports, and [that] its decision to deny any exemption was, given the limited explanation provided, arbitrary and capricious.”

First, with respect to the public disclosure requirement, the court stated that the statute required only that resource extraction issuers make their disclosure in an annual report to the SEC. Consistent with recommendations of the commentators to the Rule, the court explained that the statute did not require that annual report to be made public, but only required the SEC to make publically available a “compilation” of the information disclosed, and even then, only “to the extent practicable.”

Second, the court found that the SEC’s denial of an exemption for countries that prohibit payment disclosure was arbitrary and capricious. It stated that the SEC’s blanket approach of not considering any exemptions — because it believed such exemptions “would be inconsistent with Section 13(q) and would undermine Congress’ intent to promote international transparency efforts” — was not “the product of reasoned decisionmaking” and went against not only the explicit exemption authority that Congress had granted to the SEC in general, but also the permissibility for exemptions allowed in the statute itself.

- *New Rule Expected*

The SEC will likely issue a new final rule in the near future, but it is not clear whether the new rule will differ in any substantive respect from the one that the District Court vacated. Importantly, the court did not hold that the SEC could not require public disclosure of annual filings. Instead, relying on *Chevron*, the court only stated that the SEC had committed a fundamental error by issuing its rule on the basis of its flawed perception that Congress had mandated public disclosure of the issuer reports. The court did not state whether it would view the public disclosure requirement as a permissible construction of the statute, leaving open the possibility that the court might defer to the SEC’s interpretation under *Chevron* if the agency adopted the same rule pursuant to its own discretion and judgment. The court did hint in a footnote, however, that the new rule should contain some substantive form of public disclosure:

To be sure, a Rule that provides for no or extremely limited public disclosure in the compilations might be an unreasonable interpretation of section 13(q) under Chevron step two analysis.

Similarly, the court did not rule that the SEC could not deny local law disclosure exemptions, but only that the SEC's stated purpose for doing so was arbitrary and capricious. Nevertheless, the court indicated that other reasons that the SEC might adopt for a blanket exemption prohibition, such as the view that exemptions would "undermine the statute by encouraging countries to adopt laws, or interpret existing laws, specifically prohibiting the disclosure required under the final rules," would also be arbitrary unless accompanied by a full analysis that justified the decision.

On August 2, 2013, five current and retired U.S. senators (including Senators Cardin, Leahy, Levin, Lugar, and Markey) sent a letter to SEC Chairman Mary Jo White urging the SEC to adopt "an equally strong revised rule as soon as possible." Specifically, the Senators stated:

The new rule should continue to make all reports public and should not allow for host country exemptions. We believe the SEC has the discretion and authority to retain both of these key aspects of the initial rule as long as sufficient analysis and justification is provided in the rulemaking process.

The American Petroleum Institute ("API") — the trade organization that previously filed the court complaint that led to the vacation of the previous rule — also provided comments to the SEC in a letter dated November 7, 2013. Among other things, the API urged the SEC to adopt a rule by which the SEC would only disclose compilations that identified the government payee, the type of payment, and project-level information, including the type of resource being extracted (*e.g.*, oil), the method of development (*e.g.*, onshore), and the location of the project (*e.g.*, Nigeria Delta), but not disclose company identifying or other commercially sensitive information. The API acknowledged, as discussed below, that disclosure rules in the European Union would require full public disclosure, but argued that "reporting companies still face intense and growing global competition from state-owned oil companies not subject to these requirements." The API also urged the SEC to allow for disclosure exemptions as needed to comply with foreign local laws.

Regardless of the approach taken on these two issues, the new rule will likely include other aspects of the previous final Rule. Specifically, the new rule will likely continue to apply to payments made by issuers, as well as their subsidiaries and any entities under their control. The rule will also likely require that companies disclose payments made in connection with taxes, royalties, fees, production entitlements, bonuses, dividends, and infrastructure improvements (though not social donations), but it will likely continue to provide an exemption for *de minimis* payments under \$100,000.

- European Union Disclosure Rules

Separately, in response to Section 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Act, the European parliament approved its own mandatory disclosure regime through amendments to the Accounting Directive in June 2013 and the Transparency Directive in October 2013 (together, the “EU Disclosure Rules”). The EU Disclosure Rules require member states to enact implementing legislation that would impose requirements similar to those under the vacated SEC rule.

Specifically, the rules would require that all companies registered in the European Economic Area or listed on EU regulated markets disclose payments of at least €100,000 made to foreign governments in connection with any activity related to the exploration, prospection, discovery, development or extraction of minerals, oil, natural gas deposits, or other extractive materials. Importantly, the EU Disclosure Rules require that the reports will be disclosed to the public and do not provide for any exemptions for conflicts with foreign local laws.

Member states will be required to enact implementing legislation for the Accounting Directive by July 2015 and the Transparency Directive by November 2015. Several countries, however, have announced plans to fast track the required legislation. In June 2013, the United Kingdom announced a plan to implement the Accounting Directive by October 2014, with publication of disclosure data by 2016. France has also stated that it intends to expedite implementation of its legislation, and on October 15, 2013, SEC officials met with representatives of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Embassy of France to discuss the forthcoming SEC rule.

### ***SEC Whistleblower Rules***

The Dodd-Frank Act, enacted July 21, 2010, established (in Section 922) whistleblower rewards and protections for reporting to the SEC information relating to the violation of any U.S. securities law. Section 922’s scope is substantially greater than the preexisting whistleblower program administered by the SEC, which previously only rewarded information related to insider trading; for example, the portions of the FCPA applicable to U.S. and foreign issuers are codified at Sections 13(b)(2) and 30A of the Exchange Act. Specifically, Section 922, codified as a new Section 21F of the Exchange Act, mandates a reward of 10% to 30% of any money the government collects from an enforcement action based on “original” information received from the whistleblower or whistleblowers resulting in sanctions (including fines, disgorgement, and interest) against the company in excess of \$1,000,000. Whistleblowers are also entitled to be rewarded for related actions that stem from the information provided, including actions brought by the DOJ.

The exact amount of the reward will be left to the discretion of the SEC and will be based on criteria including the significance of the information provided and the degree of assistance provided by the whistleblower. A reward will not be available for any whistleblower who is convicted of a criminal violation related to the enforcement action. However, the Dodd-Frank Act does not specify any other limit as to the whistleblower’s involvement in the conduct that led to the violation. At least theoretically, therefore, the whistleblower could be an employee who

was directly involved in the improper behavior, assuming the individual is able to avoid criminal conviction for his or her role.

Section 924 of the Dodd-Frank Act required the SEC to adopt final implementing regulations within 270 calendar days of Dodd-Frank's enactment. On November 3, 2010, the SEC proposed rules for the expanded whistleblower program. The proposed rules generated substantial public comment by business associations, companies, interest groups, and individuals. After evaluating the comments on the proposed rules, on May 25, 2011, the SEC formally adopted final rules ("Rules").

As mandated by the Dodd-Frank Act, the Rules require whistleblowers to satisfy four requirements in order to qualify for an award:

- First, whistleblowers must voluntarily provide the SEC with information. Information will not be considered voluntarily provided if the whistleblower previously received a request for information from the SEC, other authority, or a self-regulatory organization (such as a national securities exchange) about a matter to which the information is relevant, the whistleblower's employer received such a request (and provided the information), or a legal or contractual duty to report the information to such authorities existed.
  - Second, the SEC will only award whistleblowers for providing "original information." Information is "original" if it (1) was not already known to the SEC from any other source (unless that source received the information from the whistleblower), (2) was derived from the whistleblower's independent knowledge or analysis, and (3) was not exclusively derived from judicial or government records or the news media.
  - Third, the information provided must lead to successful enforcement by the SEC of a federal court or administrative action. Information "leads" to a successful enforcement action if the information "significantly contributed" to the success of an action started or reopened on the basis of the information, or if the information was "essential" to an ongoing action and would not otherwise have been obtained during that action. While whistleblowers may also receive awards for "related actions" enforced by the DOJ, certain other regulatory agencies, self-regulating organizations, or a state attorney general, successful enforcement by the SEC is a prerequisite for any award.
  - Fourth, the SEC must obtain at least \$1,000,000 in sanctions in the action. Monetary sanctions include civil and criminal fines, disgorgement, prejudgment interest, or any other monetary penalty imposed in an action by the SEC or a related action.
- *Awards for Whistleblowers*

The Dodd-Frank Act granted the SEC discretion to determine whistleblowers' rewards, provided that the awards must be between 10% and 30% of the monetary sanctions. Whistleblowers who satisfy the four conditions described above could receive awards within these percentages of the total sanctions imposed in both SEC actions and those imposed in any

successful related action brought by the DOJ, certain other regulatory agencies, a self-regulatory organization, or a state attorney general in a criminal case. The Rules limit the aggregate award that multiple whistleblowers would receive to the same boundaries and the SEC will allocate the aggregate amount across several whistleblowers based on the same considerations used to determine the aggregate award.

Under the Rules, the SEC will consider the following in calculating whistleblower awards:

- The information's significance to the success of the enforcement action;
- The amount of assistance provided by the whistleblowers;
- The deterrent effect of making the award; and
- Whether the award will enhance the SEC's ability to enforce U.S. securities laws, protect investors, and encourage the provision of high-quality information from future whistleblowers.

It is not difficult to see that the amounts potentially available to would-be whistleblowers will be enticing. In 2008, Siemens A.G. settled FCPA related actions with the DOJ and SEC for \$800 million. A settlement that large could result in a reward to a whistleblower of up to \$240 million. In 2009, Halliburton settled with the DOJ and SEC for \$579 million, a fine that could have resulted in a whistleblower reward of almost \$174 million. On September 22, 2014, the SEC announced that it had awarded more than \$30 million to a whistleblower "who provided key original information that led to a successful SEC enforcement action." Through the end of 2014, the SEC had made awards fourteen separate whistleblowers.

Similar systems have previously been adopted for whistleblowers in tax cases and False Claims Act cases and have been largely successful because of the high stakes involved. The *qui tam* provisions of the False Claims Act have resulted in the recovery of billions of dollars from companies that have defrauded the U.S. government. Based on that success, the Tax Relief and Healthcare Act of 2006 implemented a similar IRS and Treasury Department system for rewarding whistleblowers of tax fraud. The amount of money involved in tax recovery cases can reach into the hundreds of millions, creating a similarly high incentive for potential whistleblowers.

- *Protections Against Unintended Consequences*

When she announced the proposed rules in November 2010, then-SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro noted, "[w]ith the potential for substantial awards comes the possibility for unintended consequences." The whistleblower provisions could result in substantial awards if applied to FCPA enforcement, which could entice potential whistleblowers to bypass internal reporting mechanisms, abuse positions of power, violate duties of loyalty, or even intentionally expose a corporation to liability purely to later report the violation. Several elements of the Rules demonstrate an attempt to limit these unintended consequences.

- *Preserve the Effectiveness of Internal Compliance Programs*

Chairman Schapiro, in announcing the proposed rules, emphasized the importance of effective internal controls and compliance programs, and aspects of the Rules are intended to incentivize whistleblowers to work within their employers' compliance programs. First, under the Rules a whistleblower is eligible for an award if the company informs the SEC about violations after the whistleblower reported the violation internally. Second, the Rules treat an employee as a whistleblower as of the date the employee reports the information internally, as long as the employee provides the same information to the SEC within 120 days. The idea, according to the SEC, is that employees will be able to report the information internally while at the same time preserving their "place in line" for a potentially recovery from the SEC. Finally, the Rules provide that a whistleblower's voluntary participation in a company's internal compliance reporting structure is a factor that can increase the amount of an award and that interference with internal compliance reporting is a factor that can decrease the amount.

The Dodd-Frank Act excludes law enforcement personnel, personnel working for agencies with oversight of the securities industry, and a person "who gains the information through the performance of an audit of financial statements required under the securities laws" from collecting whistleblower awards. The Rules also prohibit awards for persons with pre-existing legal or contractual reporting obligations to the organization and who obtained the information through the performance of the obligations, unless the organization unreasonably, or in bad faith, fails to disclose the reported information to the SEC. This is specifically aimed at auditors, attorneys, employees with "legal, compliance, audit, supervisory, or governance responsibilities," and anyone who received the disclosed information from such persons. The Rules further deny awards to whistleblowers who obtained reported information while working for a foreign government or foreign government regulatory authority or who were spouses, parents, children, siblings, or housemates of SEC employees.

- *Avoid Rewarding Culpable Employees*

The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to preclude culpable employees from receiving whistleblower awards by excluding from eligibility any person convicted of a criminal violation related to the judicial or administrative action for which the whistleblower otherwise could receive an award. As noted, however, a whistleblower who was involved in an offense but avoids a criminal conviction related to the offense can still recover an award, even if they participated in the securities law violation.

The Rules attempt to mitigate this consequence by excluding any monetary sanctions that the whistleblower is ordered to pay "or that are ordered against any entity whose liability is based substantially on conduct that the whistleblower directed, planned, or initiated" from both the \$1 million threshold amount and the amount of recovery to be used in calculating the whistleblower's award. The Rules also expressly deny amnesty from SEC enforcement actions for whistleblowers, although they do provide that whistleblower's cooperation would be taken into account.

- Promote Reliable Reporting

Whistleblowers may not recover if they knowingly and willfully make any false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation (including writings) to the SEC, the DOJ, or any other regulatory agency regarding the reported information.

- Increased Whistleblower Protections

The incentives introduced by the Rules are buttressed by new anti-retaliation protections established by the Dodd-Frank Act. Whistleblowers seeking damages for retaliation may not be forced to arbitrate their claims and now have the right to a jury trial, and the proposed whistleblower protection provisions increase the remedies an employee can receive for his or her employer's retaliation by providing for double back pay (with interest) in addition to reinstatement and reasonable attorneys' fees. Furthermore, confidentiality agreements between an employer and employee are now null and void with respect to securities violations, and Dodd-Frank doubles the statute of limitations period for bringing a retaliation claim from 90 days to 180 days. The Rules also enable whistleblowers to submit information anonymously through counsel.

### ***Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative***

On July 25, 2010, at the African Union Summit in Uganda, Attorney General Eric Holder announced a new Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative, which aims to combat large-scale foreign official corruption and recover public funds. According to Assistant Attorney General Lanny Breuer, the Kleptocracy Asset Recovery Initiative will involve three sections in the DOJ's Criminal Division: (i) the Asset Forfeiture and Money Laundering Section, which will lead the initiative; (ii) the Office of International Affairs; and (iii) the Fraud Section. "We are going to bring cases against the assets of those around the world who have stolen from their citizenry and have taken money that obviously belongs to their country," said Assistant Attorney General Breuer. "Those people are the embodiment, in some ways, of what's wrong in these countries."

Consistent with the announcement, less than two weeks earlier, on July 14, 2010, the DOJ had filed forfeiture claims in New York and Virginia federal courts against properties purchased by a holding company beneficially owned by Huang Jui-Ching, the daughter-in-law of the former President of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian.

In September 2009, both Chen and his wife, Wu Sue-Jen, were convicted by a Taiwanese court of embezzling state funds, taking bribes, money laundering and forgery. While this conviction is on appeal, Chen is currently serving a 20-year sentence and Wu has not yet begun her prison sentence. In addition, the couple was fined NT\$170 million (\$5.29 million) and NT\$200 million (\$6.23 million), respectively.

The DOJ's actions, however, are connected to separate allegations of fraud, which were awaiting trial in Taipei at the time of the forfeiture complaints' filings. The complaints allege that between 2005 and 2006, Wu received a bribe of approximately NT\$200 million (\$6.23 million) delivered in cash-filled fruit boxes from Yuanta Securities Co. LLC ("Yuanta"), which

at the time was trying to increase its shareholdings in Fuhwa Financial Holding Company Ltd. (“Fuhwa”). The bribe money was allegedly to ensure that then-President Chen’s administration did not interfere with Yuanta’s acquisition of Fuhwa shares. This and other bribe money was then laundered with Yuanta’s help through a series of shell companies and Swiss bank accounts controlled by the couple’s son, Chen Chih-Chung, and his wife, Huang Jui-Ching. A portion of the money was transferred to the United States and used to purchase a condominium in Manhattan, New York and a house in Keswick, Virginia. The DOJ brought six counts of violating U.S. money laundering laws, which prohibit the purchase of property with proceeds of unlawful activity, and conspiracy to violate the money laundering statute. The statute, codified at 18 USC §§1956-1957, defines “unlawful activity” to include an offense against a foreign nation involving the bribery of a public official.

On October 23, 2012, Judge Norman Moon of the Western District of Virginia entered a final forfeiture judgment against the Virginia house, and on the following day, Judge Katherine Forrest in the Southern District of New York entered a final forfeiture judgment against the New York condominium. In both instances, the final forfeiture judgment was entered into as a result of a settlement by the defendant, who did not admit liability but also agreed not to oppose a final order and judgment of forfeiture. On November 14, 2012, Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations took possession of the Virginia property, and the New York property was vested to the U.S. government through court order.

In another Kleptocracy Initiative action, on October 25, 2011, the DOJ announced that it had filed civil forfeiture complaints in Los Angeles and D.C. against approximately \$70.8 million in real and personal property of Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue (known as Teodorín), a government minister in Equatorial Guinea and the son of the president of Equatorial Guinea. The complaints allege that Teodorín amassed a fortune of over \$100 million solely on a government salary of less than \$100,000 per year. His assets include a Gulfstream jet, a large estate in Malibu, and nearly \$2 million in Michael Jackson memorabilia — including “one white crystal covered Bad Tour glove.” Teodorín allegedly used third parties and corporate entities to acquire assets in the United States. The DOJ is seeking to seize these U.S.-based assets that they allege are the proceeds of corruption derived largely from Equatorial Guinea’s lucrative extractive industries. Teodorín has also been under investigation in France, where an arrest warrant was issued for him in April 2012 on money laundering charges initially brought by Transparency International (as is permitted under French criminal procedure).

On April 19, 2013, U.S. District Judge Rudolph Contreras granted Teodorín’s motion to dismiss the forfeiture action against a \$38.5 million jet that he had purchased. Judge Contreras found that the government failed to allege that the jet was purchased using funds derived from illicit activity. Specifically, Judge Contreras stated that “the government does not allege what companies were victim to this scheme, or when this occurred, or which members of the Inner Circle were behind the acts” and as a result there is not “enough detail for the court to infer the contours of the illicit scheme.” Judge Contreras also rejected the DOJ’s argument that Teodorín’s wealth was so extreme that it had to raise suspicion of unlawful activity, stating that “[w]hen viewed in tandem with other details suggesting illegal behavior, [Teodorín’s] wealth

might allow inference of illegal activity — but standing alone, it does not.” The United States filed an amended complaint, which Teodorín also moved to dismiss on October 4, 2013.

On June 20, 2013, U.S. District Judge George H. Wu of the Central District of California agreed with Teodorín that the United States did not sufficiently establish probable cause at the time of the original action, and stated that the government should not “be allowed to seize items and thereafter develop evidence to the point where [it] can get probable cause.” The District Court therefore required that the government submit a document that “list[ed] every fact” showing that “it had probably cause to institute this action on April 28, 2011.” On August 20, 2013, the District Court granted Teodorín’s motion for summary judgment regarding three of the government’s bases for forfeiture, stating that the government’s subsequent submission only showed that Teodorín “spent money. Where the money came from is a matter of pure speculation.” A separate basis for forfeiture, relating to alleged bank fraud, survived the summary judgment ruling.

The United States settled the forfeiture action with Teodorín on October 10, 2014. Under the terms of the settlement, Teodorín was required to forfeit various assets in the United States, including a \$30 million Malibu mansion, a Ferrari, and his Michael Jackson memorabilia.

### ***Senate PSI Report***

On February 4, 2010, the United States Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations released a joint Majority and Minority Staff Report entitled “Keeping Foreign Corruption Out of the United States: Four Case Histories” (“PSI Report”). The 325-page Report illustrates through four case studies how Politically Exposed Persons (“PEPs”) have used the services of U.S. institutions (like banks and universities) and U.S. professionals (like lawyers, realtors and escrow agents) to circumvent anti-money laundering (“AML”) and anti-corruption safeguards in order to bring large amounts of suspect funds into the United States. The Report argues these four case studies “demonstrate the need for the United States to strengthen its PEP controls to prevent corrupt foreign officials, their relatives and associates from using U.S. professionals and financial institutions to conceal, protect, and utilize their ill gotten gains.” In asserting its cause, the Report is replete with sensational details of lavish expenses, consorting with hip hop stars and other audacious activities, apparently aimed at helping the Report generate as much attention as possible. It also highlights the increasingly diverse forums in which corruption concerns are surfacing.

The four case studies each detail certain aspects of suspect financial transactions of PEPs in Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria and Angola, respectively. The first case study examines how the former President of Equatorial Guinea’s son, Teodoro Obiang, used lawyers, realtors, escrow agents, and wire transfer systems to bring suspect funds into the United States. The second case study, which examines former President Omar Bongo of Gabon, shows how President Bongo brought suspect funds into the United States by using bank accounts belonging to lobbyists, family members, and U.S. Trusts. The third case study examines the dealings of Jennifer Douglas, the wife of former Nigerian Vice President Atiku Abubakar, and illustrates how a PEP can transfer large sums of money into the United States using offshore companies.

The final case study involves various questionable actors in Angola, including notorious arms dealer Pierre Falcone and a central banker with the Angolan National Bank (BNA). The Angolan transactions illustrate a theme common to all four case studies, namely the exploitation of poor PEP controls in the banking sector to bypass AML safeguards.

The PSI Report has seemingly generated immediate activity. Since its release, Angolan authorities have arrested approximately 20 BNA employees related to the embezzlement of over \$130 million from the central bank of Angola, which, from the timing of the arrests, appears unusually coincidental given some of the conduct described in the Senate Report.

The Report notes that receiving the proceeds of foreign corruption was made a U.S. money laundering offense under the 2001 Patriot Act, but that certain loopholes and exemptions have been systematically exploited. Among its official recommendations, the Report urges that Patriot Act exemptions for real estate and escrow agents be repealed, that new AML rules be made to apply to law firms and lawyers, and that U.S. shell corporations should be required to disclose the names of beneficial owners. The Report emphasizes the role that U.S. banks played in looking the other way while allowing suspect funds to enter the country, and proposes new laws and Treasury Department rules to strengthen screening procedures related to PEPs and to require regular reviews of PEP account activity.

- *Equatorial Guinea*

The Report explains how Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue (“Obiang”), the son of the President of Equatorial Guinea (E.G.), used American professionals and wire transfer systems to move over \$110 million into the United States. Among other things, Obiang fancied himself a record producer, and set up one of his California shell companies, Sweet Pink Inc., with his rapper/actress-girlfriend Eve listed as president of the shell company. Despite Obiang’s status as a PEP from a high-risk country, the report highlights a dizzying array of lucrative transactions, including the sale of a \$7.7 million Los Angeles home, the purchase of a \$30 million Malibu mansion, and millions of dollars spent on luxury vehicles, high-end fashion and other expenses all financed by wire transfers from Equatorial Guinea. In one instance, Obiang tried to purchase a \$38.5 million Gulfstream jet through an Oklahoma escrow agent. After the agent refused to move forward without more information on the funding source, Obiang found a second, less-curious agent to complete the transaction. In a period of only two months, Obiang transacted a flurry of fourteen wire transfers to move over \$73 million into the United States, which he used to purchase the Malibu mansion and Gulfstream jet. Remarkably, these mid-2006 transfers took place only two years after a 2004 Senate Subcommittee on Investigations Report<sup>35</sup> that described in detail how E.G. officials, including Obiang, had moved suspect funds through Riggs Bank.

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<sup>35</sup> “Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act: Case Study Involving Riggs Bank,” Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, July 15, 2004. Regulatory and enforcement actions related to this highly publicized 2004 report produced a \$16 million

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Among other things, the report details how two U.S. lawyers (one of whom accompanied Obiang to a party at the Playboy Mansion) facilitated Obiang's fund transfers into accounts at six different banks, including Bank of America and Citibank. The lawyers opened bank accounts for shell companies, while either failing to disclose or actively hiding the identity and PEP status of the beneficiary owners of the shell companies. The attorneys also used their own attorney-client and law office accounts as *de facto* checking accounts for shell companies. For example, in one series of transactions, Obiang wired over \$3.1 million to an attorney-client bank belonging to his lawyer, who then incorporated a shell company and opened accounts in the shell company's name at Bank of America. Bank of America performed no due diligence, even though Obiang's name appeared as the sole signatory for one account. Within days, the attorney wrote checks to fund the new accounts with the \$3.1 million that had been wired to him from E.G., and another \$6.5 million would be deposited in these accounts over the next year. Payment by payment, the Report details how suspect money from these accounts was then used for expenses relating to Obiang's housekeeping expenses, including large payments to Ferrari of Beverly Hills, Lamborghini of Beverly Hills, Dolce & Gabbana, GlobalJet Corp., and to purchase Persian rugs, a Bang & Olufsen home theater system, and a concert grand piano.

- *Gabon*

The Report examines how Former President Omar Bongo of Gabon was able to transfer large amounts of suspect funds into the United States between 2003 and 2007 using a lobbyist, his daughter and his daughter-in-law. American banks involved were largely ignorant of their clients' PEP status and failed to conduct enhanced monitoring or due diligence. Former President Bongo was able to accomplish many of these transactions between 2000 and 2007 despite having already been the focus of a 1999 U.S. Senate hearing that showed how he had used offshore shell companies to move over \$100 million through accounts at Citibank Private Bank.

A Washington, D.C. lobbyist, Jeffery Birrell, incorporated entities and established bank accounts in Virginia into which then-President Bongo wired over \$18 million from Gabon. Birrell then used \$1.2 million to purchase and transport to Gabon six U.S.-built vehicles, including two armored H2 Hummers, two stretch H2 Hummer limousines (one armored, one unarmored), a Cadillac and a Jeep, plus three mobile electric countermeasure ("ECM") units for the President's vehicles. Birrell also obtained U.S. government permission to buy six C-130 military planes from Saudi Arabia, which would otherwise have violated the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations ("ITAR"). An entity in Gabon transferred over \$17 million to one of Birrell's Virginia LLCs to purchase the planes. After six trips to Saudi Arabia related to the negotiations, the C-130 sales fell through, and Birrell immediately redistributed most of the

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criminal fine, a \$25 million civil fine, tougher oversight of AML bank procedures by federal regulators, and eventually, the sale and disappearance of Riggs Bank.

money intended for the aircraft purchase: he wired \$9.2 million of that money to a Malta account in the name of then-President Bongo, another \$4.2 million to one of the President's senior advisors' accounts in Brussels and Paris ("to feed starving refugees in Mali and Niger"), and another \$1 million to consultants' bank accounts in Brussels and Monaco.

Former President Bongo also used his daughter Yamilee Bongo-Astier as a conduit to funnel money into the United States. Bongo-Astier is a Canadian citizen who has lived in New York City since at least 2000, where she was a student at NYU and then the Parsons School of Design. As an unemployed student, she first opened an account at HSBC in September 2000 with \$118,000 using her Canadian passport and without disclosing the identity of her father. Over the course of 18 months beginning in 2002, she made periodic cash deposits of about \$50,000 each and one cash deposit of \$107,600. Only when she received an \$180,000 wire transfer from Gabon did the bank begin to ask questions, and learn of her PEP status three years after she first opened her accounts. Bongo-Astier used some of her funds to purchase cars at her father's request, including two Lincoln Town Cars for the Gabon delegation in New York.

Although HSBC closed her accounts, Bongo-Astier immediately repeated the process at Commerce Bank, which took two years to discover her PEP status. In the meantime, as an unemployed student, Bongo-Astier walked into the bank seven times with cash deposits ranging from \$35,000 to \$90,000 each, and received wire transfers from accounts in Haiti, Paris, London, Toronto, and Monaco totaling over \$250,000. When the bank finally questioned these transactions, she openly discussed her father, and stated that he gave her cash gifts whenever he came to NY for official business. The bank applied additional scrutiny after she asked for assistance counting cash in one of her safety deposit boxes, which the bank manager discovered was filled with exactly \$1 million in "all \$100 bills in sealed/bar coded bags like would come in from the fed." When asked, she explained that the money was a gift from her father to help her purchase a \$2 million New York condo. The Report states, "[e]ven after discovering this hidden cash, learning that her father had brought it into the United States without declaring it to government authorities as required by law, and acknowledging that the President was under investigation in France for possibly embezzling public funds and using those funds to purchase real estate, the bank's Enhanced Due Diligence Oversight director insisted that the bank had 'not definitely found anything solid that would preclude our continuing [the] relationship.'" Nonetheless, Commerce Bank soon decided to close the accounts, but before the accounts were closed, President Bongo wired nearly \$1 million to his daughter — perhaps to complete the purchase of the New York condo. The transaction was reversed because the bank had already frozen her accounts.

When Commerce Bank finally closed her accounts, Bongo-Astier promptly repeated the process a third time by opening new accounts at JP Morgan Chase, again with her Canadian passport and without revealing her PEP status. Still without a stated occupation, her accounts maintained a balance between \$300,000 and \$500,000 and in July 2009 she received a wire transfer of \$341,000. JP Morgan did not discover her PEP status until contacted by the U.S. Senate Subcommittee in connection with the preparation of this Report.

Finally, the Report discusses Former President Bongo's daughter-in-law Inge Lynn Collins, who is married to (but estranged from) the current President of Gabon, who has since taken a second wife. While she was still with the current President, he was serving as Gabon's Defense Minister, and she received large transfers from Gabon to a Trust she had established in California, the proceeds of which supported their lavish lifestyle in the United States between 2000 and 2003. Despite her husband's position, they spent significant time in the United States and France in addition to Gabon. During part of that time, they rented a lavish Hollywood home from Sean "Puff Daddy/P-Diddy/Diddy" Combs for \$25,000 per month. Collins also considered purchasing a home in California but, in the premier episode of the VH1 series "Really Rich Real Estate" in which a realtor showed her a prospective property, she stated that she found the \$25 million Malibu Broad Beach mansion "lacks grandeur." She was able to maintain trust accounts at HSBC and at Fidelity Investments for years and move over \$2 million from Gabon into the United States before the banks discovered her PEP status. HSBC subsequently closed her checking and savings accounts. Her account at Fidelity was a mutual fund investment account in the name of her Trust, which she used as a *de facto* checking account to disburse nearly \$1 million from 2000-2002 while avoiding AML procedures that applied to normal checking accounts. (Collins' scheme would not work today because mutual fund accounts have been required to conduct Due Diligence since June 2003.) Fidelity Investments — which learned of her PEP status only when first contacted by the U.S. Senate PSI in regard to this Report — has allowed the account to remain open in light of the *de minimis* balance and scant activity since 2007.

- Nigeria

Jennifer Douglas, a U.S. citizen and wife of the former Vice President of Nigeria Atiku Abubakar, is a former Nigerian television journalist who dated Abubakar in the 1980s before moving to the United States and marrying another man. That first marriage ended in divorce, and Douglas reestablished a relationship with Abubakar, who began to spend significant time with her in the United States, and the couple was "officially married" in 2003. From 2000 to 2007, she opened more than 30 bank accounts to help her husband import over \$40 million in suspect funds into the United States, mostly from offshore corporations. As discussed below, the money included \$2 million in bribes related to the Siemens scandal. She used some of the money to fund an extravagant lifestyle in the United States, including monthly credit card bills ranging from \$10,000 to \$90,000. The transfers also included \$14 million wired to the American University in Washington, D.C. related to the establishment and development of the new American University of Nigeria, which Douglas helped found. The University accepted all transfers without asking questions, and when one of her banks closed an account for suspicious offshore wire transfers, Douglas' U.S. lawyer helped her open new accounts to facilitate further transactions.

Atiku Abubakar derives much of his wealth from his co-ownership of a powerful Nigerian company called Intels, which he owns along with Italian Billionaire Gabriele Volpi. Intels is one of Nigeria's largest oil services companies, operating oil terminals and oil services ports in Nigeria, Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and elsewhere, with hundreds of millions of dollars in revenues. In 1996, Nigeria's then-President Abacha seized Abubakar's Intels shares,

but the Report indicates that Volpi maintained a gentlemen's agreement to restore Abubakar's ownership when politics allowed. When President Abacha died in 1998, Volpi lived up to the gentlemen's agreement. When Abubakar became Vice President of Nigeria in 1999, he placed his 16% ownership of Intels into a Blind Trust, and named one of Volpi's companies, a Panamanian corporation called Orleans Invest Holdings Ltd ("Orleans"), as the Trustee. In 2003, the Blind Trust swapped its Intels ownership for an equivalent ownership in Orleans, so that the Blind Trust became part owner of its own Trustee, and Orleans thereby gained a 16% ownership of Intels. Then, in October 2003, the Abubakar Blind Trust acquired a new Trustee, a one-day old Nigerian shell company called Guernsey Trust Company Nigeria Ltd. ("Guernsey"). Guernsey's three beneficial owners are Volpi, a Nigerian banker, and a Nigerian lawyer. From 2003 to 2008, Guernsey (operating the Abubakar Blind Trust) transferred over \$10 million to the United States, with \$7 million going to Douglas' private accounts, \$2.1 million to a lawyer's accounts, and \$900,000 to American University.

While Douglas denies receiving bribes from Siemens, part of the German company's December 2008 guilty plea includes the bribes paid to Douglas. From 2001 to 2003, Siemens transferred \$1.772 million into Douglas' personal accounts at Citibank. Siemens also claims to have made another wire transfer to her at another bank, and to have given an additional \$2 million in cash to Douglas or to two other companies she beneficially owned, "J.E. Douglas Steradian Co. U.K. L" and "Peniel Inc. U.K. Ltd." The Senate PSI Report also notes that Abubakar was associated with the events surrounding the August 2009 conviction of U.S. Congressman William Jefferson, who was arrested after an undercover investigation and the discovery of \$90,000 in his home freezer. At Jefferson's trial, a videotape was played in which the Congressman referenced Abubakar while seeking bribe money for himself. However, no evidence was ever introduced to suggest that Abubakar sought or offered a bribe in relation to the Jefferson scandal.

From 2000 to 2008, Douglas used her network of accounts to receive over \$40 million in suspect funds into accounts in her name, or in the name of the Jennifer Douglas Abubakar Family Trust or the Gede Foundation, both of which she controlled. The majority of these funds were transferred from offshore corporations in Germany, Nigeria, Panama, the British Virgin Islands, and Switzerland, including payments from companies called LetsGo, Guernsey Trust Company, and Sima Holding Payments. Volpi is the key beneficial owner of all three of these entities, leading the Senate PSI Report to intimate that Volpi — along with Atiku Abubakar — was likely behind most of these payments.

- Angola

The Report illustrates how two Angolan PEPs and a third Angolan bank have exploited weak AML and PEP safeguards to access the U.S. financial system. The first PEP, Pierre Falcone, was a close associate of a former President of Angola and is a known arms dealer who has been imprisoned previously in France, and who has been convicted subsequently in France of new charges related to arms dealing, tax fraud, and money laundering. The Report shows how Falcone used a network of shell companies, personal and family accounts to move millions of dollars in suspect funds into the United States. For example, Bank of America maintained

almost 30 Falcone accounts from 1989 to 2007, and did not consider his accounts high risk even after learning of his arms dealing conviction and imprisonment.

Separately, the PSI Report also details how a \$7 billion private Angolan bank, Banco Africano de Investimentos (“BAI”), has provided Angolan PEPs with access to myriad U.S. financial services. While its ownership structure is somewhat opaque, BAI’s largest shareholder is Sonangol, the Angola state-owned oil company, and the bank caters to wealthy Angolans involved in the oil and diamond industries, as well as to Angolan government officials. BAI used its accounts with HSBC in New York (“HSBC-NY”) to provide money transfer services, currency exchanges and credit cards in U.S. Dollars for its clients, many of whom are PEPs. For example, through HSBC-NY, BAI issued U.S. Dollar credit cards to significant PEPs in the Angolan government, including the President and his son-in-law, the Governor of the Central Bank, Ministers of Defense and Oil, and Sonangol executives.

BAI’s first president was Dr. Aginaldo Jaime, who left BAI to become head of the Angolan central bank, Banco Nacional de Angola (“BNA”). The Report explains how Dr. Jaime, as Angola’s central banker, attempted four times to transfer \$50 million in government funds into private accounts in the United States. In the first attempt, Dr. Jaime ordered \$50 million transferred from the BNA account at Citibank London to a Bank of America account in California in his own name. Bank of America became suspicious of a central banker transferring \$50 million of public funds into a private account, and canceled the transaction. In his second attempt, Dr. Jaime asked Citibank London to transfer \$50 million to HSBC in London, and then asked HSBC in London to purchase \$50 million in U.S. Treasury bills for a BNA account with HSBC in New York. As a final step, Dr. Jaime asked HSBC-NY to transfer the \$50 million in Treasury bills to a personal Wells Fargo securities account in the name of a California attorney who also owns a Nevada-based LLC. While HSBC was apparently undisturbed by the transaction, Wells Fargo became suspicious, returned the \$50 million, and closed the California attorney’s account. Undaunted, the Angolan central banker tried a third time to transfer the \$50 million into personal hands, this time by asking HSBC-NY to transfer the \$50 million into the same California attorney’s law office bank account. HSBC tried to complete this request, but had incorrect information and could not accomplish the transfer. Refusing to admit defeat, Dr. Jaime tried a fourth time and suggested that HSBC-NY keep the \$50 million in Treasury bills in New York, but give him a “safekeeping receipt” that he could use as a transferable financial instrument. HSBC agreed again, but ultimately never provided the transferable instrument. Before Dr. Jamie could try a fifth time to shift \$50 million of Angolan central bank assets into private hands, he took a new job as Assistant to the Prime Minister of Angola, and later became Deputy Prime Minister. Under new leadership, the Angolan central bank ordered HSBC-NY to sell the Treasury bills and transfer the \$50 million back to its account at Citibank London.

The four aborted \$50 million transfers by the Angolan central banker, plus broad concerns about corruption in Angola, prompted Citibank not only to close all accounts with the Angolan Central Bank, but also to close all accounts with Angolan officials and to entirely withdraw from Angola. In contrast, the Report highlights that HSBC continues to provide services to the Angolan Central Bank.

Two weeks after the Senate Report was published, Angolan authorities arrested approximately 20 Angolans for corruption offenses in connection with the embezzlement of \$137 million from the Angolan National Bank (BNA). The link between these arrests and the Senate Report is as yet uncertain, but the timing of these events suggests the underlying conduct may be related. Angolan authorities state that they have successfully recovered \$98 million and several luxury cars such as BMWs, Bentleys, and Porsches, in addition to \$15 million seized in Portugal. On February 18, the Angolan Attorney General, Joao Maria Sousa, explained that “low-level employees of the National Bank and of the Finance Ministry are suspected of having transferred funds between September and November 2009 to several countries such as Portugal, Germany, China, Dubai, Austria, Switzerland, Cayman Islands and US.” News sources indicate that rumors about the involvement of government officials are increasing and government ministers may be interviewed by the police. Angolan Attorney General Sousa has warned that “anyone could be interviewed within the frame of this investigation.”

### **U.S. Investigations, Disclosures, and Prosecutions of Note**

#### ***JPMorgan Chase***

Since at least August 2013, JPMorgan Chase & Co. (“JPMorgan”) has been under investigation by authorities in the United States for allegedly hiring the children of government officials in China and other countries as part of an effort to secure business. At that time, the company disclosed that it had received a request from the SEC regarding its employment practices in Hong Kong.

*The New York Times* has published a series of stories on JPMorgan’s so-called “Sons and Daughters” program. JP Morgan allegedly established the “Sons and Daughters” program initially to ensure that the bank would properly scrutinize well-connected job applicants in China. Over time, however, various bank employees reportedly commandeered the program to ensure instead that the well-connected Chinese applicants were subjected to fewer interviews and lowered employment standards.

As a result, JPMorgan allegedly hired the children of Chinese officials and obtained business in return. The articles report, for example, that JPMorgan hired the son of the chairman of the China Everbright Group, a state-controlled financial conglomerate, as well as the daughter of a deputy chief engineer of China’s railway ministry. After hiring the chairman’s son, JPMorgan secured multiple contracts with China Everbright, including assisting one of its subsidiaries on a \$162 million share sale and helping the company reshape its digital advertising firm in what at the time was the largest ever private equity deal in China. Similarly, the railway ministry official’s daughter was hired around the same time that JPMorgan was selected to advise The China Railway Group, a state-controlled railway construction company, on its initial public offering. JPMorgan was also awarded a number of additional contracts with Chinese railway companies during the time that the official’s daughter worked for the bank.

JPMorgan conducted an internal review that revealed that it had up to 250 employees in China, India, South Korea and Singapore who were connected to public or private entities. It has also come to light that these types of hiring practices were widespread in China and that

JPMorgan may even have modeled its hiring program on the practices of other major banks operating in the region. According to the *Times*, banks competed over who could make the most prestigious hires and were well aware of their competitor's practices. In one email a JPMorgan executive even complained that the bank lost a deal because their competitor, Deutsche Bank, hired the client's daughter the previous summer.

The *Times* has stated that a number of these other banks were also being investigated for similar practices, including Credit Suisse, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley. None of the banks, including JPMorgan, have been charged with any violations to date.

### ***Halliburton***

Beginning in October 2011, oilfield services company Halliburton Co. ("Halliburton") made a series disclosures regarding the company's investigations into possible FCPA violations in Angola and Iraq. The Houston-based company first explained that it had received an anonymous email in December 2010 that alleged that conduct by former and current personnel in connection with an Angolan vendor violated the company's Code of Business Conduct and the FCPA. Halliburton stated that it retained outside counsel and independent forensic accountants to assist with an internal investigation, and that it had since self-reported the violation to the DOJ. On February 16, 2012, Halliburton reported that it was responding to a subpoena regarding the Angola investigation, and that an employee has received an SEC subpoena.

Halliburton later disclosed that it had initiated new, unrelated investigations into further possible FCPA violations in Angola and Iraq. In a July 27, 2012 SEC filing, Halliburton explained that the new investigations related to customs matters in Angola and customs and visa matters, as well as the use of third-party agents, in Iraq. Halliburton continues to report that the investigations are ongoing and that it intends to continue cooperating with inquiries and requests from the DOJ and SEC.

Halliburton and its former subsidiary, KBR, previously paid \$579 million to resolve FCPA investigations related to bribes paid for contracts to build a liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny Island, Nigeria (*see KBR/Halliburton Company*). Halliburton's settlement with the SEC permanently enjoined Halliburton from violating the record-keeping and internal control provisions of the FCPA and required an independent consultant to review the company's anti-corruption policies and procedures.

### ***Wal-Mart***

On December 8, 2011, Wal-Mart publically disclosed that, as a result of a voluntary internal review of its anti-corruption policies, procedures, and internal controls and information from other sources, it had begun an internal investigation with the assistance of outside counsel into whether certain matters, including permitting, licensing and inspections, were in compliance with the FCPA. The company also disclosed that it had voluntarily reported its investigation to the DOJ and SEC in November 2011.

On May 17, 2012, Wal-Mart further disclosed that its Audit Committee was conducting an internal investigation with the assistance of outside counsel into alleged violations of the FCPA and other alleged crimes or misconduct in connection with foreign subsidiaries, including Wal-Mart de México, S.A.B. de C.V. (“Walmex”), and “whether prior allegations of such violations and/or misconduct were appropriately handled by the Company.” Wal-Mart also disclosed its voluntary global review of its policies, practices, and internal controls for FCPA compliance. In November 2012, Wal-Mart reported that it had expanded its internal investigation to include activities in Brazil, China, and India.

While comprehensive details have not been publically released, various sources indicate that Wal-Mart has implemented a range of changes to its compliance policies since the initiation of its internal FCPA investigation, including the creation of a new internal reporting mechanism. In October 2012, Wal-Mart created a new position, Head of International Legal Compliance, to centralize FCPA compliance functions that were previously regionally controlled. Wal-Mart also significantly increased its global compliance staff, adding more than 500 compliance employees. At the executive level, compliance targets have been incorporated into executive compensation. In addition, at least eight of Wal-Mart’s senior executives in Mexico, India and the United States have left the company since its initial FCPA disclosures. The Wal-Mart Board of Directors Audit Committee, comprised entirely of outside Directors, has also been active since the announcement of the FCPA investigations, having met seven times in the Fiscal Year ending January 2013.

In its 2014 Global Compliance Program Report, Wal-Mart stated that legal fees and other costs associated with the FCPA investigation, including compliance program overall, totaled \$439 million. Wal-Mart estimated that is compliance related spending in fiscal year 2014 would come to \$200 million to \$240 million.

- *Front Page New York Times Article*

Most of what is known about the Wal-Mart investigation comes from two front-page investigative articles in *The New York Times*. Whereas average front-page stories consist of approximately 1200 words, the *Times* devoted 7500 words to each of the two Wal-Mart articles. For their deep investigative work and the two Wal-Mart exposés, co-authors David Barstow and Alejandra Xanic von Bertrab were awarded the 2013 Pulitzer Prize for Investigative Reporting.

The first story appeared on April 21, 2012, and detailed allegedly improper payments to Mexican officials by Walmex as well as the company’s handling of its response to the allegations, which according to the *Times* had initially been raised in September 2005 by a former executive to the then-General Counsel of Wal-Mart International. According to the *Times*, the former executive had left the company after being passed over for the General Counsel position at Walmex. The *Times* reported that, in connection with building new stores in Mexico, Walmex had paid bribes to obtain zoning approvals, reductions in environmental impact fees, and the allegiance of neighborhood leaders. The *Times* further reported that the former executive had implicated Walmex’s CEO, board chairman, general counsel, chief auditor, and top real estate executive in relation to the payments. According to the *Times*, some of the

payments were made through local lawyers and had been recorded on Walmex's books and records as legal fees.

The *Times*' report also included significant details concerning the company's handling of the internal investigation that resulted from the former executive's allegations. According to the *Times*, Wal-Mart sought to downplay and disregard the allegations by transferring responsibility for the internal investigation to the very unit alleged to have made the bribes, Walmex. More specifically, responsibility for the investigation was given to the Walmex General Counsel, who had personally been implicated by the whistleblower in connection with the payments. This transfer occurred, wrote the *Times*, despite the concerns raised by the then-General Counsel of Wal-Mart International about "assigning any investigative role to management of the business unit being investigated." According to the *Times*, a few weeks after he took control of the investigation, the Walmex General Counsel cleared himself and Walmex of any wrongdoing, and based on the denials of other Walmex executives, concluded that there was no evidence or clear indication of bribery.

The April 2012 *Times* article also included details about the breadth and timing of its own reporting. According to the *Times*, Wal-Mart's voluntary disclosure to U.S. authorities occurred only after Wal-Mart learned of *The New York Times*' reporting in Mexico. The *Times* claimed to have obtained hundreds of internal company documents tracing the evolution of Wal-Mart's initial internal investigation, to have a draft work plan proposed by outside counsel, to have spoken with undisclosed "participants in Wal-Mart's investigation" and the former executive, and to have obtained e-mails between Wal-Mart executives about the handling of the investigation. The *Times* also appeared to quote directly from the notes prepared by the former Wal-Mart International General Counsel during her meeting with the whistleblower.

Following the report by the *Times*, the matter was widely reported in the media which questioned whether the allegations (if true) would provoke tens of millions of dollars in costs, billions in lost market capitalization and force changes at the highest levels of the company. To use a popular phrase: the matter went viral, with reporting in literally thousands of publications in virtually every corner of the globe. Wal-Mart stock dropped 4.7% in the first day after the April 2012 *Times* story broke, and continued to decline until approximately \$20 billion of shareholders lost approximately \$20 billion total in the short term.; within months, however, Wal-Mart stock recovered and reached a twelve-year high, and as of the date of this publication, the stock trades \$12 higher per share than the day before the initial April 2012 *Times* story.

- *Subsequent New York Times Article*

In December 2012, *The New York Times* followed-up with a second front-page article that focused on the specific case study of how Wal-Mart allegedly made over \$200,000 in improper payments to a local mayor, zoning officials, and officials of the National Institute of Anthropology and History ("INAH") in order to build a Wal-Mart store in an alfalfa field only one mile from the ancient pyramids of Teotihuacán, Mexico. The local zoning council had previously approved a zoning map to protect the archeological heritage of the site near the pyramids, but Wal-Mart allegedly ensured that the map was secretly changed just before it was

published. The *Times* did not point to direct evidence that the individual responsible for the map had taken bribes, but instead provided circumstantial evidence that the individual was able to acquire a significant amount of real estate at the time, including land value alone totaling over 65% of his salary.

The December 2012 *Times* article also stated that traffic congestion was a major concern for the town of Teotihuacán, and that the state road regulatory agency had previously approved a congestion plan that included building a bypass through the alfalfa field on which Wal-Mart wanted to build its store. The *Times* alleged that the whistleblower authorized a \$25,900 bribe to the traffic regulation agency, which granted approval to build the Wal-Mart instead.

The December 2012 article alleged that Wal-Mart made improper payments to the Mayor of Teotihuacán in order to obtain the approval of the City Council. It alleged that the mayor pushed the City Council to make a rushed approval decision despite the fact that Wal-Mart had not submitted a written request and lacked requisite permits. According to the *Times*, at the mayor's urging and after one extraordinary non-public session and only fifteen minutes of public debate, the City Council provided the necessary approval.

The article alleged that the Wal-Mart store was built without the legally required archeological excavation studies being conducted by INAH beforehand and without a formal INAH "liberation letter" verifying that the land could be developed without damaging archeological heritage. The *Times* article alleged that Wal-Mart was able to begin construction without an INAH excavation study or liberation letter by making an "official donation" to the INAH of \$45,000 as well as a "personal gift" of as much as \$36,000 to an INAH official. The *Times* article further alleged that, when a low-level INAH from Teotihuacán personally halted the Wal-Mart construction because he knew that excavation studies had not been done and that he had not issued any permit, he learned that more senior INAH had granted a permit without the usual survey or liberation letter. The *Times* alleged that, fearing a potentially embarrassing public relations situation, the senior INAH officials forged back-dated documents and pointed to an unrelated INAH study from 1984 in a post hoc attempt to demonstrate that the land had been cleared for development twenty years earlier.

While the December 2012 article focused on the alleged facts related to the construction of the Teotihuacán Wal-Mart, it also alleged that Wal-Mart paid a total of \$341,000 to build a Sam's Club in Mexico City near the Basilica of Guadalupe without the appropriate licenses and permits, and that Wal-Mart paid \$765,000 in bribes to build a refrigerated distribution center in an environmentally fragile area where electricity was so scarce that smaller developers had been rebuffed.

Like the April 2012 article, the December 2012 follow-up article also provided details about the breadth and scope of the *Times*' investigative journalism, including travel throughout Mexico, the collection of "tens of thousands" of documents, and interviews of government officials, and Wal-Mart employees. The *Times* also stated that it conducted 15 hours of interviews with Sergio Cicero Zapata, the whistleblower and former Walmex real estate executive who claimed to have organized many improper payments.

- U.S. Congressional Investigations

On April 25, 2012, four days after the first *Times* article alleging Wal-Mart bribery in Mexico, the Washington Post published its own front-page story alleging that Wal-Mart had “participated in an aggressive and high-priced lobbying campaign to amend” the FCPA. In response, two Democratic Congressmen — Elijah E. Cummings (Ranking Member, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform) and Henry A. Waxman (Ranking Member, Committee on Energy and Commerce) — wrote letters to the leaders of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”) and the Retail Industry Leaders Association (“RILA”) stating that they were “concerned about the role that Wal-Mart officials may have played” in efforts to amend the FCPA. The Congressmen wrote that “It would appear to be a conflict of interest for Wal-Mart officials to advise on ways to weaken the [FCPA] at a time when the leadership of the company was apparently aware of corporate conduct that may have violated the law.”

The Congressmen requested five types of documentation, including copies of all communications with Wal-Mart individuals involved in the Chamber or RILA on the subject of FCPA reform, all documents relating to the organizations’ strategies for amending the FCPA, and anything “relating to the actions of Wal-Mart in lobbying for changes to the FCPA or any other U.S. anti-bribery laws.” In May 2012, the Energy & Commerce Committee’s Democratic Staff released information indicating that Wal-Mart was not alone in allegedly experiencing FCPA compliance issues while being involved in FCPA amendment advocacy, and that 25% of the Board Members of the Chamber’s Institute for Legal Reform (ILR), which was tasked with lobbying for FCPA reform, represented companies that had been investigated for FCPA violations or that had entered into FCPA settlements.

On April 25, 2012, and again on May 17, 2012, Congressmen Cummings and Waxman wrote letters to Wal-Mart CEO Michael T. Duke requesting information and documents related to the *Times*’ allegations of FCPA violations. On June 12, 2012, the Congressmen again wrote to Mr. Duke, stating that Wal-Mart had not yet provided any of the information requested, nor had Wal-Mart personnel appeared before the Committee to testify. The Congressmen noted that Wal-Mart’s recently-engaged outside counsel had only provided a high-level briefing without details or documents. The Congressmen asked for copies of Wal-Mart policies and procedures, internal reports and studies, documents related to Wal-Mart’s responses to allegations and findings, copies of Wal-Mart compliance protocols, and documentation related to all internal complaints or reports related to the FCPA and the company’s responses to those internal complaints and reports. For its part, Wal-Mart responded that “As it relates to FCPA reform, Wal-Mart has never lobbied on FCPA” and that “simply because Wal-Mart is a member of an organization [like the Chamber of Commerce] does not mean we agree with every position they take.”

On August 14, 2012, Congressmen Cummings and Waxman wrote another letter to Mr. Duke, offering him a “final opportunity to respond to our requests for information,” noting that Wal-Mart had not provided any information requested by the Committee. The letter added that the Committee had obtained from “other sources” various internal Wal-Mart documents

including an internal audit report that suggested that Walmex had engaged in “questionable financial behavior” including money laundering and tax evasion.

In January 2013, in the wake of the *Times*’ December 2012 follow-up article focusing on the Wal-Mart store near the Teotihuacan pyramids, the Congressmen released internal Wal-Mart e-mails obtained from a confidential source. The emails indicated that, in apparent contradiction to past statements, Wal-Mart CEO Michael Duke and other senior Wal-Mart officials had been informed as early as October 2005 about bribes being paid in Mexico. The emails indicate that Duke was specifically informed of the “official donation” allegedly paid to the INAH and the “personal gift” allegedly paid to an INAH official, and that Duke was also informed of other irregular payments through local lawyers and architectural firms.

Alleging that the 2005 emails appeared to contradict Wal-Mart’s prior statements that the company was unaware of the allegedly improper activity in Mexico, the Congressmen wrote that “the e-mails cast a new and unfavorable light on Wal-Mart’s continued unwillingness” to cooperate with the Congressional investigation, and added that “it would be a serious matter if the CEO of one of our nation’s largest companies failed to address allegations of a bribery scheme.” Wal-Mart responded by denying any inconsistency between its past statements and the released emails, stating that the *Times*’ December 2012 follow-up article focused on events in 2004, while the released emails were from 2005, implying that Mr. Duke was not aware of the allegedly improper activities in 2004 when they occurred. Repeating its response to past letters from the Congressmen, Wal-Mart pledged to provide Members of Congress with “whatever appropriate information we can . . . consistent with maintaining the integrity of the ongoing federal investigation.”

- *Foreign Investigations*

The *Times* articles and Wal-Mart’s related disclosures have also prompted investigations outside of the United States. The *Times*’ April 2012 article received substantial attention in Mexico, where Wal-Mart is that country’s largest private employer. Shortly after the first story was published, the Mexican Federal Government announced that it was opening an investigation into Wal-Mart’s operations in Mexico. In January 2013, Wal-Mart provided documentation in response to a formal request from Mexican authorities.

Wal-Mart also halted its expansion into India and several of Wal-Mart’s Indian executives were suspended in the wake of the publications. In January 2013, the Indian government named Mukul Mudgal, the former Chief Justice of the Punjab and Jaryana High Court, to serve as a one-man committee to investigate the *Times*’ allegations that Wal-Mart had spent \$25 million on lobbying in India since 2008. In May 2013, Justice Mudgal submitted a 32-page report to the Indian government stating that he was unable to reach a conclusion because (i) he was not granted sufficient power to summon or investigate, (ii) Wal-Mart did not provide documentation or details requested with respect to lobbying activities and payments made to third parties, (iii) certain answers provided by Wal-Mart were “incomprehensible,” and (iv) oral testimony by the head of Wal-Mart in India was “ambiguous” with regard to the role played by an intermediary entity called Cedar Services. Media reports suggest that, in the wake of the

inconclusive Mudgal report, the government of India may initiate additional investigative actions. At the end of June 2013, Wal-Mart announced that the chief executive officer of Wal-Mart in India was no longer with the company.

## DOJ ADVISORY OPINIONS

As originally passed in 1977, the FCPA contained no mechanism through which companies faced with questions about the appropriateness of certain conduct could obtain guidance from federal regulators. This changed in 1980 when, at the direction of President Carter, the DOJ instituted a Review Procedure aimed at providing guidance to entities subject to the FCPA. As initially instituted, the procedure only indicated that the DOJ would make a “reasonable effort” to respond to inquiries within thirty days, and provided the DOJ with freedom to either (i) state its enforcement position, (ii) decline to state its enforcement position, or (iii) “take such other position or action as it considers appropriate.” Concern also existed that the DOJ and SEC would arrive at different interpretations as to the propriety of particular conduct. However, in 1981, the SEC issued a statement indicating that it would not commence an enforcement action against a company that received a favorable DOJ review letter.

In 1988 amendments to the FCPA, Congress directed the Attorney General to adopt revised review procedures to address some of the perceived drawbacks to the Review Procedure process. The DOJ finally adopted revised procedures, known as the Opinion Procedures, in 1992.

Under the DOJ’s advisory opinion procedures, issuers subject to the FCPA and domestic concerns have been able to obtain an opinion as to whether future conduct would violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. Under the revised procedures, companies may seek guidance on actual — not hypothetical — conduct so long as the request is “specific” and “all relevant and material information bearing on the conduct . . . and on the circumstances of the prospective conduct” is described. If the DOJ approves the conduct, there is a rebuttable presumption that the conduct as described in the request does not violate the FCPA.

Traditionally, DOJ advisory opinions contain language indicating that the opinion has “no binding application to any party which did not join in the Request, and can be relied upon by the requestor only to the extent that the disclosure of facts and circumstances in its request is accurate and complete and remains accurate and complete.” In DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 08-02, however, the Department specifically referred to prior Opinion Release 01-01 as “precedent,” suggesting that the guidance offered in the Opinion Releases may arguably be given greater weight by regulators than the traditional caveat language suggests. In addition, recent Opinion Releases have addressed increasingly complex transactions and factual circumstances, particularly in the mergers and acquisition context.

Summarized below are all of the DOJ Review and Opinion Procedure Releases issued to date.

### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 80-01***

On October 29, 1980, the DOJ issued its first ever Review Procedure Release (later to be called Opinion Procedure Releases) in response to a request by an American law firm that sought to do business in an unnamed foreign country. The law firm had sought to establish a fund, amounting to approximately \$10,000 per annum, for the American education and support of two

adopted children of an elderly and “semi-invalid” honorary foreign official of the same country in which the firm sought to do business.

The foreign official’s duties were described as “ceremonial,” such that he was not in a position to make substantive decisions on behalf of the foreign government. The natural parents of the two children were also employees of the foreign government, but they too were described as being “not in a position to make or to influence official decisions that would in any way benefit either the law firm or any corporations which may contribute to the education fund.” In issuing no-action comfort, the DOJ noted that there had been no suggestion of any preferential treatment as a result of the proposed fund, nor had the firm obtained or retained (and did not expect to obtain or retain) any business as a result of its actions.

### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 80-02***

Also on October 29, 1980, the DOJ issued Review Procedure Release 80-02, addressing a request by the American firm Castle & Cooke and two of its subsidiaries about a potential run for political office by the employee of one of its subsidiaries in a foreign country. The employee, who had worked for the subsidiary for ten years, was approached by a political party in the foreign country about running for office, and desired to retain his employment with the subsidiary during his campaign and while serving in office if elected. According to the Release, the employee’s duties with the subsidiary did not involve any sort of advocacy work before the foreign government, and his continued employment by the corporation would be fully disclosed to the political party, the electorate and the foreign government.

In providing no-action relief, the request indicated that the employee would, if elected, refrain from participating in any legislative or other governmental action that would directly affect the corporation and his salary would be based on the amount of time he actually worked for the corporation. According to the Release, the government position was essentially part time and it was common for legislators to hold outside employment. Finally, the Release noted that local counsel opined that the arrangement, as structured, did not violate local conflict of interest or other laws.

### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 80-03***

In a somewhat unique Release, the DOJ, also on October 29, 1980, released Review Procedure Release 80-03 in response to the submission by a domestic concern of a proposed contract with an attorney domiciled and functioning in West Africa. The original request contained merely a cover letter and a copy of the proposed contract, which apparently referenced the FCPA twice. First, the contract indicated that the attorney represented that he was not, and during the course of the contract would not be, a foreign official. The contract also expressly prohibited, with language that tracked the statute, payments that would violate the FCPA. The DOJ sought, pursuant to Section 50.18(g) of the Review Procedure, additional information about the attorney’s background and qualifications, including potential “[g]overnment connections, his relationship with the domestic concern, the nature of the African business, particular performance expectations and pending projects of special interest in Africa . . . .”

The Release indicated that neither the original request (consisting of the contract and cover letter) nor the results of the DOJ's follow-up questions revealed anything that would cause concern about the application of the FCPA to the arrangement. The DOJ stated that "[i]f in fact there was a reasonable concern, a mere contract provision, without other affirmative precautionary steps, would not be sufficient" to avoid a possible violation of the statute. Although there lacked any reasonable concern, based on the facts as then known, about the application or possible violation of the FCPA, the DOJ "declined to respond to this Review Request by stating whether or not it will take an enforcement action" as it deemed review of a contract not to be appropriate use of the Review Procedure.

#### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 80-04***

On October 29, 1980, the DOJ provided no-action comfort to a joint request by the Lockheed Corporation ("Lockheed") and the Olayan Group ("Olayan"), a Saudi Arabian trading, services and investment organization. Lockheed and Olayan represented that they intended to enter into agreements with each other for the purpose of entering into prospective business transactions with the Saudi Arabian government and the Saudi Arabian Airlines Corporation (known as "Saudia"). The Release indicates that Suliman S. Olayan, the Chairman of Olayan, was also an outside director of Saudia.

The Release indicated that Olayan would disclose the relationship between Olayan and Lockheed to the Saudia board, and would abstain from voting on any decisions affecting Lockheed or its subsidiaries. In addition, Olayan would not use his position on the Saudia board to influence acts or decisions of the Saudi government (including departments, agencies or instrumentalities such as Saudia) on Lockheed's behalf. The Release indicated that Olayan devoted an insubstantial amount of his business activity to his position on the Saudia board, and he held no other position within the Saudi government (in fact, the release indicated that board positions such as Olayan's are reserved for individuals considered under Saudi law *not* to be civil servants.) Further, Olayan was to receive confirmation from the Director General of Saudia that his position as a director did not make him an officer of Saudia and that he had no authority to act on Saudia's behalf (other than to vote on matters before the Board.) Finally, the Release indicates that his activities with Lockheed on behalf of Olayan and his directorship did not violate the laws of Saudi Arabia.

#### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 81-01***

On November 25, 1981, the DOJ issued Review Procedure Release 81-01 in response to a joint request by the Bechtel Group ("Bechtel") and the SGV Group ("SGV"), described as "a multinational organization headquartered in the Republic of the Philippines and comprised of separate member firms in ten Asian nations and Saudi Arabia which provide auditing, management consulting, project management and tax advisory services."

According to the release, Bechtel had already known the principals of SGV for a number of years at the time of the Release, and SGV had served, since 1977, as a business consultant on Bechtel's behalf in the Philippines. The Release indicated that the previous relationship had been successful, both in terms of the level of service provided and the professionalism, integrity

and ethics shown by SGV. Bechtel and SGV had proposed to enter into contractual relationships whereby SGV would provide various services to Bechtel, and these relationships apparently raised concern about the application of the FCPA. The Release also stated that both requestors were familiar with the FCPA and its prohibitions on improper payments to foreign officials.

In selecting SGV as its proposed consultant, Bechtel apparently considered several factors, which may be viewed as instructive for other entities considering third-party relationships. Among the factors considered were (i) the number of years the firm had been operating; (ii) the size of the firm in both manpower and geographic reach; (iii) the substantial probability of the firm's continued growth; (iv) the number and reputation of its clientele; (v) the qualifications of its professional staff; (vi) the presence of technical experts and specialists on staff; (vii) the adequacy of its support staff; and (viii) the firm's familiarity with and adherence to the principles embodied in the FCPA.

The Release spelled out a number of representations that Bechtel and SGV made in order to ultimately gain no-action comfort from the DOJ. First, the parties agreed that all payments would be made by check or bank transfer, with no payments made by cash or with bearer instruments. In addition, payments would only be made to SGV member firms (or officers or employees of such) and would be made to the Philippines unless Bechtel received written instructions to make payment to a location in which a member firm provided services to Bechtel.

SGV represented that none of its partners, owners, principals, and staff members were government officials, officers, representatives or political party candidates, and that no part of its compensation would be used for any purpose that would violate the FCPA or the law of any jurisdiction in which it performed services. Bechtel represented that it would not request of SGV any service that would or might be considered to be a violation of such laws.

In addition, SGV indicated that it would provide the opinion of Philippine legal counsel stating that SGV did not need further authorization from the Philippine government to perform the services enumerated in the agreement, and that the proposed arrangement itself, including the payment of travel expenses as contemplated therein, did not violate Philippine law. SGV also indicated that it would provide to Bechtel similar local legal opinions in other jurisdictions in which it could provide services prior to it actually doing so.

The Release also specified restrictions on the use of third parties in connection with the Bechtel-SGV arrangement. For instance, the agreement was said to restrain SGV from assigning any portion of its rights to a third party and from obligating Bechtel to a third party with which SGV has made an agreement or may direct payments without Bechtel's prior written consent. In addition, unless otherwise approved by Bechtel in writing, only SGV partners, principals and staff members could perform work on Bechtel's behalf. Both parties agreed that it was their intent in placing conditions such as these on the arrangement that neither party (or their representatives) could authorize payments to foreign officials potentially in violation of the FCPA. The arrangement also apparently indicated that SGV was to make Bechtel's general counsel immediately aware of any request by a Bechtel employee that might constitute a violation of the FCPA.

SGV had agreed that full disclosure of the existence and terms of its agreement with Bechtel, including compensation provisions, could be made at any time and for any reason to whomever Bechtel's general counsel determine has a legitimate reason to know such terms, including the government of any country where Bechtel is performing services, the U.S. government or Bechtel clients.

Under the agreement, reimbursements of expenses (for travel, gifts and entertainment) were governed by strict guidelines generally requiring Bechtel's prior approval and confirmation that the expenditures complied with local laws and custom and were directly related to a legitimate business purpose. Entertainment or meal expenses for Bechtel's clients or prospective clients would only be reimbursed without prior approval if the expense occurred on the same day as a substantial business meeting. Bechtel would only reimburse SGV for gifts or other tangible items given without its prior approval if (i) the gift was permitted under local law; (ii) its ceremonial value exceeded its intrinsic value; (iii) it did not exceed \$500 per person; and (iv) it was generally accepted in local custom as acceptable for such gifts from private business persons in the country.

The proposed agreement also contained audit and termination provisions. For example, all compensation and expenditure reimbursements were subject to audit by Bechtel, and Bechtel indicated that it intended to audit SGV's expenses and invoices when deemed appropriate based on (i) the amount paid in relation to the total payments under the agreement; (ii) the nature of the expense; (iii) the SGV services rendered during the period; and (iv) the Bechtel customers or potential customers with whom SGV had contact. In addition, should either party have a good faith belief that the other party had breached the terms of the agreement, it would be entitled to terminate the agreement without further liability or obligation. Actions that might constitute a violation of the FCPA by either party would result in automatic termination.

### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 81-02***

On December 11, 1981, the DOJ issued Review Procedure Release 81-02, which provided no-action comfort to Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. ("IBP") in response to its proposed intention to furnish samples of beef products to the officials of the former Soviet Union in an effort to promote sales in that region. The samples, which in total amounted to around 700 pounds with an estimated value of less than \$2,000, were to be provided to officials of the former Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade ("MVT"), the agency responsible for purchasing such products. According to IBP, sales of packaged beef products to the Soviet government would be in minimum amounts of 40,000 pounds each.

The Release indicates that the individual samples, which would not exceed \$250 each, were intended not for the personal use of the MVT officials, but rather for the inspection, testing and sampling of the product and to make the MVT officials aware of the product's quality. In addition, it was not the intent of IBP to provide the samples to the MVT officials in their personal capacity, but rather as representatives of the government agency responsible for purchasing such products. The Release further stated that the Soviet government had been informed of the intended provision of samples to the MVT officials.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 82-01***

On January 27, 1982, the DOJ issued Review Procedure Release 82-01, which provided no-action comfort to the Department of Agriculture of the State of Missouri (“Missouri DOA”). Missouri DOA proposed to host a delegation of approximately ten representatives, including representatives of Mexican government agencies and instrumentalities (such as a state-owned bank) and members of the Mexican private sector, for a series of meetings between Mexican officials and representatives of Missouri agriculture business and other business organizations, to promote sales of Missouri agricultural products in Mexico.

Missouri DOA proposed to pay for the expenses of the Mexican delegation, including lodging, meals, entertainment, and travel within Missouri. In the event that the Mexican officials inadvertently paid these expenses themselves, Missouri DOA intended to reimburse the delegation members directly. The Release stated that all these expenses were to be paid from Missouri DOA funds and contributions from private individuals within the state. The Release also indicated that Missouri business representatives would likely provide the Mexican officials with samples of Missouri products, such as Missouri cheeses or other items of “minimal value.”

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 82-02***

On February 18, 1982, the DOJ issued Review Procedure 82-02, in response to a joint-request submitted by Ransom F. Shoup & Company (“Shoup, Inc.”), a Pennsylvania closely held corporation in the business of selling, repairing, and designing voting machines, and Frederick I. Ogirri, a citizen of Nigeria and temporary employee of the United States Consulate of Nigeria. The Release stated that Shoup, Inc. had a contract with the Federal Election Commission of Nigeria (“Fedeco”), an independent commission of Nigeria, to design and sell voting machines.

According to the requestors’ representations, Shoup, Inc. would pay Ogirri a 1% “finder’s fee” on all contracts with Nigeria and other West African governments for a period of ten years. The fee was payment for Ogirri’s advice to Shoup, Inc. regarding the marketability of voting machines in Nigeria, the customs, protocol, and business practices of Nigeria, and his help in introducing Shoup, Inc. to a business agent in Nigeria. These activities did not relate to Ogirri’s duties at the Consulate. Under the law of Nigeria, as supported by a legal opinion submitted by the requestors, Ogirri was not regarded as a civil servant or staff member of the Federal Ministry of External Affairs in Nigeria, and his relationship with Shoup, Inc. did not violate Nigerian conflict of interest laws.

The Release noted that Ogirri represented that he had no influence with the Nigerian government and that he did not use any influence to assist Shoup, Inc. in obtaining its contract with Fedeco. Ogirri indicated that his work at the Consulate was ministerial and clerical in nature, stating that he was only responsible for gathering newspaper articles and maintaining a library, and that the Consulate paid him a bi-weekly wage of \$300.

In determining that it would not take enforcement action, the Release noted a number of factors. Ogirri and Shoup, Inc. agreed that no payments would be made to government officials and all payments to Ogirri would be made in the United States. Moreover, both parties would

keep records and verify every six months that no FCPA violations had occurred. The contract would be void if a violation did occur. Lastly, the requestors agreed that the relationship and the fee would be disclosed to Fedeco.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 82-03***

In Review Procedure Release 82-03, dated April 22, 1982, the DOJ provided no-action protection to a Delaware corporation that sought to do business with a government department of the former Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia (“FSRY”). The government department was principally responsible for Yugoslav military procurement. The company proposed to hire a sub-unit of the department to handle duties normally handled by commercial sales agents, having been advised by a senior officials of the government sub-unit that such an arrangement was required by Yugoslav law.

According to the Release, the agreement would require the company to pay the government subunit a percentage of the total contract price of the pending defense acquisition, as well as a percentage of each subsequent purchase made by the government procurement department or any other customer in the FSRY. The company proposed to include the identity of the commission agent and all commission fees in the written agency agreement, while also requiring that all fees be paid directly in the FSRY. The contemporaneous purchase contract was also to include a reference to the agency agreement. The requestor further represented that no individual government official was to benefit personally from the arrangement.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 82-04***

On November 11, 1982, the DOJ responded to a request from Thompson & Green Machinery Company, Inc. (“T&G”), in connection with an agency agreement T&G made with a foreign businessman.

T&G sought to compensate the businessman whom it had hired and used as an agent in connection with the sale of a generator in a foreign country. The agreement required T&G to pay the businessman a commission for his efforts and stated that no part of the fee could be used by the businessman to pay a commission or fee, directly or indirectly, to a third party. The agreement also referenced the FCPA prohibition on providing anything of value to employees or officials of foreign governments.

T&G later learned that the businessman was in fact the brother of an employee of the foreign government to which T&G sold the generator. After making this discovery, T&G obtained affidavits from the businessman and his brother that pledged adherence with the anti-bribery provisions of the FCPA. T&G further represented that payment was to be made by check or bank transfer in the country where services were rendered, and the company would require the businessman to comply with all applicable currency control laws of the foreign country. The DOJ deemed these precautions sufficient to merit no-action comfort.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 83-01***

On May 12, 1983, the DOJ granted no-action comfort to a California corporation that sought to use a Sudanese corporation as its sales agent. The Sudanese corporation was an autonomous legal entity whose head was appointed by the President of Sudan, and was primarily in the business of disseminating national and international news and developing a communications network. The company was also a member of a trade group composed of entities from several countries in the same general business as the Sudanese corporation. Within its operating parameters, the Sudanese company was permitted to act as an agent for foreign companies.

The California corporation represented that it wished to sell its equipment to commercial and governmental customers in Sudan and other countries associated with the trade group. The Sudanese corporation was to act as the California corporation's sales agent with respect to these sales.

The requestor represented that, pursuant to a written agreement, the California corporation would pay the Sudanese corporation a percentage of the standard list price of all products sold through the Sudanese corporation. Payment would be made directly to the Sudanese corporation (not to any individual) in a financial institution in Khartoum, Sudan. The requestor also represented that it would give notice of the agency relationship, and make specific reference to the agency agreement, in any purchase agreement that would result in a commission for the Sudanese corporation. The requestor did not expect that any Sudanese government official would personally benefit from the proposed agency relationship.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 83-02***

On July 26, 1983, the DOJ issued Review Procedure Release 83-02, relating to a proposed promotional tour. The requestor, a wholly owned subsidiary of a publicly held American corporation, participated in a joint venture in a foreign country. This joint venture had a long-term contractual relationship with an entity owned and controlled by the foreign country. The joint venture had negotiated three phases of a four-phase contract with the foreign entity; the contracts totaled approximately \$7 million, with \$2.7 million going to the requestor. The price for the final phase had not been negotiated. It was anticipated, however, it would also be for several million dollars, of which the requestor would receive a substantial portion.

The general manager of the foreign entity had planned to travel to the United States on vacation with his wife. After the requestor learned that the manager planned to vacation in the United States, the requestor invited the manager and his wife to extend their vacation for 10 days in order to tour the American facilities of the requestor and its parent company. These facilities related to the performance of the joint venture's contracts with the foreign entity. In addition, the manager and his wife would be shown one or more projects not operated by the requestor in order to demonstrate facilities similar to those being constructed in the foreign country. Visits to these facilities would require minimal travel from the requestor's facilities. The purpose of these visits was to familiarize the foreign entity's manager with the requestor's operations and capabilities.

In providing no-action comfort, the Release notes that the requestor would only pay reasonable and necessary actual expenses that the general manager and his wife incurred during the tour. These expenses, which would not exceed \$5,000, would include airfare from the city where the general manager and his wife planned to vacation (in the United States) to the three company sites (also within the United States) and return airfare to the vacation site. The requestor would also pay for lodging, meals, ground transportation and entertainment during the tour. The requestor proposed to pay all service providers directly, accurately record all expenses in its books and records, and reflect that the general manager and his wife were the persons for whom the expenses were incurred.

### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 83-03***

In Review Procedure Release 83-03, also dated July 26, 1983, the DOJ responded to a joint request from the Department of Agriculture of the State of Missouri (“Missouri DOA”) and CAPCO, Inc. (“CAPCO”), a Missouri corporation engaged in the management of properties by foreign investors. CAPCO proposed to pay, via a representative of Missouri DOA, the reasonable and necessary expenses of a Singapore government official in connection with a series of site inspections, demonstrations, and meetings in Missouri. The visit was intended to promote the sale of certain Missouri agricultural products and facilities.

CAPCO proposed to pay for airfare for one official, as well as travel, lodging, entertainment and meal expenses in Missouri. In addition, Missouri DOA represented that it might pay for certain additional costs, such as travel, lodging, entertainment, and meal expenses. In the event that the Singapore official inadvertently paid these expenses himself, CAPCO and Missouri DOA intended to reimburse the official, provided an adequate receipt was furnished.

CAPCO represented that there was no agreement between the firm and the Government of Singapore to manage any of the Government’s investments in the future. The Release noted, however, that individual owners and officers of CAPCO owned properties and firms that may enter into supply or service contracts or sales agreements with that government.

### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 84-01***

On August 16, 1984, the DOJ issued Review Procedure Release 84-01 in response to a request from an American firm that wished to engage a foreign firm (“Marketing Representative”) as its marketing representative in a foreign country. The engagement raised FCPA concerns because the Marketing Representative’s principals were related to the head of state of the foreign country and one of the principals personally managed certain private business affairs for that head of state.

In selecting the Marketing Representative for the proposed engagement, the American firm listed several factors that may guide firms considering such relationships. These factors included (i) the number of years the Marketing Representative had been in operation; (ii) the Marketing Representative’s successful representation of several other large corporations; (iii) the qualifications of the Marketing Representative’s principals; and (iv) the reputation of the Marketing Representative among businessmen and bankers in both the United States and abroad.

In light of the Marketing Representative's close connection with the foreign head of state, the Marketing Representative (via the requestor) made a number of representations. First, the Marketing Representative represented that it would not pay or agree to pay anything of value on behalf of the requestor to any public official in the foreign country for the purpose of influencing the official's act or to induce the official to use his or her influence to the Marketing Representative's benefit. If the Marketing Representative violated that pledge, the agreement would automatically terminate and the Marketing Representative would surrender all claims for sales. The agreement was also terminable by either party without cause upon thirty days notice and was governed by the law of the state in which the American firm had its principal place of business.

The Marketing Representative also represented that no owner, partner, officer, director, or employee was (or would become) an official of the foreign government during the term of the agreement.

Furthermore, the Marketing Representative agreed that it would assume all costs and expenses incurred in connection with its representation of the American firm, unless the American firm provided prior written approval. Such approval would include a detailed itemization of expenses claimed and a written authorization from the American firm. Prior written approval was also required before the Marketing Representative could assign any of its rights under the agreement to a third party or before it could obligate the American firm to third parties. All commissions were to be paid in U.S. dollars in the Marketing Representative's country of principal business.

Finally, the Marketing Representative agreed that it would disclose its identity and the amount of its commission to the U.S. government, when required.

The DOJ indicated that based on the facts and circumstances as represented, it did not intend to take any enforcement action with respect to the proposed engagement of the Marketing Representative.

#### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 84-02***

The DOJ issued Review Procedure Release 84-02 on August 20, 1984. The Release discusses an American firm's proposed transfer of assets from one of the firm's foreign branch offices to a separate, foreign-owned company. The requestor, the American firm, then intended to invest in the foreign-owned company. FCPA concerns arose when an agent of the foreign company made a remark that indicated the agent's possible intent to make a "small gratuity" to low-level government employees to facilitate the foreign government approval needed for the transaction.

In deciding not to take enforcement action, the DOJ emphasized several factors:

- The employee of the foreign company represented that no payments were ever made to officials of the foreign government; the American firm confirmed this fact to the best of its knowledge. At the time the "gratuity" statement was made, the American firm

discouraged any payments. Both parties subsequently represented that they would not violate the provisions of the FCPA.

- The American firm was to assume a minority interest in the foreign company after the transaction, with proportionate representation on the foreign company's Board of Directors so long as it was a shareholder. Once it assumed that interest, the requestor represented that it would retain the rights to have the foreign company's books and records audited by a major U.S. accounting firm to determine if violations of the FCPA had occurred.
- If the American firm were to learn that the foreign company violated (or intended to violate) the FCPA, it represented that it would notify DOJ and responsible foreign government authorities. Furthermore, the American firm represented that it would retain the right (but not the obligation) to end the relationship if FCPA violations were discovered.

#### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 85-01***

Opinion Release 85-01 was released on July 16, 1985. Atlantic Richfield Company ("ARCO"), doing business through a wholly owned subsidiary, announced plans to build a chemical plant in France. ARCO intended to invite officials of French Government Ministries responsible for industrial finance and development programs and for the issuance of permits and licenses necessary for the project to Texas and Philadelphia to meet with ARCO management and to inspect a plant.

The French government was to designate the officials for the trip. ARCO obtained an opinion that the proposed conduct did not violate French law. Further, it represented that the travel would occur only during one week and ARCO would pay the necessary and reasonable expenses of the French delegation, which will include those for air travel, lodging and meals.

The DOJ indicated that based on the facts and circumstances as represented, it did not intend to take any enforcement action with respect to trip.

#### ***DOJ Review Procedure Release 85-02***

Release 85-02 was a press release concerning the W.S. Kirkpatrick settlement, which related to allegations that the company made approximately \$1.7 million in improper payments through a Nigerian agent to obtain a \$10.8 million contract to provide medical equipment to the Nigerian government. W.S. Kirkpatrick pleaded guilty to a single count of bribery in violation of the FCPA violation and was fined \$75,000. Harry Carpenter, the Chairman of the Board and CEO of W.S. Kirkpatrick, pleaded guilty to one count of FCPA bribery and was sentenced to three years probation, community service, and a fine of \$10,000.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 85-03***

On January 20, 1987, the DOJ released Opinion Procedure Release 85-03. The requestor, an American company, had been attempting to resolve a claim against a foreign country and wished to enter into a settlement agreement. The requestor was unable, however, to identify the agencies or officials in the foreign country most responsible for and capable of settling the claim. The company wished to hire a former official of the foreign government as an agent to locate the correct agency. The requestor proposed paying the agent \$40 per hour, plus expenses, up to a limit of \$5,000.

The DOJ issued no action comfort in light of the representations that the proposed agent would enter into a written agreement specifying that the agent, among other things: (i) was not presently an official of the foreign country's government or an official of a political party or candidate for political office in the foreign country; (ii) understood and would abide by the FCPA; (iii) would not pass on his compensation to any official of the foreign government or government official; and (iv) would perform only those functions specifically authorized by the requestor.

The Release notes that action in the matter was taken in December 1985, although the Release was not published until January 1987.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 86-01***

On July 18, 1986, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 86-01. The subject of the release was three United States corporations' intentions to employ members of the Parliaments of Great Britain and Malaysia to represent the firms in their business operations in the respective nations.

The first U.S. Corporation wished to retain a British Member of Parliament, described as a backbencher, as a consultant at a rate of \$6,000 per month for six months. The Member occupied no other government position and did not have any authority with respect to the business of the U.S. corporation in Britain.

The second U.S. corporation wished to enter into a joint venture also with a British Member of Parliament who held no other position in the British Government. The joint venture was to purchase and operate airports in Great Britain. The Member would receive compensation in the range of \$40,000 to \$60,000 per year, and would be involved in the actual conduct of the joint venture's business operations.

The third U.S. corporation sought to retain a Member of the Malaysian Parliament as its representative in the purchase and sale of commodities in that nation. The MP occupied no position in the Malaysian government other than his seat in the Parliament, was to be paid \$4,000 per month for a period of one year and would receive 30% of the net profits generated by his representation, to the extent that amount exceeded his basic compensation.

All companies represented the compensation paid to the Members was reasonable and would be paid directly.

The Release noted that each Member of Parliament in the three requests occupied no special legislative position of influence other than that possessed by any single member in a large legislative body (Great Britain, over 600 members; Malaysia, over 350 members). Furthermore, each Member had entered into a written employment agreement in which he agreed to make full disclosure of his representation relationship with the U.S. corporation and agrees not to vote or conduct any other legislative activity for the benefit of the corporation. Each corporation and member also agreed that the Member would not use his position as a Member of Parliament to influence any decisions that would benefit the U.S. corporation.

Based on the facts and circumstances as represented, the DOJ issued no action comfort.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 87-01***

On December 17, 1987 the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 87-01, relating to a request from Lantana Boatyard, Inc. (“Lantana”), a company wishing to sell military patrol boats to an English corporation, Milverton Holdings, Ltd. (“Milverton”), owned by a Nigerian, Tayo Amusan. Milverton intended to resell the boats to the Nigerian government.

By the terms of the proposed transaction, Lantana was to be fully paid before any of the boats were delivered to Milverton, and Lantana would have no involvement in negotiations between Milverton and the Nigerian government except that Lantana was to send a representative to give a technical briefing to the Nigerian officials at Milverton’s expense.

Lantana represented that the contract between Lantana and Milverton would include provisions to the effect that neither Milverton nor any of its shareholders, directors, officers, employees or agents would perform any act in violation of the FCPA. Lantana also represented that it would obtain written certifications from each of its officers, directors and employees involved in the transaction, stating that he or she had no knowledge that Amusan, or any entity which he controls, has done or will do any act in violation of the FCPA. Lantana further represented that, if requested, it would disclose to any authorized official of the Nigerian government the price and term of the sales contract with Milverton.

Lantana also intended to pay a 10% commission to an international marketing organization that brought the opportunity to Lantana, which would be paid at the organization’s principal place of business. Lantana represented that the payment was consistent with normal business practices. Lantana further represented it would obtain written FCPA certifications from the marketing organization and the responsible officials.

The DOJ indicated that based on the facts and circumstances as represented, it did not intend to take any enforcement action with respect to proposed arrangements.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 88-01***

On May 12, 1981 the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 88-01 responding to a request from Mor-Flo Industries, Inc. and two of its subsidiaries (“Mor-Flo”), which intended to construct a facility for the production of gas and electric water heaters in Baja California, Mexico. As part of the project, Mor-Flo intended to participate in a Mexican Government program under which Mor-Flo would acquire certain deeply discounted debt instruments of the Government of Mexico or agencies thereof and exchange that debt paper with the Government of Mexico at a government-determined exchange rate. The funds received by Mor-Flo in exchange for the debt paper would then be restricted to expenditures in Mexico for plant and equipment.

Mor-Flo represented that it paid a fee to an agency of the Government of Mexico and that it would also be required to pay a fee to the financial institution serving as the Mexican Government’s financial agent in the United States. Those fees, approximately \$42,000 and \$320,000, respectively, were to be nonrefundable and paid without the assurance that Mor-Flo would be accepted into the program.

The DOJ issued no action comfort based on several representations from Mor-Flo. Mor-Flo represented that it would secure written confirmation from the financial institution that it was the duly authorized representative of the Government of Mexico and that none of the fees would be used in violation of the FCPA. Mor-Flo also represented that it would secure a written opinion of Mexican counsel that the payment of fees to the Government of Mexico and to its financial representative were not in violation of any Mexican law, rule or regulation.

***DOJ Review Procedure Release 92-01***

In February 1992, the DOJ issued Review Procedure Release 92-01 granting no action comfort in response to a request of Union Texas Pakistan, Inc. (“UTP”). UTP wished to enter into a joint venture agreement with the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources of the Government of Pakistan under which it would provide training, travel and subsistence expenses to officials and employees of the Government of Pakistan.

According to UTP, under Pakistan law, the Government of Pakistan may require petroleum exploration and production companies to provide training to government personnel to assist them in performing their duties of supervising the Pakistan petroleum industry. The joint venture agreement proposed to UTP by the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Resources contained a provision implementing this provision of law and obligating UTP to expend a minimum of \$200,000 per year for such training. UTP represented that the training would take place in Pakistan as well as at seminars, symposia and workshops in the United States and Europe. UTP proposed to pay the officials’ training expenses, including seminar fees, airfare, lodging, meals, and ground transportation. UTP also agreed that, in the event it proposed to exceed \$250,000 in annual expenditures for training outside Pakistan, it would request further review by the DOJ.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 93-01***

On April 20, 1993, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 93-01 at the request of a major commercial organization based in Texas. The requestor had entered into a joint venture partnership agreement to supply management services to a business venture owned and operated by a quasi-commercial entity owned and supervised by the government of a former Eastern Bloc country (the “Foreign Partner”).

The partnership was registered as a separate legal entity in the foreign state, and the companies proposed to select a board of directors, some representing the requestor and the others drawn from the Foreign Partner. The directors’ fees to the foreign directors would be approximately \$1,000 per month, which would approximate their regular income from the Foreign Partner.

The requestor represented that although the requestor or another entity owned by the requestor would pay the directors’ fees in the first instance, the fees ultimately would be reimbursed by the Foreign Partner either from its share of the profits or from its other funds. The requestor also represented that it would educate the foreign directors regarding the FCPA.

The DOJ indicated that based on the facts and circumstances as represented by the requestor, it did not intend to take any enforcement action with respect to directors’ fee payments described in the request.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 93-02***

On May 11, 1993, the DOJ issued Opinion Release 93-02. The Release concerned an American company which sought to enter into a sales agreement with a foreign government-owned business that held an exclusive license to manufacture, sell, purchase, import, and export all defense equipment for that country’s armed forces. The law of that country required the military to deal only through the government-owned business.

The government-owned business acted as an agent for the foreign military. However, in order to do business with the military in that country, all foreign suppliers were required to enter into written agreements with the government-owned business, under which the supplier agreed to pay to the government-owned business a commission.

Nevertheless, the company represented that it would not enter into such an agreement, but rather would pay all commissions directly to the country’s treasury or, in the alternative, the commissions would be deducted and withheld by the government customer from the purchase price. Therefore, the company would make no payments to the government-owned business or to any foreign officials. Under these circumstances, the DOJ issued no action comfort.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 94-01***

On May 13, 1994, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 94-01 in response to a request from an American company, its wholly owned subsidiary and a foreign citizen. The subsidiary manufactures clinical and hospital laboratory products. Its manufacturing operations are located on property acquired from a state-owned enterprise that, at the time of the request, was being transformed into a joint stock company.

The subsidiary desired to enter into a contract with the general director of the state-owned enterprise, a longtime resident of the area who possessed experience dealing with the local authorities and public utility service providers. The subsidiary intended to obtain direct electric power service for its plant by constructing a substation, which required the subsidiary to enter into a service agreement with the local power authority and obtain authorization from the authority to connect to its power grid. Also, in order to gain direct access to the substation, the subsidiary planned to perform minor road construction and install fences, which would require certain abutter consents and incidental governmental approvals.

The company wished to engage the individual to assist in obtaining the relevant permits and authorizations for these projects, which the company represented would be far more difficult to complete without his assistance. For the individual's consulting assistance, the subsidiary would pay him \$20,000 over twelve months.

Local counsel advised the company that, under the nation's law, the individual would not be regarded as either a government employee or a public official. Nevertheless, for the purposes of the Release, the DOJ considered him to be a "foreign official" under the FCPA.

The DOJ provided the requested no action comfort based on these circumstances and a series of representations by the foreign official.

- He would enter into the consulting agreement in his personal and private capacity and not as an officer, employee, or agent of the enterprise, or any other entity or individual. This included a representation that the consulting did not violate any rules of, or applicable to, the enterprise, and that his consultancy would not interfere with his duties as an officer and employee of the enterprise, and that he obtained approval from the enterprise.
- He would abstain from voting or taking any action in the event that any corporate actions or approvals of the state-owned enterprise were necessary for the subsidiary to seek or obtain consents, and instead he would refer all such matters to the governing body of the enterprise.
- He would not use his position as a director of the enterprise to influence any act or decision of the government on behalf of the subsidiary.
- No payments which he would receive under the consulting agreement would be used directly or indirectly to offer, pay, promise, give, or authorize payment of money or

anything of value to any governmental or public official for the purpose of influencing any act or decision of such public official in his official capacity.

- The proposed relationship was lawful under the written laws and regulations of the nation, and all applicable reporting or disclosure laws would be satisfied.
- Payment would only be for consulting services and his compensation was not dependent on the success of the subsidiary in securing direct electric power service or the incidental access approvals. Also, he represented that he had no right to any future relationship with the subsidiary beyond that set forth in the consulting agreement.
- He would not appear on behalf of the subsidiary before any agency of the local government, and any communication to him concerning the approvals from representatives of any local governmental agency would be referred for response to the subsidiary.
- He would serve as an independent contractor for the subsidiary without authority to legally bind the subsidiary.
- If he violated these representations or breached the consulting agreement in any manner, the agreement would automatically be rendered void *ab initio* and he would surrender any claim for payment under the consulting agreement, even for services previously performed.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 95-01***

On January 11, 1995, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 95-01 granting no action comfort in response to a request submitted by a U.S. energy company with prospective operations in a South Asian country. The requestor planned to acquire and operate a plant in a region of the foreign country that lacked modern medical facilities. A modern medical complex, with a budget in excess of one hundred million dollars, was then under construction and the requestor proposed donating \$10 million to the project for construction and equipment costs. The requestor represented that this donation would be made through a charitable organization incorporated in the United States and through a public limited liability corporation located in the South Asian country.

The requestor represented that prior to releasing any funds it would require all officers of the charitable organization and the foreign limited liability corporation to certify that none of the funds would be used in violation of the FCPA, and that none of the persons employed by either organization were affiliated with the foreign government. In addition, the requestor represented that it would require audited financial reports from the charitable organization, “accurately detailing the disposition of the donated funds.”

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***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 95-02***

On September 14, 1995, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 95-02 in response to a joint request from two companies (“Company A” and “Company B”). Company A had acquired offset obligations through contracts with the government of a foreign country. Offset obligations were handled by an Offset office that is part of the foreign country’s Ministry of Defense. Company B was owned by a U.S. citizen who established a program in the foreign country to generate offset credits for sale. In October 1993, Company B received an oral agreement from the Offset office’s chairman that Company B would receive millions of dollars in offset credits in exchange for the establishment of a new company (“Newco”) in that country. Company A then intended to purchase offset credits from Company B generated by the development of Newco.

A majority of the investors in Newco were to be foreign government officials. However, no official of the Ministry of Defense would be an investor, nor would the investors be in positions to grant or deny offset credits. Under the arrangement, Company B would receive offset credits from Newco by meeting certain program milestones. Company B represented that the milestones triggering the credits would not be tied to Newco’s profitability and that Company B and the chairman of the Offset office would negotiate a written agreement stating that the offset credits will not be contingent upon the success of Newco.

Company A would not be an investor in Newco, but, under a management services agreement, Company A would provide a general manager and would subcontract out the remaining services necessary to operate Newco to a third company (“Company C”). Company B would provide financing to Newco for its operations. Company A would be paid a fee equal to a percentage of Newco’s gross revenues and a percent of Newco’s profits. Out of this fee, Company A would compensate Company C and Company B for their services and Company B’s loan to Newco. None of the companies would have an equity interest in Newco.

Companies A and B certified to the DOJ that neither company had made or would make any improper payments in violation of the FCPA in connection with the organization or operation of the proposed Newco, nor any payments to government officials in connection with the proposed transactions. The companies further warranted that Company B had not paid and would not pay any funds from Company A for the sale of the offset credits to any investors in Newco or to any government officials.

The shareholders of Newco — some of who were foreign government officials — also provided certifications to the DOJ. These certifications contained seven representations.

- The shareholders would not take any actions that would result in a violation of the FCPA by Company A and Company B; use payments received by Newco in a manner that would violate the FCPA; use Newco’s funds or assets to take any action that would violate the FCPA; request that any of the parties to this opinion request or any local official perform any service or action that would violate the FCPA.

- The shareholders would be passive investors in Newco and would exercise no management control in Newco while holding a government office.
- The shareholders would recuse themselves from any government decision with respect to any matter affecting Newco or Company A; although a shareholder may hold a foreign government position, his official duties do not include responsibility for deciding or overseeing the award of business by that government to the parties to this request, and he will not seek to influence other foreign government officials whose duties include such responsibilities.
- The shareholders would notify Company A of any third-party assignment of rights, and if such assignment would violate the FCPA, permit Company A to withdraw as a management contractor without penalty.
- The shareholders would not take any action to oppose Newco manager's power to ensure compliance by Newco with the FCPA.
- If the nature of political positions or responsibilities of any shareholder changed so that the representations in the preceding paragraphs would not be correct if applied to such new positions or responsibilities, he would promptly notify Company A in writing. If, after consultation by Companies A and B and Newco shareholders, any such concerns cannot be resolved to the satisfaction of the DOJ, then the parties would be entitled to withdraw from or terminate Newco.
- An opinion of local counsel would be obtained to the effect that Newco and its proposed activities, including those of the shareholders, are lawful under local laws; that Newco would not be established without such an opinion; and that the opinion, when obtained, would be given to the DOJ.

The shareholders also agreed to the following additional steps to address any potential FCPA-related concerns.

- Newco's Supervisory Board would meet periodically and report on its activities and compliance with the FCPA. The board would cause a record of the meeting to be prepared and distributed to the parties to the opinion request.
- The board would keep accurate expense, correspondence, and other records, including minutes of its meetings; the board will make financial records available to the auditors for Company A whenever requested.
- All payments by Newco to the shareholders in connection with Newco would be made solely by check or bank transfer, and no payments would be made in cash or bearer instruments. No payments in connection with Newco owed to a shareholder would be made to a third party.

- Any third parties retained by Newco to professional services would be retained only with the express written permission of Newco's general manager and would be required to sign an FCPA compliance representation as part of the consultancy or retainer agreement.

Based on these circumstances and representations, DOJ issue no action comfort.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 95-03***

Also on September 14, 2005, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 95-03. The Release concerned an American company that wished to enter into a joint venture in a foreign country with an entity that was the family investment firm of a foreign official. The foreign official was a prominent businessperson in the country and held public and political offices. In addition, the foreign official was a relative of the leader of the foreign country.

The foreign official's responsibilities in the Joint Venture would include making contacts within the foreign country, developing new business, and providing investment advice and consulting services. The foreign official was to receive payments annually for services to the Joint Venture as well as a percentage of the profits received as a result of government projects awarded to the Joint Venture.

The foreign official and the official's relatives involved in the Joint Venture signed the FCPA Opinion Request and represented to the DOJ that they would comply with the FCPA as if they were subject to it. In addition, the American company and the foreign official and relatives made eight representations to the DOJ:

- Each of the requestors was familiar with and in compliance with the FCPA and laws of the foreign country and each would remain in compliance for the duration of the Joint Venture.
- None of the payments received from the American company would be used for any purpose that would violate the FCPA or the laws of the foreign country; and no action would be taken in the interest of the Joint Venture that would violate the FCPA or the laws of the foreign country.
- The foreign official's government duties did not involve making decisions in connection with the government projects sought by the Joint Venture or involve appointing, promoting or compensating any other officials who were involved in deciding which companies would receive such projects.
- If the government official's office or responsibilities changed so that the official's representations in the request no longer applied, the official would notify the other requestors so that appropriate action could be taken.
- The foreign official would not initiate any meetings with government officials and any meeting between a government official and a member of the Joint Venture would be attended by at least two representatives of the Joint Venture.

- For each meeting between a government official and the foreign official on behalf of the Joint Venture, the foreign official would provide a letter to the Minister and the most senior civil servant of the relevant government department stating that the official was acting solely as a participant in the Joint Venture.
- No member of the Joint Venture would assign its rights under the Joint Venture to a third party without the approval of the other Joint Venture members.
- Special procedures would be in place with respect to the operation of the Joint Venture, including “the keeping of accurate expense, correspondence, and other records of the business of the Joint Venture” and special requirements that all payments by the Joint Venture would be by check or bank transfer and no payments would be made in cash. In addition, all payments owed to a Joint Venture member would be made directly to that member and all payments to foreign parties would be made in the foreign country.

Based on these representations, the DOJ issued no action comfort.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 96-01***

On November 25, 1996, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 96-01 granting no action comfort in response to a request submitted by a nonprofit corporation established to protect a particular world region from the dangers posed by environmental accidents. The requestor proposed sponsoring a series of training courses in the United States and paying certain expenses for up to ten foreign government “representatives” to attend these courses. The requestor represented that it did not seek to obtain or retain business with the regional governments.

According to the Release, the requestor proposed paying — or arranging for a “leading non-governmental organization” to pay — for certain travel, lodging, and meal expenses for the government representatives. The expenses would include: (i) round-trip airfare to a U.S. city; (ii) transportation by van to and from the airport; (iii) hotel accommodations; and (iv) lunch. The requestor represented that all other expenses, “including meals other than lunch, taxis, phone calls, etc.,” would not be covered by the sponsorship. The estimated cost of this sponsorship was \$10,000 to \$15,000 per year.

The requestor represented that the sponsorship recipients would be paid in part by the foreign governments and in part by the nonprofit. First, the requestor would invite nominations for sponsorship from particular foreign governments. Second, the requestor would select nominees based on the certain criteria, including: financial need; a demonstrated interest in enhancing government/industry coordination; the position of the nominee and the nominee’s ability to convey information to appropriate agencies within his or her government; and the completion of a particular survey.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 96-02***

On November 25, 1996, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 96-02 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. company, a wholly owned subsidiary of another U.S. company. The requestor was engaged in the manufacture and sale of equipment used in commercial and military aircraft. The requestor proposed modifying and renewing an existing marketing representative agreement (“Agreement”) with a state-owned enterprise of a foreign country (“Representative”).

The DOJ granted the requested no-action comfort based on various representations. According to the Release, the requestor represented that it had not conducted any business with the Representative pursuant to the existing agreement. The requestor further represented that, under the modified agreement, the Representative would: (i) serve as the requestor’s exclusive sales representative in the foreign country, (ii) identify ultimate purchasers, who would then receive parts and services directly from the requestor, and (iii) be compensated a commission based on a percentage of net sales. The requestor represented that the commission rate established by the Agreement was commensurate with rates paid by the requestor to other marketing representatives around the world. In addition, both parties represented that the Representative was not in a position to influence the procurement decisions of the requestor’s potential customers, because the Representative and the potential customers were under the control of separate regulatory entities of the foreign government.

The requestor represented that the Agreement would include a number of warranties by the Representative as well as certain terms and conditions related to the FCPA. First, all commission payments would be made to a designated bank account held in the name of the Representative. Second, the Representative would warrant that: (i) it was under different regulatory control than requestor’s potential customers; (ii) it had no governmental connection to any ultimate customer of requestor; (iii) it had been designated by its government as a “preferred representative” for foreign companies; (iv) it had the authority to act as a marketing representative for foreign companies; (v) it was not in the position to and would not improperly influence any sales transactions of the requestor. Third, the Representative would additionally warrant to its familiarity and compliance with local laws and with the “Code of Ethics and Standards of Conduct” of the requestor’s parent company, as well as its familiarity and compliance in all respects with the FCPA. Fourth, the requestor could terminate the Agreement at any time, and without prior notice, if the Representative failed to comply with any of its warranties.

In addition, the requestor represented that the Agreement would include a certification by the Representative, to be filed with the DOJ, wherein the Representative would promise not to violate the FCPA and immediately to notify the requestor if future developments made its certifications inaccurate or incomplete.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 97-01***

On February 27, 1997, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 97-01 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. company with a wholly owned subsidiary that was submitting a bid

to sell and service high-technology equipment to a foreign government-owned entity. In connection with the bid, the requestor entered into an agreement (the “Representative Agreement”) with a privately held company (the “Representative”) in that same foreign country. An unsubstantiated allegation of a past unlawful payment by Representative led the requestor to seek DOJ guidance.

According to the Release, the requestor represented that the Representative was a privately held company and that none of the owners, officers, or employees of the company was a government official. The requestor initially selected the Representative after interviewing several other prospective companies and determining that the Representative had the most experience and expertise with projects involving similar technology. The requestor also represented that the commission rate payable to the Representative was commensurate with the rates it paid for similar services in comparable sales. The requestor further obtained an opinion from local counsel in the foreign country that the Representative Agreement complied with local law.

The requestor represented that it had conducted a due diligence investigation of the Representative and that this investigation did not uncover improper conduct. However, subsequent to the requestor’s initial due diligence investigation, the requestor learned of an allegation that the Representative had been involved in an improper payment more than fifteen years ago. The requestor undertook a second due diligence investigation in response to this allegation, including hiring an international investigative firm, interviewing principals of the Representative, the Commercial Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in the foreign country, and other persons with extensive commercial and other experience in the country. The second investigation did not uncover evidence substantiating the allegation, but did reveal that a number of persons might have been motivated, for political reasons, to disparage the Representative or its associated person.

The Representative warranted to its familiarity and compliance with the FCPA and indicated that the Representative would execute a certificate, a copy of which would be filed with the DOJ, stating that: (i) it had not made any improper payments in violation of the FCPA; (ii) it would not make any such improper payments in connection with its agreement with requestor’s subsidiary; and (iii) it would notify requestor’s subsidiary immediately if subsequent developments caused any of its representations to no longer be accurate or complete.

The DOJ granted the requestor the no-action comfort sought, but advised the requestor to closely monitor the performance of the Representative “in light of the unsubstantiated allegations.”

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 97-02***

On November 5, 1997, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 97-02 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. utility company with operations in an Asian country. The requestor had commenced construction of a plant in a region with inadequate primary-level educational facilities. An elementary school construction project had been proposed and the requestor was considering donating \$100,000 directly to the government entity responsible for the project.

This donation amount was less than the proposed budget of the project. The requestor represented that, prior to releasing any funds, it would require a written agreement from the government entity setting forth promises to fulfill a number of conditions, including that the funds be used solely to construct and supply the school.

Granting the requested no-action comfort, the DOJ noted that because the requestor's donation would be made directly to a government entity and not to any foreign official, the provisions of the FCPA did not appear to apply to the prospective transaction.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 98-01***

On February 23, 1998, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 98-01 in response to a request submitted by a U.S.-based industrial and service company with operations in Nigeria. According to the Release, Nigerian authorities had held the requestor liable for environmental contamination at a site formerly leased by a subsidiary of the requestor, assessing a \$50,000 fine. To remove the contamination and resolve this liability, the requestor retained a Nigerian contractor that had been recommended by officials of the Nigerian Environmental Protection Agency.

According to the Release, when the requestor solicited a proposal for the project from the contractor, one of the contractor's representatives orally advised the requestor's representatives that (i) the \$50,000 fine would need to be paid through the contractor, and (ii) the contractor's fee would include \$30,000 in "community compensation and modalities for officials of the Nigerian FEPA and the Nigerian Ports Authority." "Reasonably" concluding that all or a portion of the "fine" and "modalities" would be paid to Nigerian government officials, the requestor sought DOJ guidance.

The DOJ informed the requestor that it would indeed take enforcement action if the requestor were to proceed with the requested payments. The DOJ, however, would "reconsider" its position if: (i) the requestor paid the fine directly to an official account of the appropriate government agency; (ii) the contractor were to reduce its fee by the amount included for "modalities"; and (iii) the requestor made arrangements to pay the contractor's fee to the Government of Nigeria, who would in turn pay the contractor provided that it was satisfied with the results of the cleanup.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 98-02***

On August 5, 1998, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 98-02 granting no action comfort in response to a request submitted by a U.S. company with a wholly owned subsidiary operating in a foreign country. In connection with a bid by the subsidiary to sell a military training program to a government-owned entity, the requestor planned to establish a relationship with, and secure the services of, a privately held company in that same foreign country (the "Representative"). The requestor sought DOJ's guidance regarding several agreements it intended to make with the Representative and the intended payments to the Representative for past and future services.

According to the Release, the requestor had previously acquired an entity that had an International Representation Agreement with the Representative for certain marketing and consulting services. Subsequently, the requestor determined that the Agreement (for unspecified reasons) was invalid under local law, terminated the agreement, and offered the Representative a lump-sum payment for past services pursuant to a proposed Settlement Agreement. Still desiring to partner with the Representative, requestor proposed two new agreements with the Representative: an International Consultant Agreement and a Teaming Agreement. The requestor's obligations under all three of these proposed agreements were conditioned on a favorable response from DOJ under the FCPA Opinion Procedure.

In relation to the Settlement Agreement, the requestor represented that the amount to be paid to the Representative for past services had been reviewed — and determined “commercially reasonable under the circumstances” — by an independent accounting firm. In addition, the requestor represented that: (i) the Representative was familiar — and in full compliance — with relevant U.S. laws and regulations, including the FCPA; and (ii) the Representative had not made any unlawful payments.

In relation to the International Consultant Agreement, requestor represented that it would pay the Representative a monthly retainer, with reimbursements for extraordinary expenses. In relation to the International Consultant Agreement and the Teaming Agreement, the requestor represented that: (i) the Representative was familiar with relevant U.S. laws and regulations, including the FCPA; (ii) the Representative warranted that no government official had an interest in Representative; and (iii) none of Representative's officers, employees, principals or agents were also government officials.

In addition, the requestor represented that it had conducted a due diligence investigation of the Representative, including interviews with principals of the Representative and consultation with officials of the U.S. Embassy regarding the Representative and its principals, which revealed no improper conduct. The requestor also obtained an opinion from counsel in the foreign country, which stated that the Agreements complied with local law.

Finally, the Representative executed a certification (and agreed to the filing of a duplicate certification with the DOJ), which stated: (a) neither the owner, any director, officer, employee or agent of Representative was a government official; (b) no government official had any legal or beneficial interest in Representative, and no portion of the fees paid to Representative would be paid to any government official; and (c) the Representative would immediately advise the requestor if subsequent developments caused its certification to be incomplete.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 00-01***

On March 29, 2000, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 00-01 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. law firm and a foreign partner of the firm (“Foreign Partner”). The Foreign Partner had recently been appointed to a high-ranking position in the government of a foreign country and had taken a leave of absence from the firm in order to accept the appointment. The requestor proposed making certain payments and providing certain benefits to the Foreign Partner while he served as a foreign public official: (i) continued access to the firm's

group rate for health, accidental, life and dependent insurance; (ii) a one-time payment of prospective “client credit” calculated to approximate the payments to which the Foreign Partner would otherwise be entitled as a partner for the following four years (discounted to present value); (iii) continued payments of interest on the Foreign Partner’s partnership contribution; and (iv) a guarantee of return to full partnership when the Foreign Partner left office.

According to the Release, the requestor represented that it had obtained a legal opinion of foreign counsel that stated the proposed payments would not violate local law. The requestor further represented that, at the time of the Request, it did not represent or advise the foreign government nor did it represent any client in a matter involving the foreign government. Acknowledging an inability to predict future business, however, and seeking to avoid the possibility that the benefits could be construed as intended to influence the Foreign Partner in the exercise of his official duties, the requestor filed a declaration in which it agreed to: (i) not represent any clients before the Foreign Partner’s ministry; (ii) maintain a list of all clients previously represented by the Foreign Partner or to which he would be entitled a client credit; and (iii) not represent or advise such clients in any matter involving doing business with or lobbying the foreign government. Finally, the requestor undertook to inform the Foreign Partner whenever he should recuse himself in a matter involving the requestor or a client.

The Foreign Partner also filed a declaration in which he agreed to recuse himself and to refrain from participating in any decisions by the foreign government related to: (i) the retention of the requestor to advise or represent the foreign government; (ii) any government business with any of the requestor’s current or former clients; (iii) any government business with any client Foreign Partner had previously represented or to which he would be entitled a client credit; and (iv) any matter in which the requestor or a client had lobbied the foreign government.

In granting no action comfort, the Release notes that, although foreign officials, such as Foreign Partner, are not ordinarily covered by the FCPA and cannot be the recipient of an Opinion Procedure Release, here the Foreign Partner was also a director of a U.S. law firm and therefore qualified as a “domestic concern.”

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 01-01***

On May 24, 2001, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 01-01 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. company, which planned to enter into a joint venture with a French company. Each company planned to own fifty-percent of the joint venture and share in the profits and losses of the venture equally. Both companies planned to contribute certain pre-existing contracts and transactions to the joint venture, including contracts procured by the French company prior to January 1, 2000, the effective date of the French Law No. 2000-595 Against Corrupt Practices (“FLAC”). The requestor sought DOJ comfort regarding whether it could be held liable if it later became apparent that one or more of the contracts contributed by the French company had been obtained or maintained through bribery.

According to the Release, the requestor represented that it had taken a number of precautions to avoid violations of the FCPA. First, the French company had represented that none of the contracts it planned to contribute had been procured in violation of applicable anti-

bribery or other laws. Second, the joint venture agreement permitted the requestor to terminate the joint venture if: (i) the French company was convicted of violating the FLAC; (ii) the French company entered into a settlement with an admission of liability under the FLAC; or (iii) the requestor learned of evidence that the French company violated anti-bribery laws and that violation, even without a conviction or settlement, had a “material adverse effect” upon the joint venture. Third, the French company terminated all agent agreements that were related to contracts the company planned to contribute and which were effective prior to January 1, 2000. All payment obligations to these agents had been liquidated by the French company such that neither the requestor nor the joint venture would make any payments in relation to such agreements. Fourth, although the French company would retain some payment obligations to agents whose agreements came into effect after January 1, 2000 for work done on contracts the company planned to contribute to the joint venture, none of these obligations would be contributed to or retained by the joint venture. Accordingly, neither the requestor nor the joint venture would make any payments in relation to such agreements. Fifth, the joint venture would enter into new agent agreements in accordance with a “rigorous compliance program designed to avoid corrupt business practices.”

The DOJ’s response indicated that it had no intention to take any enforcement action “absent any knowing act in the future on the part of requestor in furtherance of a prior act of bribery (or the offer or promise to pay a bribe, or authorization thereof) on the part of, or on behalf, the French company concerning the contracts contributed by the French company.”

In addition, the DOJ subjected its opinion to “several important caveats.” First, the opinion relied on a particular interpretation of the French company’s representation that the contracts it planned to contribute had not been procured in violation of applicable anti-bribery and other laws. The DOJ interpreted the representation to mean that the contracts had been obtained “without violation of either French law *or* the anti-bribery laws of *all* of the jurisdictions of the various government officials with the ability to have influenced the decisions of their government to enter into the contracts” (emphasis added). If, however, the representation had been limited to violation of then-applicable French law, the DOJ warned the requestor that it could face liability under the FCPA “if it or the joint venture knowingly [took or takes] any act in furtherance of a payment to a foreign official with respect to previously existing contracts irrespective of whether the agreement to make such payments was lawful under French law when the contract was entered into.” Second, the DOJ expressed concern regarding, and specifically declined to endorse, the “materially adverse effect” standard for terminating the joint venture agreement. Believing the standard could be “unduly restrictive,” the DOJ warned that the requestor could face liability if its inability to extricate itself from the joint venture resulted in the requestor taking acts in furtherance of original acts of bribery by the French company. Third, the DOJ indicated the opinion should not be deemed an endorsement of any specific aspect of the joint venture’s compliance program’s restrictions on the future hiring of agents. Fourth, the opinion did not speak to prospective conduct by the requestor following the commencement of the joint venture.

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***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 01-02***

On July 18, 2001, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 01-02 in response to a joint request, submitted on April 13, 2001, by a foreign diversified trading, manufacturing, contracting, service and investment organization and an American company (the “requestors”). The requestors indicated that they planned to form a Consortium (with the American company doing so through an offshore company in which it held a 50% beneficial interest) to bid on and engage in a business relationship with the foreign company’s host government. The requestors sought the DOJ’s guidance due to the fact that the chairman and shareholder of the foreign company acted as an advisor to the country’s senior government officials and also served as a senior public education official in the foreign country.

In providing no-action relief, the DOJ highlighted a number of representations made by the American company, the foreign company and the foreign company chairman that sought to allay concerns over the chairman potentially influencing government decisions that could affect the Consortium. Specifically, the requestors represented that the foreign company’s chairman did not have oversight or influence over the prospective contract by virtue of his positions (as advisor or public education official), nor did his duties involve him acting in any official capacity concerning the award of the project. The requestors provided the DOJ with a legal opinion of local counsel indicating that the relevant tender had not been issued by ministries or agencies under the chairman’s control, and that the Consortium’s formation and planned activities did not violate the laws of the foreign country.

In addition, the requestors represented that the chairman would not initiate or attend any meetings with government officials on behalf of the Consortium, as doing so would violate the laws of the foreign country. The chairman would also recuse himself from any discussion, consideration, or decision regarding the project that might be construed as promoting the activities or business of the Consortium. The requestors further represented that all its bid submissions had and would disclose the chairman’s relationship with the Consortium as well as his recusal from related matters.

Finally, the requestors represented that the Consortium agreement would require each member to agree not to violate the FCPA as well as explicitly acknowledge each member’s understanding of the FCPA’s applicability to the project bid. Any failure to comply with the provision would provide the non-breaching member a right to terminate the agreement.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 01-03***

On December 11, 2001, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 01-03 granting no action comfort in response to a request submitted by a U.S. company with a wholly owned subsidiary operating in a foreign country. Requestor’s subsidiary, with the help of a foreign dealer (“Foreign Dealer”), had submitted a bid to a foreign government for the sale of equipment. At the time of the bid’s submission, the relationship between the requestor and the Foreign Dealer had been governed by an agreement (“Original Dealer Agreement”).

Following the bid's submission, Foreign Dealer's president and principal owner made comments that one of the requestor's representatives understood as suggesting that payments had been, or would be, made to government officials to ensure acceptance of the bid. The Original Dealer Agreement subsequently expired, and the requestor sought to enter into a new agreement with the Foreign Dealer ("Proposed Dealer Agreement") should the bid be accepted.

According to the Release, the requestor made the following representations in regard to the comments made by the Foreign Dealer's owner. First, the requestor, through its counsel, had conducted an investigation and did not find any information substantiating the allegation. Second, the Foreign Dealer's owner represented to the requestor that no unlawful payments had been made or promised. The Foreign Dealer's owner made the same representation to the DOJ directly. Third, the requestor would timely notify the DOJ if it became aware of any information substantiating the allegations regarding unlawful payments.

The requestor also made the following representations in regard to the Proposed Dealer Agreement. First, the Foreign Dealer would certify that no unlawful payments were made or would be made to government officials. Second, the requestor would have the right to terminate the agreement if such payments are made. Third, the requestor would have the right to conduct an annual audit of the books and records of the Foreign Dealer and the requestor planned to fully exercise this right.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 03-01***

On January 15, 2003, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 03-01 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. issuer concerning its planned acquisition of a U.S. company ("Company A"), which had both U.S. and foreign subsidiaries. According to the Release, requestor's pre-acquisition due diligence revealed payments authorized or made by officers, including United States officers, of one of Company A's foreign subsidiaries to employees of foreign state-owned entities in order to obtain or retain business. The requestor notified Company A of its findings and both companies commenced parallel investigations of Company A's operations worldwide. The companies then disclosed the results of their investigations to the DOJ and the SEC. The requestor desired to proceed with the acquisition, but was "concerned that by acquiring Company A it is also acquiring potential criminal and civil liability under the FCPA for the past acts of Company A's employees."

According to the Release, Company A took certain remedial actions, with requestor's encouragement and approval, after discovering the unlawful payments, including (i) making appropriate disclosures to the investing public; (ii) issuing instructions to each of its foreign subsidiaries to cease all payments to foreign officials; and (iii) suspending the most senior officers and employees implicated pending the conclusion of the investigation.

In addition, the requestor promised to take the following actions once the transaction closed. First, the requestor would continue to cooperate with the DOJ and SEC in their respective investigations of past payments and would similarly cooperate with foreign law enforcement authorities. Second, the requestor would ensure that any employees or officers of Company A that had made or authorized unlawful payments would be appropriately disciplined.

Third, the requestor would disclose to the DOJ any additional pre-acquisition payments to foreign officials discovered following the acquisition. Fourth, the requestor would extend its existing anti-corruption compliance program to Company A, and modify its program, if necessary, to detect and deter violations of relevant anti-bribery laws. Fifth, the requestor would ensure that Company A implemented a system of internal controls as well as make and keep accurate books and records.

The DOJ granted the requestor no-action relief, but cautioned that the relief did not apply to the individuals involved in making or authorizing payments nor would it apply to any unlawful payments occurring after the acquisition.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 04-01***

On January 6, 2004, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 04-01 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. law firm that proposed to sponsor a one-and-a-half day seminar in Beijing, China, along with a ministry of the People's Republic of China (the "Ministry"). The stated purpose of the seminar was to educate legal and human resources professionals of both countries about labor and employment laws in China and the United States and "to facilitate understanding, compliance, and development of the laws of both jurisdictions."

The requestor represented that it had no business before the foreign government entities that might send officials to the seminar, nor was it aware of any pending or anticipated business between clients (presumably of the requestor) who would be invited and government officials who would attend. The requestor further indicated that the Chinese Ministry, and not requestor, would select which officials attended the seminar.

The requestor proposed paying for the following costs of the seminar: conference rooms, interpreter services, translation and printing costs of seminar materials, receptions and meals during the seminar, transportation to the seminar for Chinese government officials who did not live in Beijing, and hotel accommodations for Chinese government officials. The requestor indicated that all payments would be made directly to the service providers and any reimbursed expenses would require a receipt. The requestor also represented that it would not advance funds, pay reimbursements in cash, or provide free gifts or "tokens" to the attendees. Additionally, the requestor would not compensate the Ministry or any other Chinese government official for their participation in the seminar. In support of its submission, the requestor obtained written assurance from a Deputy Director in the Ministry's Department of Legal Affairs (and provided such assurance to the DOJ) that its proposed seminar and payments would not violate the laws of China.

The DOJ provided no-action relief to the requestor based on the facts and circumstances as described in the Release.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 04-02***

On July 12, 2004, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 04-02, which provided no-action comfort (subject to certain caveats described below) in connection with the purchase by an

investment group consisting of, “among others, JPMorgan Partners Global Fund, Candover 2001 Fund, 3i Investments plc, and investment vehicles [‘Newcos’]” (collectively, “requestors”) of certain companies and assets from ABB Ltd. (“ABB”) relating to ABB’s upstream oil, gas and petrochemical business (“OGP Upstream Business”).

On July 6, 2004, six days prior to the Opinion Procedure Release, the DOJ had announced guilty pleas for violations of the FCPA by two of the entities being acquired by the requestors, ABB Vetco Gray, Inc. and ABB Vetco Gray (U.K.) Ltd. On the same date, the SEC filed a settled enforcement against ABB, charging it with violating the anti-bribery, books and records, and internal controls provisions of the FCPA related to transactions involving business in several foreign countries, including Nigeria.

Previously, after executing a Preliminary Agreement on October 16, 2003, the requestors and ABB agreed to conduct an extensive FCPA compliance review — through separately engaged counsel and forensic auditors — of the acquired businesses for the prior five-year period. The Release details a voluminous review, involving more than 115 lawyers manually reviewing over 1,600 boxes of printed emails, CD-ROMS, and hard drives of electronic records (all amounting to more than 4 million pages) as well conducting over 165 interviews of current employees, former employees, and agents. In addition, the forensic auditors visited 21 countries and assigned more than 100 staff members to review thousands of transactions. The requestors’ counsel produced 22 analytical reports with supporting documents of the acquired businesses, which were provided to the DOJ and SEC along with witness memoranda as they were produced.

The requestors represented that they would undertake a number of precautions to avoid future knowing violations of the FCPA. First, requestors would continue to cooperate with the DOJ and SEC in their respective investigations of the past payments. Second, requestors would ensure that any employee or officer found to have made or authorized unlawful or questionable payments and still employed by Newco would be “appropriately disciplined.” Third, requestors would disclose to the DOJ any additional pre-acquisition unlawful payments that they discovered after the acquisition. Fourth, requestors would ensure that Newco adopted a proper system of internal accounting controls and a system designed to ensure that their books and records were accurate. Fifth, requestors would cause Newco to adopt a “rigorous” anti-corruption compliance code (“Compliance Code”) designed to detect and deter violations of the FCPA.

The Release details the various elements of Newco’s Compliance Code, which would include, among other things: (i) a clearly articulated corporate policy against violations of the FCPA and foreign anti-bribery laws and the establishment of compliance standards and procedures aimed at reducing the likelihood of future offenses to be followed by all directors, officers, employees and “all business partners” (defined as including “agents, consultants, representatives, joint venture partners and teaming partners, involved in business transactions, representation, or business development or retention in a foreign jurisdiction”); (ii) the assignment of one or more independent senior corporate officials, who would report directly to the Compliance Committee of the Audit Committee of the Board, responsible for implementing compliance with those policies, standards, and procedures; (iii) effective communication of the policies to all shareholders, employees, directors, officers, agents and business partners that

included the requirement of regular training regarding the FCPA and other applicable anti-corruption laws and annual certifications by those parties certifying compliance therewith; (iv) a reporting system, including a “Helpline,” for all parties to report suspected violations of the Compliance Code; and (v) appropriate disciplinary procedures to address violations or suspected violations of the FCPA, foreign anti-corruption laws, or the Compliance Code; (vi) procedures designed to assure that Newco takes appropriate precautions to ensure its business partners are “reputable and qualified;” (vii) extensive pre-retention due diligence requirements and post-retention oversight of all agents and business partners; (viii) procedures designed to assure that substantial discretionary authority is not delegated to individuals that Newco knows, or should know through the exercise of due diligence, have a propensity to engage in improper activities; (ix) a committee to review and record actions related to the retention of agents and sub-agents, and contracts with or payments to such agents or sub-agents; (x) the inclusion of provisions in all agreements with agents and business partners (a) setting forth anti-corruption representations and undertakings, (b) relating to compliance with foreign anti-corruption laws, (c) allowing for independent audits of books and records to ensure compliance with such, and (d) providing for termination as a result of any corrupt activity; (xi) financial and accounting procedures designed to ensure that Newco maintains a system of internal accounting controls as well as accurate books and records; and (xii) independent audits by outside counsel and auditors at least every three years.

The DOJ provided no-action relief to requestors and their recently acquired businesses, for violations of the FCPA committed *prior* to their acquisition from ABB. The Release was subject to two caveats, however. First, although the DOJ viewed requestors’ compliance program as including “significant precautions,” it cautioned that the Release should not be deemed to endorse any specific aspect of requestors’ program. Second, the DOJ cautioned that the Release did not speak to any future conduct by requestors or its recently acquired businesses.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 04-03***

On June 14, 2004, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 04-03 in response to a request by a U.S. law firm that proposed paying certain expenses for a visit to three cities within the United States by twelve officials of a ministry of the People’s Republic of China (“Ministry”). The purpose for the ten-day, three-city visit was to provide the officials with opportunities to meet with U.S. public-sector officials and discuss various labor and employment laws, institutions, and resolution procedures in the United States. In connection with the proposal, the requestor represented that it had secured commitments from various relevant federal and state agencies, courts and academic institutions to meet with the officials.

The DOJ issued no action comfort based on the requestor’s representations that it had no business before the foreign government entities that would send officials on the visit and that the officials would be selected solely by the Ministry; it would host only officials working for the Ministry or related government agencies (and interpreters), and would not pay expenses for spouses, family or other guests of the officials; it would pay for the travel, lodging, meals and insurance for the twelve officials and one translator; all payments would be made directly to the providers and no funds would be paid directly to the Ministry or other government officials;

apart from events directly connected to the meetings, requestor would not fund, organize, or host any entertainment or leisure activities, nor would requestor provide the officials with any stipend or spending money; and the requestor had obtained written assurance from a Deputy Director in the Ministry's Department of Legal Affairs that its proposed payments would not violate Chinese law.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 04-04***

On September 3, 2004, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 04-04, which provided no-action relief to a U.S. company operating in the mutual insurance industry. The requestor proposed funding a "Study Tour" to the United States for five foreign officials who were members of a committee drafting a new law on mutual insurance for the foreign country to help the officials "develop a practical understanding of how mutual insurance companies are managed and regulated" and "to help the Committee further understand the differences (if any) in the organization, daily operation, capitalization, regulations, demutualization, and management of mutual insurance companies versus stock insurance companies (life and non-life)." The requestor indicated that the Tour would include visits to requestor's offices, as well as meetings with state insurance regulators, insurance groups, and other insurance companies.

According to the Release, the requestor represented that it did not have, nor did it intend to organize, a mutual insurance company in the foreign country. As such, the law to be drafted by the Committee would not apply to requestor regardless of its terms. In addition, the requestor represented that it did not write any insurance in the foreign country nor did it have any business there or with the foreign government except for certain reinsurance contracts purchased in the global market and a "Representative Office." However, the requestor acknowledged that it intended to apply for a non-life insurance license at some point and that, under current practice, an applicant for such a license needed to "demonstrate that it has been supportive of the country's socio-economic needs, proactive in the development of the insurance industry, and active in promoting foreign investment." According to the Release, the requestor's proposed Study Tour intended to help satisfy those criteria.

The requestor represented that the Study Tour would last for approximately nine days and that the officials would be selected solely by the foreign government. The requestor proposed paying for the foreign officials' economy airfare, hotels, local transportation, a \$35 *per diem*, and occasional additional meals and tourist activities. The requestor estimated the Tour would cost approximately \$16,875. All payments would be made directly to the service providers and reimbursed expenses would require a receipt. Further, the requestor would not provide any gifts or tokens to the officials. Apart from these expenses, requestor would not compensate the foreign government or the officials for their participation in the visit.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 06-01***

On October 16, 2006, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 06-01 in response to a request submitted by a Delaware corporation with headquarters in Switzerland. The requestor proposed contributing \$25,000 to either a regional Customs department or the Ministry of Finance (collectively, the "Counterparty") of an African country as part of a pilot project to

improve local enforcement relating to seizure of counterfeit products bearing the trademarks of requestor and its competitors. The requestor believed that such a program was necessary because of the African country's reputation as a major point of transit for such counterfeit goods and because of the local customs officials' compensation included a small percentage of any transit tax they collected, giving them a disincentive to conduct thorough inspections for counterfeit goods.

The requestor represented that in connection with its contribution, it would execute a formal memorandum of understanding with the Counterparty to (i) encourage the exchange of information relating to the trade of counterfeit products; (ii) establish procedures for the payment of awards to local Customs officials who detain, seize and destroy counterfeit products; (iii) establish eligibility criteria for the calculation and distribution of awards; and (iv) provide that the awards be given to those Customs officials directly by the Counterparty or given to local customs offices to distribute to award candidates.

The requestor further represented that it would establish "a number of procedural safeguards designed to assure that the funds made available by the [requestor's] contribution were, in fact, going to provide incentives to local customs officials for the purposes intended." The Release identified five such procedural safeguards. First, the requestor would make its payment via electronic transfer to an official government account and require written confirmation of the validity of the account. Second, requestor would be notified upon seizure of suspected counterfeit goods and would confirm the counterfeit nature of those goods. In addition, payments to local Customs officials would not be distributed unless destruction of the goods had been confirmed. Third, the Counterparty would have sole control over, and full responsibility for, the appropriate distribution of funds. The requestor would, however, require written evidence that its entire contribution was distributed according to the award eligibility criteria and calculation method. Fourth, requestor would monitor the efficacy of the incentive program and conduct periodic reviews, including periodic reviews of seizure data. Fifth, requestor would require the Counterparty to retain records of the distribution and receipt of funds for five years and allow requestor to inspect those records upon request. In addition to the above, requestor would also ensure that the Ministry of Justice in the African country was aware of the pilot program and that all aspects of the program were consistent with local laws.

The requestor stated in its request that its pending business in the African country was relatively small and "entirely unrelated" to the request. The requestor also stated that its future business in the country was not dependent upon the existence of the program and that the program was not intended to influence any foreign official to obtain or retain business. Finally, requestor stated that it intended to fund the program on an as-needed basis (and encourage its competitors to do so as well), provided that the program proved successful.

The DOJ granted requestor no-action relief subject to two "important caveats." First, as the language of the MOU and the proposed methodology for the selection of award recipients and distribution of funds was not provided to the DOJ, its opinion was not to be deemed an endorsement of either. The opinion was also not intended to opine on any possible expansion of the program within or outside the African country. Second, the Opinion did not apply to any

payments by requestor for purposes other than those expressed in the request, nor did it apply to any individuals involved in authorizing or distributing the monetary awards.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 06-02***

On December 31, 2006, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 06-02 in response to a request submitted by Company A, a wholly owned subsidiary of a U.S. issuer, Company B. One of Company A's foreign subsidiaries, known as Company C, sought to retain a law firm in the foreign country to assist it in obtaining required foreign exchange from an Agency of the country in which it operated. According to requestor (who had operational control over the prospective retention), although the Agency had promptly approved and processed Company C's applications for foreign exchange in the past, in the months prior to its request, approval from the Agency had been slow, unpredictable, and sometimes unforthcoming.

Noting that its applications had recently been rejected for minor reasons, Company C proposed retaining the law firm to prepare and perfect its Agency applications and represent Company C during the review process to avoid or diminish pretextual delays and denials by the Agency. Company C proposed paying the firm a "substantial" flat fee for preliminary and preparatory work and an ongoing "substantial" rate, representing approximately 0.6% of the value of the foreign exchange requested each month, once the firm's representation before the Agency began.

In granting no-action relief, the DOJ relied upon representations (described in more detail below), that include that: (i) no improper payment had been made or requested and the parties' agreement did not contemplate such activity; (ii) the firm and its principle attorney had a reputation for honest dealing and Company C performed due diligence on the firm; (iii) the parties agreed to implement anti-corruption measures; and (iv) the fees, although high, appeared competitive and reasonable under the circumstances.

The Release details a number of due diligence steps that requestor undertook in determining whether or not to hire the proposed law firm. The requestor examined the source of the firm — noting that the firm's principal attorney had been recommended on previous occasions to Company C by a firm with which it has a long-standing relationship and by a prominent criminal attorney. In addition, Company C has retained the principal attorney for the firm on other occasions and has been impressed with the quality of his representation. Finally, both the General Counsel of requestor and outside U.S. counsel interviewed the principal attorney and discussed, among other things, his understanding of the FCPA and ethical commitment to the engagement. Both found him to be professional and competent.

The proposed agreement between Company C and the law firm also contained several provisions aimed at minimizing the likelihood of an FCPA violation. The attorneys and third parties working on the matter were required to certify that they had not made and would not make improper payments and would comply with U.S. and other applicable law. In addition, employees of the firm and third parties working on the matter had to certify that they and their "parents, spouses, siblings and children" were not present or former government officials. The contract required that no payments be made that would violate the FCPA or other applicable law,

and it required the law firm to know and understand Company B's Government Relations policy. Further, the contract required weekly progress reports, including details on negotiations and a full account of payments, and allowed for Company C to audit the firm's records in connection with this engagement.

The Release also notes that the requestor reviewed the proposed fees and determined that they were reasonable. Among other things, (i) the labor-intensive nature of the work; (ii) the considerable time already devoted on the matter by the firm's principal attorney; (iii) the existence of competing bids by other firms that were substantially higher than the proposed firm's; and (iv) the customary nature of a flat fee (as opposed to hourly) within the foreign country, supported its conclusion as to the reasonableness of the fees.

Finally, the requestor made the following representations. First, that there had been no suggestion by anyone that improper payments were necessary to resolve the foreign exchange issue. Second, although the principal attorney for the firm was an advisor to the foreign country's central bank, his position as such had no bearing on the Agency's foreign exchange determinations. Third, the parties understood that the issue may not be resolved through hiring of the firm and that a successful resolution might not be achieved.

In granting its no-action relief, the DOJ cautioned that the Release should not be understood as an endorsement of the adequacy of the requestor's due diligence and anti-corruption measures "under facts and circumstances other than those described in the request."

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 07-01***

On July 24, 2007, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 07-01 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. company that was classified as both an "issuer" and a "domestic concern" under the FCPA. The requestor proposed paying for certain expenses for a six-person delegation from an Asian government for an "educational and promotional tour" of one of requestor's U.S. operations sites. The requestor's stated purpose for the tour was to demonstrate its operations and business capabilities to the delegation in hopes of participating in future operations in the foreign country similar to those that the requestor conducted in the United States.

The requestor represented that it did not conduct operations in the foreign country or with the foreign government at the time of the request. The delegation would consist of government officials working for "relevant foreign ministries" and one private government consultant. These delegates had been selected by the foreign government and not by requestor. In addition, to the requestor's knowledge, the delegates had no direct authority over decisions relating to potential contracts or licenses necessary for operating in the foreign country.

The requestor represented that the delegation's visit would last four days and be limited to a single operations site. It proposed paying for domestic economy class travel to the site as well as domestic lodging, local transport and meals for the delegates. (The foreign government would pay for the international travel.) All payments would be made directly to the service providers with no funds being paid directly to the foreign government or delegates. In addition,

requestor would not provide the delegates with a stipend or spending money, nor would it pay the expenses for any spouses, family members, or other guests of the delegation. Further, any souvenirs provided would be branded with requestor's name and/or logo and be of nominal value. Apart from meals and receptions connected to meetings, speakers, and events planned by requestor, it would not fund, organize or host any entertainment or leisure activities. Finally, requestor had obtained written assurance from legal counsel that its planned sponsorship of the delegation was not contrary to the law of the foreign country.

In providing no-action relief, the DOJ determined that the expenses were reasonable under the circumstances and were directly related to the promotion of requestor's products or services, therefore falling within the "promotional expenses" affirmative defense under the FCPA.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 07-02***

On September 11, 2007, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 07-02 in response to a request submitted by a U.S. insurance company, classified as a "domestic concern" under the FCPA. The requestor proposed paying for certain expenses for six junior to mid-level officials of a foreign government for an "educational program" at requestor's U.S. headquarters to "familiarize the officials with the operation of a United States insurance company." The requestor proposed that this program occur after the officials completed a six-week internship in the United States for foreign insurance regulators sponsored by the National Association for Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC").

According to the Release, requestor represented that it had no "non-routine" business pending before the foreign government agency that employed the six officials. In addition, requestor's routine business before the agency (which was apparently governed by administrative rules with identified standards) consisted of reporting operational statistics, reviewing the qualifications of additional agents, and on-site inspections of operations, all of which were "guided by administrative rules and identified standards." The requestor's only work with other foreign government entities consisted of collaboration on insurance-related research, studies, and training.

The requestor represented that the visit would last six days and that the officials would be selected solely by the foreign government, and further represented that it would not pay any expenses related to the six officials' travel to or from the United States or their participation in the NAIC internship program. The requestor proposed paying only those costs and expenses deemed "necessary and reasonable" to educate the visiting officials about the operation of a U.S. company within this industry, including domestic economy class air travel, domestic lodging, local transport, meals and incidental expenses and a "modest four-hour city sightseeing tour." All payments would be made directly to the providers and reimbursed expenses would be limited to a modest daily amount and would require a receipt. The requestor would not pay any expenses for spouses or family members and any souvenirs would be branded with requestor's name and/or logo and be of nominal value. Additionally, requestor would not fund, organize, or

host any entertainment or leisure activities, nor would requestor provide the officials with any stipend or spending money.

In providing no-action relief, the DOJ determined that the expenses were reasonable under the circumstances and were directly related to the promotion of requestor's products or services, therefore falling within the "promotional expenses" affirmative defense under the FCPA. In addition to its usual caveats about the Release applying only to the requestor and being based on the facts and circumstances as described, the DOJ also noted that it was not endorsing "the adequacy of the requestor's anti-corruption policies and procedures."

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 07-03***

On December 21, 2007, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 07-03 in response to a request submitted by a lawful permanent resident of the United States, classified as a "domestic concern" under the FCPA. The requestor was party to a legal dispute in an Asian country relating to the disposition of real and personal property in a deceased relative's estate. In connection with the dispute, requestor proposed making a payment of approximately \$9,000 to the clerk's office of the relevant family court to cover expenses related to the appointment of an estate administrator and other miscellaneous court costs. The requestor apparently did not make the payment out of concerns about its propriety under the FCPA, and she withdrew her application for an estate administrator pending a favorable opinion from the DOJ.

According to the Release, nothing in requestor's communications with the foreign court indicated any improper motives on behalf of the judge or court with respect to the payment. In addition, the requestor represented that the payment would be made to the family court clerk's office and not to the individual judge presiding over the dispute. The requestor provided to the DOJ a written legal opinion from a lawyer who had law degrees in both the United States and the foreign country, which stated that the request was not contrary to, and in fact was explicitly lawful under the law of the foreign country. The requestor further represented that she would request an official receipt, an accounting of how the funds were spent, and a refund of any remaining amount of the payment not spent in the proceedings. The requestor's submission was accompanied by translated versions of the applicable foreign law and regulation relating to family court proceedings.

Although it is not readily apparent from the Release how the proposed payment would do so, the DOJ assumed that the payments could be reasonably understood to relate to requestor's efforts "in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person" in order "to provide requestor with the guidance she seeks."

The DOJ identified two separate grounds on which to provide no-action relief to requestor. First, the requestor's payment would be made to a government entity (the family court clerk's office) and not to a foreign *official*. There was nothing in requestor's submission to suggest that the presiding judge or estate administrator (both of whom potentially could have been considered "officials" under the statute) would have personally benefited from the payment after it had been made to the court clerk's office. Second, consistent with one of the FCPA's affirmative defenses, requestor's payment appears to be "lawful under the written laws and

regulations” of the foreign country, at least as represented by the experienced attorney retained by requestor in the Asian country.

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 08-01***

On January 15, 2008, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 08-01, a detailed Release that contains complex factual circumstances involving FCPA and local regulatory issues. The Release highlights the importance of adequate due diligence, transparency and the need to comply with local law when entering into foreign transactions.

Release 08-01 addresses the potential acquisition by the requestor’s foreign subsidiary of a controlling interest in an entity responsible for managing certain public services for an unidentified foreign municipality. (The requestor is described as a Fortune 500 United States company with annual revenues of several billion dollars and operations in over 35 countries.) At the time of the proposed transaction, the public utility (the “Investment Target”) was majority-owned (56%) by a foreign governmental entity (“Foreign Government Owner”) and minority-owned (44%) by a foreign private company (“Foreign Company 1”). The foreign private company was owned and controlled by a foreign individual (“Foreign Private Company Owner”), who had substantial business experience in the municipality and with the public services provided by the Investment Target.

Both the Foreign Government Owner and Foreign Company 1 appointed representatives to the Investment Target. Foreign Private Company Owner acted as the representative and general manager on behalf of Foreign Company 1 while another individual served as the representative and general manager on behalf of the Foreign Government Owner. Because of the Foreign Government Owner’s majority stake, its representative was considered the legal representative and senior general manager for the Investment Target. Foreign Private Company Owner, by contrast, was not technically an employee of the Investment Target and received no compensation for serving as its general manager. The Release indicates that, nevertheless, the requestor considered the Foreign Private Company Owner a “foreign official” for purposes of the FCPA.

The Release indicates that sometime prior to November 2007, the Foreign Government Owner and governmental entity responsible for managing state-owned entities determined that they would fully privatize the Investment Target. Around November 2007, the public bid process for disposing of the Foreign Government Owner’s 56% interest in the company was initiated.

The requestor represented that, previously in late 2005, the Foreign Private Company Owner, who was searching for a foreign investor with relevant experience, contacted the requestor. In June 2006, the parties developed a proposed scenario whereby the Foreign Private Company Owner would seek to acquire, through a second foreign entity (“Foreign Company 2”), 100% of the Investment Target through the government auction of the majority stake. The requestor’s subsidiary would then purchase a controlling stake from Foreign Company 2 at a substantial premium over what the Foreign Private Company Owner paid for the Foreign Government Owner’s stake. The Release does not clearly indicate whether there were any

requirements regarding the privatization process — such as a citizenship requirement for purchasers — that would have prevented the requestor from acquiring the Foreign Government Owner's stake in the Investment Target directly.

In connection with the proposed transaction, the requestor performed due diligence to examine, among other things, potential FCPA risks. The requestor's due diligence included (i) a report by an investigative firm; (ii) screening the relevant individuals against the denied persons and terrorist watch lists; (iii) inquiries to U.S. Embassy officials; (iv) a forensic accounting review; (v) an initial due diligence report by outside counsel; and (vi) review of the due diligence report by a second law firm.

The requestor identified what it initially believed to be two FCPA-related risks that required resolution prior to consummating the transaction. First, the requestor believed that the Foreign Private Company Owner, by virtue of his position as manager of the majority government-owned Investment Target, was subject to certain foreign privatization regulations, which the requestor believed required disclosure of his ownership interests in Foreign Company 1 and Foreign Company 2 to the foreign government. Second, the requestor believed that the Foreign Private Company Owner was arguably prohibited from acting on a corporate opportunity relating to the Investment Target — such as realizing a purchase price premium for the Investment Target shares — unless disclosed to and approved by the Foreign Government Owner.

The requestor asked the Foreign Private Company Owner to make the necessary disclosures. Initially, the Foreign Private Company Owner refused, indicating that such disclosures were contrary to normal business practices in the foreign country and could result in competitive concerns, and the requestor abandoned the transaction. However, after approximately three weeks, the parties resumed discussions. Ultimately, through a series of discussions with relevant government officials and attorneys, the requestor learned that the foreign government took the position that the Foreign Private Company Owner was not subject to the foreign privatization regulations, as he was an unpaid, minority representative with the Investment Target. Further, the requestor informed these officials and attorneys of Foreign Private Company Owner's roles in both Foreign Company 1 and Foreign Company 2 and the substantial premium he would receive upon completion of the transaction. These agencies and officials informed the requestor that they were aware of these issues and had taken them into consideration in approving Foreign Company 2's bid.

In describing its willingness to proceed with the transaction, the requestor cited seven factors: (i) the Foreign Private Company Owner was purchasing the Investment Target shares without financial assistance from the requestor (which apparently would have been inconsistent with the foreign privatization law); (ii) the premium to be paid by the requestor was justified based on legitimate business considerations, including the apparently very different valuation methodologies used in the United States and the foreign country; (iii) the requestor would make no extra or unjustified payments to Foreign Company 2 from which the Foreign Private Company Owner might make improper payments to a foreign official; (iv) the requestor would make no payments to any foreign official (other than the Foreign Private Company Owner); (v)

Foreign Private Company Owner's status as a "foreign official," which resulted solely from the fact that the Investment Target was majority owned by the state, would soon cease; (vi) the Foreign Private Company Owner's purchase of the government stake was lawful under the foreign country's laws; and (vii) the Foreign Private Company Owner was not illegally or inappropriately pursuing a corporate opportunity belonging to the Investment Target by proceeding with the transaction.

In determining not to take an enforcement action based on the proposed transaction, the DOJ highlighted four factors:

- The requestor conducted "reasonable" due diligence of the Foreign Private Company Owner, focused on both FCPA risks and compliance with local laws and regulations. The DOJ also noted that the documentation of such diligence would be kept within the United States.
- The requestor required and obtained transparency relating to the significant premium that the Foreign Private Company Owner would realize from the sale of the formerly government-owned stake to the requestor.
- The requestor obtained from the Foreign Private Company Owner representations and warranties regarding past and future compliance with the FCPA and other relevant anti-corruption laws.
- The requestor retained the contractual right to discontinue the business relationship in the event of a breach by the Foreign Private Company Owner, including violations of relevant anti-corruption laws.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 08-02***

On June 13, 2008, the DOJ issued Opinion Release 08-02, which provided no-action comfort in connection with Halliburton's proposed purchase of the English oil-services company Expro International Group PLC ("Expro").<sup>36</sup> Expro, traded on the London Stock Exchange, provides well-flow management for the oil and gas industry. At the time of the Release, Halliburton was competing with a largely foreign investment group known as Umbrellastream to acquire Expro.

As described by Halliburton and assumed by the DOJ, U.K. legal restrictions governing the bidding process prevented Halliburton from performing complete due diligence into, among other things, Expro's potential FCPA exposure prior to the acquisition. According to the

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<sup>36</sup> In a break from typical Opinion Release practice, Halliburton is identified by name. Requestors often remain anonymous. Expro and other involved parties were not identified by name but were identifiable through context and publicly available sources.

Release, Halliburton had access to certain information provided by Expro, but its due diligence was limited to that information. Halliburton could have conditioned its bid on successful FCPA due diligence and pre-closing remediation. Umbrellastream's bid, however, contained no such conditions, meaning a conditioned Halliburton bid could have been rejected solely on the basis of such additional contingencies.

As a consequence of its perceived inability to conduct exacting pre-acquisition due diligence, Halliburton proposed that it conduct detailed post-acquisition due diligence coupled with extensive self-reporting through a staged process. It should be recognized that while proposed by Halliburton as part of its opinion procedure release request, it would be usual under the circumstances for Halliburton to have made its proposal after discussions with the DOJ to ensure as best as possible that its suggested work plan would be acceptable.

First, immediately following closing, Halliburton was to meet with the DOJ to disclose any pre-closing information that suggested that any FCPA, corruption, or related internal controls or accounting issues existed at Expro. In this regard, it should be noted that Halliburton claimed that its pre-existing confidentiality agreement with the target prohibited it from disclosing the potentially troublesome conduct that it uncovered through its due diligence process. In a footnote, the DOJ accepts the representation that Halliburton had to enter into a confidentiality agreement and therefore not disclose the findings of its limited due diligence review, but cautions companies seeking guidance on entering into agreements that limit the amount of information the company can disclose to the DOJ.

Second, within ten business days of the closing, Halliburton was to present to the DOJ a comprehensive, risk-based FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence work plan organized into high-risk, medium-risk, and low-risk elements. The work plan was to include each of the critical due diligence areas including: (i) use of agents and third parties; (ii) commercial dealings with state owned companies; (iii) joint venture, teaming and consortium arrangements; (iv) customs and immigration matters; (v) tax matters; and (vi) government licenses and permits. Such due diligence was to be conducted by external counsel and third-party consultants with assistance from internal resources as appropriate. A status report was to be provided to the DOJ with respect to high-risk findings within 90 days, medium-risk findings within 120 days, and low-risk findings within 180 days. All due diligence was to be concluded within one year with periodic reports to the DOJ throughout the process.

Third, agents and third parties with whom Halliburton was to have a continuing relationship were to sign new contracts with Halliburton incorporating FCPA and anti-corruption representations and warranties and providing for audit rights as soon as commercially reasonable. Agents and third parties with whom Halliburton determined not to have a continuing relationship were to be terminated as expeditiously as possible, particularly where FCPA or corruption-related problems were discovered.

Fourth, employees of the target company were to be made subject to Halliburton's Code of Business Conduct (including training related thereto) and those who were found to have acted

in violation of the FCPA or anti-corruption prohibitions would be subject to personnel action, including termination.

In light of its proposed plan of post-acquisition due diligence, Halliburton posed three questions to the DOJ. First, whether the proposed acquisition itself would violate the FCPA. Second, whether through the proposed acquisition, Halliburton would “inherit” any FCPA liabilities of Expro based on pre-acquisition unlawful conduct. Third, whether Halliburton would be held criminally liable for any post-acquisition unlawful conduct by Expro prior to Halliburton’s completion of its FCPA and anti-corruption due diligence, if such conduct were disclosed to the DOJ within 180 days of closing.

Based on Halliburton’s proposed plan (and assuming full compliance with it), the DOJ concluded that it did not intend to take enforcement action against Halliburton. The DOJ specifically noted that this representation did not extend to the target company or its personnel.

With regard to Halliburton’s first proposed question, the DOJ emphasized that because stock ownership of the target company was widely disbursed, it was not a case where the payment for the shares could be used in furtherance of earlier illegal acts of the target as distinguished from other situations previously identified by the DOJ. Previously, in Release 01-01, the DOJ noted the potential for inheriting liability by a non-U.S. joint venture partner for corrupt activities undertaken prior to that company’s entry into the joint venture. The U.S. requestor feared that, in entering into the joint venture, it might violate the FCPA should it later become apparent that one or more of the contracts contributed by the non-U.S. co-venturer was obtained or maintained through bribery. The DOJ provided no action comfort based on the requestor’s representation that it was not aware of any contributed contracts that were tainted by bribes. The Release cautioned without elaboration, however, that the requestor might “face liability under the FCPA if it or the joint venture knowingly take any action in furtherance of a payment to a foreign official with respect to previously existing contracts.”

Release 08-02 gives greater insight into what activities may or may not be deemed “in furtherance of” previous acts of bribery by an acquired company or joint venture partner. The Release conditionally absolves Halliburton of successor liability under the reasoning that the funds contributed through the purchase would overwhelmingly go to widely disbursed public shareholders, not Expro itself, and that there was no evidence that any Expro shareholders received their shares corruptly. Implicitly, the Release can be read to endorse the view that payments to shareholders who have received their shares corruptly would violate the FCPA.

The DOJ also determined that, in light of the restrictions placed on Halliburton in performing pre-acquisition due diligence, and the company’s commitment to implement extensive post-acquisition due diligence, remedial and reporting measures, that it did not intend to take enforcement action with regard to any FCPA liabilities Halliburton could be argued to have inherited by Expro based on pre-acquisition unlawful conduct or for post-acquisition unlawful conduct by Expro prior to Halliburton’s completion of its FCPA due diligence, if such conduct were disclosed to the DOJ within 180 days of closing.

Although the DOJ issued no-action relief, the Release is heavily qualified and contains significant expectations for Halliburton, were it to acquire Expro under the stated conditions. Above all else, the Release illustrates the critical need for due diligence. Although the circumstances made pre-acquisition due diligence impracticable due to the operation of non-U.S. law, the underlying message is that where such impediments do not exist, substantial and probing due diligence is expected. The DOJ also for the first time explicitly endorsed a program of post-acquisition due diligence, thereby bowing (albeit gently) to compelling commercial circumstances that would otherwise render a company subject to the FCPA uncompetitive. In doing so, the DOJ placed significant emphasis on conducting due diligence in all appropriate locations that includes (i) carefully calibrating risks (including the need for thorough examination of third-party and governmental relationships); (ii) an exacting review of broad categories of documents (including e-mail and financial and accounting records); (iii) the need for witness interviews not only of the target personnel but others; and (iv) the retention of outside counsel and other professionals working with internal resources as appropriate. As to the latter point, it can be speculated that the use of internal resources will be deemed appropriate only where such resources are qualified and free of disabling conflicts.

The DOJ also placed considerable emphasis on the need for remediation, including the need (i) to terminate problematic relationships (including with employees and third parties); (ii) to enter into new contractual relationships with enhanced compliance protocol (including new contracts that contain audit rights) as “soon as commercially reasonable”; and (iii) to conduct effective compliance training.

Finally, the Release contains broad self-reporting obligations to the DOJ in all risk categories. The self-reporting aspects of the due diligence program can be seen (with the due diligence itself) as a critical basis upon which the DOJ provided its no-action relief. In addition, the DOJ was careful to extend the benefits of self-reporting to the target company in the context of any enforcement action the DOJ might pursue against the target and its personnel following such disclosures. This could raise important issues with respect to the attorney-client privilege and work product protections that must therefore be considered at the outset in connection with any company that might find it necessary or desirable to engage in similar self-reporting.

On June 23, 2008, ten days after the Release, Expro accepted Umbrellastream’s bid, despite Halliburton’s offer of a higher price per share. On June 26, 2008, the British High Court rejected an argument by two hedge funds that controlled 21 percent of Expro shares that the bidding should have been turned over to an auction. On July 2, 2008, Expro announced that the acquisition by Umbrellastream had been completed.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 08-03***

On July 11, 2008, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 08-03 in response to a request submitted by TRACE International, Inc. (“TRACE”), a membership organization that specializes in anti-bribery initiatives around the world. TRACE, which is organized under the laws of the District of Columbia and therefore a “domestic concern” for the purpose of the FCPA, proposed paying for certain expenses for approximately twenty Chinese journalists in

connection with an anti-corruption press conference to be held in Shanghai. The journalists were employed by Chinese media outlets, most of which are wholly owned by the Chinese government, arguably making them “foreign officials” for purposes of the FCPA.

TRACE proposed paying slightly different travel expenses based on whether the journalist was based in Shanghai or traveling from outside of Shanghai. For those based within Shanghai, TRACE proposed providing them with a cash stipend of approximately \$28 to cover lunch, transportation costs, and incidental expenses. For journalists traveling from outside of Shanghai, TRACE proposed providing them with a cash stipend of approximately \$62 to cover lunch, local transportation costs, incidental expenses, and two additional meals. TRACE also planned on reimbursing the out-of-town journalists for economy-class travel expenses (by air, train, bus or taxi) upon the submission of a receipt, and pay for one night’s lodging at a hotel at a rate not to exceed \$229 per journalist, which TRACE would pay directly to the hotel. With respect to the cash stipends, TRACE noted that they would be provided openly to each journalist upon signing in at the conference.

In providing no-action relief, the DOJ determined that the expenses were reasonable under the circumstances, as they directly related to the promotion of TRACE’s products or services, and therefore fell within the “promotional expenses” affirmative defense under the FCPA. The DOJ noted, however, that despite the fact that such reimbursements may be commonplace, it placed no weight on that fact, which further confirms the view that commonality of a particular practice bears no weight on the appropriateness of that practice in the context of the FCPA.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 09-01***

On August 3, 2009, the DOJ published Opinion Procedure Release 09-01. The requestor, a “domestic concern” under the FCPA, is a manufacturer of medical devices that is attempting to enter into the market to sell its products to the government of a foreign country.

According to the Release, in or around March 2009, representatives of the requestor visited the foreign country to meet with a senior official (“Official”) of a government agency. The Official indicated that the government intended to provide a type of medical device to patients in need by purchasing the medical devices and reselling them to patients at a subsidized lower price. The Official explained that the government would only endorse products for the program that it had technically evaluated and approved and advised the requestor that its products would need to be evaluated.

The requestor was asked to provide sample devices to government health centers for evaluation. The foreign government and the requestor jointly determined that the optimal sample size for such a study was 100 units distributed among ten health centers as this number would ensure results free from anomalies that might result from a smaller sample size or sampling at a smaller number of centers. The requestor indicated that it would also provide accessories and follow-on support for the medical devices free of charge. The approximate total value of the devices and related items and services is \$1.9 million.

According to the Release, the evaluation of the devices will be based on objective criteria that were provided to the DOJ, and the results of the evaluation will be collected by the requestor's Country Manager, a physician, who will, along with two other medical experts, review the results and provide reports to a senior health official in the foreign country who will share his assessment with the Government Agency. The Government Agency will then evaluate the results and assessments to determine whether to endorse the device.

The foreign government has advised the requestor that none of the companies' devices will be promoted by the foreign government above any of the other qualified devices in the program, and the requestor indicated that it has no reason to believe that the Official who suggested providing the devices will personally benefit from the donations.

The DOJ provided no action comfort and noted that the proposed provision of medical devices and related items and services would "fall outside the scope of the FCPA" because the goods and services will be provided to the government health centers (selected by the requestor), as opposed to individual government officials, and the ultimate end-users will be determined based on the following criteria and limitations:

- The 100 recipients will be selected from a list of candidates provided by the medical centers. The centers will be expected to nominate candidates that best meet certain objective criteria, which requestor provided to the DOJ. All candidates will be required to present a certificate establishing their inability to pay.
- The 100 recipients will be selected from the list of candidates by a working group of health care professionals who are experienced in the use of this type of medical device. Requestor's Country Manager will participate in the working group, enabling the requestor to ensure that the selection criteria are met. According to the Release, the Country Manager had previously received FCPA training.
- The names of the recipients will be published on the Government Agency's web site for two weeks following the selection.
- Close family members (defined as "immediate relatives, as well as nieces, nephews, cousins, aunts, and uncles") of the Government Agency's officers or employees, working group members, or employees of the participating health centers will be ineligible to be recipients under the program unless:
  - The relatives hold low-level positions and are not in positions to influence either the selection or testing process;
  - The relatives clearly meet the requisite economic criteria; and
  - The recipient is determined to be a more suitable candidate than candidates who were not selected based on technical criteria.

- The Country Manager will review the selection of any immediate family members of any other government officials to ensure that the criteria were properly applied and will report his determination to the requestor's legal counsel.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 10-01***

On April 19, 2010, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 10-01. The Release arises out of an agreement between the U.S. government and a foreign country government, under which a U.S. government agency provides assistance to the foreign country. The requestor, a U.S. company, entered into a contract with the U.S. government agency to design, develop, and build an unnamed facility for the foreign country. Under the agreement, the requestor is also required to hire and compensate individuals in connection with the facility.

The foreign country notified the U.S. government agency that it had appointed an individual to be the Facility Director. The foreign country selected the candidate based on his or her qualifications, and the U.S. government agency subsequently directed the requestor to hire the selected person as the Facility Director. The requestor will pay the \$5,000 per month salary of the Facility Director, although indirectly through the in-country subsidiary of a subcontractor hired by the requestor to handle personnel staffing issues. The foreign country is expected to assume the obligation to compensate the Facility Director after the initial one-year period of employment.

The requestor approached the DOJ because the designated Facility Director is also a "Foreign Official" under the FCPA by virtue of his or her current position as a paid officer for an agency of the foreign country. As described in the release, the individual's position as a Foreign Official does not relate to the facility, and the services that he or she will provide as Facility Director are separate and apart from those performed as a Foreign Official. Additionally, in his or her positions both as Facility Director and Foreign Official, the person will not perform any services on behalf of, or make any decisions affecting, the Requestor, including any procurement or contracting decisions, and the Requestor will not provide any direction to the individual with respect to his or her position as Facility Director. Accordingly, the Foreign Official designated to become the Facility Director will have no decision-making authority over matters affecting the requestor.

In providing no-action relief, the DOJ highlighted several important facts relevant to its analysis of the request. The DOJ stressed that the Facility Director is being hired pursuant to a contractual agreement between a U.S. government agency and the foreign government, and that the Facility Director — although a Foreign Official under the FCPA — will not be in a position to influence any act or decision affecting the Requestor. The DOJ noted that pursuant to the agreement between the U.S. government agency and the foreign country, the requestor is obligated and bound to hire as the Facility Director this specific person, whom the requestor had no part in choosing, and who was chosen based on his or her personal qualifications for the job. Finally, the DOJ emphasized that the person's new job as Facility Director is separate and apart from his or her existing job as a Foreign Official, and that both jobs are truly independent of the requestor. The individual, in his or her capacities as both Foreign Official and Facility Director,

will not take any directions from the requestor, nor have any decision-making authority over matters affecting the requestor, including procurement and contracting decisions.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 10-02***

On July 16, 2010, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 10-02 in response to a request by a U.S.-based nonprofit microfinance institution (“MFI”) that provides loans and basic financial services to low-income entrepreneurs around the world who may otherwise lack access to loans or financial services. The requestor intended to convert all of its local operations to commercial entities licensed as financial institutions. One of these operations was a wholly owned subsidiary in a country in Eurasia (the “Eurasian Subsidiary”) that wished to transform itself from a limited liability company regulated by an agency of the Eurasian country (the “Regulating Agency”) into an entity that would permit it to apply for regulation by the Central Bank of the Eurasian country, with the ultimate goal of acquiring a license as a bank.

The Regulating Agency expressed concern that allowing the MFI to transition from “humanitarian” status to commercial status could result in grant funds and their proceeds either being withdrawn from the country or being used to benefit private investors. The Regulating Agency pressured the Eurasian Subsidiary to take steps to “localize” its grant capital to ensure that it remained in the Eurasian country. Specifically, the Regulating Agency insisted that the Eurasian Subsidiary make a grant to a local MFI in an amount equal to approximately 33 percent of the Eurasian Subsidiary’s original grant capital and provided a list of local MFIs from which to choose.

The requestor believed that compelled grants to an institution on a designated short list could raise red flags under the FCPA. The Eurasian Subsidiary undertook a three-stage due diligence process to vet the potential grant recipients and select the proposed grantee. First, it conducted an initial screening of six potential grant recipients by obtaining publicly available information and information from third-party sources. Based on this review, it ruled out three of the six MFI candidates as unqualified. Second, the Eurasian Subsidiary undertook due diligence on the remaining three potential grant recipients to learn about each organization’s ownership, management structure and operations. This review involved requesting and reviewing key operating and assessment documents for each organization, as well as conducting interviews with representatives of each MFI. The Eurasian Subsidiary eliminated one organization for conflict of interest concerns, and another after the discovery of a previously undisclosed ownership change in the entity. Third, the Eurasian Subsidiary undertook targeted due diligence on the remaining potential grant recipient, the Local MFI. This diligence was designed to identify any ties to specific government officials, determine whether the organization had faced any criminal prosecutions or investigations, and assess the organization’s reputation for integrity.

The third round of due diligence revealed that one of the board members of both the Local MFI and the Local MFI’s Parent Organization was a sitting government official in the Eurasian country and that other board members are former government officials. The DOJ noted, however, that the sitting government official serves in a capacity that is completely unrelated to the micro financing industry, and, under the law of the Eurasian country, sitting

government officials may not be compensated for this type of board service. Further, the Local MFI confirmed that neither its own board members nor the board members of the Local MFI's Parent Organization receive compensation for their board service.

The requestor indicated that the Proposed Grant would be governed by a written grant agreement with the recipient and be subject to numerous controls. First, the Eurasian Subsidiary would pay the grant funds in eight quarterly installments, in order to allow interim monitoring and to assist the Local MFI in effectively managing the inflow of capital. Each successive installment would be retained by the Eurasian Subsidiary until the satisfactory completion of a quarterly monitoring review and/or semi-annual audit. Second, each quarter, the Local MFI's use of grant funds would be reviewed by an independent monitor. In addition, every six months, the Local MFI's use of the donated funds would be audited by an accounting firm selected by the Eurasian Subsidiary. The monitoring and audits would continue for three years beyond the disbursement of the final installment of loan capital. Third, a portion of the grant funds would be dedicated to capacity-building to help the Local MFI develop the organizational infrastructure needed to make effective use of the new loan capital. Fourth, as discussed, the grant agreement would expressly prohibit the Local MFI from transferring any of the grant funds to the Local MFI's Parent Organization or otherwise using the grant funds to compensate board members of either the Local MFI or the Local MFI's Parent Organization.

Finally, the grant agreement would include a series of anti-bribery compliance provisions, including provisions: (i) prohibiting the Local MFI from paying bribes or giving anything else of value to benefit government officials personally; (ii) requiring the Local MFI to keep and maintain accurate financial records and to provide the Eurasian Subsidiary's representatives access to its books; (iii) requiring the Local MFI to adopt a written anti-corruption compliance policy; (iv) requiring the Local MFI to certify its compliance with these obligations upon request by the Eurasian Subsidiary; (v) prohibiting the Local MFI from undergoing a change in ownership or control, upon penalty of forfeiting the grant; and (vi) permitting the Eurasian Subsidiary to terminate the agreement and recall the grant funds if it obtains evidence that reasonably suggests a breach of the compliance provisions.

The DOJ provided no action comfort and stated that, based on the due diligence performed and the controls in place, "it appears unlikely that the payment will result in the corrupt giving of something of value to [government] officials." The Release further states that, "the Requestor has done appropriate due diligence and ... the controls that it plans to institute are sufficient to prevent FCPA violations."

The Release is notable in that it expressly relies on three previous Releases (95-01, 97-02, and 06-01) dealing with charitable grants and bases its approval of the Requestor's due diligence in part on its completion of the due diligence steps outlined in those prior Releases. In doing so, the Release further clarifies what due diligence the DOJ expects in such situations, including: (i) FCPA certifications by the recipient; (ii) due diligence to confirm recipients' officers are not affiliated with the foreign government; (iii) the provision of audited financial statements; (iv) a written agreement with the recipient restricting the use of funds; (v) steps to ensure the funds are

transferred to a valid bank account; (vi) confirmation that contemplated activities had taken place before funds were disbursed; and (vii) ongoing monitoring of the program.

The Release is also notable because it expressly states that the Eurasian Subsidiary's Proposed Grant to the Local MFI "is for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business (nonprofit business, to be followed by for-profit business) in the Eurasian country; that is, the Proposed Grant would be made as a condition precedent to obtaining a license to operate as a financial institution." This suggests the DOJ may, in appropriate circumstances, view payments made by non-profit organizations engaged in charitable or humanitarian work as payments to "obtain or retain business" under the FCPA.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 10-03***

On September 1, 2010, the DOJ released Review Procedure Release 10-03 in response to a request from a limited partnership established under U.S. law and headquartered in the United States. The requestor planned to engage a consultant and its sole owner (collectively, the "Consultant") to assist with the requestor's attempt to obtain business from a foreign government. The Consultant was a U.S. partnership and its owner was a U.S. citizen.

The requestor developed natural resource infrastructure and sought to enter into discussions with the foreign government about a particularly novel initiative. It felt that it required the assistance of an agent in order to break through a market dominated by established companies and gain the necessary audience with the foreign government.

The complicating factor was the Consultant's past and present representation of that same foreign government and a number of its ministries in unrelated matters. The Consultant held contracts to represent the foreign government and act on its behalf, including performing marketing on behalf of the Ministry of Finance and lobbying efforts in the United States. It was a registered agent of the foreign government pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. § 611, *et seq.*, and it had previously represented ministries of the foreign government that would play a role in discussions of the Requestor's initiative.

The requestor represented that the Consultant had taken steps to wall off employees who would work on the contemplated representation from those working on the various representations of the foreign government or its ministries, and that the Consultant would provide, at the requestor's insistence, full disclosure of the representation to the relevant parties. The requestor had also confirmed the legality of the Consultant representing both it and the foreign government under local law and had secured from the Consultant contractual obligations to limit further representation of the foreign government for the duration of the consultancy.

At issue was whether the Consultant would be considered a "foreign official" for the purposes of the FCPA. The DOJ indicated that the answer depended on the circumstances of the engagement. The DOJ emphasized that the FCPA defines the term "foreign official" as "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international organization, *or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government* or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on

behalf of any such public international organization.” 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (emphasis supplied by DOJ). Thus, where the Consultant had acted or would act *on behalf of* the foreign government (in its capacity as an agent of that government), the Consultant likely would be deemed a “foreign official” for the purposes of the FCPA. However, where the Consultant was not acting *on behalf of* the foreign government, it likely would not fall within that definition.

In this particular case, the DOJ indicated that the steps taken by the requestor were sufficient to ensure that the Consultant would not be acting on behalf of the foreign government for the purposes of the consultancy and therefore it would not be deemed a “foreign official” in that context. As a result, the DOJ would not take enforcement action based solely on payments to the Consultant. The DOJ cautioned the requestor, however, that while the Consultant would not be deemed a “foreign official” for FCPA purposes under the circumstances described, the proposed relationship increased the risk of potential FCPA violations, and the Review Procedure Release did not foreclose the DOJ from taking enforcement action should an FCPA violation occur during the consultancy.

Release 10-03 is particularly noteworthy for several reasons. First, it reemphasized that the definition of “foreign official” under the FCPA is independent of — and almost always broader than — the definitions of similar terms in the local laws of foreign countries. In the present case, it did not matter that the Requestor had represented that as a matter of local law, the Consultant’s owner and its employees were not employees or otherwise officials of the foreign government. As the DOJ pointed out, the FCPA’s definition of “foreign official” is broader than persons formally designated by the foreign government as employees or officials and might have captured the Consultant in different circumstances.

Second, it makes clear that the definition of “foreign official” is, at times, conduct-specific. The DOJ indicated that when an individual is deemed to be a “foreign official” by virtue of acting on behalf of a foreign government, that classification attaches only in certain circumstances, *i.e.* when that individual is actually acting in that capacity and not necessarily when he is acting in other capacities.

Third, it is an example of the DOJ extending an analytical framework that it previously applied to one category of cases to another category of cases and underscores the influential — if not precedential — value of previous guidance to future circumstances. The DOJ cited, and appeared to draw support for its determination in this case from, a number of previous releases wherein the DOJ stated its lack of enforcement intent relating to various proposals to hire *employees and officials* of foreign governments. In those cases, the DOJ stated that it looked to determine whether there were any indicia of corrupt intent, whether the arrangement was transparent to the foreign government and the general public, whether the arrangement was in conformity with local law, and whether there were safeguards to prevent the foreign official from improperly using his or her position to steer business to or otherwise assist the company, for example through a policy of recusal. That analytical framework is the same or similar to the one applied in the present release, even though here the DOJ was addressing a slightly different category, *i.e.* individuals who in certain circumstances might be deemed a “foreign official” because they were acting *on behalf of* a foreign government in those circumstances.

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***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 11-01***

On June 30, 2011, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 11-01 in response to a request submitted by an adoption service provider that facilitates foreign adoptions. The requestor, a domestic concern, proposed to pay the expenses for a trip to the United States by one official from each of two foreign government agencies to educate the officials about the operations and services of U.S. adoption service providers.

The requestor made several representations that are now a common refrain in similar requests for DOJ advisory opinions. The requestor represented that it had no “non-routine business” (such as licensing or accreditation) before the relevant foreign government agencies and that the respective agencies — not the requestor — would select which officials would travel. The requestor would pay all costs directly to the service providers and that costs and expenses would be only those necessary and reasonable to educate the visiting officials about the operations and services of U.S. adoption service providers. The requestor represented that any gifts would be nominal in value and reflect the requestor’s business and/or logo and that it would not host officials’ spouses or family members. The requestor also represented that its routine business with the relevant foreign government agencies is guided by international treaty and administrative rules with defined standards, and that it had invited another adoption service provider to participate in the visit. The DOJ determined that the proposed expenses were reasonable under the circumstances and directly related to promotion of the requestor’s services.

Similar sponsorship of trips to familiarize foreign officials with the requestors’ business operations, in which requestors made substantially similar representations, were approved under Opinion Procedure Releases 07-01 and 07-02. The fact that the requestor sought guidance for a relatively straightforward set of circumstances may reflect heightened FCPA compliance sensitivity even among smaller entities conducting international operations. Although the DOJ expressly disavows that its opinion procedure releases (including 11-01) carry precedential value, Opinion Procedure Release 11-01 is noteworthy in that it specifically cited to Opinion Procedure Releases 07-01 and 07-02 as “instances, with appropriate protections, [in which] the Department . . . recently issued favorable Opinion Releases with respect to sponsoring travel and related expenses for foreign officials . . . .”

***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 12-01***

On September 18, 2012, the DOJ released Opinion Procedure Release No. 12-01, which addressed a request by a U.S. lobbying firm (“Requestor”) seeking to engage a third-party consulting company (“Consulting Company”) to assist with potential lobbying activities that the Requestor wished to provide to the Embassy and Ministry of a particular Foreign Country.

The Requestor hoped to provide lobbying services and strategic advice to the Embassy of a Foreign Country, including in connection with monitoring the activities of Congress and the U.S. government relevant to that country, to improve the image and visibility of the Foreign Country within the United States. In connection with these activities, the Requestor proposed to engage the Consulting Company to provide introductions to Embassy personnel, advise on

cultural issues, serve as the Requestor's sponsor (as is required by the law of the foreign country), help the Requestor form an office, and identify potential business opportunities.

The request stemmed from the fact that one of the three partners of the Consulting Company was a member of the Foreign Country's royal family. The DOJ therefore addressed two issues: (1) whether the Royal Family Member was a "foreign official" under the FCPA; and (2) whether Requestor's engagement of the Consulting Company would prompt an enforcement action.

- Royal Family Members Are Not Foreign Officials Per Se

In the Release, the DOJ noted that it had never before directly addressed the precise question of whether a member of a royal family qualified as a "foreign official" for purposes of the FCPA. In addressing the issue, the DOJ concluded that a "person's mere membership in the royal family of the Foreign Country, by itself, does not automatically qualify that person as a 'foreign official.'"

Instead, the Release provided that the question of who constitutes a "foreign official" requires a "fact-intensive, case-by-case determination." In particular, the DOJ looked to at least one other Opinion Procedure Release (No. 10-03) as well as discussion contained in the District Court decision *United States v. Carson, et al.*, which arose from the federal government's prosecution of individuals associated with Control Components, Inc. In *Carson*, for example, the court was asked to assess whether a particular state-owned entity should be considered an "instrumentality" of a foreign government and did so by examining factors such as (i) the foreign state's characterization of the entity and its employees; (ii) the foreign state's degree of control over the entity; (iii) the purpose of the entity's activities; (iv) the entity's obligations and privileges under foreign law; (v) the circumstances surrounding the entity's creation; and (vi) the foreign state's extent of ownership in or financial support of the entity.

Based on the Release, the DOJ confirms that the *Carson* analysis applies to individuals as well, and that the relevant inquiry turns on the amount of control or influence that a particular individual has over governmental functions and how the individual is characterized by the government, as well as whether (and under what circumstances) the individual acts on the government's behalf. The DOJ indicates that the determination will hinge upon factors such as:

- The structure and distribution of power within a country's government;
- A royal family's current and historical legal status and powers;
- The individual's position within the royal family;
- An individual's present and past positions within the government;
- The mechanisms by which an individual could come to hold a position with governmental authority or responsibilities (such as royal succession);

- The likelihood that an individual would come to hold such a position; and
- An individual's ability, directly or indirectly, to affect governmental decision-making

With respect to the proposed engagement, the DOJ noted that the Royal Family Member “holds no title or position in the government, has no governmental duties or responsibilities, is a member of the royal family through custom and tradition rather than blood relation, and has no benefits or privileges because of his status.” The Release also noted that the Royal Family Member held only one governmental position throughout his career during the late 1990s, when he oversaw a governmental construction project. The Royal Family Member had never served in any capacity for the Foreign Country and was not in a position to ascend to any governmental post in the future. The DOJ also noted that the Royal Family Member has previously served as the legally required sponsor to other companies operating in the Foreign Country, and in doing so had acted on behalf of those companies only in his personal capacity rather than as a representative of the Foreign Country.

Based on its review of the above factors, the DOJ determined that the Royal Family Member was not a “foreign official” for purposes of the FCPA, so long as he did not hold himself out as acting on behalf, or in his capacity as a member, of the royal family.

- *The DOJ Provides No-Action Comfort But Cautions Against Improper Payments*

The DOJ further assessed whether the proposed engagement of the Consulting Company (and therefore the Royal Family Member) by the Requestor would be grounds for an enforcement action. The Release indicates that the Consulting Company was proposed to help introduce the Requestor to the Foreign Embassy, provide advice on cultural and policy-related issues concerning the Foreign Country, and make selected introductions and liaisons as requested. Under a separate agreement, the Consulting Company would also identify business development opportunities for the Requestor in the Foreign Country. The draft agreement between the Requestor and the Consulting Company contained FCPA representations and warranties and the Consulting Company agreed that all of its partners and employees would be bound by the procedures set forth in the OECD's Good Practice Guidance on Internal Controls, Ethics and Compliance.

In proposing to engage the Consulting Company, the Requestor represented that the relationship between it and the Consulting Company would be treated with complete transparency, including by referencing the Consulting Company's and the Royal Family Member's name in the retainer agreement between the Requestor and the Foreign Embassy. The Requestor and the Consulting Company would also determine transparently a fee amount that accurately reflected the amount of work provided by the Consulting Company (estimated to be approximately \$6,000 per month), equally divided between the three partners of the Consulting Company. The Requestor represented that this fee was less than or comparable to the fee amount charged by other entities - including the Requestor itself - to provide similar services.

Based on these factors, as well as the fact that the Royal Family Member did not have familial, professional or personal relationships with the key decision makers of the Foreign

Embassy (*i.e.*, the Ambassador and the Foreign Minister), the DOJ stated that it would not take enforcement action against the Requestor for the proposed relationship.

Notably, however, the DOJ did not preclude itself from taking action in the future should the relationship in practice involve conduct that could violate the FCPA. In particular, the DOJ noted that the FCPA also prohibited improper payments to foreign officials through third parties and emphasized that this could serve as a potential basis for liability should the Requestor and the Consulting Company behave inappropriately.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 12-02***

On October 18, 2012, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 12-02. The Release is another in a series of Releases, several of which are directly cited in Release 12-02, relating to the provision of travel expenses to government officials. In this case, the requestors were 19 non-profit adoption agencies based in the United States that sought to host 18 government officials of varying ranks and responsibilities during a four-day trip to the United States. The requestors indicated that the purpose of the trip was to demonstrate their work to the government officials, each of whom had responsibilities or authority that extended or could extend to adoption-related matters, including two members of the national legislature, so that the officials could review how children adopted from their country have adjusted to life in the United States and to facilitate proper communication between the requestors and the relevant government agencies during the adoption process. During the trip, the officials would interview the requestors' staff, meet with families, and review the requestors' files.

Among the relevant conditions placed on the travel expenditures by the requestors were the provision only of economy class airfare for all but certain senior officials, who received business class airfare on international flights, and lodging and meals that would not exceed General Services Administration rates. The requestors represented that any entertainment provided would be of nominal cost and involve families of adopted children, no per diems or spending money would be provided, no expenses would be paid for family members, any souvenirs would be of nominal value and include a requestor's logo, and the requestors would not themselves select the particular government officials who would travel. Further they represented that they would pay no additional money to the officials' government or any other entity in connection with the trip.

The DOJ determined that, as presented, the expenditures would fall under the FCPA's affirmative defense for reasonable and bona fide expenditures related to the promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 13-01***

On December 19, 2013, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 13-01 to address the payment of medical expenses to a non-U.S. government official's family member on humanitarian grounds. According to the release, a partner in a U.S. law firm sought to pay the medical expenses for the daughter of a government official who worked in the Office of the Attorney General ("OAG") of another country.

The partner had stated that he had become personal friends with the OAG official, whose daughter was suffering from a severe illness that could not be effectively treated in his home country. The partner proposed to pay between \$13,500 and \$20,500 for medical treatment in another country, as the OAG official lacked the financial means to pay for treatment overseas himself. The requestor further represented that the payment would be made directly to the medical facility using his personal funds, and that both he and the OAG official had discussed the matter transparently with their respective employers, neither of whom had any objections.

The partner and other attorneys with the law firm actively represented the country on several matters, and the OAG was the entity responsible for selecting and contracting with international counsel on behalf of the government. The partner stated, however, that he was not the law firm's lead attorney for the country, and that the OAG official had not had and would not have any role, influence on, or involvement in the hiring of international legal counsel by the OAG or otherwise (which the OAG official confirmed in a certified letter). The partner stated that the country's laws required the OAG to publish a reasoned decision justifying the engagement of international counsel, and that any corrupt behavior by government officials in connection with public contracting is punishable by imprisonment.

The OAG also provided a certified letter stating that (i) the decision to pay or not to pay for the medical treatment would not have any impact on current or future decisions of the OAG in hiring international legal counsel; (ii) under the circumstances the payment would not violate local laws; and (iii) the OAG official had not and would not take part in any decisions regarding the retention of the law firm.

In addressing what it described as a matter of first impression, the DOJ cited OPR 10-3 in noting that "the FCPA does not per se prohibit business relationships with, or payments to foreign officials." The DOJ stated that the relevant inquiry regarding such payments is "whether there are any indicia of corrupt intent, whether the arrangement is in conformity with local law, and whether there are safeguards to prevent the foreign official from improperly using his or her position to steer business or to otherwise assist the company, for example through a policy of recusal." Notably, the DOJ added that it had previously expressed its "lack of enforcement intent in matters where the requestor provided adequate assurances that the proposed benefit to the foreign official would have no impact on the requestor's present or future business operations."

The DOJ noted that the payment of medical expenses for a government official's family member could violate the FCPA under certain circumstances, but it found that the present facts suggested an absence of corrupt intent. The DOJ provided the partner with no-action comfort in light of the adequate assurances that he had taken, as discussed above, to ensure that the proposed benefit to the OAG official's daughter would not have any impact on his or his firm's present or future business with the country.

#### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 14-01***

On March 17, 2014, the DOJ issued Opinion Procedure Release 14-01 regarding a U.S. financial services company and investment bank that sought to purchase the remaining shares of

its majority-owned non-U.S. subsidiary company. At the time of the request, the minority shares of the subsidiary were owned by a shareholder who had served as its Chairman and CEO, but who had recently been appointed to serve as a high-level public official at the country's central and banking agency. Given his new status as a "foreign official" under the FCPA, the bank sought the DOJ's guidance on the proposed transaction.

The bank noted that the proposed purchase price for the shares deviated from the value contemplated by the original 2007 Shareholders Agreement, explaining that the price calculation formula therein would have provided that the shares had no value in light of operating losses that the subsidiary incurred as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008. The bank stated that this "was not the commercial intention of the parties, as the shares have substantial value," and noted any attempt to enforce the 2007 valuation formula would likely lead to unfavorable consequences, such as litigation or sale of the shares to another third party. The parties therefore engaged a highly regarded global accounting firm to determine an independent and binding fair market value of the shares instead.

In responding to the bank, the DOJ noted that it "typically looks to determine [i] whether there are any indicia of corrupt intent, [ii] whether the arrangement is transparent to the foreign government and the general public, [iii] whether the arrangement is in conformity with local law, and [iv] whether there are safeguards to prevent the foreign official from improperly using his or her position to steer business to or otherwise assist the company, for example through a policy of recusal."

The DOJ stated that it found no indicia of corrupt intent, as the proffered purpose of the payment was to sever the parties' existing financial relationship, which began before the Shareholder held an official position. Given the justification provided, the DOJ stated that the alternative valuation appeared reasonable, and that engagement of an independent global accounting firm provided additional assurance that the payment reflected a fair market value rather than an attempt to overpay the Shareholder for any corrupt purpose. The shareholder had also signed a written warranty that the buyout payments were in consideration of the value of his shares only, and that they would not represent consideration for any present or future action.

With regard to the second and third factors, the DOJ noted that (i) the minority shareholder had disclosed his ownership interest and the proposed sale to the relevant government authorities (who had no objection to the proposed transaction), (ii) the bank obtained a local legal opinion confirming the legality of the buyout, and (iii) the bank would obtain multiple approvals that would be sought from both U.S. and non-U.S. agencies and regulators.

With respect to the fourth factor, the DOJ cited and discussed OPR 00-01, in which it had previously discussed the severance of an existing business relationship with an individual who became a government official. In that release, the DOJ had "highlighted the very strict recusal and conflict-of-interest-avoidance measures that were put in place . . . to prevent [the new government official] from assisting the requestor in obtaining or retaining business." The DOJ noted that the bank had represented that it would implement measures in light of the facts that the soon-to-be-former minority shareholder (i) ceased to have any role or function at the

subsidiary, other than as a passive shareholder since his appointment to the government, (ii) had recused himself from any decision concerning the award of business to the bank or its affiliates, (iii) would not be involved in any supervisory or regulatory matters regarding the bank, and (iv) would recuse himself from post-buyout involvement in any of bank's business that was "under negotiation, proposed, or anticipated at the time of, or prior to" the buyout ("Prior Business").

The bank further warranted that it would seek to identify all Prior Business and take reasonable steps to avoid contact with the soon-to-be former shareholder in those circumstances. To this end, the subsidiary circulated written instructions to its senior employees explaining the minority shareholder was "prohibited from participating in any discussion, consideration, or decision, or otherwise influencing any decision related to the award of business" to the bank's companies.

### ***DOJ Opinion Procedure Release 14-02***

On November 7, 2014, the DOJ issued an Opinion Procedure Release confirming that an issuer's acquisition of a non-U.S. company not previously subject to the FCPA's jurisdiction would not retroactively create FCPA liability for the acquiring issuer. The guidance was issued in response to a request from a U.S. consumer products company that had discovered a number of potentially improper payments during the due diligence of a non-U.S. company that it hoped to acquire. The requestor's pre-acquisition due diligence had revealed a number of problematic issues, including a number of improper payments to government officials in the form of gifts, charitable contributions, and sponsorships.

The DOJ conceded that, assuming the truth of the Requestor's representations, it did not have jurisdiction over the target company, given in particular that (i) the target company has negligible business contacts with the United States, (ii) none of the payments were made in the United States or through a U.S. person or issuer, and (iii) the Requestor would not gain any financial benefit from the contracts that had been determined to have been potentially obtained through bribery, as they would have all concluded prior to the acquisition.

The DOJ stated again, however, that it encouraged companies engaging in mergers and acquisitions to take a number of mitigating steps, including (i) conducting thorough risk-based due diligence, (ii) implementing the company's anti-corruption compliance program as quickly as possible, (iii) conducting anti-corruption compliance training, (iv) conducting an FCPA-specific audit, and (v) disclosing any corrupt payments discovered during the due diligence process. The DOJ stated that, in situations where it possessed jurisdiction, a company's adherence to these factors may determine whether and how it seeks to impose liability in case of violations.

**ANTI-CORRUPTION AND INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS PRACTICE GROUP**

Kevin T. Abikoff  
(202) 721-4770  
[kevin.abikoff@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:kevin.abikoff@hugheshubbard.com)

F. Amanda DeBusk  
(202) 721-4790  
[amanda.debusk@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:amanda.debusk@hugheshubbard.com)

Marc Henry  
+33 (0)1 44-05-80-34  
[marc.henry@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:marc.henry@hugheshubbard.com)

Elizabeth Prewitt  
(212) 837-6551  
[elizabeth.prewitt@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:elizabeth.prewitt@hugheshubbard.com)

Nicolas Swerdloff  
(305) 379-5571  
[nicolas.swerdloff@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:nicolas.swerdloff@hugheshubbard.com)

John F. Wood  
(202) 721-4720  
[john.wood@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:john.wood@hugheshubbard.com)

Michael R. Silverman  
(202) 721-4773  
[michael.silverman@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:michael.silverman@hugheshubbard.com)

Benjamin S. Britz  
(202) 721-4772  
[benjamin.britz@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:benjamin.britz@hugheshubbard.com)

Michael A. DeBernardis  
(202) 721-4678  
[michael.debernardis@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:michael.debernardis@hugheshubbard.com)

Anne Hukkelaas Gaustad  
+33 (0)1 44 05 80 57  
[anne.gaustad@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:anne.gaustad@hugheshubbard.com)

Robert Kolick  
(212) 837-6785  
[robert.kolick@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:robert.kolick@hugheshubbard.com)

Michael Lignos  
(212) 837-6730  
[michael.lignos@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:michael.lignos@hugheshubbard.com)

Marie-Agnes Nicolas  
+33 (0)1 44 05 80 23  
[marieagnes.nicolas@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:marieagnes.nicolas@hugheshubbard.com)

Felipe Rocha Dos Santos  
(202) 721-4622  
[felipe.rochadossantos@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:felipe.rochadossantos@hugheshubbard.com)

Julia L. Szybala  
(202) 721-4746  
[julia.szybala@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:julia.szybala@hugheshubbard.com)

Derek J. T. Adler  
(212) 837-6086  
[derek.adler@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:derek.adler@hugheshubbard.com)

Beatrice A. Hamza Bassey  
(212) 837-6778  
[beatrice.hamza.bassey@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:beatrice.hamza.bassey@hugheshubbard.com)

Edward J.M. Little  
(212) 837-6400  
[edward.little@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:edward.little@hugheshubbard.com)

Bryan J. Sillaman  
+33 (0)1 44-05-80-03  
[bryan.sillaman@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:bryan.sillaman@hugheshubbard.com)

Marc A. Weinstein  
(212) 837-6460  
[marc.weinstein@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:marc.weinstein@hugheshubbard.com)

Lisa Cahill  
(212) 837-6155  
[lisa.cahill@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:lisa.cahill@hugheshubbard.com)

Ya'ara Barnoon  
(202) 721-4637  
[yaara.barnoon@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:yaara.barnoon@hugheshubbard.com)

Kyden Creekpaum  
+33 (0)1 44-05-76-15  
[kyden.creekpaum@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:kyden.creekpaum@hugheshubbard.com)

Jan Dunin-Wasowicz  
(202) 721-4716  
[jan.dunin-wasowicz@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:jan.dunin-wasowicz@hugheshubbard.com)

Michael H. Huneke  
(202) 721-4714  
[michael.huneke@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:michael.huneke@hugheshubbard.com)

Tamara Kraljic  
(202) 721-4667  
[tamara.kraljic@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:tamara.kraljic@hugheshubbard.com)

Daniel McLaughlin  
+33 (0)1 44-05-76-18  
[daniel.mclaughlin@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:daniel.mclaughlin@hugheshubbard.com)

N. Tien Pham  
(202) 721-4736  
[tien.pham@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:tien.pham@hugheshubbard.com)

Cara Rosen  
(202) 721-4783  
[cara.rosen@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:cara.rosen@hugheshubbard.com)

Jonathan Zygielbaum  
(202) 721-4763  
[jonathan.zygielbaum@hugheshubbard.com](mailto:jonathan.zygielbaum@hugheshubbard.com)

[hugheshubbard.com](http://hugheshubbard.com)